The Advance into Egypt

The Italians lacked the required transport to conduct effective warfare in a desert environment. However, in September 1940 they lurched across the border into Egypt on 9 September. The absence o trucks to move supplies and other necessities of war severely hampered Graziani. Instead of a grand sweep around the British, he had to adopt a plan of advance that moved his infantry divisions along the coast with his tank force (the Maletti Group) providing only a flank guard. In effect, the 10th Army had to advance on a narrow front near the coast road using its artillery and tanks to escort its infantry that was mostly on foot. The army would be striking the enemy frontally, pushing him back and fighting on his chosen ground.

Clashes at Sollurn and Halfaya marked the progress of the Italian advance. The British never really came within reach of 10th Army. O'Connor would have it no other way. His plan was to retire before the enemy behind light covering forces (the Support Group on the desert flank and a battalion strength unit on the coast) on Mersa Matruh. There, they would await attack in the town defended by his infantry as he sprung a counterattack with 7tb Armored Division from the escarpment deep on the desert flank. By successive bounds, the retirement took place. The flank forces on almost every occasion easily evaded the Italians as they lumbered up to each new British position. By the 16 September, the Support Group passed through Sidi Barrani, Maktila and on to Mersa Matruh.

That day, Graziani halted his "pursuit" of the enemy. There were three reasons. His deplorable lack of transport prevented needed supplies from keeping up with the advance. The Italian troops were moving on foot and exhausted from the heat and lack of water. The British mobile rearguard tactics convinced the Italian commander that the English had hundreds of tanks ready to batter his army into the desert sands. The 10th Army stopped and began to dig in at Sidi Barrani with the faint prospect that it might eventually move on to Mersa Matruh.

With the Italian army immobile and apparently taking root at Sidi Barrani, General Wavell, the British C-in-C Middle East Theater, planned to seize the initiative in the Western Desert. He had to justify his demand for reinforcements and was confident that with a little boldness the British could force the enemy to evacuate Egyptian territory.

The Five Day Raid

Wavell turned to O'Connor. He wanted a plan to push the Italians back from whence they had come. O'Connor did just that. His scheme, code-named Operation Compass, depended upon secrecy and surprise in its initial attack since the assaulting force would be meager. It relied on one thrust, compared to a pincer movement favored by Wavell.

Plans for Compass matured from September to late November 1940, modified according to the forces that became available to the British and the stance of the Italian army. During this period, the British received substantial forces to give the projected attack some chance for success. Additional infantry from the 4th Indian division arrived as well as more A9, A 10, and A 13 medium tanks. To supplement the handful of Gloster-Gladiator bi-planes, a dozen Hawker-Hurricane mono-planes appeared to allow the British to dominate the skies during the forthcoming offensive. However, the most important addition to O'Connor's arsenal was the Matilda 11 tank of the 7th Royal Tank Regiment. The twenty-six ton monster sported a 40mm cannon and 3 inches of armor impervious to almost all Italian guns. In addition, most of the Italian artillery lacked armorpiercing ammo at this stage of the war in Africa. Its mission was to lead the break-in into the Italian camps and fortress areas such as Bardia and Tobruk.

For the counteroffensive, Western Desert Force would possess the newly reinforced 7th Armor Division and 4th Indian Infantry Divisions. This made a total of 36,000 men, 150 artillery pieces, 48 fighters, 140 bombers, and 200 light, 75 medium and 45 Matilda tanks.

On 6 December 1940, O'Connor's army started its 100 mile approach march from Mersa Matruh. The plan called for 7th Armor Division to slip behind the enemy camps in the Sofafi-Rabia area, take station around Buq Buq, isolate the battlefield and prevent the escape of Italian forces encamped to the east. Meanwhile, 4th Indian Division, reinforced with the British 16th Brigade and spearheaded by 7th Royal Tank Regiment, would successively attack the enemy camps in the Sidi Barrani zone. [Box counters in the game are a good representation of the flimsy defenses the Italians constructed before O'Connor's offensive. Their greatest strength lay in the minefields surrounding them. However, their shallow earthworks and distance from each other made them prone to quick conquest by the British infantry and heavy tanks.]

