Operation Cartwheel

Crossing the Straits

Battle of Saidor

by James Miller, jr.

The first two DEXTERITY operations faced toward Rabaul, and as events later showed had much less effect on the course of the war than the other CARTWHEEL operations. But in December 1943 General MacArthur reversed his field and decided to exploit the tactical successes at Arawe and Cape Gloucester by moving West to seize Saidor, on the north coast of the Huon Peninsula. (See Map 12.) General Chamberlin had suggested Saidor in September, but it was 11 December before an outline plan Was prepared. (This section is based on Craven and Cate, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, PP. 345-49; Morison, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, PP. 389-91; Off of Chief Engy, GHQ AFPAC, Engineers in Theater Operations, pp. 118-19, and C7itique, pp. 112-32; Smith, The Approach to the Philippines, PP. 90-93; ALAMO Force Rpt, DEXTERITY Opn; ALAMO Force G-3 Jul, MICHAELMAS Opn, DEXTERITY; MICHAELMAS TF [126th RCT, reinforced], Rpt Of MICHAELMAS Opn, 16 Dec 43-10 Feb 44; MICHAELMAS TF Opn Diary; CTF 76 Opn Plan 4-43, 29 Dec 43; CTF Rpt of Saidor Opn, 3 Feb 44; GHQ SWPA Outline Plan Saidor, 10 Dec 43, in ALAMO Force G-3 Jn1 DEXTERITY No. 8; Memo, CAW [Gen Willoughby] for CON GHQ SWPA, 21 Dec 43, no sub, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 21 Dec 43; GHQ Ltr of Instns to Comdrs ALAmo Force, ANF, AAF, NGF, and USASOS, 17 Dec 43, sub: MICHAELMAS Opn, and GHQ SWPA 01 38/19, 31 Dec 43, both in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 22 Dec 43; ALF, Rpt on New Guinea Opns: 4 Sep 43-26 Apr 44; 8th Area Army Operations, Japanese Monogr No. 110 (OCMH), pp. 86-91; 18th Army Operations, II, Japanese Monogr No. 42 (OCMH), 125-80.)

Saidor lay slightly northeast of Mounts Gladstone and Disraeli, Which glower at each other from their 11,000-foot eminences. It had a prewar airstrip, and had been used as a barge staging point by the japanese. Lying 110 nautical miles from Finschhafen, 52 from Madang, and 414 from Rabaul, it Was Well Situated to support the advance Westward toward the Vogelkop and the move northward against the Admiralties. In addition Allied seizure would cut the 18th Army in two, for that army's main concentrations were at Madang-Wewak to the west, and at Sio-Gali to the east.

Preparations and Plans

The invasion of Saidor Was not actually decided on until 17 December, two days after the invasion of Arawe and nine days before the invasion of Cape Gloucester. On that date General MacArthur ordered Krueger to prepare plans at once for an operation from Goodenough Island to seize Saidor and construct an advanced air and naval base there. Allied Air and Allied Naval Forces would support, and again MacArthur made Krueger responsible for co-ordination of planning by the ground forces and the commanders of close support air and naval forces. The New Guinea Force, whose troops were now advancing against Sio and patrolling in the Ramu Valley beyond Dumpu, would support by continuing the move against Sio and by vigorous demonstrations in the Ramu Valley. U.S. Army Services of Supply was to haul supplies for the operation forward to Cape Cretin, where Krueger was to establish a temporary staging area and supply point pending the time that the U.S. Army Services of Supply base at Finschhafen began operating. Ground combat forces would come from the ALAMO reserve for Cape Gloucester, the U.S. 32d Division which had fought in the Papuan campaign. In addition MacArthur assigned two engineer aviation battalions, an amphibian truck company, and an engineer boat and shore regiment.

Assignment of the mission to ALAMO Force instead of New Guinea Force represented a departure from the principle that New Guinea Force would command all operations in New Guinea. The change was probably made because nearly all trained Australian divisions were either committed to action or withdrawn for rest, and because it seemed clear that all the ALAMO reserve would not have to be committed to Arawe or Gloucester.

MacArthur gave Krueger and his air and naval colleagues little time to (yet ready. Actual initiation of the Saidor offensive, he announced, would depend on the progress of operations on Cape Gloucester, because landing craft for the former would have to come from the latter. It was expected, however, that D Day would be 2 January 1944, or shortly thereafter. Two days' notice would be given.

