Cowards at Waterloo?

16 June: First Experience of Battle

by Andre Dellevoet
with artwork by Keith Rocco and Steven Palatka

The French did not attack at daybreak, nor throughout the morning [a delay for which Marshal Michel Ney has been much criticized by historians]. The only action was the incidental exchange of artillery fire and skirmishing fire between the picket lines. When Wellington arrived at about 10:00 a.m. he agreed with the arrangements, concluded that all was quiet, and continued his journey to meet with his ally Blucher.

The Prince of Orange, as quoted in the official government newspaper, reported: "The fire of the tirailleurs [skirmishers] commenced yesterday morning at five o'clock at this point, and we carried it on both sides till twelve o'clock without result. About two o'clock the attack became fierce, especially by the cavalry and artillery." At that time Marshal Ney finally ordered the main attack to capture Quatre Bras. To this end, he had formed General Count Foy's 9th Infantry Division to the west side of the main road to Brussels and General Baron Bachelu's 5th Infantry Division in columns to the east side, while Pire's light cavalry covered the flanks and the rear of both infantry divisions. The light cavalry of the Imperial Guard under General Count Lefebvre-Desnou"ttes was held in reserve.

As soon as the French build-up for the main attack became apparent, the batteries of Bijleveld and Stevenart were positioned on both sides of the main road to Brussels, while the infantry also changed position. The 8th Militia, which stood southwest of the crossroads, advanced along the eastern edge of Bossu and moved into the sunken road next to the 1st Battalion of the 2nd Nassau Line. The 1st Battalion of Orange Nassau was placed in the southern end of the Bossu Wood, where the company of Nassau light infantry was established.

The 5th Militia moved forward to the north of the farm of Gemioncourt. The 2nd Battalion of the 2nd Nassau Line was relieved by the regiment's 3rd Battalion, which together with the 27th Jagers still held the picket line to the north of Frasnes. The 2nd Battalion of the 2nd Nassau went back to the crossroads, where the 7th Dutch Militia and 2nd Battalion of the Orange Nassau Regiment sat in reserve.

At about 2:00 p.m. the 7th Belgian Line arrived from Nivelles, where they had been relieved by troops from General Chasse's 3rd Division. The Belgians were sent into the Bossu Wood, where they initially stayed at the northern end.

After a preliminary bombardment, the French attack columns swept forward, preceded by swarms of skirmishers. The French moved directly against Saxe-Weimar's Nassau troops around Grand Pierrepont farm and the 27th Jagers who were spread out over a kilometer in front of the position. Bachelu's infantry came into contact with the 27th Jagers at the farm of Laraille. The lead Dutch companies kept up a brisk fire but were soon forced to fall back. Shortly afterward, Grunen-bosch deployed his 27th Jager Battalion in column, in order to be able to form square at any time, and retreated westward to join the 5th Militia at Gemioncourt. This maneuver was quite risky since the Dutchmen were repeatedly harassed by Pire's light cavalry. The covering fire of Bijleveld's battery near the main road could not prevent a considerable number of casualties on the way. Meanwhile, the 5th Militia moved forward to establish itself around the farm.

An officer of the 5th Militia later described what happened: "The 5th Battalion went forward double quick in column and deployed to the right of the farm of Gemioncourt, under considerable canister and musket fire, but in the best order. The farm was defended by two flank companies of the battalion and two companies of the 27th Jagers, the first in front of and the latter inside the farm. Our men suffered much from the severe attacks by the enemy in skirmishing order, supported by awesome columns; here Lieutenant Wyn-oldie was killed, who had been surrounded by the enemy and had attempted to break through" (from W. J. Knoop, Quatre Bras en Waterloo, Krijgskundige Beschou-wingen, s'-Hertogenbosch, 1855, page 191).

The 5th Militia lacked engineers and could do little to prepare Gemioncourt for defense. The high-walled farm had few windows and could be entered only through one gate. Making loopholes through its thick walls in a short time was practically impossible, and no one had foreseen the need for such work the previous night. So the farm was occupied by only one company while the rest of the battalion was positioned outside.

When the 27th Jagers arrived it sent both flank companies to occupy the farm. The rest of the battalion positioned itself along the dense hedges that bordered the creek which ran across the field. The 5th Militia deployed four companies 200 paces to the west of the farm, near the main road, and sent a company forward as skirmishers.

As the Dutch militia and jagers prepared to receive Foy's and Bachelu's columns, the 7th Line came forward from the north of Bossu Wood and was placed in closed columns to the east of the wood, roughly parallel to the 5th Militia. The 7th Militia also advanced to an open space on the eastern edge of the wood. This deployment effectively blocked the central approach to the Quatre Bras crossroads.

