Hannibal Crosses the Alps
A Route Examined and
a Proposed Alternate Route

Hannibal's Line of March Considerations:
Proposing a Route

By Russ Lockwood

Taking all of the above, I propose a different route, for the more I looked at my research, the more patterns I noticed that did not fit into any one author's work. Indeed, it seemed as if they were nipping at the edges in trying to reconcile various passages of geography and detail. And yet, it comes down to Carthaginian intentions and a few key points that may have been dismissed by earlier authors, not so much as what's been stated, but what can be inferred as well.

Begin at the End

The key to the puzzle is where Hannibal exited the Alps and which tribal lands he entered in Italy. It seems Polybius' Insubres and Livy's Taurini are incompatible, but I believe that idea false. I draw on the following passage of Polybius to explain the difference.

"A little while later, after his army had regained its condition, Hannibal learned that the tribe of the Taurini, who lived at the foot of the Alps, had fallen out with the Insubres and were inclined to be suspicious of the Carthaginians." [Polybius, III, 60]

Livy referred to this as a "war" [Livy XXI, 39] and the result was that Hannibal's forces were not attacked as they staggered into the plains of Italy. However, from that passage, Hannibal was not aware of the falling out of the two tribes during the march. As far as he was concerned, every tribe was still friendly, or at least neutral, towards the Carthaginians. And if the two tribes had a falling out, then beforehand, they had at least a neutral stance if not an understanding. However, after he reaches the plain, Hannibal learns this is not the case. The use of the word "inclined" in the translation indicates a change of heart towards the Carthaginians.

Do not forget Magilus and the other Gallic chieftains. Nothing is mentioned of them past the Rhone River speech, but as they were received as guides, envoys, and even allies, so they may have continued on with the Carthaginian army. Whether they made the entire trip is open to speculation.

And finally, just as Polybius interjects a diatribe against historians attributing Hannibal's crossing to gods leading him by the hand over the mountains, so Livy injects a vitriolic condemnation of historians who claim Hannibal used the Pennine Alps or Northern Alps passes. He specifically mentions Hannibal did not enter the Salassi tribal lands (just north of the Insubres), and specifically says Hannibal entered the lands of the Taurini.

Strabo mentions four passes in particular that were known at the time of Polybius. However, you can bet the locals knew a whole lot more of them. Some are more or less passable to an army compared to a single traveller, but the Alps contains more than four--or five if you use Varro's list.

The placement in the list is important. Both place the pass in a more southern area, between the coast road pass and the St. Bernard passes. Whether or not the words "Hannibal's Pass" or "Pass Used by Hannibal" were really in the orignal text may be a stretch, but considering that Hannibal appeared like a "thunderbolt" from the Alps to the Roman historian Florus, and that Juvenal tells of Hannibal's exploits being the stuff of "speech-day recitations" (Satires, X), it would not be out of line to consider tagging Hannibal's name to a pass. This is balanced by regarding such tagging as over-enthusiasm. Still, it places the passes towards the southern end of the Alps nearer the coastal road than Bernards passes of the Alps.

This not only limits the number of passes, it presents an aiming point. How was Hannibal going to get to the Taurini?

Intentions

From a strategic perspective, Hannibal tried to break into Italy and take the war to the Romans. He harbored the idea, confirmed with pre-invasion intelligence, that Gallic tribes hated the Romans and would join his quest to defeat Rome. Hannibal's version of a strategic victory would be to force Rome to the bargaining table and overturn the First Punic War terms. Carthage, and not Rome, would become the pre-eminent power in the Western Med.

He may have entertained notions, perhaps beforehand and certainly as he marched up and down the peninsula, that military victories could separate Rome from its allies. That most territories stayed loyal to Rome would not be known to him for years, but his plan hinged on finding allies in Italy, as he could not bring an overwhelming force with him from Spain.

