The Tawakalna Division was assessed to be at 25% strength and combat ineffective. With the screening force swept aside, the VIIth Corps smashed into the Medina and Hammurabi Armored divisions of the Republican Guards before they could reach Basrah. A total of 11 Iraqi divisions were destroyed by VIIth Corps before a cease fire was declared at 0800 hours February 28th.

At right, removing ammo from Iraqi tanks.

The VIIth Corps' mission of destroying the Republican Guard Forces Corps was successfully completed, and the strategic objective of liberating Kuwait and removing the Iraqi Army as a threat to the region was also a resounding success. (Desert Jayhawk, p. 22)

The long term significance of the Coalition victory over Iraq will depend on future political resolution to the region's conflicts. As of this writing, Kuwait is still autonomous, and Iraq is still weak. The long term lessons of the Battle of Ghazlani, and dozens of other battles like it fought during the "100 Hour War," are clear. Tactical commanders on the modern technology dominated battlefield are still subject to the same blunders, misjudgments, and the general fog of war that has plagued warriors and leaders for centuries.

At right, Iraqi prisoners march to internment. The last in line was the "aristocratic" Iraqi commander, who initially refused to place his hands on the shoulders of his "common" men. He finally relented to place one hand after some diplomacy--a US officer with a .45 convinced him.

At Ghazlani, the blunders, misjudgments, and fog of war were overcome by three key factors: (1) Overwhelming technical superiority of the U.S. weapons systems. (2) The U.S. commander's cautious but effective application of all of his combat power, and above all, (3) A complete disintegration of Iraqi unit cohesion and combat morale.

Large Iraqi POW (EPW) Photo

Works Cited