WWII Soviet Air Force

Lecture by Charles Sharp

by Russ Lockwood


Whatever his shortcomings as a military leader, Hitler as political decision maker picked the right time to launch a war with the Soviet Union. The militry had not recovered from Stalin's purge and in the case of the Soviet Air Force, it was in the middle of a re-equipment with newer aircraft and a revision of its entire support structure in June 1941. Overall, the Soviet Air Force spent 1941 getting plastered, 1942 rebuilding, 1943 achieving parity, 1944 gaining supremacy, and 1945 looking to the post war period.

In June 1941, the Soviet Air Force had 79 Air Divisions composed of 348 Air Regiments (of about 60 aircraft each). All told, it numbered 23,000 aircraft, of which 11,500 were fighters (and that included all types, from I-15s to MiG 3s, 1,100 bombers, 100 ground atack (IL2s), 12,100 transports, and 7,300 other types. Of these 23,000, about 2,000 were in the Far East, 2,500 in Naval Aviation, and 800 in the Trans-Caucus areas.

In the westernmost areas, the Soviets places 32 Air Divisions with 6,379 aircraft--most within 10 kilometers of the border separating the USSR and Germany. On a side note, some of the airfields were so lose to the front, German artillery pounded the airfield in the opening hours of the attack.

Of these 6,379, the following "modern" aircraft were available: 886 MiG 3, 11 MiG 1, 83 Yak 1, 68 Po2, 464 DB3f (IL4 long range bombers), 73 Yak 2, 24 Yak 4, 7 TB7 (Pe8), 113 Er2, and 45 IL2.

Of these 6,379, the following "less than modern" aircraft were available: 1,762 I-16, 1,549 I-153, 1,228 SB, SU2 and AR2, and 300 I-15bis, I-15, DI6, R5, and R10.

The Air Force also had a number of Po-2s as air liaison with ground units, and these were not counted in OOB totals.

Pilot and crew training was miserable, and the command and control aspects was even worse, with air functions split among many organizations. It was just starting training in two- and four-aircraft tactics with the pilot in the aircraft he would fly.

War

There's not much to say about 1941 except the Germans dominated. In 1942, the Soviets would at least contest an area. Stalin appointed a single commander, Nobikov, of the Soviet Air Force to supervise its rebuilding and organization.

By the end of 1942, the Soviet Air Force converts all their political officers to personnel officers. They now write letters home, do hospital checks, and generally function as morale officers. In exchange, army officers are now given sufficient rank to handle air functions.

In the spring of 1943, there was a huge air battle at Kuban. Nobikov flew down for its operations and in part to use as a training tool to see if his reforms worked. The Soviet Air Force lost tremendous numbers of planes and pilots, but it helped develop the tactics best used by each aircraft and shook out the organizational bugs. Indeed, it caused the Luftwaffe to issue its own tactical alerts warning against certain tactics versus certain aircraft at certain altitudes.

If Kursk is best known for breaking the German Army's potential for offensive actions, it should also be known as the battle that broke the Luftwaffe's back as well. In December 1942, the Soviets could put up 3,000 planes. In July 1943, they totalled 12,876 planes (including 950 long-range bombers, 1,012 PVO "local" aircraft, and 662 sent to the reserves). The Luftwaffe could fly about 2,500. By the end of August, the Luftwaffe had lost 1,696--or about 2/3rds of their strength in two months of heavy fighting. While the Soviets kept four Air Armies in Reserve (about 400-500 aircraft each), the Luftwaffe had no reserves. By 1944, Air Armies had 1,000 aircraft, with some amassing up to 2,000.

In 1943, the Soviet Air Force lost 26,700 aircraft, but USSR factories cranked out 38,200. By late 1943, an additional AA platoon was issued to Panzer divisions because it was getting tougher to move thanks to aggressive Soviet ground attacks and an absence of Luftwaffe protection. The Soviets added the Yak 9T with 37mm AT gun and the famed IL2M Sturmovik to their inventories, making for not only more planes, but better ones.

By the end of 1943, the best the Luftwaffe could hope to do is achieve local air supiority. They did try to do some strategic bombing with their twin engine bombers, to little effect, but in adition, they increasingly had to pull units westward for reconstitution. The initiative was clearly in the Soviets' favor.

Pilots certainly performed heroic feats, and examples abound of pilots doing 200, 300, and even 500 sorties. One IL2M pilot completed his 100th ground attack mission--a notably high-risk assignment--and received a medal for his efforts. Po-2 night bombing missions numbered into the thousands.

On the topic of air kills, a pilot did not get credit unless it was confirmed by someone outside the air regiment or someone could get to the wreck. Otherwise, it would be called a "probable" or a "group kill." Indeed, the political/personnel officer did much of the verification work.

1944

In 1944, they pushed it with new targets: German artillery 10-20 kilometers behind the front lines. The Germans based their defense on artillery, and taking it out from the air was a big reason for the collapse of the German Army in 1944. In addition, long-range Pe-2s would range 100 kilometers behind the lines hitting bridges, railroad yards, and convoys. Although lightly armored and vulnerable in its shallow dive, it as fast for a bomber and helped curtail German movement. By mid 1944, the Soviets had perfected ground control of air operation. Forward observers now rode with front-line units and could control air units.

The Soviets never did any real strategic bombing of German industry as their air force was not built for it. The 18th Air Army had about 2,000 planes for such purposes per se, but they were all twin-engine Lend Lease B-25s. Oddly enough, these B-25s went through problems as Soviet fuel did not have a high enough octane and so the planes were prone to engine failure. Other Lend Lease aircraft sent were the British Hampton, which had limited action, and A-20J torpedo capable plane which performed some anti-shipping strikes. The Soviet Air Force lost 88,000 planes during the war, of which 43,000 were shot down by the Germans and the rest lost to accidents. By the end of the war, the Soviet Air Force boasted 59,700 aircraft in inventory (including PVO and Naval aircraft): 24,200 fighters, 10,200 ground attack, 8,900 bombers, and 15,700 transports and trainers.

In comparison, the US Army Air Force had 98,000 aircraft (not including transports) and the US Navy had 25,000 spread across the world.

End of War

During the war, the Soviet Air Force had increased serviceability rates and placed command and control with front line ground forces. At the end, it was expanding its Air Defense operations (AA Divisions), was developing advanced piston-engined aircraft including the high-altitude MiG5 and MiG7 and the beginning of a ramjet engine, and was copying US B-29 heavy bombers because the Pe-8 four engine bomber was rather a poor substitute. They were not developing jet aircraft--indeed, the first jets came from the Germans. Indeed, Yak 9, 11, and 13 designs, plus MiG 9 and 15 designs look an awful lot like German prototypes being developed by the end of the war. The Soviet Air Force built its first jet only in 1949.

Lectures

E2000

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