GHQ's first outline plan had envisaged a parachute assault to take Saidor, but that was decided against because there still were not enouah forward airfields to support current bombing operations and a parachute assault at the same time. The attack would have to be made by ground troops.

For the attack Krueger organized the MICHAELMAS [Saidorl Task Force tinder command of General Martin, assistant commander of the 32d Division, who had just reached Goodenough Island. Most combat troops of the task force came out of the force Krueger had originally organized for Gasmata. The rest were those assigned by General MacArthur. Martin's force was built around the 126th Regimental Combat Team of the 12d Division, which included the 120th Field Artillery Battalion (105-mm howitzers). ( Other units were the 121st Field Artillery Battalion (75- mm. pack howitzers); Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 191st Field Artillery Group; B and D Batteries, 209th Coast Artillery Battalion (AA, AW); A and D Batteries, 743d Coast Artillery Gun Battalion (AA); the Shore Battalion of the 542d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, 2d Engineer Special Brigade; the 808th and 863d Engineer Aviation Battalions; and a variety of service units.)

At the time of assignment the 32d Division units of the task force had just moved to Goodenough Island from Milne Bay. The rest of the force was scattered at such diverse points as Milne Bay, Kirtwina, and Lae.

Although time for planning and preparing was short, and the pressure of Admiral Barbey's duties prevented him from conferring frequently with Krueger in person, the reports of the participating units bear witness to the fact that the experience and state of training of the commanders and troops were so high that things went smoothly.

General Martin hastily organized a headquarters for his task force, taking as the nucleus Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 126th Infantry. To this were added some officers from 32d Division headquarters. Col. Charles D. Blanchard, task force G-3, came from ALAMO Force as did a complete engineer section. Col. J. Sladen Bradley, commander of the i26th, also served as deputy commander and chief of staff of the MICHAELMAs Task Force.

Plans began to take shape on 20 December at a conference in ALAMO headquarters at Goodenough Island. Present were Admiral Barbey; Maj. Gen. William H. Gill of the 32d Division; General Heavey of the 2d Engineer Special Brigade; Brig. Gen. Edwin D. Patrick, ALAMO Force chief of staff; Col. Clyde D. Eddleman, G-3 of ALAMO Force; General Whitehead; General Martin; and Colonel Blanchard. Whitehead, Patrick, and Eddleman presented their ideas, as did Barbey, who was just about to leave for Cape Gloucester. Both Barbey and Martin felt that, as Saidor was known to be lightly held by the enemy, preliminary air bombardment on the beaches on D Day would be of less value than a surprise landing at an early hour in the day. This conference was followed by two other brief ones during the next ten days.

As there was neither time nor opportunity for ground reconnaissance of Saidor, the landing beaches were chosen from aerial photographs. Three beaches, designated Red, White, and Blue from left (south) to right on the west shore of Dekays Bay just east of Saidor were selected. They were rough and stony but were chosen because they were close to the objective, because the beach gradient was steep enough to enable the troops to make a dry landing, because there was solid ground behind them, and because Dekays Bay could be expected to offer protection from the northwest monsoons prevailing at that time of year.

Formal orders were published in late December. (See ALAMO [ESCALATOR] FO 7, 22 Dec 43, and MICHAELMAS TF FO 1, 29 Dec 43, both in ALAMO Force G-3 Jnl File, MICHAELMAS; CTF 76 Opn Plan 4-43, 29 Dec 43.)

Admiral Barbey organized his force generally as follows:

    APD's:
      Red Beach 3
      White Beach 2
      Blue Beach 4

    LCI's:

      Red Beach 6
      White Beach 6
      Blue Beach 4

    Destroyers:

      Escort 4
      Bombardment 6
      Cover 5

    Control and rocket vessels: 2 LCI's and 2 SC's.
    Supply group: 6 LST's.

These ships would carry the assault troops from Goodenough and land them at Saidor on D Day. Six more LST's would land additional troops and equipment on D plus 1, and LST shipments would continue to bring in troops and supplies from Goodenough and Cape Cretin for some time thereafter.

The assault waves of troops would land from the APD's in thirty-six LCP(R)'s as follows: The 3d Battalion, i26th Infantry, was to land on Red Beach at H Hour with two companies abreast, while the 2d Battalion, 126th, put one company on White Beach and one company on Blue; the 1st Battalion, 126th, would land from LCI's on White Beach at H Plus 30 minutes.

