WWII Soviet Armor

Lecture by Charles Sharp

by Russ Lockwood


Soviet tank forces in 1941 were basically run by amateurs--the officer purge eliminated the most experienced officers (even in the Far East, though slower to take effect) and the poor state of logistics and maintenance meant that tank formations would suffer massive attrition simply by moving, much less combat.

Pre-war tank brigades were not very good. They had potential, but the reality was that they were not ready for prime time when the Germans attacked. The recon battalions were good and knew what they were doing, but as for the main formations, they were awful. Out of a 256-tank brigade, at best only half of it would be operational.

Influence of the Spanish Civil War

The years 1939-41 were a "rollercoaster ride" of changes, in large part influenced by the Spanish Civil War. The Soviets, drawing from unfortunate Italian experiences, concluded that large armored units did not work. In November 1939, the Soviets broke up their four armor corps into two tank brigades and one motorized rifle brigade. The largest unit left after there-organization as a motorized division with a 175-tank regiment.

Not that records were all that clear. The 30th Motorized Rifle Division was created with one tank battalion, but how was the division motorized? The 65th Rifle division became the 65th Motorized Rifle and was later converted back to the 65th Rifle Division. According to TO&E data, there was absolutely no change in divisional structure or equipment. Thus, at least some of the "Motorized" divisions were motorized in name only.

Influence of the Battle of France

From June 1940 to November 1940, the USSR formed 18 new tank divisions by disbanding 12 Tank Brigades. In December 1940, two more tank divisions were formed, and from February to July 1941, 41 tank divisions were formed. The equipment lagged far behind, and these divisions were created in large part due to shuffling tank battalions out of the Rifle Divisions. The typical tank division had two tank regiments, one motorized rifle regiment, one howitzer regiment, and an anti-tank battalion. Note that KV-2s were assigned to artillery regiments--a direct response to the Mannerheim Line of forts encountered in Finland. Flamethrower tanks were the equivalent to a battalion. The sum of all these parts was a confusions of purpose--was it an armored shock formation or an infantry support formation--and an even greater onfusion of tables of organization as they try to sort the equipment to fulfil the role.

No tank division was ready for combat in June of 1941. The 1st, 3rd, and 5th Tank Divisions were the only ones to train at the divisional level at all, and most were doing the very basic tank training--like how to drive and fire. Part was staffing--only 75% of NCOs and 50% of junior officers were available in any given tank unit. The tank drivers had less than 15 hours of actual driving. Not one tank division has logistical support--maybe 10% of the divisions had mechanics--and most had no store of spare parts.

German combat reports in the early invasion period discuss Soviet formations, but the actual units were just untrained groups. The Soviets had 21,000 tanks at start and may have manufactured another 5-6,000 in the first six months. They lost 24,000 tanks in that period, of which only 3,000 were knocked out from German fire. The rest were lost to lack of maintenance or logistics support. Over 70% of T-26s broke down.

On particular Soviet tank division had 256 T-26s on 22 June 1941 and could only physically drive 120 tanks. At the end of the day, only 60 were operational--and the division never met a German unit in combat. The 8th Mechanized Corp was briefly effective at the start of the war, but after a week, it was down to 10 operational tanks.

Worse, the Soviets had no tank haulers. They moved their tanks long distance by rail. On paper, the Red Army was a very a very motorized force, but the transport had to be yanked from the civilian sector.

On 15 July 1941, Stavka ordered the disbanding of the tank divisions back into tank brigades. By March of 1942, the order was carried out in total. The survivors of the tank divisions were sent back east as cadres. For example, the 15th Tank Division became the 1st Guards Tank Division, while others were simply renumbered.

By the end of summer 1941, the brigade is the largest organization for tank units, and the new tanks start rolling out of the factories, a mixed bag to be sure, but in late 1941 and early 1942 the new tanks are starting to appear at the front.

By early 1942, the Soviets have formed 91 new tank brigades of 20 tanks each in three months. These are not committed to the front but kept in training until the early summer. In April and May, these start to be committed, with more in June and July, but disintegrate just as quickly as they did in 1941. There are too few competent, trained commanders to direct large scale tank units. By the end of 1942 however, the survivors have learned how to fight the German armor, and Tank Corps are built around the cadre of veterans. They still have no sustainability, but they are learning about logistics and maintenance, too.

