Operation Hula
The North Pacific Offensive

Potential Joint US/Russian Operation
in the North Pacific, 1945

Part 7: The War Ends - But Not for the USSR and Japan

by Brooks A Rowlett, brooksar@indy.net

The main facts of the end of the war in the Pacific are well known. Atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima on 6 August and Nagasaki on 9th August 1945. Also, on 9th August, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan and commenced Operation August Storm, the invasion of Manchuria. The Soviet Union had laid defensive mine fields beginning the previous day, including 236 mines off Petropavlovsk. After various machinations and a near coup by the hard-core military officers in Tokyo, the will of the Emperor prevailed, and the Imperial Rescript announcing the surrender was broadcast on 15th August.

It is almost unknown in the West that hostilities between the USSR and Japan persisted for several days. The USSR was not prepared for the surrender to happen so fast. They apparently were unable to hasten the schedule for the occupation of the Kuriles; but they proceeded even without the (alert, but now noncombatant) USN's aid. The most intense combat that occurred after the Imperial Rescript was the USSR landing on Shumshu on 18th August. A full assault landing was carried out, and despite the Rescript, the Japanese forces on Shumshu and Paramushiro resisted fiercely.

The Soviet land and air forces were as follows (again, essentially quoting translations summarized by Leonid Baskirov):

Command: Major-General D'jakov

    Two reinforced rifle regiments (including the 138th one) of the 101st Rifle Division
    a battalion of naval infantry,
    279th howitzer artillery regiment (some sources report that only a detached battalion of this regiment was involved –LB},
    169th detached tank destroyer battalion (towed guns?)
    a company of naval frontier-guards
    a trench mortar company
    a submachine-gunners company (translated literally – LB}
    a scout platoon,
    and other minor units

This is a total of some 8824 men, 205 guns and trench mortars (although most later pages of the same reference indicate a total of 218 artillery tubes, not 205).

The troops were divided into four groups:

  • an advance detachment (consisting of the urgently formed battalion of naval infantry (783 men) to spearhead the main forces landing),
  • a detachment for "pointed landing" (?), and
  • two echelons of the main forces.-presumably one regiment each.

It was intended to land the troops on two beaches – the coast area between Capes Kokutan-saki and Kotomari-saki as primary landing site, and the Bay of Nanagawa-wan area as the secondary site. Air cover and support were provided by the 128th Mixed Air Division (total of 78 aircraft, including the Bell P-39 Airacobras fighters) as well as the 2nd Bomber Regiment of the Soviet Naval Aviation (about 30 to 35 aircraft, probably Il-4's). Land-based fire support was from a battery of four 130mm guns of the Cape Lopatka coast defense artillery on the Kamchatka mainland (12 km from the Shumshu north coast).

The Soviet Naval vessels involved in the operation were a very mixed bag. The landing craft were all ex-USN, as were some of the escorts. Other escorts and some of the auxiliary vessels were ships taken over from NKVD command (in the same way that the USN took over the Coast Guard in wartime). Soviet naval vessels in the Shumshu invasion were assigned to Naval Defense Sector Petropavlovsk, under Captain 1st Rank Ponomar'ov.

The escort & support force for the Shumshu landing consisted of:

    2 patrol boats (from the 60th Naval Frontier squadron)
    Kirov (flagship of Ponomar'ov who served as the landing operation commander)
    Dzerzhinski, each with two 102mm guns;
    4 minesweepers:
      T-334 (ex AM-149 Augury, command post of the operation commander, Major-General Grechko)
      T-525 (ex YMS-428),
      T-155 (ex YMS-145)
      T-156 (ex YMS-59) all shipping one 76mm and two 20mm guns;

    two 62-ton minesweeping cutters, KT-153 and probably KT-152 (two 76mm guns each), both converted from seiners;
    minelayer Okhotsk (three 130mm and two 76mm guns);
    a floating battery (?);
    2 Uragan class torpedo boats
    8 patrol craft, including lend-lease EK-9 (ex PF-53 Machias, three 76mm, two 40mm and nine 20mm guns) and including PK-8, -9. The PKs were small craft of 23 tons, 27 knots, three machine guns and a couple of depth charges.
    nine "frontier patrol craft" of MO-4 type (two 45mm guns each);
    two survey ships: Polyarny (smallish merchant of 1300 tons with an icebreaker bow, 9 knots, light AA only ) and Lebed (a converted trawler of about 600 tons, 10 kts, light AA).
    Submarine L-8 of the XI series was assigned reconnaissance patrol in the southern entrance of the Second Kurile Strait - i.e. between Shumshu and Paramushiro.

