The Egyptian Army
1880-1900

The Frontier 1885-96 and Reconquest

by Doug Johnson

Numerous frontier skirmishes took place at the end of 1885 as the British retreated and the Mahdists advanced. The new Egyptian army got its first test in December, 1885, in the battles around Kosheh and Ginnis. Unlike later actions with the British army, the Egyptians were not brigaded separately, The 3rd Egyptians, one company of the Camel Corps and one Field Battery were with the 1st Brigade; and the 1st Egyptians, IXth Sudanese, one company of Camel Corps and one squadron of cavalry were with the 2nd Brigade.

Kosheh and Ginnis were a revelation to the British on the ability of the Egyptians. Together the Cameron Highlanders and the IXth Sudanese cleared a Mahdist village near Kosheh, the IXth alone capturing two cannon. The Egyptians, too, cleared part of the village of Ginnis in stiff hand-to-hand fighting and captured four Mahdist guns.

After Ginnis the British force at the Frontier was progressively reduced until only one company remained at Assuan by 3 january 1888, and this was withdrawn to Cairo in June The defense of the Frontier and of Suakin was, for all practical purposes, left entirely to the Egyptian army from 1886 on. British troops were either entirely absent, or played only a supporting role. The defeat of Wad al-Nujumi at Toski was done entirely by Egyptians and Sudanese, the 20th Hussars being the only British troops involved.

Most of the fights that took place were skirmishes and small actions, with both the Egyptians and the Mahdists advancing and retreating around the villages of Serras, Gemai, Suarda, Argin, and others. Usually the Mahdists remained in Serras and Gemai while the advanced posts of Egypt were at Argin and the Khor Musa Fort. After Toski the Egyptians advanced up to Serras, though they generally remained on the defensive up to 1891.

Many of these skirmishes ended in Egyptian defeats, but they were defeats of a type that proved the steadiness of the new army. Only a few examples need be cited.

In a skirmish near Khor Musa Fort in October, 1887, the Camel Corps and cavalry were caught in a melee by a superior Mahdist force while withdrawing. Yet they were able to continue their retreat in good order, while fighting, until the rifles of the IXth Sudanese could come to their aid. (Royle, p. 470). The disasterous Handub expedition three months later, which nearly cost Kitchener his life, could have ended in a massacre but for the valor of one company of the Xth Sudanese that was with the force. This company was caught unsupported when 300 "friendlies" routed in the face of Uthman Diqna's troops. A force of 150 men faced 1,000, of which 600 were entrenched with rifles. The Xth held out until Kitchener could bring up his reserves of cavalry and Camel Corps. Despite losses of 40 percent the remnants of this company covered the retreat of the entire force. One British officer later wrote "...had it not been for the gallantry and steadiness of the Xth, we must have all been scuppered." (Hunter, pp. 6-9). A similar incident happened at the KhorMusa fort the night of August 29, 1888. The Mahdists managed to enter the fort at night and occupy half of it while part of the Egyptian battalion there, under the comnand of an Egyptian major, was able to hold the other half until relief came in the morning in the form of cavalry, infantry, an armored train and a gunboat (Royle 1900, p. 472).

Various British writers date the "transformation" of the Egyptian army from Toski in 1889, or Tokar in 1891, and some even as late as Omdurman itself. But it is clear that the transformation was earlier than that.... for one cannot think of a greater contrast between El-Obeid and El-Teb than the above incidents where the Egyptians remained steady when outnumbered and outgunned, surprised or actually overtaken by the enemy. Toski and Tokar were the largest tests, but they only showed the British public what the British officers in the Egyptian Army already knew.

In late June, 1889, reports came that Wad al-Nujumi was advancing into Egypt with a force of about 4,000 fighting men. Immediately a Flying Column of about 1,940 men and four steamers under Colonel Wodehouse was formed to make contact with the enemy. This they did at the village of Argin where, by fortifying the village, setting the guns across the river overlooking the village, and skillfully using the steamers filled with men to rush reinforcements from one sector to the next, the Flying Column repelled the Mahdist attack. The force then spent the rest of July trailing Wad al-Nujumi and preventing him from reaching the river while the Sirdar, Sir Francis Grenfell, gathered a larger force of Egyptians and called In British reinforcements.

The Egyptian force was concentrated at Toski and reformed into two brigades. Grenfell hoped to delay action until the British arrived, but it turned out he needn't have worried, On August 3rd, two days after the Sirdar's arrival at Toski, a battle was unexpectedly precipitated.

At first the Mahdist rifle fire was so heavy that the Camel Corps and cavalry were forced out of two defensive positions. But in a series of rushes the Sudanese and Egyptian battalions were able to storm and sieze the Mahdist hill-tops. The last hill was taken by a united charge of the IXth, Xth and XIIIth battalions. The ensuing Mahdist retreat was harassed by the Egyptian cavalry aided by the 20th Hussars, the only incident where British troops came into action in the nearly two month long expedition. (See Hunter, pp. 17-18; Royle 1900, pp. 480-484; Wingate, pp. 406-432).

With their defeat at Toski the Mahdists retreated south to Suarda. Minor raiding continued until 1893, but the frontier was quiet after that. Only Suakin needed security. In 1891 Colonel Holled-Smith, commander of the Suakin garrison, was sent to secure Tokar.

Taking Handub first on January 27, 1891, he arrived at the old government buildings of Tokar on February 19th. The battle there was not the dramatic event some writer later made it to be. A force of three battalions of veterans (two had been at Toski) was attacked by a smaller force of some 2,000. There was no question of whether the Egyptians would hold, or whether the square would break. The main attack came against the XIIth but firing was general all along the perimeter. Once the Mahdist charge was checked the XIth launched a counter charge which cleared the field. Uthman Diqna was forced to fall back on Kassala and for the next five years made only occasional raids against Suakin and Tokar.

