Neither MacArthur nor Halsey could start his offensive yet. They had not yet agreed on a co-ordinated plan, and they lacked enough forces to begin. Allotment of forces would depend on decisions by the joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff, who at Casablanca had decided on the program for 1943 without knowing how many troops, planes, and ships would be needed for Rabaul. Shortly before leaving Washington for Casablanca, the joint Chiefs had instructed MacArthur to submit detailed plans for carrying out their directive of 2 July 1942 and authorized him to exchange views with Nimitz and Halsey. They suggested personal meetings by the commanders or by their staffs to prepare a broad plan that would enable theJoint Chiefs to give careful consideration to such matters as timing, reinforcement, supply, and the transfer of command over Tasks Two and Three to MacArthur. (Rad to MacArthur, 8 Jan 43, CM-OUT 2833; Rad to Maj Gen Rush B. Lincoln, New Caledonia (to be passed to Halsey), 8 Jan 43, CM-OUT2834; Rad to Lt Gen Delos C. Emmons, Hawaii (to be passed to Nimitz), 8 Jan 43, CM-OUT 2835; Rad to MacArthur, 11 Jan 43, CM-OUT 3664.) Maintaining that it was inconvenient for high commanders to undertake long journeys away from their headquarters, MacArthur radioed his ideas for Tasks Two and Three to Nimitz and Halsey. On 11 February Halsey sent his deputy commander, Rear Adm. Theodore S. Wilkinson, to Brisbane to begin a co-ordinated plan. (Rad from MacArthur, 27 Jan 43, CM-IN 12553; Rad from MacArthur, 11 Feb 43, CM-IN 5610; Commander, South Pacific Area and South Pacific Force, War Diary: 1 January 1943-30 June 1944 (hereafter cited as COMSOPAC War Diary), 11-2, 14- 15 Feb 43 entries.) Shortly thereafter MacArthur asked the joint Chiefs for permission to send his chief of staff and several other officers to Washington to explain his plans. The joint Chiefs approved, but stipulated that representatives from Halsey's and Nimitz' areas should also come for a general discussion of Pacific problems. (Rad from MacArthur, 15 Feb 43, CM-IN 7418; Rads to MacArthur, 16 Feb 43, CM-OUT 5656 and CM-OUT 566o; Rads to Harmon (for Halsey), 16 Feb 43, CM- OUT 5658 and CM-OUT 5661; Rads to Emmons (for Nimitz), 16 Feb 43, CM-OUT 5657 and CM-OUT 5659. The Pacific representatives timed their trip to accompany Brig. Gen. Albert C. Wederneyer to Washington. Wedemeyer, a member of the Operations Division of the War Department General Staff and of the joint and Combined Staff Planners, visited the Southwest Pacific to explain the Casablanca decisions to MacArthur and to become better acquainted with the area.) The delegates reached Washington on 10 March and two days later met with Admiral King and various officers from the Army and Navy planning and logistical staffs. (To represent him, Halsey had selected General Harmon, Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in the South Pacific Area; /Maj. Gen. Nathan F. Twining, commanding the, Thirteenth Air Force; and two staff officers, Brig. Gen. Dewitt Peck, USMC, his war plans officer, and Capt. Miles R. Browning, USN, his chief of staff. MacArthur sent Maj. Gen. Richard K. Sutherland, his chief of staff; Brig. Gen. Stephen J. Chamberlin, his operations officer; and Lt. Gen. George C. Kenney, Commander, Allied Air Forces, SWPA. Representing Nimitz were his deputy and chief of staff, Vice Adm. Raymond A. Spruance, General Emmons, and Capt. Forrest P. Sherman. Present at the first meeting besides King and the Pacific delegates, were Lt: Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army; Lt. Gen. Stanley D. Embick, of the joint Strategic Survey Committee; Maj. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer, Chief of the Air Staff; Maj. Gen. Thomas T. Handy, Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, War Department General Staff; Maj. Gens. LeRoy Lutes and Lucius D. Clay, of Headquarters, Army Service Forces; Vice Adm. Russell Willson, of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee; Rear Adm. Charles M. Cooke, Jr.; and Wedemeyer.) Thus began the series of meetings, generally known as the Pacific Military Conference, which were to produce a new directive for operations. This conference constituted an excellent example of the detailed and undramatic, but absolutely essential, spadework that had to precede major decisions affecting the course of the war in the Pacific. The ELKTON Plan After Admiral King opened the first session on 12 March with a strategic review of the world situation, Maj. Gen. Richard K. Sutherland, MacArthur's chief of staff, presented the ELKTON plan to the conference. (Notes on Pac Conf Held in Mar 43, 1st Mtg, 12 Mar 43. George C. Kenney, General Kenney Reports: A Personal History of the Pacific War (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1949), devotes one chapter (VIII) to this conference.) This plan, bearing the date 28 February 1943, was a revision of the first ELKTON plan, which was dated 12 February, and prescribed the same general scheme of maneuver as MacArthur's earlier plans for the reduction of Rabaul. MacArthur had prepared it on the assumption that he would control both the Southwest and South Pacific forces for Tasks Two and Three, for the joint Chiefs' directive had stated explicitly that these would be conducted under his command. Halsey, according to MacArthur, had already assented to ELKTON. ELKTON'S intelligence estimate pointed out that the Japanese generally controlled the north coast of New Guinea northwest of BUDa, as well as New Britain, New Ireland, and the Solomons northwest of Guadalcanal. Japanese defenses were concentrated, as were Allied holdings in the region, in the vicinity of airfields. Except for the perimeters around the airfields and naval bases, the land areas were pretty well unoccupied. Between 79,000 