The Joint Chiefs of Staff, having approved the additional Pacific reinforcements and heard the opinions of the Pacific delegates, immediately accepted the proposal that South and Southwest Pacific operations in 1943 be limited to Task Two, and turned to consideration of new orders for Halsey and MacArthur. (Min, JCS mtg, 21 Mar 43.) Neither the limitation of operations to Task Two nor the inclusion of Woodlark and Kiriwina was an entirely new idea. The joint U.S. Strategic Committee, commissioned by the joint Staff Planners to prepare a plan for the defeat of Japan, in February had considered the means for, and limiting factors affecting, the operations planned at Casablanca, and recommended that only Task Two be carried out in 1943. The committee felt that the capture of Rabaul, which could not be undertaken until fairly late in 1943, might interfere with the recapture of Burma, an operation which was considered to be on a priority with the advance through the Central Pacific and the support of China. The Strateaic Committee had also recommended capture of Woodlark and Kiriwina. (Memo, Secretariat JUSSC for Secretariat JPS, 13 Feb 43, sub: Opus in S and SW Pac Areas During 1943 and Their Relation to the Concept of Mil Strategy for 1943 as Set Forth in the Anfa Papers, with Incls A and B, attached to JI'S 67/2, 4 Jan 43, title: Proposed Dir for a Campaign Plan for the Defeat of Japan, ABC 381 Japan (8-27-42), Sec 1. This paper is also filed as JPS 67/3, 15 Feb 43, title: Opus in S and SW Pac in 1943. The Casablanca Conference was held at Anfa and is often referred to as the Arda Conference, although its code name was SYMBOL. The joint U.S. Strategic Committee was renamed the joint War Plans Committee in March 1943, and should not be confused with the joint Strategic Survey Committee, which was composed of senior officers who advised on broad strategic matters.) Seizure of these islands would bring Rabaul and the northern Solomons within range of fighters and medium bombers, and would thus compensate for the absence of enough heavy bombers. The islands, which lie outside the bad weather belt that frequently blankets the southeast tip of New Guinea, would also serve as staging bases for the rapid switching of air units between the South and Southwest Pacific. In December of the previous year, Admiral Halsey had suggested to MacArthur the establishment of an air base at Woodlark or Kiriwina, and offered to furnish some of the necessary troops. This project had the approval of Marshall and Kina. (See COMSOPAC to COMSOWESPAC [CINCSWPA], 17 Dec 42; COMINCH to COMSOPAC, 18 Dec 42; Memo, King for Marshall, 2o Feb 43, sub: Instal of Airstrips on Kiriwina Island or Woodlark Island; Memo, Marshall for King, 22 Fell 43, same sub. All in CNO File A 16-3 (4) No. 1, Warfare Opus, SWPA, 1943, and made available by Lt. Grace P. Hays, USN, of the Hist Sec, JCS. See also Halsey and Bryan, Admiral Halsey's Story, p. 154.) The seizure of Woodlark and Kiriwina was included as part of Plan ELKTON Of 12 February, but had been omitted from the version of ELKTON which Sutherland brought to Washington. Timing Although the joint Chiefs had accepted the delegates' proposals in principle, they were concerned about the timing of operations. They brought the Pacific representatives and some of the Joint Planners into their meeting on Sunday morning, 21 March, to help settle matters. The Southwest Pacific delegates argued that lack of adequate forces would keep the South Pacific from beginning operations against New Georgia and southern Bougainville until after the Southwest Pacific had seized the Huon Peninsula in New Guinea, an operation that would take place about August. This sequence was approximately that set forth in the ELKTON plan. The South Pacific delegates, especially Harmon, felt that it would be better to move against New Georgia before the capture of the Huon Peninsula. A reasonable margin of safety would require that enough strength be mustered for a drive right through to Bougainville after Munda's capture. The views of the' Southwest Pacific delegates on New Georgia are somewhat curious. At an early meeting of the conference, Rear Adm. Charles M. Cooke, Jr., of Admiral King's staff, had asked Sutherland for MacArthur's opinion on the operation against Munda for which the South Pacific was then preparing. Sutherland replied that his chief would be unable to make recommendations until he had been "apprised" of the operations, the forces involved, and the amount of assistance he would be expected to contribute. (Notes on Pac Conf Held in Mar 43, 3d mtg, 13 Mar 43. It is difficult to comprehend Sutherland's statement as reported in the official record. MacArthur's message regarding Wilkinson's visit to Brisbane indicated that an exchange of views had taken