Part 4: Geography and Japanese Forces in the Kurile Islands
by Brooks A Rowlett, brooksar@indy.net
Alaska and the Aleutians had always been considered by the US as having too wretched a climate to be a worthwhile route of advance towards Japan in wartime. Actual wartime experiences only confirmed this. Further advances beyond the Aleutians into the Japanese Kuriles were considered, but rejected, in the fall of 1943. Venturas of VB-139, at Attu early 1944. But in the spring of 1944, in preparation for Operation Forager, the assault on the Marianas, the US Armed Forces carried out a deception plan intended to confuse the Japanese so as to react to the possibility of the US preparing an assault on the Kuriles. This plan was at least partly successful. The Japanese established an entire "Area Army" command in the Kuriles, of over 100,000 men. These forces were not available in the Marianas or later to defend the Philippines. After Forager and the return to the Philippines, the Japanese began drawing down the forces again, but comparatively large numbers of Japanese Army troops were still in the Kuriles in 1945. The Kurile island chain, most of which are dormant volcanoes, extends from the northern tip of Hokkaido up to the southern tip of Kamchatka. They form the barrier islands of the Sea of Okhotsk, between Kamchatka and the Kuriles and the Russian coast. The Kuriles had been entirely Japanese since the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. The Japanese still consider the four large southernmost islands as historically theirs. As "the Northern Territories" Japan is constantly trying to negotiate their return, even today. The vessels of the Pearl Harbor Striking Force had rendezvoused at Hittokapu Bay in Etorofu (Russian name Iturup). The largest island at the northern end of the Kurile chain is Paramushiro or sometimes just Paramushir; this had been the base of the Japanese Fifth or Northern Fleet. The Japanese cruisers and destroyers that ran supplies to occupied Attu and Kiska and the ships that fought at the Battle of the Kommandorskis operated from here. Paramushiro was also the base of large numbers of Japanese civilian fishing boats, and there were several canneries on the island. Next north, and last in the chain, is a smaller but similarly important island named either Shumshu (Russian), or Shumushu (Japanese), or even Shimshu or Shimushu (variants). Much of the following information is from Mr. Leonid Baskirov, who has provided translations of some Russian works on the Kuriles actions. Shumshu island was separated from the Kamchatka mainland coast by the First Kurile Strait (Russian) or Shimushu Strait (Japanese). It is a small (20 x 12.5 km/13 x 8 miles), treeless island, the only lowland one in the entire chain. It does not have a volcano on its own, but off to its southwest is the distinct cone of Araido To (Japanese name) Atlasova Island (Russian name) (which erupted in 1997). There was a small but well-equipped naval base at Kataoka in the southwest part of the island, on the Second Kurile Strait (Russian) or Paramushiro Strait (Japanese) coast, while another one, Kashiwabara, was on the Paramushiro Island's coast. Both bases were strongly fortified and could easily support the minor ships of the Imperial Japanese Navy. Two airfields were available on Shumshu, capable of supporting two aircraft regiments. The "Battobou" lake in the southwest part of the island had served as a protected seaplane base, probably for Aichi E13A Jake floatplanes. The island's main road was a highway connecting the port of Kataoka with the Cape Kokutan (Kokutan-saki). Numerous dirt roads for a total length of 120 km supplemented the main road to the island's shore. Heavy construction over the years had led to a complex of powerful fortifications in 1945. All the beaches suitable for landing were screened with pillboxes and "permanent fire points" {there is no appropriate interpretation of the Russian abbreviation for this sort of fortifications – LB}, connected by the trenches and underground passages. In total 34 "permanent fire points" and a great number of pillboxes were built on the island. The main defense position included heights No.'s 171 and 165 in the northeast part of Shumshu. Its separate strong points were connected with each other, so it was quite easy for Japanese troops to withdraw deep inshore in case of an enemy's landing. Most of the underground passages were in tunnel galleries of some 50-meter depth, with the ammunition stores, hospitals, electric and telephone stations installed inside. In short, it must have been strongly reminiscent of the kind of tunnel fortifications that faced the US Army and Marines in Okinawa and Iwo Jima. The Japanese command organization for the Kuriles and Northern Hokkaido was as follows: 5th Area Army (Hokkaido, Sakhalin and Kuriles) was formed from Northern Army in March-April '45 under command of Lt-Gen. Higuchi Kiichiro. (Japanese style, family name first). There is some confusion from unconfirmed redesignations, but what had been 27th Army, whether under that name or not, was the only one under 5th Area Army. Constituent units at the time of the surrender were; 7th Infantry Division (HQ Obihiro, Hokkaido, and unidentified units in Kuriles) 42nd Infantry