The National Military Strategy 1992 states that the
purpose of nuclear forces is "to deter the use of weapons of mass
destruction and to serve as a hedge against the emergence
of an overwhelming conventional threat."
[6]
The dilemma confronting the United States is still the
same classic problem that confronted strategists throughout
the cold war. Nuclear weapons fulfill their declared
deterrence function only if they are never used. Yet, if
everyone knows that they will never be used, they lack the
credibility to deter. The most credible means to resolve this
dilemma is through a combination of declaratory policies and
military capability that emphasizes the warfighting capabilities
of conventional forces with strategic reach.
[7]
There is, however, a potential paradox of success if
aggressive Third World leaders believe that only weapons of
mass destruction can offset U.S. advantages in conventional
military power. Under such circumstances, theater nuclear
weapons can have important signaling functions that
communicate new risks and introduce greater costs for
nuclear aggression that inflicts high casualties on U.S. forces
or on allied countervalue targets.
Nuclear signaling can take the form of presidential or
DOD declarations that U.S. ships deploying to a hostile
theater of operations have been refitted with nuclear
weapons carried by dual-capable aircraft (DCA) and
Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles(TLAM). [8] Deployment options alone
can playa critical role in the strategic calculus of aggressors
who possess uncommitted nuclear capabilities.
The role of strategic nuclear forces is also directly
related to the problems of reorienting the National Military
Strategy from a global to a regional focus. The first problem
is determining the force structure after the combined
reductions of the START Treaty, unilateral initiatives, and
reciprocal arrangements with the Russian Republic. The
results will be dramatic cuts in U.S. strategic forces from
some 12,000 strategic warheads to approximately 4,000 or
less. [9]
These cuts are prudent responses to the collapse of
the Soviet Union, and give us a long-sought opportunity to
pull back from the nuclear brink where we so often found
ourselves during the cold war. Moreover, these reductions
fulfill our obligations
under the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). They should be
accompanied by strong U.S. endorsements of the treaty and
support for the strengthening of the nonproliferation regime
as we move toward a critical NPT review conference in 1995.
The credibility of U.S. support for nonproliferation will
also be affected by the declaratory policies and targeting
strategy for a smaller strategic nuclear force structure. The
most comprehensive review of the problem to date suggests
that we could be moving in the right direction provided that
the strategic role of conventional forces dominates future
planning. A report by the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff
Advisory Group, chaired by former Secretary of the Air Force
Thomas C. Reed, recommends major changes in the Single
Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP).
The cold war SIOP contained carefully calibrated
strike options against the former Soviet Union. In its place,
the panel recommends an Integrated Strike Employment Plan
(ISEP) with a "near real time" flexibility to cover a wider range
of targets with a smaller force structure. The proposal
identifies five categories of plans:
[10]
In their current form, these recommendations are
excessive and favor a nuclear force structure that is not well
suited for credible deterrence in the new world order. If they
were misinterpreted as official policy, the United States could be
accused of a double standard in declaring the value of
nuclear weapons at the same time that it was asking others to foreswear them.
In the case of the former Soviet Union, U.S. targeting
policy should be muted. Prudence dictates that advantage be
taken of every opportunity for mutual reductions of force
levels and confidence-building measures such as lower alert
rates, improved command and control structures, and
cooperative steps to improve the safety of nuclear storage,
transportation, and destruction procedures.
[11]
Russia will remain a nuclear power with a potential to
threaten the United States and its allies. On the other hand, it
is no longer the center of a hostile global movement or the
leader of a powerful military alliance threatening Europe with
overwhelming force deep in its own territory. Russian
behavior is leveraged more by its need for Western aid and
technology than by U.S. military capabilities. It is difficult to
conceive credible scenarios in which even the most
reactionary great Russian nationalist could find in nuclear
weapons the tools that could be used against the West in
preplanned ways to coerce concessions or that might tempt
revisionist leaders to adopt reckless and inflexible positions.
The United States will and should, along with its British
and French allies, retain nuclear options, but it is premature
in the extreme to plan robust nuclear attacks against the
"force projection assets" of a state that is struggling for
democracy and economic reforms.
[12]
Even though the United States may be a benevolent
superpower, the political impact of global nuclear targeting is
more likely to stimulate rather than deter nuclear
proliferation. An alternative set of declaratory policies that
are consistent with nonproliferation include commitments to
deep cuts in nuclear forces coupled with a defensive strategy
of direct retaliation against nuclear attacks on U.S. territory.
Direct retaliation is one of the few credible missions for
strategic nuclear forces in the post-cold warworld. Extending
deterrence should be a function of conventional forces (the
option embodied in Plan Alpha above).
Global retargeting by nuclear forces is an unfortunate
concept that is more likely to put American interests at risk in the
long run. Marshal Shaposhnikov, Commander-in-Chief of the
Russian Armed Forces, struck a more positive image in his correct
observation that retargeting frightens people. It is better, he said, to
discuss "nontargeting," which lowers the level of alert to "zero flight
assignments of missiles." [13]
The Marshal's formulations are too vague to serve as the
basis of national policy. Nevertheless, his point should not be
dismissed. The objectives of national military strategy are more
likely to be achieved through the implicit flexibility to respond to
nuclear aggression from any source rather than explicit
declarations of global nuclear targeting. Many regional crises may
be precipitated by the proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic
missiles. U.S. strategy will, therefore, require a delicate balance not
to give incentives to that very threat. A reassuring posture, in the
eyes of regional actors and global partners, will require
reexamination and "denuclearization" of deterrence in a new
multipolar world.