place. According to the COMSOPAC War Diary, 4 March 1943 entry, MacArthur was informed Oil 4 March that South Pacific headquarters hoped to seize New Georgia about 10 April. Halsey discussed the action with Sutherland and Kenney at his headquarters in Noumba, New Caledonia and made it clear that MacArthur would not have asked for any assistance except for limited air action against the Shortland Islands. Finally, the 28 February ELKTON, which Sutherland read to the conference, specifically called for an invasion of New Georgia and made an estimate of the forces that would be needed.) Admiral King was disturbed by the idea of postponing action in the Solomons, for the Japanese fleet was no longer pinned down by the Guadalcanal Campaign. If the Solomon operations were to be postponed, he suggested, the American fleet units assigned to the South Pacific might be more profitably employed elsewhere, perhaps in the Central Pacific. The joint Chiefs directed the joint Planners to draft a plan, but did not immediately attempt to decide on the timing of operations. (Min, JCS mtg, 21 Mar 43.) In the message the joint Chiefs sent to MacArthur, Nimitz, and Halsey about the additional reinforcements, they stated that "prevailing opinion" in Washington favored launching the invasion of Munda after the establishment of an air base at Woodlark and possibly after the conclusion of the planned advance in New Guinea. MacArthur replied at once to express his vigorous opposition to what he, Sutherland, and Kenney called "divergent action," that is, concurrent operations against New Georgia and New Guinea by the South and Southwest Pacific Areas. Neither area, he asserted, would be strong enough for independent action. The South Pacific would need strong air support from its neighbor in the New Georgia action, and there simply were not enough planes. He therefore recommended that the New Georgia invasion be postponed at least until the seizure of the Lae-Madang area guaranteed control of the Vitiaz Strait between the Huon Peninsula and western New Britain, prevented the Japanese from moving reinforcements to Rabaul from the west, and enabled the Southwest Pacific to support and protect its neighbor by bombing Rabaul heavily. Then New Georgia could be taken, and the South and Southwest Pacific Areas, now mutually supporting, could begin the reduction of Rabaul. (Rad from MacArthur, 25 Mar 43, CM-IN 13461; Comments by Gen Kenney on draft MS of this volume, attached to Ltr, Gen Kenney to Maj Gen Albert C. Smith, Chief of Mil Hist, 11 Nov 53, no sub, OCMH.) The question of timing was never finally determined by the joint Chiefs. Speaking at their meeting on 28 March when the joint Planners' draft of a new directive for Halsey and MacArthur was considered, King again emphasized the dangers of allowing the South Pacific to stand idly by while waiting for the northeast New Guinea coast to be cleared. Marshall, whose talents included great skill at reconciling divergent points of view, offered the opinion that both MacArthur and Halsey would take every advantage to press forward whenever Japanese resistance was weak. The Japanese would find themselves in a difficult position. If they strengthened the Solomons at the expense of New Guinea MacArthur could move forward, and Halsey could take advantage of any shifts of troops to New Guinea. Halsey himself, although willing to postpone the advance against New Georgia until after Woodlark and Kiriwina were taken, had stated that he would not remain idle. He intended to hit the Japanese with land-based aircraft and to be prepared to move into New Georgia and southern Bougainville if the Japanese weakened their defenses to such an extent that he cou a vance without precipitating a major engagement. King withdrew his objections, subject to the proviso that MacArthur submit detailed plans showing timing and sequence of operations and the composition of task forces. (Min, JCS Mtg, 28 Mar 43; COMSOPAC War Diary, 28 Mar 43 entry.) Command One final question, command, remained to be decided before the joint Chiefs could issue a new directive. This question was settled fairly quickly. (But see Rad, Sutherland to MacArthur, 25 Mar 43, CM-OUT 9499.) The directive Of 2 July 1942 had provided that Tasks Two and Three would be under MacArthur's direction. This principle continued to be accepted by the joint Chiefs without serious challenge. Both the Army and the Navy had been arguing somewhat heatedly over the question of a unified command for the entire Pacific, but the warmth of their debate did not seriously interfere with the preparation of the new directive. The possibility of mutual co- operation by Halsey and MacArthur was rejected. Some naval officers, including King, sugcrested that since Halsey would be operating west of the