Operation Cartwheel

Crossing the Straits

Plans and Preparations

by James Miller, jr.

By November 1943 CARTWHEEL was rolling along rapidly and smoothly. In just over five months Nassau Bay, Woodlark, Kiriwina, New Georgia, Vella Lavella, Salamaua, Nadzab, Lae, the Markham Valley, Finschhafen, the Treasuries, and Empress Augusta Bay had fallen to the Allies. At the newly won bases airfields were either in operation or under construction. Allied planes dominated the skies all the way to Rabaul, and Allied ships sailed the Solomon Sea and the Huon Gulf in comparative safety.

The capture of Finschhafen in Operation II was a step toward control of the straits between New Guinea and New Britain, a control that would help make possible the drive toward the Vogelkop Peninsula and the Philippines in 1944 and would be essential to any amphibious advance against Rabaul. The Southwest Pacific's next move (Operation III of ELKTON III) was first planned by GHQ on the assumption that Rabaul would be captured. Looking eastward rather than westward from the Huon Peninsula, it aimed at the establishment of air forces at Cape Gloucester on western New Britain and of PT boat bases on the south coast of New Britain. (See Map 12.)

These were to increase Allied control over Rabaul and over Kavieng and Manus in the Admiralties, and to provide bases on the north side of the straits to insure the safe passage of convoys.

Selecting Targets

GHQ's orders for the operation, given the code name DEXTERITY, were published on 2.- September. (GHQ SWPA 01 38, 22 Sep 43, and amendments, in GHQ SWIIA G-3 Jnl, 22 Sep 43.)

They directed General Krueger's ALAMO Force, formerly the New Britain Force, supported by Allied Air and Allied Naval Forces, and by U.S. Army Services of Supply, Southwest Pacific, to seize Cape Gloucester by airborne and amphibious invasions and to neutralize the forward Japanese base at Gasmata on southern New Britain, to gain control over western New Britain as far east as the line Gasmata-Talasea, and to capture Vitu and Long Islands beyond the straits. General Blarney's New Guinea Force would meanwhile continue its operations in the Huon Peninsula and the valleys. Gasmata was to be neutralized by troops who would land at nearby Lindenhafen Plantation, establish an emergency airfield, and advance on Gasmata in a shore-to-shore movement.

The plan directed Krueger to prepare to participate with South Pacific forces in the capture of Rabaul but this order was canceled on 10 November. (GHQ SWPA 01 38/12, 10 Nov 43. Apparently there was a strategic tag at GHQ so that the impact of the joint Chiefs' order to bypass Rabaul was not fully reflected at once in orders prepared by the GHQ staff.)

Saidor Was not specifically mentioned, although both MacArthur and Chamberlin had suggested it as a target earlier in the month.

D Day for the invasion of Cape Gloucester was initially set for 20 November but was postponed twice. The final date was 26 December.

This plan provoked a good deal of disagreement. The first to protest Was General Kenney. With the decision to bypass Rabaul obviously in mind, he presented his objections to General MacArthur on 10 October. The original concept, fie argued, called for an encircling ring of air bases, including Cape Gloucester, to be established around Rabaul in order to lay siege to it. But now that "faster action is contemplated" it would take too long to develop Gloucester into a useful air base. It would not be necessary to take either Gloucester or Lindenhafen, he told MacArthur: bases at Dobodura, Nadzab, and Kiriwina, plus the one at Finschhafen and perhaps a new one at Saidor, could provide support for invasions as far away as Kavieng. (Ltr, Kenney to CINCSWPA, 10 Oct 43, sub: GHQ 01 38, 22 Sep 43, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 11 Oct 43; Kenney, General Kenney Reports, pp. 32627; General Kenney's comments on draft NIS of this volume, OCMH.)

In speaking of faster action, Kenney apparently was referring to the long-range plan RENO III, which was then being prepared. It called for completion of the CARTWHEEL operations and then the move toward the Philippines, according to the following schedule: Hansa Bay, 1 February 1944; Kavieng (by the South Pacific), 1 March 1944; Admiralties, 1 March 1944; neutralization of Rabaul and perhaps, later, Its occupation; Htimboldt Bay and Arafura Sea, 1 June 1944; Geelvink Bay-Vogelkop Peninsula, 15 August-1 October, 1944; Halmahera, Amboina, the Palaus, 1 December 1944; Mindanao, 1 February 1945.

