Reading from his book about the possibility of the Allies launching a cross-channel invasion and creating a Second Front in 1943, Walter Dunn engaged in a numerical analysis of OOBs during the critical year of 1943.

The British didn't think the US could train a division in three years, and yet, how many divisions did the US possess?

January 1942: 40 (remember, the National Guard was mobilized in 1940)
January 1943: 79

Thus, in one year, the US doubled the size of its ground forces.

By October of 1942, only 5 divisions were in the European Theater, while 11 (including Marines) were in the Pacific. By the end of 1942, the rate of divisional transfers averages one per month to the Pacific, while the transfers went in spurts to Europe. Thus, by June 1943, the US had 12 army and 3 Marine divisions in the Pacific. In September 1943, the spurt to Europe starts anew.

How many divisions could be transfered at a time? A steadily growing number. In August 1944, 8 divisions were shipped to Europe. In September 1944, another eight were shipped over. This capacity to move troops, thanks to the many Liberty ships, especially after the U-boat menace tailed off, meant the Allies could strike anywhere. Note that the "Queen" liners could move 1 division every other week. The men were moved seperately from their weapons, tanks, etc. They were not combat loaded, but bulk shipped in two bathes and re-united in the UK. The Pacific needed twice to three times the shipping due to distances between the US and Australi versus the US and UK.

The Germans placed their strategic reserves in France, not Germany, and used it as a rest and replacement spot for divisions rotated from the Eastern Front. In June 1941, there were 9 "Occupation" divisions in France. By June of 1944, there were still 8 of them. These particular divisions of six battalions were composed of overage (36 years old plus) men, limited artillery, no real services, and not even horse transport, let along truck or mechanized vehicles. Their main weapons, often a mixed bag, were installed in fortifications and were essentially static. Indeed, when the Allied breakout came after D-Day, these were used by Allied command as a good way of combat training -- they sent green Allied divisions against these static ones, knowing there was little chance that an Allied unit would be defeated.

German divisions destined for combat -- meaning the Russian front -- received final training in France. At any given time, six to eight new or rebuilding divisions were in the rotation. This works well until march 1943, when the debacle at Stalingrad becomes apparent and the Germans strip their replacement system to make up the losses. By 1944, horses and trucks were culled from all of France as well. Note that these measures work only once...

By May of 1943, all usable divisions, often created from a mix of advanced training regiments, are stripped until only one division (the 65th) remains in France. As the Germans reach the bottom of the manpower pool, they start recruiting heavily. The 999th Afrika Division is heavily recruited from political prisoners. The Stalingrad divisions, or what was left of them, were eventually rebuilt, and by August, were starting to be shipped to Italy to meet that Allied threat. For example, the 305th Division was rebuilt in April 1943, and sent to Italy in August.

Of course, the question is, if a Second Front could have been opened up in 1943, where would the German divisions necessary to fight it come from? The ones in France would not have gone to the East Front, and undoubtedly, some rotated divisiojns back from Russia would have stayed. And you might be able to make a case that Italy would have been shorted as well. Thus, Mannstein would not have received divisions to counter the Russian offensive around Kiev, and arguably, the Sicilian and Italian landings and campaigns would have been easier as well. What didn't happen in the west impacted the east. Also note that Western divisions needed time to acclimate to the East front as well. The veterans and wounded returning would know of the combat, but there would be less luxury of training with two main fronts. A junior lieutenant needed 13 months of training, thus you can't simply replace them quickly enough.

By September 1943, Hitler was convinced a second front would come, and indeed, built up 30+ divisions for the west front, either new ones or those culled from the East Front, sometimes, battalion by battalion.

The lack of training NCOs and junior offices, the real workhorses of German tactical doctrine, hurts the efficiency of the army. Indeed, on D-Day, there is no concerted German counterattacks at company or battalion levels --the hallmarks of German tactics--on June 6. You might count the limited counterattack on the paratroops, but as for the beaches, nothing occurs. At the higher levels like Division and Corp, yes, plans develop, but the junior leadership fails below the regimental level.

In August 1944, the loss rate for the Germans doubled! The Allies had broken out across France, and the "Destruction of Army Group Center" in the East hit the manpower pool harder.

Soviets

On 1 July 1943 (issued in April), the Soviets give cash awards of 500-1500 rubles to troops knocking our German tanks, as the Soviet command understood that you stop the tanks, you stop the German counterattacks. It became important who held onto the battlefield after a battle, so that the winner could evacuate the tanks and repair them.

If you take a look at photos of the battlefield of Kursk, you'll notice a lot of US Grant, Lee, and Stuart tanks--the result of British lend-lease efforts through the Persian Gulf area. Note that the british are somewhat duplicitous here, for these came from their "boneyard" to fulfil Lend-Lease agreements.

For example, tanks from the 11th Hussars were sent to the USSR with their desert camo and markings. The Soviets considered it "good luck" to keep the banners and language on the tank.

Lectures

Convention Introduction and Overview
Possible German-Czech War of 1938 by Jason Long
1943: Orders of Battle and Early D-Day by Walter Dunn
Kiev Offensive: October 1943 by Col. David Glantz
WWII Soviet Armor by Charles Sharp
Grand Master Europa and GR/D by Tom Johnson
Kiev Offensive: November 1943 by Col. David Glantz
WWII Soviet Air Force by Charles Sharp

E2000

Last Year's Convention: E2000

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