Landing Craft of the Shumshu invasion:

Most of the sources use the Russian names (numbers) given to the sixteen lend-lease landing craft of LCI(L) class. In fact, however, none of them received her Russian designation until October 5th, 1945. In other words, during the Kurile operations, all vessels of the landing flotilla had their American designations, and presumably even had the American numbers still painted on them

  • LCI-672 as DS-1;
  • LCI-557 as DS-10;
  • LCI-522 as DS-2;
  • LCI-523 as DS-3;
  • LCI-524 as DS-4;
  • LCI-525 as DS-5;
  • LCI-945 as DS-6;
  • LCI-469 as DS-7;
  • LCI-521 as DS-8;
  • LCI-554 as DS-9;
  • LCI-943 as DS-43;
  • LCI-526 as DS-46;
  • LCI-671 as DS-47;
  • LCI-551 as DS-48;
  • LCI-946 as DS-49;
  • LCI-666 as DS-50.

Besides the above, ten LCT-class landing craft are reported to have participated in the landing operations. One of the photos taken during some landing operation in on the Kurile islands clearly shows an LCT(6) class landing craft, in the shallows, with the ship's ramp lowered and a 122mm heavy gun being disembarked.

  • LCT-1047 as DS-11;
  • LCT-561 as DS-12;
  • LCT-1438 as DS-13;
  • LCT-1046 as DS-14;
  • LCT-1442 as DS-15;
  • LCT-1445 as DS-16;
  • LCT-1434 as DS-17;
  • LCT-1435 as DS-18;
  • LCT-1436 as DS-19;
  • LCT-1437 as DS-20.

Troop transports and auxiliary vessels:

Before the Kurile landing operation, 17 vessels were placed at the Navy's disposal by the People's Commissariat of the Fleet (i.e. the merchant fleet), People's Commissariat of Fishing Industry, and other state organizations. I was unable to obtain a list of these, and the mishmash of sources for the ships makes any list unreliable and liable to be incomplete anyway, but names known to have participated include Mongol, Pugachev, and Buryat.

The Conduct of the Invasion:

It is unclear when the Russianforce left Petropavlovsk, but it was intended to land around dawn on 18th August. The Russian convoy's passage across the First Kurile Strait took place in a typical sub-Arctic dense fog. This meant that the landing took the Japanese defenders by surprise, but it also prevented the Russian air units from flying from Kamchatka's airfields until as late as noon of August 18th. After that, several groups of 8 to 16 aircraft each made a number of raids on Kataoka and Kashiwahara bases, with the objective of preventing transportation of the Japanese troops from Paramushiro to Shumshu. In their turn, the Japanese aircraft conducted some attacks vs. the Russian landing craft and their escorts, as well as vs. the Cape Lopatka shore battery.

All landing craft of the first wave had to stop at a 150 to 200-meter range from the coast, just inside the 2-meter depth waters, because of increased draft due to their being overloaded. Thus, the soldiers of the naval infantry battalion were forced to swim across the shallows to reach the coast line.

This made the landing reminiscent of the Marines encountering the unusual low tide at Tarawa, and was similarly costly to the Soviet forces. Even worse for the invading force, fierce fire of the Japanese shore batteries prevented most of the LCTs with the artillery on the board from closing the shore during the whole day of 18th, so that only four light antitank 45mm guns were available.

This is where the heavy gunfire of the US vessels might have contributed, as the Soviet naval gunfire support was fairly limited. Only the mine layer Okhotsk as well as perhaps a pair of the minesweepers carried out fire support for the landing troops, while some patrol boats were screening the right flank of the landing to the west off Cape Kokutan. The other patrol boats and minesweepers patrolled the Cape Higasasaki area at the east coast of Shumshu. They may have contributed to reducing the numbers of Daihatsu with reinforcements from Paramushiro to make it to Shumshu, but they contributed nothing in direct support. It seems that these were very much wasted, as there was essentially no Japanese naval capability left in the waters of the Northern Kuriles.