Not all tribes would be so inclined at the start, and thus he needed to pave the way for the march through diplomacy. Again, his envoys returned with a positive response. He would receive guides (Magilus and other chieftains) to show him the way to reach Italy. Yet there were two stumbling blocks: the city of Massilia and the Roman army he knew was coming.

Massilia he could detour around, in part to avoid the idea of a siege, and in part to avoid allowing Rome's allies intelligence on his whereabouts. Now, the idea of hiding a 50,000-man army seems absurd, but given the distance and wild nature of the terrain, it is not too much of a pie-in-the-sky idea to at least be able to move well past Massilia before the Romans could receive word. After all, the Romans seemed surprised when they discovered Hannibal was north of the Ebro River--and they were certainly scrutinizing the situation.

The Roman army would be a different matter. Just as he could not be bogged down with a siege of Massilia, so he could not be intercepted by a Roman army. If he was to break the fabric of the Roman republic and its allies, he had to take the war to Italy.

As it turns out, the two armies did not know each other's location though they were roughly 80km apart, but they did find out fast. Hannibal, being a competent commander, would have taken such scouting and reaction into account during the planning stage.

Hannibal probably planned to bypass Massilia, leaving a rearguard if necessary to prevent scouts from following, and head up the Durance River Valley for a bit, then cut eastward and skirt the Alps to the south, eventually crossing at the Col de Lombard, or perhaps further north at the Col de Larche. Both lead into the Taurini lands. This would be far enough away from the coast road to escape detection, and yet, it is a fairly straight line into Italy.

This is entirely speculation about the route planned but not taken. A couple points serve to make this a credible invasion route. The Way of Hercules, an ancient path, was a well-known route through the Alps. If Hannibal was trying to get to the Boii, Taurini or Insubres by the quickest route without using the coast road, this would be it. If envoy/guide chieftains from your allied tribes were heading west to reach Hannibal, they would not be wandering the mid to northern Alps, they'd be taking a direct line, too. If they did wander across at mid-Alps, then they would have been prepared to guide Hannibal when he was forced north up the Rhone Valley. However, Hannibal used guides from Brancus and also accepted guides a little later on from the treacherous tribe that led them into an ambush just below the Pass. It would seem they did not know about the middle Alpine Passes at all--Mont Genevre, Mont Cenis, Col du Clapier--or the Northern ones of the St. Bernards. Otherwise, they would have led Hannibal's army there during the march. No credit is given to Magilus and his chieftains as guides, but both Livy and Polybius mention other guides during the narrative.

Now We Start at the Beginning

Map from: The South of France: Provence and the French Alps.
Jumbo Map (extremely slow: 534K)

Hannibal may have gotten a slightly later start than expected by waiting for his troops to assemble from winter quarters. He crossed the Ebro and headed towards Gaul, subduing tribes in between the Ebro and Pyrenees. As part of this campaign, he took losses of some significance, which would also cause further delay.

Still, the march proceeded through the Pyrenees, and thanks to diplomacy, overwhelming force, and bribery, placated the tribes enough to let him pass unmolested along the coast. At some point before reaching--or upon reaching--the Rhone River delta, he cut away from the sea and moved inland to a spot where the Rhone River is but a "single stream."

Though he may have been a bit behind schedule, he still figured to be ahead of any Roman army and still had to bypass Massilia. Indeed, Polybius specifically says Hannibal arrived at the river "long before anyone [anyone Roman, that is] expected him." He crossed at the first available place: Arelate (Arles), a place whose name means in Celtic, "near the marshes."

We have to go back to Hannibal's intentions. He was marching along a coast he had not visited, and there is no mention of guides. He's trying to get to Italy the quickest way possible, but to bypass Massilia. And that means hugging the coast until he gets to the first big river, then turns upriver until he finds a place at the apex of the delta where there's a crossing spot at a "single stream." Those four days, at what you'd call a standard march rate of 14km per day, bring him to Arles. It is roughly 50km away from the coast, well within striking distance, and indeed, the first practible crossing place of the Rhone as single stream.

