The Major Napoleonic Powers

The Peninsular War

By Dana Lombardy

An example of the principle of unintended consequences and the incremental approach to disaster, this conflict began with Napoleon's determination to enforce upon Portugal his Berlin and Milan Decrees establishing the Continental System designed to bar from Europe all British trade and those neutral vessels which cooperated with Britain's network of inspection and blockade. Moreover, the French Emperor hoped to deny Lisbon's port and the ships of the Portuguese navy to Portugal's old ally, Great Britain.

General Jean Andoche Junot, a former ambassador to Lisbon, was dispatched with an army corps across Spain in 1807 to occupy Portugal. While the Portuguese royal family and navy fled to Brazil with British assistance, the Spanish royal family did not escape Napoleon's attentions. Additional French troops followed to maintain Junot's line of communication with France, gradually occupying key fortresses and cities in northern Spain in early 1808. Napoleon, unhappy with Spain's increasingly vacillating policy and less cordial relations, decided to bring the reforming power of Imperial France to bear on Spain. By May 1808, at a conference in Bayonne, Napoleon skillfully manipulated King Charles IV and Ferdinand, the Crown Prince, to resign, and designated his brother, Joseph Bonaparte (then King of Naples) as the new King of Spain.

Unfortunately for Napoleon, he miscalculated the depth of Spanish popular resentment to French interference, and on 2 May Madrid rebelled. By the end of the month provincial revolts were widespread, isolating Junot in Portugal. To assist Spain and to liberate Portugal, Britain committed its army and huge resources. When Spain succeeded in driving French forces back to Ebro, Napoleon was compelled to intervene personally in November 1808, at the head of a powerful army of invasion. The small combat at Somosierra, the pass guarding Madrid, constituted Napoleon's only personal military engagement in Spain. Napoleon returned to France by January 1809, content to leave his marshals to chase the British army from Spain and complete the Peninsula's conquest.

Napoleon fatally mismanaged what became his "Spanish ulcer." The emperor failed to provide a unified command or to grant King Joseph any control over the military operations of ceaselessly squabbling marshals and generals, believing that he could direct operations from Paris despite the weeks of delay in transmitting reports and orders. Up to 360,000 occupation troops proved of little avail in a region where large armies starved and small armies were beaten. The French were exposed to an increasingly ferocious guerrilla war that demanded dispersion to provide garrisons, and also required large concentrations to combat Wellington's little Anglo-Portuguese army.

Estimates of total losses range enormously, from 164,000 to 300,000 lost to battle, disease, starvation, and the "little war" waged by guerrillas. The Peninsular War was a major factor in the eventual downfall of Napoleon.

More Powers of the Napoleonic Era

Back to Table of Contents -- Napoleon #17
Back to Napoleon List of Issues
Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List
© Copyright 2001 by Napoleon LLC.
This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web.
The full text and graphics from other military history magazines and gaming magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com
Order Napoleon magazine direct