In the fall of 1864 the situation for the Confederate forces in the west had grown grim. Atlanta had fallen and every confrontation with Sherman's Army had cost the Army of Tennessee dearly. Under John Bell Hood the Army had undertaken offensive operations with the hopes of stemming the inexorable tide of Union advance. By the fall Sherman was planning his final push to the sea. However, Hood had a plan. As a division commander he had seen how bold moves planned by Jackson and Lee in the east had resulted in huge triumphs. The Valley Campaign and the Second Manassas Campaign and the Chancellorsville Battle are but three examples. Hood now reasoned that such an operation might force Sherman to change his plans and pursue him in order to protect his lines of supply.
Hood devised an elaborate plan, which he hoped would shift the seat of war in the west 500 miles to the North. He planned to take the Army of Tennessee away to the west towards Gadsden, Alabama and then Northward to Tennessee. He wished to occupy Nashville and then perhaps, with luck and success, even threaten the Ohio River line, He hoped to force Sherman to follow him in order to protect his line of supply and communication.
The major flaw in this plan was significant. Hood failed to recognize the fact that the Union armies in the west were large enough to effectively conduct Sherman's march while protecting his lines of supply simultaneously. None the less, Hood marched forth from with his army on October 22 toward an ill fate.
Moving across east central Alabama then to the north, Hood's army finally reached Florence, AL where he waited for a month while he vacillated over his plan. Hood advanced on November 22 and made contact with Federal forces near Columbia, Tennessee. Opposing Hood were the forces commanded by John M. Schofield. Parts of his 23rd Army Corps and the reconstituted 4th Army Corps, Army of the Cumberland. Hood surmised that he could leave the bulk of his artillery temporarily at Columbia and steal a march on Schofields army cutting him off from Thomas' forces in Nashville.
With this strategy in mind he sent the bulk of Benjamin Franklin Cheatham's Corps toward Spring Hill Tennessee on the 28th of November. Realizing this later after receiving information from his cavalry commander James H. Wilson; Schofield also put his forces in motion sending 4th corps back to Spring Hill to protect his long baggage trains before Hood could capture them. Hood had the brilliant Nathan Bedford Forrest as his cavalry commander, but utilized his talents poorly.
Although Forrest beat the Federals and Cheatham to Spring Hill, his attack on the Federal garrison faltered when Stanley arrived and began to move his infantry into line.
On the 29th of November around 3:00 PM the divisions of Brown, Cleburne and Bate arrived at Spring Hill with orders to cut the Columbia & Nashville turnpike and thereby sever the line of retreat toward Franklin. Their orders were at the best, confusing. At the worse they were downright idiotic. After supposedly issuing these orders Hood simply went to bed. He never made any attempt to see that the plan was executed nor even went to the field of battle. In a pitiful display of poor planning the army failed to move on Schofield. Hood placed blame on the failure of Cheatham and his divisional commanders to carry out his orders. They in turn pointed to the laudanum-induced stupor under which Hood functioned as the principle cause. Hood had indeed displayed poor judgement during the entire campaign.
For whatever reason, Schofield escaped to Franklin and the attack never materialized. Although some display was made by both Cleburne and Brown, the Federal Army simply marched past the Army of Tennessee and planted itself behind the extensive field works in Franklin. What was about to happen in Franklin would turn the so-called "Spring Hill affair" into a raging debate for years after.
When Hood awoke the next day he was astounded to find out that no real attack was ever made. This put Hood into a raging frenzy. His staff officers said that the Hood was "as ill as a rattlesnake" during the march to Franklin. Hood was determined to rid his army of its weak-heartedness. He believed that the Army of Tennessee would only fight behind works.
He intended to launch an all-out assault at Franklin to cure the Army of its malady. Hood never considered that he might destroy the bulk of his army in doing so. The cure was definitely worse than the illness.
He arrived at Franklin to find the Union Army entrenched behind fortifications around the outskirts of town. The singular exception to this was Wagner's Division (less the Brigade of Emerson Opdycke), which was deployed in be about half a mile to the front.
The angry Hood ordered Cheatham and A. P. Stewart to launch a full frontal assault against the town, He wished to prove the metal of his army. At 4:00 PM the attack was launched against Wagner's two isolated brigades while back toward Franklin. The Confederates raced after them and used the fleeing Federals as a shield. This allowed the Confederates to enter the town and pass the Union line. A timely counter-attack launched by the Brig Gen Emerson Opdycke foiled the initial surge and threw back the Rebels. This earned his brigade the nickname "Opdycke's Tigers".
After this initial success the Confederates began to take heavy fire as they moved in. Several assaults were launched all without success. In less than five hours 6,000 men were removed front the ranks of the 38,000 man Army of Tennessee. This included six Generals. One of these was the superb Patrick Cleburne. The Army of Tennessee was destroyed in this charge and never recovered. Hood failed to see the true meaning of his loss at Franklin. He pursued Schofield to Nashville where the huge Army under George Henry Thomas waited to finish the job begun at Franklin.
In one of the more puzzling moves of the war, Hood lay siege to a force nearly three times the size of his own at Nashville. The results would be predictable. The war in the west, lost well before this campaign began, was now clearly a fruitless waste of lives.
More Hood's 1864 Tennessee Campaign
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