Conventional deterrence has a future, but one very different from its past in which it was subordinated to nuclear threats and derived from classic strategic nuclear theory. The United States now faces a multipolar international political system that may be destabilized by a proliferation of armed conflict and advanced weaponry. To secure stability, security and influence in this new world order, the United States can use the military prowess it demonstrated in the Gulf War to good advantage. However, using that force effectively, or threatening to use it, requires the formulation of a coherent strategy of "general extended conventional deterrence" and the prudent planning of general purpose forces that are credible and capable of underwriting a new military strategy. Neither proponents nor critics should judge this analysis in isolation. Conventional deterrence cannot succeed unless it is reinforced by supporting policies and concepts. The strategic concepts in the current National Military Strategy document which appear to have the greatest synergistic value in support of conventional deterrence are: [1] Technological superiority, Collective security, Strategic agility, and Theater defenses Technological Superiority Expected reductions in the overall force structure will make the force-multiplying effects of technological superiority more important than ever. Space-based sensors, defense-suppression systems, "brilliant weapons," and stealth technologies give true meaning to the concept of force multipliers. This broad mix of technologies can make conventional forces decisive provided that they are planned and integrated into an effective doctrine and concept of operations. The most likely conflicts involving the United States will be against less capable states that have trouble employing their forces and their technology in effective combined arms operations. As Tony Cordesman has concluded in his assessment of the Gulf War, ... the U.S. can cut its force structure and still maintain a decisive military edge over most threats in the Third World. It can exploit the heritage of four decades of arming to fight a far more sophisticated and combat ready enemy so that it can fight under conditions where it is outnumbered or suffers from significant operational disadvantages. [2] Exploiting technology to get economies of force will require investments where the pay-off in battlefield lethality is greatest. Given the threats that our forces are most likely to confront in regional contingencies, these technologies will include: Battle management resources for real-time integration of sensors-command-control and weapons systems that make enemy forces transparent and easily targeted; Mobility of conventional forces to fully exploit technological superiority and battlefield transparency; Smart conventional weapons with range and lethality; and, Component upgrades for existing delivery platforms to avoid costly generational replacements. This means limited procurement of new tactical fighters, tanks, bombers, submarines, or other platforms that were originally conceived to counter a modernized Soviet threat. Technology that leads to unaffordable procurement threatens us with force multipliers of .9 or less. Net decreases in combat-capable forces can best be avoided through combinations of selective upgrading and selective low-rate procurement. Technological superiority will also depend on concurrent political strategies. Technology is a double-edged sword; it can act as a force multiplier, but the laws of science apply equally to our potential adversaries. Multilateral support for the nonproliferation of both nuclear and critical conventional military technologies can be an equally effective means for preempting threats to our interests and for underwriting conventional deterrence. Collective Security Collective security has become explicitly incorporated in the National Military Strategy. It is broadly defined to include both collective security (UN-sanctioned activities) and collective defense (formal alliances such as NATO) arrangements. These are linked informally in what could, if promoted by the United States, form transregional security linkages-a "seamless web" of collective action. [3] The potential value of collective security to conventional deterrence is difficult to quantify because it requires the United States to link its security to the capabilities and political will of others. Its potential must always be balanced against the risk that collective action may require significant limitations on unilateral action. Nevertheless, there are three compelling reasons for the United States to embrace collective security: First, allies or coalition partners are essential for basing or staging the range of capabilities required to fully exploit technologically superior forces against a regional hegemon. Second, the American public shows little enthusiasm for an active role as the single, global superpower. Collective deterrence is politically essential for sharing not only the military burden, but also the increasingly salient political and fiscal responsibilities. Third, patterns of collective action, as demonstrated in the Gulf War, give conventional deterrence credibility and capabilities that the United States can no longer afford or achieve on its own. Even though collective action and shared capabilities may limit our freedom of action, these limits are reassuring to others and may contribute more to stability than attempts by the world's only superpower to unilaterally impose deterrence-nuclear or conventional. Strategic Agility Strategic agility is a generic concept that reflects the dramatic changes in cold war forward deployment patterns that fixed U.S. forces on the most threatened frontiers in Germany and Korea. Old planning assumptions have given way to new requirements to meet diffuse regional contingencies. Simply stated, American forces will be assembled by their rapid movement from wherever they are to wherever they are needed. Strategic agility requires mobile forces and adaptive planning for a diverse range of options. Many of these options signal our commitment and demonstrate military capabilities short of war. Joint exercises, UN peacekeeping missions, and even humanitarian/disaster relief operations provide opportunities to display power projection capabilities and global reach despite reduced forward deployment of forces. Theater Ballistic Missile Defenses Nuclear and chemical weapons proliferation make theater air and antitactical ballistic missile defenses important components of conventional deterrence. The next states that are likely to acquire nuclear arms are under radical regimes that are openly hostile to U.S. interests (North Korea, Libya, Iran, and Iraq, if LIN intervention fails). [4] The success of such regional powers in creating even a small nuclear umbrella under which they could commit aggression would represent a serious challenge to U.S. global strategy. Theater defenses in support of conventional deterrence need not be a part of the grander objectives of the Strategic Defense Initiative or its most recent variant, Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS). The layered, space-based weapons architecture of these costly systems seem, at best, technologically remote and, at worst, vestiges of the cold war. [5] What is needed in the near term is a global, space-based early warning, command and control network that is linked to modernized, mobile, land-based theater defense systems (Patriot follow-on or Theater High-Altitude Area Defense [THAAD] interceptors designed for greater defense of countervalue targets). Theater Strategic Targeting With Conventional Forces Uncertainties about nondeterrable nuclear threats make it all the more imperative that the United States also have credible warfighting options. Nuclear preemption prior to an attack is not plausible, and there are uncertainties as to whether any President or his coalition partners would authorize a response in kind, even after nuclear first-use by the enemy. More plausible are the range of conventional options afforded by modern, high-tech weapons that have a theater strategic capability for both denial and punishment missions. The broad outline of a conventional deterrence strategy would include: Conventional preemption of the nuclear/chemical infrastructure and key command and control nodes to deny or disrupt an attack (deterrence by denial). Threats of conventional escalation to countervalue targets if nuclear weapons are used (deterrence by punishment). Threats to seize enemy territory (deterrence by punishment). Countervalue retaliation by conventional forces if deterrence and preemption fail (deterrence by punishment). Theater antitactical missile and air defenses (deterrence by denial). The air war against Iraq demonstrated the limitations of counterforce targeting against missiles and nuclear/chemical infrastructures. The imperfect capability of deterrence by denial (even with nuclear weapons) and the unknowable responses to threats of retaliation and punishment leave theater antitactical ballistic missile defenses as the last line of defense for U.S. and coalition forces. On balance, conventional deterrence that combines attempts to dissuade, capabilities to neutralize or capture, credible threats to retaliate, and the ability to defend is more credible than nuclear threats against regional powers. Together, these capabilities dramatically reduce the coercive potential of Third World nuclear programs. This does not mean, however, that nuclear forces have no role to play in the future of deterrence. More Deterence and Conventional Military Forces Introduction A Conventional Force Dominant Deterrent Role of Nuclear Weapons in a Conventional Force-Dominant Deterrent Back to Table of Contents Deterrence and Conventional Military Forces Back to SSI List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 2001 by US Army War College. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com