General Chamberlin, MacArthur's G-3, observed that the air general's plan differed from MacArthur's present plans. (Chamberlin must also have been referring to RENO III.)

There would be time, he asserted, to complete airdromes at Gloucester before undertaking the next operations. While lie did not state that the Kavieng invasion could not be supported without Gloucester, he pointed out several advantages to be derived from the move to New Britain:

    1. The Allies could better control Vitiaz Strait. (Here he reversed himself on the position he had taken on the point the month before.) Control from one side would be possible but it would be dangerous to leave the other side in Japanese hands.

    2. Cape Gloucester would provide better support for the Kavieng and Admiralties attacks provided for in RENO III.

    3. Cape Gloucester would provide better cover for convoys moving through Vitiaz Strait against the Admiralties. Even assuming the bypassing of Rabaul, Chamberlin concluded, a point on the south coast of New Britain Would be needed to control Vitiaz Strait, neutralize Gasmata, and provide an emergency airfield for planes attacking Rabaul (Memo, ACofS G-3 GFIQ SWPA for CofS GFIQ SWPA, 11 Oct 43, sub: Comments on Ltr From Comdr AAF, 11 Oct 43, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 11 Oct 43; Craven and Cate, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, PP. 330-31)

Admirals Carpender and Barbey also seem to have favored holding both sides of the straits, as did General Krueger. The admirals did not favor the seizure of Gasmata, because they felt it would mean a reckless exposure of ships to Rabaul-based aircraft. (Ltr, Achn Barbey to Gen Smith, Chief of Mil HiSt, 20 Nov 53, no sub, OCMH.)

Kenney was informed that MacArthur's plans, which encompassed the bypassing of Rabaul, required Cape Gloucester and Lindenhafen. (Ltr, GHQ SWPA to Comdr AAF, 16 Oct 43, sub: GHQ 01 38, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 16 Oct 43.)

But Kenney's statement, coupled with the admirals' and added to the facts that Gasmata was swampy and that the Japanese were known to be sending more troops there, did have some effect. One month later MacArthur canceled Gasmata operations and directed the ALAMO Force to seize Cape Gloucester and to establish control over adjacent islands and "minimum portions" of western New Britain with the purpose of protecting Cape Gloucester. (GHQ SWPA 01 38/12, 10 Nov 43. General Whitehead also disliked both Gasmata and Cape Gloucester. See his letter to Kenney, 11 November 1943, quoted in Craven and Cate, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, PP. 329-30.)

The matter did not end there. It was finally settled by a conference at GHQ in Brisbane on 21 November attended by Kenney, Carpender, and Barbey. The naval commanders opposed Gasmata and are reported to have wanted a PT boat base elsewhere on New Britain's south coast. Therefore Arawe, the name of a peninsula, a harbor, and an island west of Gasmata which had been listed as an objective in ELKTON III, was substituted for Gasmata with the intention of using it as a PT base and in the hope of diverting the enemy's attention from Cape Gloucester. Arawe had a fair anchorage and there were only a few Japanese in the area. General Kenney assured his fellow commanders that he could give better air cover to Arawe than to Gasmata. Cape Gloucester remained the main objective. (Memo, SJC [Chamberlin] for MacArthur, 21 Nov 43, sub: Practicality of Establishing P'r Base S Coast Western New Britain, in GFIQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 21 Nov 43; GHQ 01 38/15, 22 Nov 43; Ltr, Gen Krueger to Gen Smith, Chief of Mil Hist, 31 Oct 53, no sub, OCMH. For conflicting accounts see Kenney, Genet-at Kenney Reports, PP. 326-27, and Morison, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, p. 372. After the war Barbey expressed the view that the PT base was never air important factor.)

As the same ships had to be used for both invasions, the dates were staggered.

Setting Dates

The first dates selected, 14 November for Lindenhafen and 20 November for Cape Gloucester, proved Impossible to meet and had to be postponed. The process of postponement and selection of new dates clearly illustrates some of the controlling factors in Southwest Pacific amphibious operations.