and 94,000 Japanese troops were thought to be stationed in the New Guinea-Bismarck Archipelago-Solomons area. Enemy air strength was, estimated at 383 land- based planes, while 4 battleships, 2 aircraft carriers, 14 cruisers, 11 seaplane tenders, about 40 destroyers, numerous auxiliaries, and about 50 merchant ships of 3,000 tons or over were on hand for operations. It was expected that the Japanese, if attacked, could be immediately reinforced by 10,000 to 12,000 troops and about 250 planes as well as major portions of the Combined Fleet from the Netherlands Indies, Japanese home waters, and the Philippines Islands. In six months, 615 more aircraft could be committed, and 10 or 15 divisions might be dispatched if shipping was available. Having described the forbidding nature of the enemy stronghold, General Sutherland proceeded, in his presentation of the ELKTON plan, to outline the contemplated Allied moves. The execution of Tasks Two and Three would require mutually supporting, co-ordinated advances along two lines: one, by Southwest Pacific forces in the west, from New Guinea to New Britain; the other, by South Pacific forces in the east, through the Solomons. ELKTON broke Tasks Two and Three into five operations: 1. Seizure of airdromes on the Huon Peninsula of New Guinea to provide air support for operations against New Britain; 2. Seizure of Munda Point as well as other airdromes on New Georgia to cover operations against New Ireland in the Bismarck Archipelago and the remainder of the Solomons; 3. Seizure of airdromes on New Britain and Bougainville to support operations against Rabaul and Kavieng in New Ireland; 4. Capture of Kavieng and the isolation of Rabaul, although it was considered possible that Kavieng might be taken after Rabaul; 5. Capture of Rabaul. The timing of these missions was not rigidly fixed, nor was there an estimate as to the time required to carry them out. Large forces, assembled in advance, were required to execute the five operations Of ELKTON-and there was the rub from the point of view of the Washington planners faced with global responsibilities. They listened as Sutherland read a detailed accounting of forces on hand and forces requested. The plan, in brief, called for five additional divisions, fortyfive additional air groups, or about twice the 1,850 land-based planes then on hand, and an unspecified number of warships, transports, cargo ships, and landing craft sufficient to mount and support all the operations. (GHQ SWPA, ELKTON Plan .... 28 Feb 43.) The official records do not disclose with what emotions the officers from the various Washington agencies received the information about the necessary reinforcements, but it is not difficult to imagine that some were surprised. At Casablanca the Americans had assumed the capture of Rabaul in 1943 as a matter of course, and had confidently discussed the possibility of advancing beyond Rabaul. The Pacific delegates learned immediately that there was virtually no chance for them to get all the reinforcements that they wanted .(Rad, Sutherland to MacArthur, 12 Mar 43, CM-OUT 1930.) It was possible to effect some increases in the number of aircraft, but to give General MacArthur everything he asked would have cut too deeply into the bomber offensive against Germany. There were several trained divisions available in the United States, but there were not enough transports to ship them overseas in time, or to supply them after their arrival. Everyone at the conference was convinced of the necessity for offensive operations, but it was recognized that the operations would be limited by the available means. Admiral Halsey's representatives, Lt. Gen' Millard F. Harmon of the Army, Brig. Gen. Dewitt Peck of the Marine Corps, and Capt. Miles R. Browning of the Navy, endorsed the ELKTON plan, but some of the Navy planners in Washington were dubious of its value. They believed it would tie up too many ships and too many troops for too long a time, and would not achieve decisive results. The Washington planners informed the Pacific representatives that only two or three more divisions and a few more planes could be sent overseas. (For the detailed record of debate and discussion at the various meetings of the Pacific Military Conference, see Notes on Pac Conf Held in Mar 43, with Inclosures and Annexes. See below, Bibliographical Note.) The solution therefore was to replace the ambitious directive of 2 July 1942 with something more realistic. Before deciding on a new directive, the 'Joint Chiefs instructed the Pacific delegates to decide what offensive operations they thought could be undertaken in 1943 with the allotted forces. It was understood that the Pacific commanders would not be committed by their subordinates' recommendations. (Min, JCS mtg, 19 Mar 43.) The Pacific delegates answered promptly. They stated that the South and Southwest Pacific forces would be able to advance as far as the southeast part of Bougainville, seize eastern New Guinea up to Madang, extend to Woodlark and Kiriwina in the Trobriand Islands, and advance to Cape Gloucester in western New Britain. These operations were essentially the second task of the directive Of 2 July 1942. (Memo by Reps of the Pac Areas, in JCS 238/2, 1 Mar 43.) With this statement, the Pacific Military Conference as such came to a close, although the Pacific representatives remained in Washington a few days longer at the request of the joint Chiefs of Staff. More Selecting Objectives Introduction and Preliminary Theater Planning The Pacific Military Conference Preparation of the Directive of 28 March 1943 Back to Table of Contents -- Operation Cartwheel Back to World War Two: US Army List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 2002 by Coalition Web, Inc. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com