All units would push inland and reconnoiter. Field and antiaircraft artillery were to land soon after the assault infantry. Forming the shore party would be A Company, 114th Engineer Battalion; the Antitank Company and part of the Cannon Company, 126th Infantry; and the Shore Battalion, 542d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment. In all, seven thousand men and three thousand tons of gear were to be put ashore on D Day.

Plans for naval gunfire called for two destroyers to Put 575 5-inch rounds of deep supporting fire at inland targets between H minus 2o minutes and H Hour. Four destroyers would fire 1,150 rounds at the beach from H minus 20 to H minus 3 minutes when the lead wave of landing craft would be nine hundred yards from shore. Fire from rocketequipped LCI's would cover the landing craft during the last nine hundred yards. In accordance with Martin's and Barbey's desire for surprise, the air plans did not provide for a preliminary bombardment on D Day. Provisions were made, however, for bombers to strike at inland targets after H Hour, and for strafers and fighters to execute supporting missions on call.

H Hour was set for 0650, fifteen minutes before sunrise--the earliest possible minute that would allow adequate light for the earlier naval bombardment.

Weather could be expected to be either squally with rough surf or pleasant with smooth surf, and subject to sudden change from one extreme to the other.

Troops of General Martin's task force, aside from the 32d Division units, were arriving at Goodenough while the plans were being prepared. Some units arrived short of clothing and equipment, and these were supplied as well as possible.

Meanwhile General Krueger, concerned over the difficulties of supplying Arawe, Cape Gloucester, and Saidor simultaneously, argued in favor of postponing Saidor. But General MacArthur, Vice Adm. Thomas C. Kinkaid, and others, promising to make sure that enough supplies arrived at Saidor, and unwilling to lose momentum, agreed that the operation would be valueless if postponed. Preparations went forward. (Ltr, Krueger to CINCSWPA, 28 Dec 43, sub: Deferment of MICHAELMAs, and Rad, Gen R. IMarshall to Gen Chamberlin, 28 Dec 43, both in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 29 Dec 43.)

Admiral Kinkaid, a cool, soft-spoken, bushy-eyebrowed product of many years in the U.S. Navy, had relieved Admiral Carpender as commander of Allied Naval Forces and of the Seventh Fleet in November. A classmate of Admiral Turner at the Naval Academy, he had already had ample experience in the Pacific, having commanded carrier task forces during the Guadalcanal Campaign and led the invasion of the Aleutians.

On 28 December General Patrick notified Martin that the Cape Gloucester operation was proceeding successfully, and that his task force would probably invade Saidor on 2 January, the estimated date. As the LST's would have to sail from Goodenough on 31 December in order to reach Saidor on D Day, Martin concluded that loading would have to start on 30 December, for the task force assembly area on Goodenough lay eighteen miles from the embarkation point. He ordered his force to move to the embarkation point at once. Movement and loading continued night and day, usually in rain which turned the roads into mud. On 30 December Martin received word officially that D Day would definitely be 2 January.

APD's and LCI's took aboard only troops, individual equipment, and individual or squad weapons. Heavy equipment, vehicles, motor- drawn weapons, bulk supplies, and some troops went aboard the LST's. Martin was forced to make a last-minute change in embarkation plans on 3o December when he found there would be nine APD's instead of the ten he had expected. The surplus infantrymen were ordered aboard an LCI, but since the units involved were then moving to the embarkation point some did not receive word of the change until they had reached the beach.

The difficulties were all overborne, and by 0830, 11 December, the six LST's had departed Goodenough. Their slots at the beach were promptly taken by the six that were to bring heavy equipment to Saidor on D plus 1. The LCI's left Goodenough in midafternoon, and the fast APD's completed loadinga at 1700There had not been opportunity for a dress rehearsal, but the LCP(R)'s of the APD's practiced landing formations at Goodenough Bay. (The 126th Regimental Combat Team had received six weeks of amphibious training in Australia and three weeks training in LST's, LCI's, and APD's at Milne Bay.)

For the soldiers and sailors aboard the APD's New Year's Eve passed quietly. Martin, the APD captains, Colonel Bradley, and the battalion commanders conferred aboard the destroyer Stringhain and made minor last-minute changes in landing plans. Some of the ships showed moving pictures.

