The Egyptian Army
1880-1900

The Egyptians and Conclusion

by Doug Johnson

If the praise for the Sudanese battalions is sometimes as wild and free as Sudanese firing was reputed to be, the praise of the Egyptian battalions is more restrained, almost defensive. "Though the Sudanese might be considered the flower of the army," wrote one British officer, "the fellaheen cavalry, artillery and infantry were absolutely trustworthy troops" (Maxse, p. 133).

"Excellent soldiers, but not heroes" is the type of remark one is apt to hear about them. It is a general feeling, rarely substantiated by specific instances. Some of the examples can be questioned in their interpretation, and others do not merit being turned into blanket generalizations.

The Times correspondent was impressed with the Egyptian performance at Firka: "I had already noted in the course of the action, that the Egyptians were perfectly steady under fire, and they have always had the reputation for being so, but few gave them credit for possessing the dash they displayed on this occasion." (Knight, p.123)

A new reputation should have begun with Ginnis when the 3rd Egyptians cleared several houses at the bayonet and captured four guns, or with the early string of "gallant actions" of the Camel Corps. Yet the memory of El-Obeid and El-Teb, as unindicative of the new army as they were, lingered.

I have already noted the veteran status of the Sudanese as one reason for their reliability. Egyptian soldiers were recruited for only six years, so that only officers and NCO's were likely to be veterans of the widely separated campaigns. Seven years had elapsed between Toski and Firka, with only one Egyptian battalion having served in the 1891 Tokar expedition. It is not likely that any battalion had the accumulated experience of the Sudanese. It is not surprising, then, that some of the reservist battalions distinguished themselves quite well, though generally kept out of battle. The 15th battalion, unsupported, took Shendi before Atbara. The 16th battalion did so well at Gedaref and other actions along the Blue Nile that even Churchill was moved to say that it "won greater distinction than any fellahin troops during the war." (Churchill, II, p. 266).

THE OFFICERS

The common explanation for the fighting ability of the new Egyptian army is that it was now "properly led by British officer." Though nothing should be detracted from the real achievements of the British officers and NCO's that trained and officered the Egyptian army, it is time that this emphasis on the officer be dropped. When properly led and trained, by anybody any army can fight well. It is not true that an army is only as good as its officers - the British army has proved that over and over again in the 19th Century, and especially WWI. An army is only as good as its soldiers, and again the British army has proved that.

There were certainly some very good officers seconded to the Egyptian army, Those who came early and were in command of a company or two, who had close contact with their men, seem In many ways better than those who straight away commanded a battalion or larger. They had a better understanding of their men, knew their capabilities and how to reach them. It also seems that those who came out in the 80's or early 90's and stayed on became the best officers in the army. Certainly there was a difference between them and those who came much later, for the last phase of the reconquest. There were some brand new officers who came out in 1898 just in time for Atbara, and who could not converse fluently in Arabic on military matters until after Omdurman! One might also suggest that those in the Sudanese battalions seemed to advance further than those in the Egyptian battalions. It is more than a coincidence that during the reconquest the commander of the Egyptian Division, General Hunter, and three out of four commanders - Lewis, Macdonald and Collinson all had served in Sudanese battalions.

Native officers were often belittled. It was often said that the 7th Egyptians at Omdurman, the only battalion with no British officers, wavered In the face of the enemy. The fact that it was commanded by native officers was seen as sufficient explanation. Unfortunately no one has yet gone into the matter more thoroughly.

There were many instances on the frontier and the Dongala campaign where troops under their own officers fought quite gallantly. The case of the Egyptian major defending Khor Musa Fort has already been cited.

There was a difference between Egyptian and Sudanese officers. Almost all Egyptian officers (many of whom served in Sudanese battalions) were trained at the military academy in Cairo. All Sudanese officers came from the ranks. These officers won high praise from the Times correspondent in 1896, and he could by no stretch of the imagination be called a negrophile.

RELATIONS WITH THE BRITISH

Churchill attributes the transformation of the Egyptian army to the regimental pride adopted and instilled by the British officers. "The officer's military honour is the honour of his men...whatever they are, or wherever they are, the officer who leads them believes in them and swears by them" (Churchill, 2,p. 412). This may not be a major reason for the change, but it certainly was an element. Officers in the Egyptian battalions despised the Sudanese.

Officers with the Sudanese knew their men were best. Both resented the officers of the British regiments. At Ginnis a British officer in the Egyptian army was the first to enter the Mahdist camp. He went rushing about grabbing Mahdist banners yelling "Don't let the English get the flags! Don't let the English get the flags!" It was only after remonstrations from Grenfell that he reluctantly gave up a few of the trophies he had gathered for the Egyptians (Haggard, p. 376).

The same rivalry was sometimes displayed by the men. One Sudanese battalion fired warning shots over the heads of the Grenadiers as the latter tried to pull in front of them in the rush to be the first to enter Omdurman after the battle. When one officer nervously inquired about the shots, another answered, trying to sound cheerful, "oh, it's the Gyppies behind...they always do that if you get in front of them." (Ziegler, p. 191). Nor did the "Gyppies" let the Guards remain in front for long. Smith-Dorrien led his XIIIth Sudanese through the back alleys and the outskirts of the town, re-entering the main road in front of the Guards, and then spread his companies out across the width of the street so that no one else could pass (Ziegler, p. 196). As it was, Sirdar chose the XIIIth over the Guards to be the first to storm the citadel.

There were friendlier relations between individual battalions. In commemoration for their joint defense of Kosheh, the Cameron Highlanders presented the IXth Sudanese with their own color. Friendly interest continued between the two regiments until 1930 when the IXth was disbanded. The IXth insisted on returning their color to the Camerons for safekeeping, and also gave them two of their most prized trophies: the Khalifa's war horn and the Mahdi's original green flag. The Xth Sudanese had a similar relationship with the 10th Lincolnshire Regiment while the latter was stationed in Egypt, but this friendship was based on the fact that both shared the number ten. On the march into Omdurman both battalions cheered as they passed and repassed each other on the way. The band of the Xth played the "Lincolnshire Poacher", and finally gave the 10th a Mahdist flag to carry in front as a trophy. In reciprocation the 10th presented the Xth with a color of their own after the campaign. The Grenadier Guards also presented the Xth with a Drum Major's staff.

CONCLUSION

The conquest of Africa was carried out by European governments, but primarily through African troops. The old askaris do not figure as prominently in modern history as their enemies who resisted European domination. "Mercenaries" they are sometimes called, and mercenaries they often were, but not In the image that word now evokes. Thus dismissed by Africanists, they fare no better with modern. British writers who, with extraordinary ingratitude, ignore the soldiers who won for them the empire they remember so fondly.

The Egyptian army was raised with the conquest of the Sudan as its main, almost its sole purpose. The defense of the Suez Canal and British interests were left to the Royal Navy and British troops in Egypt. This purpose the Egyptians achieved through a long frontier war, In battles on their own, and finally in battles aided by the British army. The officers who served in the Egyptian army have long since died. The battalions who bore Ginnis, or Toski, or Firka on their flags have been disbanded. They have no regimental histories or museums to maintain the credit due them. Many recent books by British authors on the colonial period have emphasized such notable British traits as a sense of "fair play", yet there has been little that is fair in the treatment of the memory of the Egyptian army. There is still the need for fairer and more analytical accounts. They may come in the near future, but they are long overdue.

The Egyptian Army 1880-1900

Back to Table of Contents -- Savage and Soldier Sudan Special Issue
Back to Savage and Soldier List of Issues
Back to MagWeb Magazine List
© Copyright 2004 by Milton Soong.
This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web.
Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com