By 26 October Kenney, Sutherland, and Chamberlin realized that enough air cover would not be available to meet the first target dates. The Finschhafen airstrip would not be completed until about 5 December. Construction of the Lae-Nadzab road had fallen behind schedule and it could not take heavy vehicles and machinery before 1 December; consequently the three airstrips in the lower Markham Valley would not be in shape to maintain air operations before 15 December. The VII Amphibious Force, which would carry the assault troops in DEXTERITY, could not be released from its responsibilities for supplying Lae and Finschhafen for some time. It was estimated that from 135,000 to 150,000 more tons of supplies would have to be sent to Lae, 60,000 to 70,000 more to Finschhafen, in order to support air operations. Shipments to Nadzab were slowed by the lack of enough men and docks at Lae, and movement of supplies to Finschhafen was slowed by the fact that until the airfield was finished the naval commanders would not risk sending heavy ships there.

Southwest Pacific invasions usually took place during the dark of the moon to help hide ships from nocturnal raiding planes. The last- quarter moon would come on 19 November, the first-quarter moon on 4 December. If the attack could not be mounted before 4 December it would have to be put off until after 19 December, the date of the next lastquarter moon. But this was the period of the northwest monsoon, and the longer the Southwest Pacific waited for ideal moon conditions the rougher would be the surf at Cape Gloucester.

Chamberlin therefore recommended that DEXTERITY be put off until the earliest possible date in December, that the VII Amphibious Force keep on supplying Lae and Finschhafen a while longer, and that two engineer aviation battalions that were scheduled for Cape Gloucester be set to work at Lae and Finschhafen for the time being. (Rad, MacArthur to Comdrs NGF, ALAMO, et al., 28 Oct 43, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 28 Oct 43.)

MacArthur, accepting these recommendations, announced that he would delay the attack about fifteen days, and that the VII Amphibious Force would supply Lae and Finschhafen until about 20 November. (Memo, Chamberlin for CofS GHQ SWPA, 26 Oct 43, sub: Data of Attack on New Britain, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jul, 26 Oct 43.)

This decision provoked the quiet, undramatic General Krueger to protest that the resulting schedule would be too tight. MacArthur's order meant that Gloucester would have to be invaded on 4 December. The subsidiary operation would have to be accomplished on 28 November. Since there was no reserve shipping, any losses on 28 November would hamper the main landing. Further, the VII Amphibious Force, once relieved at Lae and Finschhafen, could not be expected to get to Milne Bay until 26 or 27 November. Thus there would hardly be time for rehearsals. Krueger, asking for more ships or for more time, suggested that the first operation take place on 2 December Gloucester on the 26th. (Ltr, Krueger to MacArthur, 12 Nov 43, no sub, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 14 Nov 43.)

MacArthur agreed to another postponement and eventually set Z Day for Arawe at 1-5 December, D Day for Gloucester at 26 December. (GHQ SNVPA 01 38/17, 3 Dec 43; GHQ SWPA 01 38/18, 16 Dec 43.)

ALAMO Force Plans

Originally assigned to ALAMO Force for ALAMO Force for DEXTERITY were the 1st Marine Division; the 32d Division; the 632d Tank Destroyer Battalion; the 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment, for Cape Gloucester only; and a number of quartermaster, medical, signal, engineer, and antiaircraft units. The 1st Cavalry and 24th Infantry Divisions, then in Australia but soon to move to New Guinea, and the 503d Parachute Infantry (which would be committed at Cape Gloucester) constituted GHQ's reserve. The 1st Marine and 32d Divisions moved from Australia to the forward area shortly before the invasions. (The 32d Division went to Milne Bay and Goodenough, the 1st Division to Milne Bay, Oro Bay, and Goodenough.)

As usual, MacArthur gave Krueger responsibility for co-ordinating the plans of supporting air and naval forces with those of the ALAMO Force. In contrast with the system of unity of command over all elements of an invasion force that prevailed in the South Pacific, the commander in chief specifically directed that Allied Air and Naval Forces would operate under GHQ through their respective commanders and exempted them from control by ALAMO or New Guinea Forces. However, if the Japanese attacked in any area the senior local commander was to control all Southwest Pacific forces in the threatened area.

General Krueger and the ALAMO Force staff had been planning for DEXTERITY since August. (ELKTON III had provided for the invasion of Cape Gloucester, Arawe, and Gasmata, and in August and September GHQ had prepared general plans and specific orders that were superseded by RENO III and 01 38. See GHQ's MARFA Plans in ALAMO Force G-3 Jnl DEXTERITY No. I.)

