With Germany's defeat of France looming on the horizon, Italy declared war on France and Great Britain on 10 June 1940. Mussolini hoped to get pieces of the Riviera and trade concessions from France. War with England could yield control of the Eastern Mediterranean with the conquest of British Egypt.

Italy hoped and Great Britain assumed that Italy would invade Egypt if war broke out. They would likely advance down the Mediterranean coastal road fifty miles to take the English railhead and base at Mersa Matruh. That desert was ideal for unhindered movement by mechanized units. To the south, the escarpment runs parallel to the coast, ten miles inland, affording an attacker several axes of advance. The only natural obstacle to mobile operations was at the small port of Sollum where sea and escarpment merge.

The road wound uphill out of Sollum to Capuzzo and the larger Italian port of Bardia. Even there, mechanized troops can outflank the coastal block to the south by moving through Sidi Omar to the west of Bardia. Regardless of route, the barren and waterless area would prevent an army operating far from the coastal region unless it had sufficient transport to carry water, fuel, spare parts, ammo and food required to fight away from an established base or normal lines of communication.

[Afrika reflects this desert dilemma through its escarpment provisions (Rule 1.5). The rule prevents units from crossing escarpment hexsides, except along roads. This makes truck movement neatly cut between movement along the coast and further inland. Remember, you can only move Supply Points by truck. The supply rules in the SCS (Rule 21.1) accurately show the difficulty of movement and keeping in supply during the North African Campaign. They prevent a supply path from crossing impassable hexsides, in this case escarpment hexsides.]

Numerous British ambushes and raids on Italian columns and positions from across the Egyptian/Cyrenaican border occurred on 11 June. Surprise was complete since Rome had not yet informed its troops in Libya that Italy and England were at war!

The Italian garrison stationed in Libya in 1940, designated 10th Army, was mostly a army short of tanks and guns. The transport situation was so meager that the army barely had enough to maintain itself during peace time. Any thought in June 1940 of taking the offensive was unrealistic. Beyond the material deficiencies, the 10th Army experienced the lack of firm leadership at the top. This prohibited it from any serious forward movement in early summer 1940, or at any time.

In late June, Marshal Rudolfo Graziam became Commander in Chief of all Italian forces in Libya. Active in the war against Ethiopia in 1935, Graziani was noted for his use of truck- borne infantry supported by light tanks. This made him the Hans Guderian of Italy though his opponents during the campaign were mostly riflemen possessing neither tanks nor other modem weapons of war. However, if some considered the Marshal a military innovator of sorts, they also knew him as a paranoid.

During the Ethiopian War, he set up his headquarters over 200 miles behind the front due to a fear of possible assassination. His command bunker was 70 feet below ground in an attempt to safeguard his person. Graziani was a coward and pessimist even in the best of situations. This flaw in his character combined with exaggerated claims of British strength in Egypt. Thus, he would never have the strength of will to carry out a sustained offensive against a competent opponent. Consequently, the 10th Army spent the next ten weeks building up strength while Graziani made excuses why he could not march into Egypt.

The men and weapons that reinforced 10th Army came primarily from the Italian 5th Army stationed on the Tunisian border. The transfer process continued beyond when the British struck in early December 1940.

[The Axis Order of Arrival Chart reflects the type of units that came to 10th Army. Medium M 13/40 tanks joined the M13/39 armor fighting vehicles in the theater since August in November and December 1940. Artillery and more tanks from the 5th Army appeared to face the British throughout January and February 1941.]

By 9 December 1940, Graziani could muster 248,429 men (including 33,000 Libyan troops), 400 pieces of artillery--the largest caliber was only 100mm types, 60 medium and 240 light tanks, 190 fighters and 140 bombers. Tenth Army's total transport assets for this large force only counted about 6000 trucks. A significant portion of these were never available for service due to breakdowns and lack of spare parts.

[The Axis Truck Points Chart on the map highlights the truck shortage the Italians faced between when their advance into Egypt in September 1940 and when they left Cyrenaica early the next year.]

As the Italians augmented 10th Army between June and September 1940, they determined to hold off the enemy on the frontier by use of light forces. These would consist of the few truckborne infantry they had and L3/35s (a 3 ton machine-gun carrier that passed as a tank) supported by air power in the form of CR 42 and CR 32 bi-planes.

[These craft were obsolete by 1940. Thus, the low number of Air Points the Italians get on game turns 1 through 7.]

The British field force in Egypt, Western Desert force, responded to their unaggressive foe, throughout June by staging ever bolder incursions into Italian territory. They struck atFort Maddelenna and Fort Capuzzo in mid-month with armor and motorized infantry, maintaining control of the air with the handful of aging bi-planes. The Italians were unable to redress the balance a bit until late July. They created their own combined arms teams of medium armor, artillery, mobile infantry backed up by aircraft used primarily for defense.

[Rule 1.16, Combined Arms, is different from most combined arms rules in that it allows the defender to take advantage it. Using this technique, the Italians were able to hold their ground during the summer skirmishing. Vastly outnumbering their opponents helped.]

The commander who orchestrated the English response to the Italian threat in mid 1940 was Richard O'Connor. O'Connor was a combat veteran of the First World War during which he won the DSO, the MC and the Italian Silver Medal for Valor. He was selected to lead the Western Desert Force on 7 June 1940. He was in the thick of the fighting at Paschendale and the crossing of the Piave (in Italy). His style of leadership in the desert continued to be one that saw him leading from the front. (Contrast this with the leadership style of Graziani.)

[It would be appropriate if AFRIKA had an O'Connor rule, as it does for Rommel (see Rule 2.3). Both men exhibited the command traits of boldness and speed combined with up-front leadership on the battlefield.]

More O'Connor's Offensive

Introduction
Harbingers of War
Egypt and the Five Day Raid
Beda Fomm

Counterpoint: Desert Storm 1940 (OP11)