Division (Shinshiru Island) 88th Infantry Division (Toyoharo, Sakhalin) 89th Infantry Division (Etorofu (Iturup) as well as some on Kunashir and Habomai 91st Infantry Division (Paramushiro & Shimushu) 43rd Independent Mixed Brigade (somewhere in the Kuriles) 69th Independent Mixed Brigade (location not specified) 41st Detached Infantry Regiment (Matua Island) 129th Detached Infantry Brigade (Urup) To go into the Japanese 91st Infantry division in more detail: The Japanese force on the Shumshu island (under Major-General Fusaki's command) consisted of: 73rd Brigade of the 91st Infantry Division, 31st air defense regiment, Kurile fortress artillery regiment, plus elements of the 11th tank regiment with a total of 60 tanks. Further, these units could be strengthened with troops transported from Paramushiro, whose northeast part included the troops of the 74th Brigade (less two companies) of the 91st Division, 18th and 19th mortar battalions, and a small unit of 11th Tank Regiment, consisting of 17 tanks. Moving these units would have allowed Japanese to quickly concentrate up to some 23,000 men on Shumshu. Most of the armored vehicles seemed to be the Ha-Go Type 95 light tanks, though one of the 1990s photos made by the Russian amateur historians on Shumshu shows a disabled Japanese vehicle with a Chi-Ha Type 98 tank turret. Zaloga's Vanguard on the Pacific includes a plate of a Shinhoto Type 97 belonging to 11th Tank Regt on Shumushu in August 1945. There were large numbers of Japanese landing craft of the Daihatsu type at Paramushiro to be available to move these reinforcements. In summary, Shumshu was defended by the Japanese 91st Infantry Division (8500 men and perhaps 60 tanks), with as many as 15,000 potential reinforcements on Paramushir. There were good shore batteries, and at least a single line of tank traps on most or all of the beaches of the two critical islands. In total, in the islands of the Kurile chain were Japanese Army forces of 80 thousand men (besides the units on Shumshu and Paramushiro), and nine airfields throughout the chain, which could have supported up to 600 aircraft. However, most of the aircraft by August 1945 had been withdrawn for protection of the Home Islands against the imminent threat of US invasion. The coast artillery in the north part of Shumshu consisted of two batteries on Capes Kokutan and Kotomari, as well as a third one which was installed on board the wreck of the Soviet 7024-ton oil tanker, Mariupol, which was lost on November 14th, 1943 because of a navigation accident (the vessel ran aground off the Cape Kotomarisaki). In 1945, she shipped about 20 guns of up to 75mm caliber. Russian documents, even in the 1990s, do not carry information on what kinds of shore batteries the Japanese did have; just their main locations. Many of these weapons were probably the standard twin 5"/40 mount used on ships and as land-based coast and air-defense. However, it is possible larger guns were present, and in any event, Japanese Coast Artillery Defense proved very effective. Similarly, there is little or no accurate information about the air and naval forces in the Kuriles in 1945. The Russians recovered at least six unidenti-fied, but presumably A6M5 Zeke fighters, two unidentified single-engine bombers, and a half dozen of the older torpedo bomber, the B5N2 Kate, at airfields on Shumshu itself. Further, up to 7 or 8 were claimed shot down by the Soviet vessels, and by some reports a Soviet vessel was crashed by an aircraft acting as a Kamikaze. It is known that in 1944 a force of 19 Zeros had been left as the Shimushu Detachment by Naval Air Group 203, when that group departed back to the Home Islands and thence to the Philippines (where it was destroyed). It is possible that a few Nakajima J1N1-S Irving night fighters were also left, as the US was conducting occasional bombing operations on Paramushiro by Navy PV-1 Venturas, and their successors, PV-2 Harpoons; and Army B-24 Liberators from the Aleutian bases. During 1943 and 1944, Japanese Army fighters on Paramushiro had included Ki.43 Oscar and Ki.44 Tojo interceptors, but I lack IJAAF order of battle data to know what was still there in 1945, although several Oscars were seen as late as June. Similarly, in the past a unit of Mitsubishi G3M Bettys had provided offensive capability, along with a unit of four-engine flying boats (probably the H6K2 Mavis), but these had apparently been withdrawn by summer 1945. There was a Japanese air early warning radar of unspecified type on the southern cape of Paramushiro, Kurabu Zaki, but its view of Shumshu was likely blocked by the 5958 foot volcano (apparently named Suribachi, like the one on Iwo Jima) in the center of Paramushiro. More Operation Hula
Operation Hula: Part 1: Hula Base Operation Hula: Part 2: Lend-Leased Ships Operation Hula: Part 3: Soviet Naval Forces Operation Hula: Part 4: Geography and Japanese Forces Operation Hula: Part 5: US 9th Fleet Operation Hula: Part 6: US 9th Fleet Reinforcement Operation Hula: Part 7: The War Ends...Not for USSR and Japan BT Back to The Naval Sitrep #16 Table of Contents Back to Naval Sitrep List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1999 by Larry Bond and Clash of Arms. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com |