However, the local tribe, the Volcae, decided to contest his crossing the Rhone River--if not the entirety of the tribe, for many of them happily sold the Carthaginians boats, then at least enough of them to form a significant force to oppose his crossing. Acting with cleverness, and with a strategem similar to Alexander's opposed river crossing at Jhelum over 100 years earlier, he sent a subcommander upriver to cross over the river and take the tribe in the flank and rear while he crossed with the main army. The Carthaginians routed the Volcae and Hannibal crossed the Rhone, though it took considerable effort to get the elephants across.

It took six days from the time Hannibal arrived at the Rhone River until the time he crossed it. On the seventh day, he learned of the Roman Army at Massilia, some 80km away, and sent the Numidian horsemen to do a recon. They came back soon, having met the Roman recon force "quite near their camp," and with Roman cavalry hard on their heels. The Romans surveyed the Carthaginians and headed back towards their own army.

The recon towards Massilia makes sense. Hannibal knew the city was where the Roman army would likely come from, as the coastal road went from Italy to the port city. Whether the Romans marched by land or transported by sea, they would end up near Massilia.

However, of note is the Roman reconnaissance force. Although not explicitly stated in either historian's work, someone from the Volcae must have hightailed it to Massilia to tell the Romans that 50,000 Carthaginians were about to force a crossing of the Rhone. This seemed to surprise the Romans, who may very well have thought the messenger delusional. But, Scipio sent a group of cavalry to the crossing point anyway in a sort of "better-safe-than-sorry" activity.

Scipio often receives credit for sending his army on to Spain (the original destination when he set out from Rome) instead of pulling it back into Italy when he learned Hannibal gave him the slip. How different the Second Punic War would have turned out had Scipio immediately marched his entire army to the crossing point instead of sending a cavalry recon force. Remember, the army marched for three days to get to the Rhone point. Presumably, the Roman cavalry recon took at least two days (if not three) to reach the spot 80km from Massilia, then two days (if not three) to return. Scipio's army would have arrived too late. Whether that was an apologists view from a patriotic writer, and in the case of Polybius, a Scipio-backed writer, is open to speculation.

In any case, by the time the Roman cavalry returned and Scipio marched the army for three days from Massilia, Hannibal was gone. Indeed, Polybius reports that Scipio was surprised that Hannibal had headed inland in an attempt to cross into Italy by a route other than the coast road. Evidently, Scipio was surpised a lot: once that Hannibal was even near the Rhone and a second time when the Carthaginians headed upriver. Scipio refused to follow and turned the army around to head back to Massilia.

Hannibal spent four days from crossing the Rhone to "The Island." From the distances given by Polybius, it would be about 600 stade, or about 105km. The average daily march was about 10km per day over the entire five months, and after leaving The Island, the Carthaginian army would average 14km per day. The 105km divided by four (days) equals about 26km per day. This average seems high, but a 50 percent boost in marching speed, or about 21km per day, would not be out of the ordinary, and indeed, seems reasonable.

In any case, if Polybius' numbers are correct, a spot about 100km upriver was where the terrain turned into something looking like the Nile River Delta with the Rhone River as one side and the Skaras or Arar River on the other. Furthermore, there are almost inaccessible mountains forming a base between the two rivers. With a more conservative marching speed of 21km per day, then you're looking for a spot 84km upriver.

This Island, or more correctly, a location 80-100km upriver at a spot where two rivers meet, is usually placed at the confluence of the Aygues, Drome, or Isere River. The Durance can be eliminated because it's too close, lacks the mountainous range, and does not fit the triangular description. Certainly the philologists have had a field day in proclaiming each of these rivers to be derivations of Skaras or Arar.

Are the two four-day periods equal? Is the distance marched four days from the sea equal to the distance four days from the crossing of the Rhone? Under normal marching, the answer is likely, "yes," making a spot about 56km from the crossing. That spot would be around Avignon, if the army kept to the river. But Polybius specifically notes 105km, or almost twice the normal march distance. Could Hannibal push his army that far, that fast?