O'Connor designed the attack to be only a five-day affair. He and Wavell were confident that they could give the Italians a bloody nose and possibly force a retreat back over the frontier. The size of the Italian army, and the British lack of men and material, especially critical logistical support, made any other possible result unlikely. Further, unknown to O'Connor, his 4th Indian Division was slated for withdrawal from the operation after five days to go to the Sudan.

[AFRIKA represents this by the withdrawal provisions listed under Rule 3.3.1]

The British forces moved into position just southeast of the forward Italian camps. One hundred miles west at his headquarters in Bardia, Graziani did not realize the disaster about to befall his army. Combined arms mobile British units screened their force's movements and controlled the areas between the Italian camps. This effectively isolated each camp from one another. Blinded by English 'Jock' Columns, he assumed the British would have to remain on the defensive while he prepared to resume his September advance sometime in December.

By noon of 9 December, 7th Armor Division cut the coastal road westward from Sid Barrani. The end of the day saw the fall of the camp at Nibeiwa [map hex 53.22] and at Tummar West [hex 54.12]. The next day the Italians abandoned the position at Tummar East. The Libyans, at Maktila [hex 55.11], and the Catanzaro Division retired on Sidi Barrani. The Cirene and Marmarica Divisions fled out of Egypt on the I I th.

By the 11th, the situation presented O'Connor with complete victory and prospects of rich exploitation. He had crushed the forward zone of the enemy defenses and 7th Armored Division headed west beyond Buq Buq, while 4th Indian Division aimed to reduce Sidi Barrani. News came in that thousands upon thousands of Italian prisoners, thirsty and unable to retreat, were surrendering hourly.

[No rule in AFRIKA better reflects the demoralization of the Italians caused by the British attack and the unpreparedness to receive it than the Italian Surrender Rule found in rules section 2.2. You could appropriately call Rule 2.2 "O'Connor's Secret Weapon"].

The dawn of 12 December saw 7th Armored Division ready to cross into Cyrenaica leaving over 38,000 enemy prisoners behind. The 4th Indian Division also remained behind earmarked for service in the Sudan. The eager but inexperienced 6th Australian Infantry Division would be its replacement. The logistical strain of sending 4th Indian back to Alexandria and bringing 6th Australian to the front hindered the British advance into Libya more than the resistance offered by the Italians. The loss of 4th Indian Division and resultant slow progress of 7th Armored along the coastal road, caused O'Connor, on the 14th, to order the 4th Armored Brigade to swing south of the road and by-pass the retreating enemy to cut the road from Bardia to Tobruk. Meanwhile, 7th Armored Brigade continued to crowd the Italian rearguard along the coast road while attempting to cut off the retreat by a turning movement aimed at Fort Capuzzo.

With the British armor rushing after them, the fleeing Italians congregated at Bardia, Tobruk and Sidi Omar. The latter place fell on 16 December. The British cut the Bardia-Tobruk road on the same day trapping four Italian Divisions (40,000 men, 500 pieces of artillery and 120 light and medium tanks). Joined by 6th Australian Division on 20 December, the British attacked Bardia on 3 January capturing the town by the 5th. For a loss of less than 500 men, Western Desert Force took the entire garrison and most of its material.

The fall of Bardia allowed O'Connor to head for the most important objective in Cyreneica, the port of Tobruk. It was the only viable place to bring supplies and troops into the Western Desert between Tripoli and Alexandria. In mid-January 1941 the Italian troops guarding the port consisted of 25,000 men, 200 guns and 90 medium and lighttanks. Their job was to protect a defensive perimeter of thirty miles (twice as long as that found at Bardia) which was in a state of disrepair.

The British assault on Tobruk was short and sharp. The Australians, following behind the Matilda tanks, attacked on 21 January and cleared the port by the next day. Again, the entire garrison fell into the attackers' hands. With this supply entry point under its control, O'Connor's force temporarily found relief from the supply problems that had dogged its progress from the start of Compass.

More O'Connor's Offensive

Introduction
Harbingers of War
Egypt and the Five Day Raid
Beda Fomm

Counterpoint: Desert Storm 1940 (OP11)