While sources are mixed, between 10:30 AM and 01:30 PM either two aircraft, or a flight of 7 or 8, attempted to attack the T-525 minesweeper, but were shot down or driven off by the ships' AA fire in the Sea of Okhotsk, off the Shumshu western coast. One crashed ashore. Further, at least some sources report that Minesweeping cutter (motor boat) KT-152 was sunk by a Japanese Kamikaze aircraft attack on 18th or 19th August, 1945 in the Shumshu area.

One of the ex-Russian LCIs being hand back to the USN in 1955

But the real danger to the Soviet shipping turned out to be the Japanese shore batteries. With little or no suppressing fire on them, they heavily engaged the incoming landing craft. DS -4, 6, 8, 43 and 50 , (LCIs) were all destroyed by Japanese fire. At least 1500 of the Soviet landing force were reported killed, all told. For the Japanese side, the Soviets claimed to have encountered 38 tanks during the day of August 18th and destroyed 32. In the early morning of August 19th, when both Capes Kokutan and Katamari shore batteries were destroyed by the Soviet assault groups, the Japanese command managed to concentrate in heights No.'s 167 and 171 area a combat strength of over five infantry battalions, about 60 tanks and 70 guns (these units and vehicles were partly transported from Paramushir).

News of the resistance did reach the Japanese government, but communications were difficult under the conditions. Apparently, they had not expected their garrisons to resist the Russians. The government ordered their forces to comply with the cease fire terms and surrender. Eventually, the message did reach the defenders. The Japanese garrisons on Shumshu, Paramushir, and Onekotan islands surrendered late on the 19th. The Soviets spent the next two weeks working their way down the island chain, but from then on met no resistance. The total list of the Soviet captures throughout the Kurile chain includes about 60 thousand men, at least 60 intact tanks, over 300 guns and trench mortars, and 1000 machine guns. A variety of Daihatsu and other small boats were captured ashore or even at sea over the course of the next few weeks as well. There had been spotty resistance on the mainland in Manchuria and Korea as well, but no other incident approached the Shumshu landing in losses to both sides after the primary cease-fire.

The Soviet Union considered that between the Shumshu operation and the support provided the Red Army on the Manchurian Coast, the Soviet Pacific Fleet too could be awarded the Order of the Red Banner for successful combat. Thus all four Soviet Fleets could wear the decoration - and it became the "Red Banner Pacific Fleet."

Conclusion:

The US fleet could only have been intended to support the Soviet landings in continuance of hostilities. Planning for the main invasion of Japan had included the Soviet role in the Northern Kurile Islands and even invading Hokkaido. Besides, the Soviet main Pacific Fleet was not well-based to support the Kurile operations;

The Japanese Navy was so weak in the Kuriles that the USN made no naval difference here, but it would likely have been very useful to landing Soviet operations in terms of the extra air and especially naval gunfire support. The actual landing action that occurred strongly indicates that the Soviet land and naval gunfire support was inadequate, and further the mainland guns that fired on Shumshu were a coast defense battery, not artillery moved into position specifi-cally to support the landing. It seems somewhat surprising in retrospect that Soviet artillery support was so weak, given Russian preferences for heavy artillery employment in support of land combat operations.

The experience of the USN might have helped in the fight against the shore batteries, fully prevented the Paramushiro reinforcements from getting across to Shumshu, and aided in the land combat by providing fire support against the Japanese tanks. In the event, the Russians apparently did a creditable job on this aspect despite lack of antitank guns, given the number of Japanese tanks reported destroyed.

Today:

Some of what is known in Russian sources comes from Soviet history enthusiasts actually visiting Shumushu and photographing the remains of Japanese tanks, bunkers, forts and aircraft that remain there. Unfortunately, there is no After the Battle magazine equivalent yet that we can use to learn what relics they have discovered. The Kuriles remain totally in Russian hands and are a source of some tension even today, as Russia refuses to return the four southern islands, even though Japan has apparently renounced claim to South Sakhalin and any other islands in hopes of getting these back.

