With Allied strategic objectives for 1943 determined at Casablanca, the next task facing the Army and Navy commanders in Washington and in the Pacific was the selection of exact tactical objectives. Two considerations would be paramount in making a choice: the military value of the objectives, and the resources that would be available. The process of selection was not completed until a full-dress conference involving the joint Chiefs of Staff, the joint Staff Planners, and representatives of all the Pacific commands had met in Washington. (See below, pp. 11-15.) Such a conference was made necessary by the large disparity between the size of the forces General MacArthur asked for to take his objectives and the size of the forces that were actually available. Preliminary Theater Planning General MacArthur's Plans In the Southwest Pacific, General MacArthur had begun planning for the offensive against Rabaul at an early date. His plans for Tasks Two and Threemutually supporting advances along two axes, culminating in a converging attack against Rabaul-were the same in early January 1943 as those outlined in July of the previous year. But his forces could not start Task Two until the Allies had successfully completed the Guadalcanal and Papuan campaigns in the first two months of 1943. There were not enough ground troops to undertake any offensive moves immediately, MacArthur reported, and there were far from enough air forces to conduct the campaigns. .(Rad to MacArthur, 7 Jan 43, CM- OUT 2273; Rad to MacArthur, 8 Jan 43, CM-OUT 2833; Rad from MacArthur, 10 Jan 43, CM-IN 4574.) In order to advance against Rabaul in one continuous movement, MacArthur wished to assemble all the necessary forces before starting the offensive, and substantial reinforcements would be required. In both South and Southwest Pacific Areas there were troops equivalent to fifteen and two-thirds American, New Zealand, and Australian divisions, but not all were trained and equipped for offensive action. Of the six trained Southwest Pacific divisions, five would be resting and reorganizing for some time to come, after fighting in Guadalcanal, Papua, and the Middle East. There were seven trained divisions--six American and one New Zealand-- as well as some separate infantry and cavalry regiments in the South Pacific. Three of the divisions and one regiment had seen service on Guadalcanal and were enjoying a well-deserved rest. The equivalent therefore of only five divisions plus several separate regiments could be counted as ready for immediate use. In naval strength, MacArthur was limited to cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. He had no carriers, no battleships, and few cargo ships, transports, and landing craft. The greater part of the Pacific Fleet, including aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers, and destroyers, was operating in the South Pacific Area. Both areas boasted a total air strength of about 1,850 land-based planes of all types- bombers, fighters, and cargo planes. These planes came from the U.S. Army Air Forces, the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Marine Corps, the Royal New Zealand Air Force, and the Royal Australian Air Force. (Information on strength and plans at this time is drawn from GHQ SWPA, ELKTON Plan for the Seizure and Occupation of the New Britain-New Guinea-New Ireland Area, 12 and 28 Feb 43, and from U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, The Employment of Forces Under the Southwest Pacific Command (Washington, 1947), P. 18. The latter is an almost verbatim copy of a series of monographs prepared during and immediately after the war by the Historical Section, G-3, GHQ, SWPA.) At this time General MacArthur was looking forward to targets well beyond Rabaul; he had set his sights on the Philippine Islands. In February 1943 he and his staff concluded that the completion of the campaign against Rabaul could secure for the Allies "important, but not decisive advantages." These advantages would certainly aid future operations but, except for the destruction of precious shipping, would do little damage to Japan's main economic structure. Since the Netherlands Indies contained the great economic wealth, especially oil, taken by Japan in 1941 and 1942, a decisive blow could be struck, MacArthur reasoned, by cutting the lines of communication between Japan and the Indies. As the Philippine Islands lay squarely athwart all sea and air routes between Japan and the Indies, the Allies could cut them by establishing air and naval bases in the Philippines. General MacArthur concluded that he should move to the Philippines by advancing westward along New Guinea's north coast, then swinging northwest through the intermediate islands into the Philippines. The advance along the New Guinea coast might be started about the time that the siege of Rabaul began, but could not safely start until Rabaul was neutralized lest ships and planes based there harry or obstruct the advance. (GHQ SWPA, Estimate of the Situation and Rough Draft, RENO Plan, 25 Feb 43, OCMH.) This plan for advancing to the Philippines, called RENO, had not yet been transmitted to Washington. It looked far into the future. There were not enough forces to inaugurate the Rabaul plan, ELKTON. Certainly not enough were available to begin RENO. Admiral Halsey's Plan In the South Pacific, Admiral Halsey looked on Munda Point in New Georgia as the most likely first objective for his forces under Task Two. (The name "Munda" is apparently a phonetic rendition of a native term rather than a reflection of Caesar's glory.) The Japanese had started an airfield at the Australian Methodist Mission on Munda in November 1942 when their attempts to recapture Henderson Field on Guadalcanal had faltered. The new field was intended to serve as an advanced air base in an other attempt to retake Henderson Field in 1943. The Japanese exhibited skill and cunning in concealing their activities at Munda. Even though the Allies had long known that Munda Point was being used as a staging area, they were not sure that an airfield was under construction until 3 December. The Japanese had rigged cables to the tops of the palm trees, then cut the trunks away and left the cables holding up the treetops. Thus hidden from aerial observation, they built their runway and then cut down the camouflage. The day they completed the runway, 15 December 1942, the Japanese decided to build a second airfield at Vila on nearby Kolombangara. (Southeast Area Naval Operations, 1, Japanese Monogr No. 48 (OCMH) in the series Japanese Studies in World War II, 47, 52; ONI USN, Combat Narratives: Solomon Islands Campaign, X, Operations in the New Georgia Area, 21 June-5 August 1943 [Washington, 1944], 1-2.) The airfields at Munda and Vila, only 180 nautical miles from Henderson Field, presented a serious threat to the Allied positions in the Solomons and New Hebrides. In Allied hands, Munda would be invaluable for continuing the advance against Rabaul, and Admiral Halsey's forces pressed on. They capped their success on Guadalcanal with the bloodless seizure of the Russell Islands on 21 February 1943. This shortened the airline distance to Munda by sixty-five miles and provided torpedo boat and landing craft bases to assist in the capture of all New Georgia, an operation then being planned by Halsey and his subordinates. Munda Point was, physically, one of the best sites for an air base in the Solomon Islands. Strategically, it was well situated to support an advance to Bougainville, which would be necessary if South Pacific aircraft were to strike Rabaul effectively. (From Henderson Field to the Shortland Islands is 285 nautical miles, to Kahili, 300 miles, to Buka Passage, 363 miles. From Munda, which is within fighter range of Henderson and the Russells, to the Shortlands is ioo nautical miles, to Kahili, 125 miles, to Buka Passage, 234 miles, and to Rabaul, 394 miles.) South Pacific forces would have to use aircraft carriers to advance directly from Henderson Field to Bougainville, but possession of Munda Point would enable them to advance progressively under cover of land- based fighter planes and bombers and obviate the need to use precious carriers close to islands that were studded with enemy airfields. (Adrn William F. Halsey, Jr., Narrative Account of the South Pacific Campaign, 3 Sep 44, OCMH; Lt Gen Millard F. Harmon, The Army in the South Pacific, 6 Jun 44, P. 7, OCMH; Fleet Admiral William F. Halsey and Lt Comdr J. Bryan, III, Admiral Halsey's Story (New York: Whittlesey House, 1947), P. 154.) More Selecting Objectives Introduction and Preliminary Theater Planning The Pacific Military Conference Preparation of the Directive of 28 March 1943 Back to Table of Contents -- Operation Cartwheel Back to World War Two: US Army List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 2002 by Coalition Web, Inc. 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