In the beginning ALAMO headquarters was at Milne Bay, where it had been established at the opening of the CARTWHEEL offensives. On 21 October Krueger moved it to Goodenough Island. (Sixth Army headquarters remained at Camp Columbia near Brisbane until 2 February 1944 when it moved to Cape Cretin on the southeast corner of the Huon Peninsula. ALAMO headquarters had moved from Goodenough to the cape on 24 December to be near the scene of operations. The advance echelon of GHQ remained at Port Moresby.)

During the planning period for DEXTERITY the Japanese were strengthening their garrisons in western New Britain in accordance with the orders issued by Imamura in September. Thus Allied estimates of Japanese strength in the area rose from 500 before September to 2,500 on the 26th. In December Krueger placed enemy strength at between 5,668 and 9,344, with the strongest concentration at Cape Gloucester. The 1st Marine Division, apparently deriving its information from the same sources as ALAMO Force, arrived at a higher figure--between 8,400 and 12,076. (ALAMO Force Rpt, DEXTERITY Opn, 15 Dec 43 - 10 Feb 44, and Inds, 17 May 44; ALAMO G-2 Periodic Rpt 18, 9 Dec 43, in ALAMO Force G-3 Jnl DEXTERITY No. 6; 1st Mar Div Order of Battle and Strength Est, New Britain, 13 Dec 43, in ALAMO Force G-3 Jnl DEXTERITY No. 7. The order of battle lists were nearly correct except that the Allies did not know that the 17th Division was moving from Rabaul to western New Britain.)

Little was known about the terrain of western New Britain, and Krueger ordered ground reconnaissance in addition to the extensive air photography that was undertaken by Allied Air Forces. Because PT boats were not allowed to operate off New Britain's north coast no patrols were able to examine Borgen Bay, where the main Cape Gloucester landings were to take place. Marine patrols landed from PT boats and reconnoitered the area south of Cape Gloucester from 24 September through 21 December in a series of patrols. A group of ALAMO Scouts, an informal reconnaissance organization operating directly under General Krueger, reconnoitered Gasmata from 6 through 27 October. On the night of 9-10 December one American officer and five natives disembarked from a PT boat east of Arawe, scouted the area, and concluded there were only a few Japanese present. (The patrols on western New Britain included Maj. John V. Mather, Australian Army; Sub-Lt. Andrew Kirkwell-Smith, a coastwatcher in the Australian Navy; and Sub-Lt. William G. Wiedenran, also of the Australian Navy but before the war a Church of England missionary at Sag Sag on western New Britain.)

More information was obtained from aerial photography. Missions were flown almost daily so that ALAMO and subordinate headquarters could be kept informed of gun positions, beach defenses, bridges, and trails. The VII Amphibious Force used air photos as the basis for its hydrographic charts, and the ist Marine Division used them to pick the landing beaches. (ALAMO Force Rpt, DEXTERITY Opn; Craven and Cate, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, P. 332.)

Krueger's first tactical plans, prepared in accordance with GHQ's orders, had called for the heavily reinforced 126th Regimental Combat Team, under Brig. Gen. Clarence A. Martin, of the 32d DIvision, to take Gasmata. Cape Gloucester was to have been captured by the BACKHANDER Task Force under Maj. Gen. William H. Rupertus, commander of the ist Marine Division. The assault force was to have consisted of one regimental combat and one battalion landing team of Rupertus' division, the 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment, and the 12th Marine Defense Battalion. The marines were to have delivered an amphibious assault, coupled with a parachute jump by the 503d. (In reserve was Maj. Gen. William H. Gill's 32d Division less the 126th Regimental Combat Team. General Chamberlin doubted the wisdom of using the 503d as no suitable drop zone was to he found. ALAMO Force Rpt, DEXTERITY Opn; ALAMO Plan of Opn, DEXTERHY, 28 Sep 43, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 28 Sep 43; Memo, ACofS G-3 GHQ SWPA for CofS CHQ SXVPA, 10 Oct 43, sub: Plan of Opus DEXTERITY Submitted by ALAMO Force, same file.)

But this whole plan was drastically revised.

