Back in February after the fall of Peto,
the government appointed a distinguished
veteran of the Mexican wars, General
Sebastian Lopez dc Llergo, commander of all
Yucatan forces. The new commander now
faced a formidable task. Since the fall of
Valladolid desertions and mutiny were rife
among the Yucatecan forces. Working with
what troops remained and with what could be
raised from the refugees assembling on the
coast General Llergo took advantage of the
armistice lull to organize a new defense line.
Llergo regrouped the various militia
battalions and companies into five divisions
which were deployed in a wide arc covering the
capital. [1]
The First Division, some 1,800 men under
Col. Alberto Morales defended the southern
approaches at Ticul. The Second Division
was placed in reserve at Mexcanu under Colonel
Leon. Col. Jose Delores Pasos commanded the
Third Division at Hocaba. The Fourth
Division defended Izamel under Col. Carmen
Bello, while Col. Jose Cosgaya's Fifth Division
held Motul. A Sixth Division was later organized
to defend the approaches to Campeche. Back in the capital Barbachano made
preparations for a mass evacuation of the
Peninsula should these defenses fail.
With the peace talks ended, the Mayan
offensive picked up steam in the center with a
drive against Ticul on May 17th. The First
Division defending Ticul received newly raised
reinforcements from Merida commanded by the
notorious Col. Jose Cetina (back in favor with
the new government). Cetina took command of
the defensive operations around Ticul; improving
the defenses with new artillery emplacements
covering the three main roads, and launching
aggressive but ineffective sorties against the
encircling Maya.
Anticipating the encirclement of Ticul a
force under Col. Pablo Antonio Gonzalez had
been stationed at Sacalum eight miles to the rear.
Their orders were to keep open the supply line to
Ticul. In a series of confused actions Gonzalez
managed to get one supply convoy through to
Cetina but in the process lost his own base at
Saculum where the inhabitants were massacred.
The demoralized troops ran fled back to Merida.
Gonzalez managed to raise a new force from the
refugees there and marched south again to
recover Saculum.
Back at Ticul, Cetina was running low on
ammunition and the Maya barricades were
creeping closer. After five days without relief
Cetina decided on a breakout. The evacuation
followed the now typical pattern. Cetina led the
breakthrough against the northern lines. The
advance guard established a forward screen at
the Hacienda San Jose. The rearguard, a
Ticul militia battalion, was hard pressed by the
Maya and collapsed. the result was a repeat of
the Valladolid road. Cetina managed a stand at
San Joaquin and the retreat continued after dark
to Uayalceh just 17 miles from Merida. The
Maya were too busy looting San Joaquin to
pursue any further.
In the northern sector Cicilio Che massed
his forces against the 4th division holding Izamel.
Taking Dzilim to the north in early May, Che
went on with another column to besiege Sitilpech
a few miles east of Izamel.
On the 14th Col. Carmen Bello
commanding at Izamel first sent one battalion
reinforce Sitilpech. It was stopped dead in its
tracks. Another Battalion was committed and
the combined force fought its way to Sitilpech
to extricate the decimated garrison there. Less
than half the force made it back to Izamel. A
week later the sole survivor of a scouting
patrol reported that the road to Merida was
cut and Izamel surrounded.
Carmen Bello had enough supplies but the
garrison's morale was brittle and after a week
of siege and fighting at close quarters he opted
for the inevitable evacuation. On the 28th he
pulled out his thousand man garrison in a well
executed night withdrawal along a poorly
guarded back trail. The Maya cautiously
followed up and burned the town after paying
their devotions at the cathedral.
The Mayan drive in the south was led by
the capable Jose Maria Beffera, one of Pat's
lieutenants who would eventually become the
dominant Mayan leader. His initial force of
3000 from the Puuc hills had swollen by
thousands more local recruits as he pressed
toward the coast. In April he had overrun the
Chenes region and early May brought his
advance forces to the walls of Campeche.
General de Llergo watched his patchwork
defense line crumble. The last days of May saw
Ticul, Saculum, and Izarnel fall; Campeche and
Merida directly threatened; and to worsen
matters Colonel Pasos' Third Division at
Hocabo was cut off and not heard from since.
News arrived by steamer that Bacalar far
behind the lines near the Caribbean coast had
also fallen.
On the north coast the fifth Division in
danger of encirclement was ordered to abandon
Motul and cover the vital escape route to the
port of Sisal. The final defense of Merida would
rest with the First and Second divisions holding
Uayalcheh and Tecoh but their morale was
shaky at best, while some of the other divisions
were outright mutinous.
Half of Carmen Bello's Fourth division,
those from Campeche, mutinied and abandoned
their positions for the protective walls of
Campeche. In Campeche the French consul
wrote how the city would surely fall and that the
militia garrison was demoralized.
Offshore the American bomb-brig
Vesuvius and other ships of Commodore
Matthew Perry's Gulf Squadron stood ready to
evacuate U.S. citizens. The Yucatecans
petitioned Commodore Perry for U.S. Marines to
land and maintain order if not to fight Mayans.
Further south in another refugee center, the
remote Island port of Carmen, 300 U.S. Marines
from offshore ships were detailed to provide
protection. Perry a close observer of events
wrote his government
[2] :
Though he considered the Ladinos an
"extraordinary example of disgraceful
cowardice" and noted "they have become panic
striken and seem to have lost all courage" Perry
did advocate their cause; requesting permission
to garrison Campeche with bluejackets. This was
vetoed by President Polk who did not wish to
intervene in a civil war, though Perry was
authorized to proctect Carmen if it was
threatened. Perry ordered his ships to land a
supply of powder and some 1000 captured
Mexican muskets at Campeche and to rescue
stranded refugees along the coast.
Merida and the crowded coastal ports
where over a hundred thousand refugees
huddled, were in a state of acute anxiety if not
panic. Llergo contemplated a fighting withdrawal
to Sisal and a final stand behind the walls of
Campeche. Governor Barbachano packed his
bags and prepared his proclamation of the
evacuation of Merida but could find no paper for printing it. Among
the general population the fear of a general
slaughter was on the verge of realization.
Machete and Musket Part II The Yucatan Indian Uprising 1847-1855
...that the inhabitants of
Campeche are preparing to abandon
that stronghold to the indians. The [US.
State] Department is, I presume, aware
that Campeche is a strongly fortified
place, being entirely surrounded by
thick and high walls, rendering it
defensible against a very large force,
especially of half-armed Indians,
unprovided with a
battering train.
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© Copyright 1992 by Milton Soong.
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