line of demarcation (longitude 159 degrees east), it should be moved westward again, but did not press the point. (Kenney, General Kenney Reports, p. 213, indicates that discussions of this point in and out of the conference room were heated. The minutes do not yield much information about the emotions of the protagonists.) It was agreed that MacArthur would command the operations by the Southwest Pacific forces, and that Halsey's operations with South Pacific forces in the Solomons would be under MacArthur's "general directives." One particularly important aspect of the command question related to the Pacific Fleet units that would take part in the operations. Admiral King always opposed any tendency to break up the Pacific Fleet by permanently assigning its units to any particular area, for then the fleet would lose part of its striking power as well as strategic and tactical mobility. For these reasons King had previously proposed that Nimitz' authority be extended to include the waters of the Southwest Pacific Area, but had apparently never insisted on this as a solution. The joint Chiefs settled the matter on 28 March by agreeing that all units of the Pacific Ocean Areas other than those assigned by the joint Chiefs to task forces engaged in the operations would remain under Nimitz' general control. This meant that MacArthur would exercise strategic direction only over Halsey's forces that were engaged in the Solomons west of longitude 159 degrees east, and that Halsey's other forces, as well as Pacific Fleet units not assigned by the joint Chiefs, would remain under Nimitz. (The command question is treated in the following documents: Ltr, COMINCH-CNO [King] to CofS USA [Marshall], 6 Jan 43, no sub ' included in JCS 112/1, 14 Oct 42, title: Mil Sit in the Pac, ABC 370.26 (7-8-42), Sec i; Memo, Gen Handy for Capt Connolly, Naval War Plans Div, 29 Dec 42, no sub, OPD 384 PTO (12- 29-42), SCC 2, Case 43; Memo, Marshall for COMINCH, 8 Jan 43, sub: Strategic Dir of Opus in the SW Pac, same file; Memo, COMINCH for CofS USA, 18 Feb 43, sub: Opus in SOPAC-SWPA, OPD Exec Off File No. 10, Item 67c; Memo, CofS USA for CNO, 19 Feb 43, same sub, same file; JCS 238/3, 21 Mar 43, title: Plan of Opns for Seizure of Solomon IslandsNew Guinea-New Britain-New Ireland Area; JCS 238/4, 27 Mar 43, title: Plan of Olins for Seizure of Solomon Islands-New Guinea-New Britain-New Ireland Area- Offen Opns in the S and SW Pac During 1943; JCS 238/5/D, 28 Mar 43, title: DirPlan of Opus for Seizure of Solomon Islands-New Guinea-New Britain-New Ireland Area; and Min JCS Hug, 28 Mar 43.) With the question of command settled and the problem of timing left largely to the commanders' discretion, the joint Chiefs on 28 March approved a directive providing for offensive operations by MacArthur and Halsey in 1943. (Min, JCS mtg, 28 Mar 43.) The 28 March Directive Brief crisp orders were dispatched to Halsey, Nimitz, and MacArthur on 28 March. The joint Chiefs canceled their directive of 2 July 1942. They ordered MacArthur and Halsey to establish airfields on Woodlark and Kiriwina, to seize the Lac-Salamaua- Finschhafen-Madang area of New Guinea and occupy western New Britain, and to seize and occupy the Solomon Islands as far as southern Bougainville. The operations were intended to inflict losses on the Japanese, to deny the target areas to the enemy, to contain Japanese forces in the Pacific by retaining the initiative, and to prepare for the ultimate seizure of the Bismarck Archipelago. As previously indicated, operations would be conducted under MacArthur's command. The advances in the Solomons were to be under the direct command of Halsey, who would operate under MacArthur's strategic direction. Except for those units assigned by the joint Chiefs of Staff to task forces engaged in these campaigns, all elements of the Pacific Ocean Areas would remain under Nimitz. MacArthur was directed to submit detailed plans including the composition of task forces and sequence and timing of operations. (JCS 238/5/D, 28 Mar 43.) With this directive, the joint Chiefs set the program for 1943 in the South and Southwest Pacific. There can be no doubt that they were disappointed by their inability to approach the goals set so freely at Casablanca, but the 28 March directive possessed the virtue of being based on assumptions that were realistic, even pessimistic. The defined objectives were believed to be surely attainable. More Selecting Objectives Introduction and Preliminary Theater Planning The Pacific Military Conference Preparation of the Directive of 28 March 1943 Back to Table of Contents -- Operation Cartwheel Back to World War Two: US Army List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 2002 by Coalition Web, Inc. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com