When on 22 November General MacArthur substituted Arawe for Gasmata, Krueger decided to use a smaller force than the 126th. He correctly believed Arawe to be weakly defended. For Arawe fie formed the DIRECTOR Task Force under Brig. Gen. Julian W. Cunningham, who as a colonel had led the invasion of Woodlark. Its assault units included Col. Alexander M. Miller's two-squadron 112th Cavalry; the 148th Field Artillery Battalion; the 50th Engineer Company; Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 2,36th Antiaircraft Artillery (Searchlight) Battalion; and C and D Batteries, 470th Antiaircraft Artillery (Automatic Weapons) Battalion. In reserve was the 2d Battalion, 158th Infantry.

Supporting garrison units, to be moved to Arawe after 15 December (Z Day), consisted of several engineer, medical, ordnance, and other service detachments. All these units had been attached to the ALAMO Force for the invasion of the Trobriands in June, and were still occupying the islands.

The concept of the Cape Gloucester invasion was changed also; the parachute jump was canceled and the 503d removed from the troop list. Several factors contributed to this change. General Krueger's headquarters had never liked the idea. General Rupertus, too, had opposed the parachute jump from the start. He pointed out that bad weather, which had prevented several air attacks against Rabaul, might interfere with the parachute jump and thus deprive him of a substantial part of his assault force. (Memo, CG BACKHANDER TF for CG ALA'110, 3 NOV 43, no sub, in ALAMO Force G-3 Jnl DEXTERITY NO. 3.)

General Kenney's headquarters, in December, added its opposition. First, although ALAMO Force orders did not specify exactly how the jump was to be accomplished, it was understood at Allied Air Forces headquarters that a piecemeal and therefore dangerous drop was planned. Second, it seemed that the jump would be under way about the time that Japanese planes might be expected to turn up. Asking if the jump was necessary, Kenney's operations officer stated emphatically that the air commander wanted "no part" of it. (Check Sheet, Dir Opus AAF for G-3 GHQ SWPA, 8 Dec 43, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 8 Dec 43.)

General Rupertus' headquarters had disliked the whole scheme of maneuver as prescribed by ALAMO headquarters, as well as the parachute jump. ALAMO's first plans called for simultaneous, separated landings by two small forces, which were to converge on the airfield at Cape Gloucester in conjunction with the 503d's jump. But the 1st Marine Division, which had had ample experience with jungle warfare on Guadalcanal, felt that this plan was unsound because the rough and scarcely known terrain could easily delay either or both of the marching forces. Also, the Japanese could be expected to outnumber any one of the three landing forces.

When Generals MacArthur and Krueger visited 1st Marine Division headquarters at Goodenough on 14 December, Col. Edwin A. Pollock, divisional operations officer, frankly expressed the marines' objections to the parachute jump and the scheme of maneuver.

Krueger had included the parachute jump because MacArthur's headquarters had assigned the 503d Parachute Infantry to the operation, and he considered himself under orders to make his plans fit the forces assigned. (Lt. Col. Frank 0. Hough, USMCR, and Maj. John A. Crown, USMCR, The Campaign on New Britain (Washington, 1952), P. 19; Gen Krueger's comments on the draft MS of this volume, attached to his ltr to Maj Gen A. C. Smith, Chief Mil Hist, 31 Oct 53, no sub, OCMH.)

MacArthur, Krueger, and Kenney now discussed the matter further. It developed that Dobodura would not support the mounting of the 503d as well as all the planned bomber operations. To use the 503d would require moving one heavy bomber group from Dobodura to Port Moresby, and bad weather over the Owen Stanleys might keep the bomber group out of action. The jump was canceled.

ALAMO Force further revised its tactical plans for taking Cape Gloucester to meet the 1st Marine Division's objections. Final plans called for one regimental combat team to land on two beaches on the north coast of New Britain between Silimati Point in Borgen Bay and the airfield at Cape Gloucester, while a second (less a battalion landing team) landed immediately behind, passed through the first, and attacked toward Cape Gloucester to the airfields. One battalion landing team was to land near Tauali on the west coast of New Britain to block the coastal trail and prevent reinforcement of the airdrome area from the south or retreat of the airdrome garrison to the south.

The assault units of Rupertus' BACKHANDER Task Force were two regimental combat teams of the 1st Marine Division; the 12th Marine Defense Battalion less its 155-mm. gun group; detachments, including LCM's and LCVP's, of the 2d Engineer Special Brigade; and the 913th Engineer Aviation Battalion. The reserve, supporting, and garrison units included the remainder of the 1st Marine Division, the 155-mm. gun group of the 12 th Defense Battalion, and a large number of engineer, medical, quartermaster, and malaria control units, chiefly of the Army.