At 0600 on New Year's Day, 1944, the APD's sailed. They put in at Oro Bay en route, where they were joined by Admiral Barbey in his flagship, the destroyer Conynghain, to which General Martin transferred his command post afloat. During the ships' approach to Saidor on 1 January, sixty B-24's and forty-eight B-25's hit the Japanese installations with 218 tons of demolition bombs.

Barbey's final run through the straits to Saidor was unexciting. The early part of the night of 1-2 January was clear, with a quarter moon shining on the ships. After midnight the sky became overcast and rain fell.

Seizing Saidor

When the ships and landing craft hove to in Dekays Bay before sunrise of 2 January, heavy overcast and rain obscured the shore. Admiral Barbey postponed H Hour from 0650 to 0705 to provide more light for naval gunfire, loading and assembly of boats, and identification of beaches. There followed another delay of twenty minutes while LCP(R)'s formed up. The destroyers and rocket LCI's fired the scheduled 1,725 5-inch shells and 624 4.5-inch rockets at the beaches and inland areas. Troops aboard ship, one thousand yards offshore, felt the concussion of the explosives.

The assault waves meanwhile had boated and assembled, and were churning toward Red, White, and Blue Beaches. First craft touched down at 0725, and during the next seventeen minutes the four waves of thirty-six LCP(R)'s landed 1,440 troops. There was no opposition from the enemy. The sixteen LCI's, organized in three waves, grounded and put ashore more than 3,000 troops.

Each LST had towed an LCM of the 2d Engineer Special Brigade. The LST's cast loose their tows on arrival offshore, and three LCM's sailed to the beaches with the last wave of small craft. Thirty minutes before the LST's were scheduled to beach, an angle-dozer clanked out of each LCM and at once set to work grading landing points and beach exits to use in unloading the LST's.

When the six LST's beached at about 0800, landing points and beach exits made of gravel and wire mesh were ready. This performance, plus the efficiency of the shore party, which Admiral Barbey praised highly, enabled cargo to come ashore in record time. Each LST rapidly unloaded three hundred tons of bulk supplies and two hundred tons of vehicles and equipment.

By 1140 all LST's had unloaded and retracted. The bad weather delayed the scheduled air bombing, but later in the morning B-24's, B-25's, and A-20's bombed the Saidor, airstrip and the high ground inland.

(There was one hitch in the air plans. Martin did not receive the 1st Air Task Force's support plan until after he had left Goodenough and was aboard ship. There he discovered that one alternate target lay on the American side of the bomb safety line. As the ships were under radio silence he coula not notify air headquarters. The air liaison party, after landing, radioed the necessary information directly to the bombers before any American casualties were incurred.)

M10 MOTOR CARRIAGE MOUNTING 3-INCH GUN on a rough and stony beach near Saidor, 2 January 1944.

When they reached shore the rifle battalions began to push inland while the artillery established itself and the shore party moved supplies off the beach. Japanese resistance was limited to a few rifle shots. General Martin reported that only 15 enemy soldiers had been near the beaches at the time of the landing, and 11 of these were killed by the bombardments and by soldiers of the 126th. Saidor had a normal garrison of about 50, and on 2 January some 120-150 transients were present. All these promptly took to the hills. American casualties on D Day numbered 1 soldier killed and 5 wounded and 2 sailors drowned at Blue Beach. Forces ashore numbered 6,779: (This figure comes from the MICHAELMAS Task Force report. TF 76's report gives 7,200.) 6,602 Army ground troops, 129 from Army Air Forces units, and 48 sailors.

Admiral Crutchley's task force had performed its usual mission of covering the invasion against Japanese warships from Rabaul, but none appeared. Thirty-nine fighters and twenty-four bombers of the 4th Air Army were based at Wewak but were unable to launch an attack until 1600. By then Barbey's ships were well out to sea, Martin's soldiers had dispersed their supplies, and little damage was done.

So ended the first day at Saidor. The speedy efficiency of Saidor operations, when compared, for example, with the Kiriwina invasion of the previous year, bears witness to the Southwest Pacific's improvement in amphibious technique. Yet the fact that there are flaws in even the best-executed operations was demonstrated the next morning. The MICHAELMAs Task Force expected six LST's (each towing an engineer LCM) carrying the 121st Field Artillery Battalion and A and D Batteries, 743d Coast Artillery Gun Battalion (Antiaircraft), to arrive at 0700, 3 January, which would be after daylight. When three vessels came dimly in view about a hundred yards from the north shore at 0510 and failed to identify themselves, the shore defenses opened fire. The vessels withdrew. After daylight they returned and were correctly identified as three of the six expected LST's.