Scipio apparently did. He marched a fresh army roughly 80km in three days, or almost 26km per day, which is roughly the distance are to believe Hannibal's army matched. It was a well-trod route and his supplies moved via river boats, which helped his marching speed.

Hannibal was in a hurry and deployed his elephants and cavalry as a rearguard, no doubt primarily to see if the Romans followed, but also to net any stragglers. Marching like a "thunderbolt" at twice as fast as normal, or 26km per day, even with mostly veterans, will likely result in straggling. The Cathaginians had fought a battle across a contested river, had to consider additional hostile tribes, followed a less developed track, and Hanno's subset of light troops marched even farther in a day. Neither Polybius nor Livy mention battle or marching fatigue. Hannibal could not afford to bleed his army through attrition, and he had no idea that the Romans would not follow.

Consider 26km per day a top speed. A more reasonable 50 percent boost to the base 14km per day, or 21km per day, especially through less than improved areas, seems justified. The four day march certainly exceeded the 50-55km or so from the sea to the crossing of the Rhone.

The Island

Map from: The South of France: Provence and the French Alps.
Jumbo Map (monstrously slow: 918K)

Here, it is interesting that Polybius chose to call the Island similar in size and shape as the Nile Delta. If he had traveled the locale, why not call it the size and shape of the Rhone Delta? Is is because more readers knew the size and shape of the Nile versus the Rhone, or is it because the Nile was even more remote, possessed an atmosphere of mystery and grandeur, and would spice up a tale? Polybius would disavow the latter, noting that a historian should tell facts and write a pragmatic history. Yet, he is not above embellishment. Should we then interpret other parts of Polybius, which we know to be hyperbole, similarly--for example, his pointing out the plains of the Po? Is it a literal spot or a figurative allusion?

In any case, since he makes a particular point about the Island, if we take him at close to his word, we need to locate a large, well-cultivated, well-populated area between two rivers with delta-like conditions of multiple waterways and a base of inaccessible mountains.

Livy provides other clues. The Island must be at a place where Hannibal can then march into Tricastini territory and past Vocontii and Tricorii territories. Too far upriver and Hannibal has missed the territories. Polybius makes no mention of these specific tribes.

Livy further states the Druentia River has to be crossed.

Arausio (present day Orange) sat on a hill rising 300 feet above the plain. According to Strabo, in pre-Roman times, Arausio was one of the centers of the Cavares Confederation. In 35-33BC, Octavian (Augustus) established a colony of ex-legionaries there--on land taken from the Tricastini (a tribe of the former Cavares Confederation). (A Guide to the Ancient World, page 57) Many of the books place the Tricastini at present day St. Paul Trois Chateaux, cutting off the portion of the confluence of the Aygues and Rhone Rivers from their territory. Certainly, tribal migrations have occurred during Roman times, but if some historians point to church diocese as tribal limits, then land taken from the tribes must be in play, too.

Vasio Vocontiorum (present-day Vaison la Romaine), 13 miles northeast from Arausio, was the capital of the Vocontii (A Guide to the Ancient World, page 681).

Both those places were well-populated and well-cultivated in its time, and Orange sits on the Aygues River.

However, just south of the Aygues, about a third of the way between Avignon and Orange (10km from Avignon and 20km from Orange), runs the Ouveze River. The Ouveze, which also counts the Nesque River as a feeder river, enters the Rhone at an angle similar to the Aygues, is the most southernmost major watercourse that can still form the triangle, and claims the Baronnies Mountains as the inaccessible mountainous border.