The Arawe (DIRECTOR) forces were to mount the invasion at Goodenough, the Gloucester (BACKHANDER) forces through Oro Bay, Goodenough, and Milne Bay. In ALAMO reserve was the 32d Division. (See ALAMO Force, Rpt, DEXTERITY Opn; ALAMO FO 5, and annexes, 3o NOY 43, in ALAMO Force G-3 Jnl DEXTERITY NO. 5; Amendment I to ALAMO FO 5, 15 Dec 43, in ALAMO Force G-3 Jnl DExTERITY No. 7; Craven and Cate, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, P. 331; Hough and Crown, The campaign on New Britain, p. ig. See also ACofS G-3 ALAMO, Revised G-3 Study, Gloucester, 2 Dec 43, in ALAMO Force G-3 jnl DEXTERITY No. 5.)

Logistical plans called for the U.S. Army Services of Supply, Southwest Pacific Area, now commanded by Maj. Gen. James L. Frink, to establish and maintain at New Guinea bases sixty days' supply of all types except chemical and Air Force. (General Marshall was Deputy Chief of Staff, GHQ.)

Thirty days' of the last two classes were to be maintained. Frink's command was to make building materials for ports and air bases available to the ALAMO Force by Z Plus 5 and D Plus 5, and was to furnish naval forces with supplies common to the Army and Navy pending establishment of the naval supply system, or in emergencies. The VII Amphibious Force would of course transport supplies to the beachheads until they were secured and Frink was ready to take over. Allied Air Forces was to transport supplies to the ground troops in emergencies.

All units in the task forces were to be stripped of equipment not needed for their combat missions. They would carry to Arawe and Cape Gloucester in the assault echelons thirty days' supply and three units of fire, which would be built up by succeeding shipments to sixty days' supply and six units of fire (ten for antiaircraft). Oro Bay was the main supply base, Milne Bay the secondary. (GHQ SWPA 01 38, 22 Sep 43, in GHQ SWPA G-3 Jnl, 22 Sep 43; ALAMO Administrative Order 4, 3o NOY 43, in ALAMO Force G-3 Jn1 DEXTERITY NO. 5.)

Cape Cretin, near Finschhafen on the southeast corner of the Huon Peninsula, which the ALAMO Force was preparing as a supply point and staging base, was to serve for resupply.

Krueger, on receiving data on Allied Air Forces' requirements, directed the BACKHANDER Task Force to build a small strip at Cape Gloucester for air supply at once, a 100-by-5,000 foot runway by D plus 10; a second 100-by- 5,000-foot runway, capable of expansion to 6,000 feet, by D Plus 30; and also overruns, parallel taxiways, roads, and airdrome facilities. (Appendix 4, Annex 4, Engr, to ALAMO FO 5, 17 Dec 43, in ALAMO Force G-3 Jnl DEXTERITY No. 8.)

Air Operations

With the new fields in the Markham Valley and at Finschhafen in operation, Allied Air Forces' aerial preparations f6r DEXTERITY were the most extensive yet seen in the Southwest Pacific. (This subsection is based on Craven and Cate, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, PP332-38.)

They included, besides daily P-38 photographic missions, long-range search missions by PBY's of the Seventh Fleet's Patrol Wing 10, RAAF Catalinas, and Fifth Air Force B-24's, and bombing and strafing.

Air attacks, which had been under way against New Britain since October, began on a large scale in late November. Cape Gloucester and Gasmata were the main targets. Arawe was avoided until 14 December in order to keep from warning the Japanese. During December Kenney's planes attacked Gasmata or Gloucester, or both, nearly every day and sometimes twice a day. As General Whitehead said, Cape Gloucester was "tailor made" for air operations. The target area lay along the beach and was long and narrow. (Memo, Lt Col Paul Weyrauch, Asst Arty Off ALAMO, and Lt Col Carl A. Fields, Air Off ALAMO, for CON ALAMO, 10 NOY 43, no sub, in ALAMO Force G-3 Jnl DEXTERITY NO, 3.)

During December Kenney's planes flew 1,845 sorties over Gloucester, dropped 3,926 tons of bombs, and fired 2,095,488 rounds of machine gun ammunition. The chief targets were Tuluvu airfield, antiaircraft guns, supply dumps, and the barge staging points. The airfield was knocked out of action early in the operation and stayed that way.

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