Egypt, through the army, had now established secure frontiers which could also serve as bases for its own invasion of the Sudan.

THE RECONQUEST

It is natural that British authors give more attention to the few British troops involved in the conquest of the Sudan, but this gives a distorted view. In one sense the conquest of the Sudan was a British victory, for the designers of the military and political strategy were British. The Egyptian army was remodeled by British officers and British infantry and artillery did play a considerable part at Atbara and Omdurman. Yet it is as untrue to claim the reconquest a British victory as it would be to claim that the Normandy landings were an American victory. Even in substituting "Anglo-Egyptian" for "British" the emphasis should be on Egyptian, for it was the Egyptian army that won the battles.

When the decision was made to advance on Dongala in April, 1896, the Egyptian army was momentarily caught off-guard, only in that no campaign was expected that year. Two new battalions were raised from the reserves, an Indian Contingent was sent to replace the garrison at Suakin, and the North Staffordshire Regiment moved south to occupy frontier posts for the Egyptian army. The force that crossed the frontier was on its own. The first engagement at Firka on June 7th was carried out entirely by the three Egyptian brigades and mounted support. While the North Staffordshire Regiment was at Hafir, that battle was primarily an artillery duel between the Mahdist guns and the Egyptian flotilla. It fell to the Egyptian artillery and two companies of the Xth Sudanese to cross over the neighboring island of Artaghasi and silence the Mahdist redoubt at close range. Dongala fell to the gunboats.

The consolidation of 1897 again was done solely by the Egyptian army. Abu Hamid was captured by four battalions and the artillery on August 7, Berber was taken by Ja'alin "friendlies" on September 6th. Kassala was handed over by the Italians to the 16th Egyptians on December 25th.

It was not until February, 1898, that one brigade of British infantry began to arrive at the frontier. This brigade was a great help at Atbara, and all are agreed that the bulk of the fighting done was by the two Highland and six Sudanese battalions.' Yet it was the Sudanese who, having the longest distance to travel and coming under the heaviest fire, breached the zariba first. It was the Xth that captured Mahmud.

The 21st Lancers did not come out from Cairo until August, nearly six months after Atbara. They seem to have been a totally superfluous regiment as most reconnaissances were conducted by the Egyptian cavalry either in small groups, or, as at Atbara In force. Together with the Camel Corps, the Horse battery and the galloping maxims, the Egyptian cavalry could form the advance force for the entire army, engaging the enemy with rifles, artillery and machine-guns. The galloping maxims even allowed the cavalry to fire while withdrawing, though the effect at full tilt must have been erratic. This potent formation was used effectively at Omdurman in "soaking off" the forces of Shaikh al-Din and Ali wad Hilu. But, as so often before, the slow moving Camel Corps nearly got overwhelmed by the enemy's fleeter movement, and the entire farce might have come to grief without the intervention of the gunboats. By the end of the battle the Egyptian cavalry and the Camel Corps were still able to attempt the pursuit of the Khalifa. This pursuit, or rather the prevention of the Khalifa's escape was supposed to be the job of the 21st Lancers who had wasted their opportunity by being tricked into their charge, They were in no condition afterwards to pursue anything but their own glory.

Another brigade of British infantry, plus two batteries of artillery were sent to reinforce the Egyptians after Atbara, though one wonders if they were needed. The artillery support at Omdurman was effective. The first Mahdist charge was directed mainly at the British brigades but finished in front of Maxwell's. This was scarcely the whole battle. The main attack, first by the Black Flag, then by the two Green Flags, was directed at the Egyptians, and particularly against Macdonald's Sudanese. The credit for meeting both of these threats, delivered almost simultaneously, should go equally to Macdonald and his men, for he gave the orders, but they carried them out perfectly. The eventual support of the 10th Lincolnshire Regiment hastened, but did not dictate the end of the Mahdist charge. That was already decided by the 2nd Egyptians and the IXth, Xth and XIth Sudanese. One English officer with the 2nd Egyptians wrote home after the battle, "I also saw (from newspaper clippings) that 2 cos. of the Lincolns came up and saved us!! Certainly 2 English Regiments came up to our support but after we had finished our job, they never formed up into alignment, much less fired a shot." (Ready Ms, NAM).

The actual capture of Omdurman was carried out by the Egyptian army, with the XIIIth Sudanese entering and taking the citadel just too late to capture the Khalifa.

With Omdurman captured the British troops left the Sudan. The Guards and the 21st Lancers returned home to cheering crowds while the Egyptian army continued the year-long hunt for the Khalifa and his remaining amirs. Gedaref, the last major Mahdist stronghold was taken by the 16th Egyptians and the "Kassala Irregulars". The largest battle after Omdurman was at Rosaires on December 26, 1898, when a few companies of the IXth and Xth attacked Ahmad Fadil in a well-entrenched position. The Mahdists had two tiers of riflemen concealed in sand hills and scrub and subjected the Sudanese to a fire that many compared to the fire the Mahdists received at Omdurman. The Xth alone lost nearly a quarter of its strength. Yet when they halted and were rushed by the Mahdists, they returned an equally devastating fire at close range which completely repulsed the Mahdists (Hunter, p. 52).

The Khalifa was finally met and killed at El Gedid on November 23, 1899, by the IXth and XIIIth Sudanese. Among the trophies carried off by the IXth were the Khalifa's own leather and silver encased ombeya (elephant tusk horn) and the Mahdi's original modest green flag.

The Egyptian Army 1880-1900

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