The confluence is about 75km in distance from Arles following the twists and turns of the Rhone. The 105km mark would place the Island roughly at Orange and the Aygues. But if Orange is already Tricastini territory, then Hannibal could not "turn left to the territory of the Triscatini, proceeding thence past the borders of the Vocontii." Brancus was evidently not part of the Tricastini tribe. Indeed, Livy refers to the entire matter as settling the "business of the Allobroges." [Livy, XXXI, 31] Other authors comment on a scattered number of tribal groups south of the main land claimed by the Allobroges, typically north of the Isere River.

Based on that statement, it appears Hannibal had not yet reached the Tricastini. The 75km march is almost 50% faster than the average, which is because Hannibal is trying to put distance between his army and the Romans.

One wonders why you'd call a place "The Island." It must have been a particular reference point, as there is no corresponding "Island" in the Nile Delta, and according to Polybius, the two are supposedly similar in nature. Perhaps it is a 300 foot hill towering over a plain at the confluence of a couple rivers? As one of the centers of the Cavares Confederation, it would have been one of the dominant towns in the area. Entering this delta area means to enter its jurisdiction, and the Ouveze River would have been a boundary point of note.

The Island may very well have been Arausio itself, considering the way the land rises from the delta, or the narrow area between the Ouveze and Aygues Rivers. And it is within the distance of march for an army to reach in four days.

Here, at the Island, Hannibal intervened in the tribal dispute over leadership, untimately backing the winning party of Brancus, who reciprocated by re-equipping the Carthaginian army. The territory of Brancus exists somewhere between the Ouveze and Aygues Rivers. Hannibal felt safe with two rivers in between the Romans and the Carthaginians--the Durance and the Ouveze--as well as the strength of his new-found friend.

From the Island, Hannibal "turned left" or "veered left" (depending on the translator) and marched by Arausio. He evidently did not have permission to go through Vocontii territory, for he proceeded past their borders to the Tricorii. As the Vocontii were centered at Vasio Vocontiorum (present-day Vaison la Romaine), 13 miles northeast from Arausio (Orange), Hannibal had to detour around the territory instead of making a straight run at the Alps.

He initially went north along the Rhone. It is tempting to branch off to travel along the "river," as Polybius notes, and follow the Aygues. Hannibal must be starting to worry about crossing the Alps. He had just been issued winter clothing by Brancus. He knows the Alps are higher than the Pyrenees. His Boii guides have said passage is difficult, but not impossible. Time is slipping by and his detour north along the Rhone--for he had failed to slip by fast-marching Romans--threw his already delayed march further behind schedule. He's got to be thinking about how he's going to get 50,000+ troops across a difficult pass.

Brancus is guarding his rear, so he has a good source of information about tribal boundaries. Hannibal is trying to thread the needle between the Vocontii to the south and the larger Allobroges to the north. Besides, Brancus is new to the throne. He probably--and this is speculation--does not want to antagonize neighbors within days of being declared head of the tribe. The Vocontii, though not an enemy to the Carthaginians, are no friends, either. And while they may not be powerful, they are not pushovers, either. Hannibal must detour around their land. That's why it is more credible for the Carthaginian Army to "avoid the most direct route" and march "left" up the Rhone instead of the Aygues. [Livy XXI, 31]

Polybius notes the distance covered between the Island and the Ascent of the Alps is 140km in 10 days. Livy notes the Carthaginians have to cross a hazardous stream, the Druentia, after which they turn to the Alps over fairly open country. Polybius mentions no stream or river, but does mention that during this phase the army marched on the river banks.

So Where is the Druentia?

Polybius never mentions this river, but it figures prominently in Livy's account as a difficult stream to cross, with shifting pools and quick-sand like conditions. While not as difficult to cross as the final descent into Italy, it is sufficiently troublesome that it occupies a place in the narrative. After crossing, Livy notes the relatively open country.

After heading up the Rhone as far about present-day Donzere, Hannibal turns east towards the Alps, skirting the Vocontii and Tricorii tribal areas and ultimately reaching the foot of the pass somewhere near present day Remuzzat.