Soviet Tank Corp TO&E

In December 1942, a Soviet Tank Corp consisted of three tank brigades, one motorized rifle brigade, one Guards mortar battalion, one motorcycle battalion, and one engineering company. All told, 96 medium tanks and 69 light tanks were in the unit.

By December 1943, the corp still had the three tank brigades, but the number of tanks increased to 195 medium tanks and up to 49 self-propelled field artillery vehicles (SU-76, SU-85, SU-152, etc.) and added a maintenance battalion.

This 1943 corp had two variations in supporting the tank brigades. The first had the one motorized rifle brigade, one Guards mortar battalion (eight rocket launchers), one mortar regiment (36 120mm mortars), one AA regiment (24 37mm AA guns), and one anti-tank regiment (24 76mm AT guns). The other had one light SU regiment (21 SU-76s), one SU regiment (16 SU-85s), one heavy SU regiment (12 SU-152s), one AT battalion, and one Engineering battalion.

By 1943, the Soviet tank driver schools are staffed with 400-500 tanks to be beaten to death by the students. Usually, these are British Matildas and Valentines because they have higher reliability than Soviet tanks. By the late war, the tanks are flowing to the front and the crews are flowing with them, albeit creating a cadre of veterans supplemented by raw new guys. For example, in August 1944, the 7th Guards Tank Brigade's effectiveness is good with the T-34 85s due to the cadre of experienced crews while the T-34 76s do little as they are crewed by the green crews. Of note is that only 4% of the total casualties suffered by the Soviet Union were tank crews, but, 40% of tank crew losses occurred after the tank was hit--the Germans would spray the tank with machine gun fire and hit the bailed out crew.

In 1941, all the tanks that broke down were lost. By 1944, the USSR manufactured 24,000 tanks but put 37,000 to the front--the difference being the tanks recovered and repaired.

In 1943, the German Panzer Grenadier units were superior to the equivalent Soviet motorized units because the infantry rode in half tracks that kept up with the tanks. The Soviets should have had transport, but often did not. The most dangerous units were the cavalry corps that included tanks because they could move at the speed of horses, not foot. By 1944, the transport vehicles were placed with the motorized infantry and added mobility to the Soviet assault.

The Soviets used Lend-Lease tanks from the US, specifically diesel-powered Shermans. Early transfers used gasoline powered Shermans, but Soviets didn't want them and pleaded for diesels.

Operational Use

In 1943, tank brigades were independent units, but by 1943, the tank units evolved into larger corps and were somewhat sustainable organizations. By 1944, they were operating better than expected.

The forward detachment in 1943 consisted of one tank brigade with a SU battalion, AA battery, and supplemented with more tanks. By late 1943, a forward detachment of a Rifle Corp had no tanks, but a SU-152 detachment with riding infantry, two companies of engineers on trucks, and a light AA battery. The idea was to seize a bridgehead.

By late 1943/early 1944, air dropped resupply and ambulances (especially PO-2 aircraft) would land ammo and remove the wounded. It wasn't much, but it extended the supply line just a little bit further. The PO-2 had the lowest loss rate (Germans shot down 1 out of ever 890 sorties) and the highest maintenance rate of all Soviet aircraft. Of course, it was not flying in real hostile places, but it did help.

Overall, about 60-70% of the wounded (Germans and Soviets) would be able to return to the front. Medical proficiency increased during the war.

German Kampfgruppen

The strength of Panzer Grenadiers' Kampfgruppen resided in its self-propelled artillery, a PzG battalion, and a Panzer regiment. The idea was for the infantry to grab ground and form a shield for the integral AT capacity and the panzers to provide mobile support for counterattacks. The StuGs were especially used for fire support--they weren't much on the attack, but did very well on the defense.

In Europa terms, some of the formations present certain challenges at quantifying them into unit counters. For example, flamethrower tank "brigades" were never meant to be used together--they were split up down to the platoon level and assigned to various infantry formations. A cavalry division included and armored regiment consisting of 64 BTs and armored cars.

Lectures

E2000

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