On the other hand, there is today an International Kuril (Russian spelling) Island Project, sponsored jointly by the US, Russian, and Japanese Academies of Science, doing a major wildlife survey in the Kuriles. A URL with data and some lovely color photography of the Kuriles is:

    http://artedi.fish.washington.edu/ikip/

Gaming:

This wouldn't make a really great naval scenario with the USN, but a straight up battle of the limited Soviet forces vs. the powerful Japanese shore batteries would be a good test of No Sailor But a Fool. On the other hand, the US Omaha and Fletcher class sweeps near Paramushiro could make for a good game, especially if something like a small Japanese convoy with a real destroyer or two was approaching Paramushiro at the time.

For more detail in land combat, the landing operation would be a very good Command Decisionor other WW II rules game, however, and it could be played twice, with and without USN fire and air support, to see the effect. In conclusion - remember the joke that Cold Bay - Hula - was a wonderful place, with "a woman behind every tree"?

The punch line of the joke, of course, is that, like Shumshu, there were no trees at Cold Bay.

Sources:

Allen, Thomas B., and Norman Polmar. Code-Name Downfall: The Secret Plan to Invade Japan — and why Truman Dropped the Bomb. Simon & Schuster, 1995
Berezhnoy, S.S, Flot SSSR. Korabli i suda lendliza St. Petersburg, 1994 (Fleet of SSSR. Ships and vessels of the lend-lease), listing nearly all ships transferred.
Fuller, R., Shokan - Hirohito's Samurai: leaders of the Japanese armed forces, 1926-1945, Arms & Armour 1992
Garfield, Brian, The Thousand Mile War, World War II in Alaska and the Aleutians, Doubleday & Co, 1969
Glantz, Lt. Col. David M., Leavenworth Papers No. 7: August Storm: The Soviet 1945 Strategic Offensive in Manchuria, Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, Feb 1983.
Jones, Lowell, "A Well Kept Secret", Our Navy, Vol., XL #20, Mid-March 1946
Larkin, William T., Battleship and Cruiser aircraft of the United States Navy, Schiffer Military/Aviation History, 1996
Meister, Jürg, Soviet Warships of the Second World War, Arco Publishing, 1977
Morison, Samuel Eliot, History of US Naval Operations in World War II
Rohwer, Jürgen and Hummelchen, Gerhard, Chronology of the War At Sea 1939-1945, Revised Edition, Naval Institute Press, 1992
Roscoe, Theodore, United States Destroyer Operations in World War II, Naval Institute Press, 1953
Russell, Richard A.,U.S. Naval Historical Center Monograph: Project Hula: Soviet-American Cooperation in the War Against Japan , GPO: 1997.
Silverstone, Paul, US Warships of World War II, Doubleday & Co., 4th Edition (1972)
Strel'biclkij, K.B., Avgust 1945 Sovetsko-japonskaja vojna na more Cena Pobedy, L'vov 1996. (August 1945 - The Soviet-Japan War on the sea. Price for the Victory)
Scrivner, Charles L., The Empire Express: The story of the U.S. Navy PV Squadrons' aerial strikes against the Japanese Kuriles during WW II, Historical Aviation Album, 1976.
Terzibaschitsch, Stefan, Escort Carriers and Aviation Support Ships of the US Navy, The Rutledge Press, 1981
Terzibaschitsch, Stefan, Zerstörer's Der U.S. Navy Steven Zaloga, Vanguard on the Pacific

Not consulted, but noted:

Osvoboditel'naya Missiya na Vostoke, Moskva 1976 (Freedom Mission in the East) - Soviet era analysis of the land operations and political backgrounds.

Thanks to:

Andreas von Mach, who provided titles of some of the Russian references;
Leonid Baskirov of Ukraine, who provided much of the translated Russian data,
Chris White, Secretary - Norwich Rearguard Wargames Society, for Japanese OB data from Shokan,
Tim Lanzendörfer, owner of the "US Navy in World War II in the Pacific" Website, http://www.microworks.net/pacific, who provided the US DesRon data from Terzibaschitsch's Zerstorer's Der U.S. Navy
Mark Hayes, of the Naval Historical Center, for information extracted from the NHC Monograph on Project Hula.

More Operation Hula

BT

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