The Donzere area is a natural narrowing of the valley--the present day spot has a dam built on the Rhone. Further up would start to encroach on the Allobroges' main area. This is a good spot, especially before reaching the narrows, to turn right so to speak, skirt the northern fringes of Vocontii territory, and head towards the Alps. This is also where the Lockwood proposed route deviates from the others.

Indeed, place yourself in Hannibal's boots. You know the weather is starting to turn colder, so for every day you delay, the passes are under that much threat for being snowed in. The Roman army has not followed you up the Rhone valley, so there's no chance of being caught in a battle. Where it went after you evaded it at the Rhone crossing is unknown. It either stayed near Massilia to await your return (where else would an enemy army go?), headed to Spain (into those same Gallic tribes that cost your casualties), or headed back to Italy (in anticipation of your crossing the Alps). That latter option cannot be ignored, and a Roman army is exactly what you don't want to meet alighting on the plains of Italy at the end of an Alpine pass.

So, if you are Hannibal, you want to start the army heading towards the Alps, not further into barbarian Gaul. You took enough casualties just getting to the Rhone. You can't take too many and still maintain a viable army upon emergence into Italy.

This is not 10 days' worth of marching along the Rhone. It's two-thirds of the way between the Aygues and Drome Rivers, so there's no real following of a river at this point, especially along river banks, if you cut cross country and head to the Alps. It's a stretch to say the route follows either of these major rivers. And yet, somewhere between the Rhone and the Alps lies Livy's Druentia "alpine stream," which is not mentioned by Polybius.

At this point, Livy takes precedence, precisely because of the detail about the "Druentia" crossing--it's the sort of anecdote Livy lived for. It may be a bit melodramatic to describe quicksand-like sinkholes and so on, but in one of Livy's sources, it takes on an important role--much the way losses occurred in landslides further along in the narrative. That the incident may have been exaggerated is open to speculation, and indeed, probably is a taller tale with the passing of years, but that there was a rain-swollen stream or minor river to cross before reaching the place of the ascent of the Alps remains in the struggle to reach the Alps.

The present day Lez River cuts through the area between the Aygues and Drome Rivers and lies directly on the path to the Alps. It also eventually leads into the "delta" area of The Island, and open country abounds on the eastern shore before reaching the Alps. From the mountains, the Lez runs SSW emptying into the Rhone about 5km north of where the Aygues River empties into the Rhone. Polybius does not mention the incident, perhaps from insignificance to the march as a whole, or perhaps the number of soldiers lost was minimal compared to the dangers that lay ahead.

But it tallies with Livy and makes sense if Livy is integrating several sources. It is also possible that this marked the extent of the Triscatini tribal area, as this right turn is about where St. Paul Trois Chateau sits, which a few of the historians contend is of a later diocese structure of the Triscatini tribal area. Whether a later diocese boundary conforms to an earlier tribal area is a topic for another time. The modern French departmental boundary lies there too, running generally eastward towards the Baronnies Mountains.

In any case, Hannibal turns right just south of modern day Donzere, around Pirrelatte, and heads eastwards towards the Alps.

Ascent of the Alps

Map from: The South of France: Provence and the French Alps.
Jumbo Map (exceptionally slow: 746K)

From the Lez River, Hannibal's army marches eastward across "open country" [Livy XXI, 32] heading towards the Alps. He comes back to the Aygues River somewhere around Nyons in the low foothills of the Baronnies and continues heading east into steeper and steeper terrain until reaching present day Remuzat-Rosans area. This is where the terrain becomes much more difficult. From the Island to this Ascent of the Alps spot measures about 130-140km, tallying nicely with Polybius' number of 10 days covering nearly 800 stades (140km).

Here, Hannibal faces another challenge. Livy is his usual descriptive self noting the dangers of the terrain, the local tribesmen "with their wild and ragged hair" who lived in "rude huts clinging to the rocks," and "other sights of horrors that words cannot express." {Livy XXI, 32]

As the Carthaginians advance, Hannibal finds local tribesmen holding a defile, likely halfway between modern Rosans and Serres. His guides discover the natives abandon the defile at night. Sure enough, Hannibal begins the ruse of fortifying a camp and turning in for the evening, only to capture the heights at night with a picked force, and start the movement of the army through the defile.

