The Egyptian Army
1880-1900

The Sudenese Battalions

by Doug Johnson

In making a critical assessment of the Egyptian army it has to be admitted that the Sudanese battalions were universally regarded as the pride of the army. In numerous battles they were placed in the firing line first, with the Egyptians in support. Though there may be something in the attitudes toward war in the Sudanese culture to account for their reputation, it would be a mistake to explain it solely by the "martial race" theory. A better reason for their reliability is found in the set-up of the Egyptian army itself.

The Sudanese battalions were recruited from the Blacks of the Southern Sudan and the Nuba Mountains. Many were veterans of the old Egyptian army who had fought in Mexico and Turkey. Some later served with the Mahdists in the jihadiyya. Many of these had-been commanded by Hamdan Abu Anja, the greatest tactician and general of the Mahdist army. The first Sudanese battalion, the IXth, was raised from ex-soldiers still in Egypt. The next two, the Xth and XIIIth, were drawn mostly from the survivors of three Sudanese battalions in the Eastern Sudan who had escaped, en masse, from the Mahdists In 1885. After every major battle, a few recruits from the jihadiyya prisoners were sent off for additional training to replace losses. Thus, in the beginning and throughout the long war against the Mahdiyya the Sudanese battalions were able to recruit almost exclusively from veterans with many years' experience fighting under a variety of conditions in the Sudan. Unlike the Egyptian battalions, the Sudanese were recruited for life, so these veterans were retained from campaign to campaign.

This experience told in the soldiers' relations with their British officers. One subaltern who served with the the IXth on the frontier reports several instances of being corrected by his men. Prior to Toski he was assigned to fortify a house and walled courtyard with part of one company:

"I had two three-barrelled Nordenfelts and on my making a position for them at one corner, which had a good field of fire, I was checked by an old Shilluk (one of the tribes of the Southern Sudan) for doing so, as he said that the dervish would be sure to make for the corner of the fort, and then our machine-guns would jam; whereas three or four men would be ever so much safer, and then there were their bayonets. There was a lot in what he said." (Mitford, part 2, p. 226).

At another point during the battle of Toski he was ordered to fire on a body of Mahdists same 900 yards away to prevent their advance north:

"I noticed some of the volleys seemed very weak, so watched the muzzles and spotted that no smoke appeared an the word of 'Atesh', so, seizing one man by the ear, asked him why he had not fired. He said, 'No, Bimbashi, not yet, it is far; let us wait until we see the whites of their eyes; the day will be long, and we shall want all our cartridges before it is finished I had to quickly explain that we must prevent the foe going north." (Mitford, part 3, p, 66).

Thus there seems to have been a continuous rapport between the Sudanese and their officers: sharing combat experience, explaining, relying on initiative, and a general keeping everyone on his toes. This did much to maintain their standard of fighting.

There has been much criticism about Sudanese fire-discipline. The authority most often quoted on this is Churchill, whose greatest criticism is voiced regarding incidents he did not witness. He claims that Sudanese firing at Atbara "was of the wildest and most reckless description." though he himself had not been at Atbara (Churchill, I, p. 934). His criticism compelled his editor, who had served with the Egyptian army throughout the reconquest, to comment "The shooting was generally very free, and no unit can be either entirely exonerated or severely blamed." (Ibid.) Churchill then gives a very long and vivid description of the wild nature in which the Sudanese of Macdonald's brigade wasted ammunition. Yet at this time he was nowhere near the scene of the action and his seemingly eye-witness account appears more and more like the imaginative reporting for which he was known. A more reliable authority reported that when Macdonald's brigade was drawn up to face the Mahdists the artillery and maxims opened fire prematurely, and this set the Sudanese off at independent firing. Macdonald brought this to a halt, company vollies were opened up at four hundred yards, and "from that time on they worked like a machine" (Pritchard p. 206). The real problem the Sudanese faced was a shortage of ammunition, which is not surprising considering they bore the brunt of the battle (Zulfo, p.227). The official report records that Macdonald's brigade repulsed the attack by their own firepower (SIR, p.7). This was only one of three attacks the Sudanese repulsed with firepower during the battle. There were other battles, Firka, Hafir and Rosaires, for instance, where the effectiveness of Sudanese firepower drew special comment (Knight, p. 123, Atteridge, p. 212, Hunter, p. 52).

The Egyptian Army 1880-1900

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