Finally, and above all, this study's primary purpose has
been to recommend the option of using modern conventional
forces for strategic purposes. A reliance on offensive nuclear
weapons carries enormous risks that brought us to the brink of war
during several cold war crises. The American public has every right
to expect that the cold war's principal legacy of danger not be
deliberately extended into the new world order.
[1] These strategic
concepts are drawn from The National Military Strategy 1992, released
by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in January 1992. Some have been
narrowed in scope for ease of analysis. For example, the NMS lists strategic
deterrence and defense as one of the four foundations on which our strategy is
built. This study narrows this strategic concept to conventional deterrence and
theater defense.
More Deterence and Conventional Military Forces
ENDNOTES
[2] Anthony H.
Cordesman, "Compensating For Smaller Forces: Adjusting Ways and Means
Through Technology." Paper presented at the Third Annual Strategy Conference,
U.S. Army War College, February 14, 1992, p. 2.
[3] For a detailed assessment of
collective security and U.S. strategy, see Inis Claude, Jr., Sheldon Simon, and
Douglas Stuart, Collective Security in Asia and Europe, U.S. Army War College,
Strategic Studies Institute, March 2, 1992. Ironically, the administration's pledge
to support growing UN peacekeeping activities is under attack by members of
Congress because of a long-standing agreement that makes the United States
responsible for 30 percent of the cost of every operation. Japan and Western
Europeans could conceivably relieve part of the perceived inequity, but
Congress should also examine these costs in the larger context of collective
security and global stability. See Don Oberdorfer, "Lawmakers Balk at
Peacekeeping's Cost," The Washington Post, March 4, 1992, p. Al 7.
[4] Leonard S. Spector, "Deterring
Regional Threats From Nuclear Proliferation." Paper presented at the Third
Annual Strategy Conference, U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute,
February 14, 1992, p. 31 and Appendix A.
[5] In his testimony before the
House Armed Services Committee on December 10, 1991, CIA Director Robert
Gates stated that only Russian and Chinese missiles could threaten the
territory of the United States. He did not expect direct risks from other countries
for at least another decade. See Statement of The Director of Central
Intelligence, pp. 16-17.
[6] The National Military
Strategy 1992, p. 13.
[7] A major thesis of this study is
that conventional deterrence must occasionally give way to conflicts that
demonstrate capabilities, thereby strengthening deterrence for a new phase of
stability. The bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki had much the same effect
on nuclear deterrence.
[8] President Bush's unilateral
initiatives in September 1991 eliminated ground-launched tactical nuclear
weapons and withdrew them from surface ships and submarines. Some sea-
based weapons are scheduled for destruction. Others are in storage from
where they can be redeployed for the "signaling" purposes advocated here.
[9] President Bush's January
1992 initiative pledged cuts in strategic nuclear warheads up to 50 percent
below START-permitted ceilings of approximately 8,000 warheads.
[10] Thomas C. Reed and Michael
0. Wheeler, "The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the New World Order,"
JSTPS/SAG Deterrence Study Group, October 19, 1991, pp. 33-34. See also R.
Jeffrey Smith, "U.S. Urged to Cut 50% of A-Arms," The Washington Post,
January 6, 1992, p. Al.
[11] These latter steps are well
underway. Congress allocated $400 million to assist Russian efforts to
transport, store, and destroy nuclear
weapons, and on March 26, 1992, the State Department announced the
appointment of Retired Major General William F. Burns, former Director of the
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, to head the U.S. delegation on
Safety, Security, and Dismantlement of Nuclear Weapons (SSD Talks). Moscow
has agreed on U.S. assistance in the production of containers for fissile
material from dismantled nuclear weapons, conversion of rail cars for secure
transport, construction of storage facilities, training in nuclear accident
response, accounting procedures, and ultimate disposition of enriched
uranium and plutonium. See Department of State Press Release, March 26, 1992.
[12] Open discussions of nuclear
targeting in the press were followed by equally controversial reporting of threat
scenarios that were developed in the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff. These scenarios included a hypothetical NATO counterattack if Russia
invaded Lithuania. There is virtually no support in NATO or in the U.S. Congress
for such a course of action. However, the scenario does raise the question of
what the United States should do in the event of a Russian-initiated civil warto
reunite the former Soviet Union. Russian nationalists could indeed threaten
nuclear retaliation against Western intervention. History suggests, however, that
Western response would be political and economic, but not military, thus
making nuclear threats irrelevant. "Threat" scenarios are discussed by Barton
Gellman, "Pentagon War Scenario Spotlights Russia," The Washington
Post, February 20, 1992, p. A1.
[13] Marshal Ye. I. Shaposhnikov,
interview in Red Star, February 22, 1992, pp. 1-3. Quoted in FB/S-SOV-92-
036, February 24, 1992, p. 8.
Introduction
A Conventional Force Dominant Deterrent
Role of Nuclear Weapons in a Conventional Force-Dominant Deterrent
Back to Table of Contents Deterrence and Conventional Military Forces
Back to SSI List of Issues
Back to MagWeb Magazine List
© Copyright 2001 by US Army War College.
This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web.
Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com