Old Duffer's Book Corner

The Military Revolution
In The Sixteenth Century

David Eltis
for I B Taurus

From the Imbibing Bibliophile himself

"My goodness" said the first Earl of Foppington in 1552, "It is 1552, where's that bloody military revolution, its late! You never can trust military revolutions these days, of course it was different when I was a boy". Sadly, the noble earl's memoirs were misfiled and latter-day historians have had to try to pinpoint this revolution ever since. The difficulty for most of them is that (like evolutionists) they point out the medieval army (small and mounted) and then the armies of Louis XIV (large and on foot) and assume this difference was caused by whatever crackpot theory they have. Since this change was made by political adept individuals we may assume that it had its own internal consistency, yet the theories do not always try to use this functional test. It is little surprise that both sides will grasp any Military Revolution Piltdown Man too swiftly to their bosoms.

In my humble view the difficulty with single points of reference is that unless you have them exactly right they will mislead, better to try to follow the continuum and ask oneself "Why?". Of course, this requires that you give the historical actors the benefit of the doubt that they are not cretins. For example, one feature much noted by Military Revolutionists is that campaigns became less decisive into the 16th century because of fortification, but an old 12th century student like me would find it hard to see this as a difference. King Stephen might be surprised by firearms but he would swiftly recognise the cities of the Netherlands as being akin to adulterine castles of his era.

First out of the traps on the topic was Michael Roberts who attempted to explain what he saw as a move away from efficient fire (the longbow) to inefficient firearms manned by ghastly proles. A move resulting in cavalry using pistols when (clearly) hard-charging is the "answer" (something that the Reiters might have a view upon which just might have more application than the opinions of academics, cloistered or not). This was all solved by Maurice of Nassau and Gustavus Vasa who returned us to Roman size units and boot-to-boot cavalry. Geoffrey Parker saw this Protestant view as not the whole story, and was one who posed The Great Question: if these "Roman" units were so good how come the evil Catholic tercios beat them handily at Nordlingen. No answer has been adduced, and if you look for an answer in Lion of The North my dears, you may not find it. Swedes good, Spanish bad, is a message for the sort of gamers who like their history simple in outline and complex in execution.

To Parker the key is the Italian style of fortification that (practically) could only be starved out and not taken. Suddenly, monarchies with faced with "invulnerable" stadts that they could only take at immense cost and over a long time. Even the great Duke of Parma had not enough time to absorb all the rebellious cities of the Netherlands. But was this really different from the problems facing our King Stephen or the Emperor Frederick against the Lombard League? No it was not. This is no revolution but a retrogression. In truth a short lived revolution where artillery could take down curtain-walls was returning us to the usual status quo.

Eltis sees things as follows (if I have the measure of him):

  • Firstly, things were a great deal more complex and varied than one might suppose in any period based on the evidence of the writing of professional soldiers.
  • Secondly, firearms far from being less effective than longbows were more effective against plate.
  • Thirdly, properly handled firearms could slaughter infantry and cavalry.
  • Fourthly, to protect the firearms one needed well handled pikes this required all parties to train in a way that a Medieval army did not.
  • Fifthly, that cavalry combat with swords had been pretty desultory whereas pistol-armed cavalry increased the decisiveness of the combat. (You can kill someone more certainly with the latter than the former).
  • Sixthly, that any form of fortification (except curtain walls) was pretty effective as long as you had time to build a half-moon behind the breach and pour in your new-found firepower.
  • Seventhly, that defensive artillery in fortification was now such that attacking from close by was no fun.

So the expenditure and organisation (and training) that was needed to run these mixed arm forces is the true Military Revolution, indeed Dennis Showalter has argued that an 18th Century infantryman fighting in close order, firing and marching must have had professional skills in line with a modern hi-tech soldier.

I found this a very well-argued book with plenty of practical examples of what occurred. For example, to answer that old question of what would have happened if the Spanish Armada had landed Eltis has two examples, the first I have seen, (one a landing in Cornwall where the militia were soundly routed, the other in Wales where the Trained Bands had had some training and won). Most historians substitute theory, Eltis uses facts. Linked with Delbruck's work I believe we have the beginnings here of a view of how changes occurred that take us between the two points I mentioned earlier, but do so in a way that is believable.

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© Copyright 1996 by Charles and Teresa Vasey.
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