At daybreak, the tribe returns to find the Carthaginians on the march through the defile. Although the resulting ambush disorders the Carthaginians and causes heavy losses, Hannibal's swift counterattack from above routs the natives and ultimately, succeeds in taking the native's unnamed village--quite likely Serres.

For three days, Hannibal marches in peace through the ever-higher mountains until reaching another tribe, only this one is more devious and treacherous than the last. It is about 41km (about 14km per day) from Serres to modern Gap, which in ancient times was in the locale of the Tricorii tribe.

On the fourth day, the tribes offer Hannibal peaceful passage and guides. They had heard of his victory at the last defile and wanted nothing more than to allow the Carthaginians to move along. Hannibal is not so gullible, but accepts the offer anyway, even as he alters his marching order.

It is unclear whether the army halted on this fourth day, but likely not. The tribes had no intention of attacking in the open, negotiations would not have taken very long, and Hannibal's in a hurry. For two more days, Hannibal's army marches eastward towards the Alps until they've rejoined the Way of Hercules and get to the area around modern Guillestre (43km). No word is mentioned about the original Boii guides. Either they perished somewhere between the Rhone and here, or had been sent back to Italy to say Hannibal's coming. In any case, there's not a loyal guide who evidently recognizes the Way of Hercules.

In any case, the Carthaginians are following the local guides, and these divert the Carthaginian army eastward up a side valley, the Combe du Queyres, towards modern Chateau Queyres instead of continuing on the Way of Hercules over the Montgenevre pass. They lead Hannibal into a trap.

Up the Queyres valley is a "steep and precipitous defile" [Polybius III, 52] perfect for an ambush. The tribes gather and attack the rear of the Carthaginian column. Here, Hannibal's prudence regarding his marching order pays dividends. With most of the baggage up front and the key fighting units behind, Hannibal holds off the attack, even as it comes from above where the tribesmen "rolled down rocks" from above [Polybius III, 53] and attacked front, flank, and rear.

The Carthaginians suffer severe losses as they try to move through the gorge and resulting ambush. Indeed, the column is cut in two and Hannibal must remain with his rear guard overnight "near a certain bare rock which offered some protection." [Polybius III, 53]

At the head of the valley, after a narrow gorge perfect for an ambush spot, sits the Chateau Queyres atop a prominent mini-mountain. Take away the medieval fortress and it looks like a perfect "rock" to establish a defensive position.

The next day, Hannibal and his rear guard catch up with the head of the column. Although harassed by occasional raids (and repelled with help from the elephants), Hannibal winds his way upwards to the pass. Here, at the pass, the Col de Traversette, Hannibal halts for a couple days to rest his troops and await stragglers.

The Pass of Hannibal: Col de Traversette

From Queyres to the Col de Traversette is relatively easy country to march. Most important is the height of the pass, and the Col de Traversette, at 3000 meters, is high enough for new snow to overlay last year's snow. Next is the descent, which is as difficult and precipitous as described in Polybius and Livy. Third is the area for troops to bivoac, and there is enough room in the valley to camp 30,000 troops, horses and elephants. Fourth is a view to Italy, and indeed, the Col de Traversette does have a view of the Po. Fifth, it exits from the valley and is generally a straight shot into the territory of the Taurini.

Map adapted from The War with Hannibal.

The descent is a battle against the elements, and to a certain extent time, although Hannibal won his race against the closing of the passes. It takes a day to rebuild a section of the path obliterated due to a landslide. Then the mule train and horses move on and are released into Italian pastures. Three days and a widened path later, the elephants and the rest of the army join them.

Hannibal Crosses the Alps A Route Examined and a Proposed Alternate Route

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