Thereafter shipments of troops and supplies on the LST's were uneventful. The 808th Engineer Aviation Battalion arrived on 6 January; the larger part of the 128th Regimental Combat Team came in on 16 and 19 January in response to General Martin's request for more troops; the 863d Engineer Aviation Battalion was landed on 29 January.

By 10 February, when General Krueger declared DEXTERITY over, and GHQ announced that U.S. Army Services of Supply, Southwest Pacific, would take over supplying Saidor, Arawe, and Gloucester on 1 March, the Saidor garrison numbered 14,979 in addition to a small naval detachment. Forty men had been killed, 111 wounded; 16 were missing.

Base Development

Construction missions assigned to the engineers included building or installing an airfield, roads, fuel storage tanks, docks, jetties, a PT boat base, and a hospital. Work on the airfield started promptly and in itself was not difficult, since the prewar field was in fair condition. The amphibian engineers unloaded ships and built roads, but continuous rainfall hindered their work and General Martin occasionally diverted the aviation engineers to assist the amphibians in their work.

The Americans were assisted in all phases of construction work by native labor. A detachment of the Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit consisting of one officer, several enlisted men, and eleven native policemen had landed on 2 January to supervise the employment of New Guinea natives. Seven days later ioo native workers came up from Lae, and by 10 February there were 13 policemen, 200 Lae natives, and 406 local workers at Saidor. C-47's landed on the airfield on D plus 9, and by 10 February it was almost ready to receive warplanes.

Junction With the Australians

In the days immediately following D Day General Martin disposed one battalion in defensive positions on each flank, with the third patrolling in the mountains between the flanks. There were some fourteen miles of coast line between the flanks which were held by the coast artillery, supported by other units.

The MICHAELMAS Task Force was hardly ashore when General Krueger warned that, as the Japanese troops in the vicinity of Sio were preparing to move west to Madang, an attack against Saidor was to be expected. These warnings were repeated on 7 and 9 JanuaryGeneral Martin asked for more troops on 10 January and General Krueger sent him the 1st and 3d Battalion Combat Teams of the 12 8th Regimental Combat Team.

Meanwhile patrols went to the east, west, and south. There were occasional brushes with scattered Japanese patrols, but no pitched battles. January ended without an attack. The Japanese were known to be advancing west, but they had not yet touched Saidor.

Almost from the very outset General Martin had urged an advance to the east to hem in the Japanese between his forces and the advancing Australians, but, partly because it apparently did not wish to commit additional troops, and partly because of garbles in the transmission of messages, ALAMO headquarters did not at once accede to Martin's desires. (Gen Martin, 1st Ind, 2 Nov 53, to Ltr, Gen Smith, Chief of Mil Hist, to Gen Martin, 6 Oct 53, no sub, OCMH. General Martin kindly attached to his indorsement several letters and papers and took the trouble to prepare an excellent narrative which clarified many obscure points.)

Doubts regarding Japanese intentions were dispelled on 6 February when from a newly established observation post in the Finisterres American soldiers saw large numbers of Japanese troops marching along an inland trail that ran south of Saidor through the mountains and foothills. It was concluded that the Japanese were bypassing Saidor.

The conclusion was correct. In late December General Adachi, concerned over the state of things to the east, had flown from Madang to 51st Division headquarters at Kiari. He received word of the American landing at Saidor just before he went overland to the 20th Division at Sio. Opinion at General Imamura's Rabaul headquarters was divided over the best course of action. Some staff officers argued that the 20th and 51st Divisions should attack Saidor. Others counseled that they slip peacefully past Saidor over an inland route and proceed to Madang to join with the remainder of the 18th Army to defend Wewak. Abandoning the attempt to hold the shores of the straits, Imamura decided in favor of bypassing Saidor. He sent orders to that effect to Adachi at Sio.

Adachi placed General Nakano of the 51st Division in charge of the retreat and directed the 41st Division to move from Wewak to defend Madang. Adachi left Sio, by submarine "in a troubled state of mind because he would again have to force the two divisions to go through difficulties." (18th Army Operations, II, Japanese Monogr No. 42 (OCMH), 132.)

He later ordered General Nakai to send eight companies out of the Ramu Valley to Bogadjim. They were to advance down to the coast to harass Saidor while Nakano's force retreated.

Nakano, who first directed the 20th Division to retreat along the coast while the 51st Division and naval units moved inland, eventually decided to avoid enemy opposition by sending the whole force through the Finistcrres.

The retreat began promptly. Sio was abandoned to the 9th Australian Division and the Japanese moved up the coast, then headed inland east of Saidor. The retreat to Madang, almost two hundred miles away by the coastal route, was another of the terrible Japanese marches in New Guinea. The troops struggled through jungles, across rivers, and over the awesome cliffs and mountains of the Finisterres. Fatigue, straggling, disease, and starvation characterized the retreat. "The men were no longer able to care for themselves and walked step after step looking ahead only a meter to see where they were going." (18th Army Operations, II, Japanese Monogr No. 42 (OCMH), 180.)

The two divisions had totaled twenty thousand in December 1943; only ten thousand wearily entered Madang in mid-February.

Yet that the ten thousand made such a trip and that the Japanese could make such marches in retreat and in the advance are tribute and testimony to the patient fortitude and iron resolution of the Japanese soldier. They clearly illustrate that despite his baggy uniforms and bombastic phrases he was a formidable opponent.

After the fall of Sio the 5th Australian Division relieved the 9th and advanced up the coast. Its advance patrols made contact with those of the MICHAELMAs Task Force on the Yaut River about fourteen miles southeast of Saidor on 10 February 1944.

Because permission to move east was received too late, Martin could not block the Japanese in that direction. And the escape route to the south ran up and down such steep ravines and slopes that no heavy weapons could be carried there, and the Americans could not block that route either. General Martin decided to attack to the west. The move, executed by elements of the 1st and 3d Battalions, 126th Infantry, began at once.

General Gill and his staff reached Saidor on 18 February to assume command, and continued the westward move. By 24 February patrols of the 3d Battalion, 126th, had reached Billau at Cape Iris, about twelve land miles from Saidor. On 5 March the 126th Infantry (less the 2d Battalion), the 121st Field Artillery Battalion, and B Battery, 120th Field Artillery Battalion, disembarked from engineer landing craft at Yalau Plantation, twenty miles farther on.

By now the 7th Australian Division had broken out of the Ramu Valley and General Nakai was retreating toward Madang. Patrols of the 32d U.S. and the 7th Australian Divisions made contact at Kul between the Sa and Kambara Rivers, about eight miles beyond Yalau Plantation, on 21 March. The Australians went on to take Bogadjim on 13 April.

Meanwhile Imperial General Headquarters had transferred the 18th Army and the 4th Air Army out of the 8th Area Army and assigned them to control of the 2d Area Army to pull Adachi's troops out of Madang and west to Wewak, Aitape, and Hollandia. Adachi's troops started West again, evacuating Madang just before the Australians entered from the east on 24 April. (For the 18th Army's operations subsequent to the period embraced by this volume, see Smith, The Approach to the Philippines, Chs. V-VIII. The new boundary between the 8th Area and the 2d Area Armies was set at longitude 147 degrees east.)

So the large-scale attack on Madang envisaged in ELKTON III never came off. Saidor proved to be an effective and economical substitute.

Securing of the major objectives of Operation II of CARTWHEEL was completed by the seizure of Saidor, and subsequent operations on the Huon Peninsula were anticlimactic strategically, however bitter and tragic they were for those who fought and died in them. The Saidor landing completed the seizure of the Markham-Ramu trough and the Huon Peninsula for the Allies and obtained one more airfield to support operations against the Admiralties and enemy bases to the west.

Strictly speaking, Saidor was the last invasion of the CARTWHEEL operations. With it General MacArthur fulfilled the provisions of the joint Chiefs' orders of 28 March 1943. But he and Admiral Halsey Were not yet finished With the Japanese in the Southeast Area.

By the end of 1943 Rabaul had not yet been completely neutralized, and before the approach to the Philippines could begin there remained a set of subsidiary, transitional operations to be accomplished. These, which the joint Chiefs and MacArthur had discussed earlier in 1943, would complete the encirclement of Rabaul and would provide a naval base to substitute for Rabaul in the drive to the Philippines.

More Crossing the Straits

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