However, the lack of cavalry support was soon felt. Stevenart's lone foot battery, now at the southeastern tip of the Bossu Wood, suffered heavy losses by the murderous fire from Foy's artillery. Captain Stevenart was killed and two guns were disabled. The remains of the battery pulled back to the Quatre Bras crossroads. [Only two of Stevenart's original eight guns would fight at Waterloo two days later.] Bijleveld's horse artillery had also retreated to the northeast of Gemioncourt, where it deployed behind the road that led to Namur.

Despite these losses, the 5th Militia, supported by the 27th Jagers in the farm, stood against the mounting pressure from Foy's infantry. One company of the 5th Militia sent forward in skirmishing order lost a great number of men since the young militiamen were insufficiently trained in these tactics. Suddenly, the French 6th Chasseur Regiment surprised and fell upon the 27th Jagers. This cavalry attack was so unexpected that Lt. Colonel Grunenbosch was unable to deploy his men into square. The battalion was ridden down and chased in all directions (144 killed and wounded, plus 118 men missing at Quatre Bras, 32% of its starting strength). Eventually, 547 surviving jagers assembled behind Bijleveld's battery north of the road to Namur.

Unlike the jagers, the 5th Militia saw the French cavalry coming and quickly formed square on the main road. W. J. Knoop of the 5th wrote: "Thereupon, the attacks by enemy cavalry followed. In order to resist these, we formed the battalion in columns en masse [in square], making front to all sides. We succeeded four times in not only repulsing the enemy horsemen but also sending the necessary bullets after them on their return journey; and it was during one of these occurrences that the Prince of Orange not only expressed his satisfaction with a loud voice over our conduct but also led us in closed columns against an infantry column that was advancing in support of the retreating cavalry.... All movements were executed with all possible calm and correctness. Even so, I still remember that after we had formed square, we noticed that some men from one company or platoon were mixed with those of other companies and wanted to restore the proper order; then Lieutenant Colonel Westenberg told us that we did not have to be so precise" (Knoop, pages 192-193).

Lieutenant Colonel van Zuylen van Nyevelt, on the staff of Perponcher's division, observed the fighting at Gemioncourt farm with increasing alarm and noted: "The example of his Royal Highness [Prince of Orange], followed by the staff of the division, so inspired the 5th Battalion National Militia, which was under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Westenberg, that they did miracles of bravery; but one attack had scarcely been repulsed ere the enemy made another with fresh men and in larger numbers" (Report of the 2nd Division by Colonel van Zuylen van Nyevelt in F. de Bas and Count J. de T' Serclaes de Wommersom, La Campagne de 1815 aux Pays-Bas, Brussels, 1908, vol. III, page 290).

The 5th Militia officer related what happened after the battalion had been brought forward again by the Prince of Orange:

"Again we reached the farm of Gemioncourt, and, after being deployed once more with the 7th Line Battalion, which until then had shifted to our right and outside the woods [of Bossu], had closed up on our side, together we opened up a two-line fire and brought the skirmishers forward. In that way, we were able to maintain ourselves for half an hour, when we were again being attacked by cavalry. The 7th Battalion had the woods for protection, but we, making use of our former maneuver [to form square], were less fortunate; especially the fifth company, whose commanding officer, Lieutenant Boltjes, was killed, suffered much from this attack. Notwithstanding the fact that the battalion lost many men in general, it still reached its objective, since the remaining part pulled together in closed columns [in square] on the Chaussee" (Knoop, page 192).

While these dramatic events unfolded in the center, the battle also raged in the Bossu Wood, where Saxe-Weimar's Nassau troops put up a fighting retreat against Foy's infantry. The 1st Battalion of Orange Nassau Regiment and the 8th Militia, under severe fire from Foy's artillery, gradually fell back and gave up the southeastern tip of the wood, but the farm of Grand Pierrepont continued to be defended by the Nassau light infantry and a section of Stevenart's battery.

Major Van Limburg Stirum, adjutant to the Prince of Orange, ordered Colonel de Jongh to send two companies of his 8th Militia Battalion to the eastern edge of the Bossu Wood, to help stop the French advancing west of the Chaussee. The four remaining companies of the battalion stayed for a while in their position in the sunken road, constantly under French artillery fire, until the order was given to move back into the woods. De Jongh argued in vain that he preferred to advance in order to silence the French guns that were harassing his battalion and that he feared that his young troops would lose their order in the thick undergrowth. However, Lt. Colonel Lord Fitzroy Somerset, military secretary to Wellington, soon brought a second order to move to the defense on the west side of the wood, close to the Chaussee.

Colonel de Jongh reported what happened next:

"I stayed with Captain Sijbers outside the wood until the entire battalion had passed, dismounted my horse and placed myself in front of the battalion, crossing the tip of the wood, and found on the other side part of the 7th Line engaged with the enemy. I immediately acted with the four companies under my command and chased the French back; since they received reinforcements, they [the French] attacked me in their turn and, while fighting, pushed me back into the wood. At this time I was wounded by a howitzer fragment in my left side; I collapsed to the ground, but immediately was back on my feet because this injury had only caused a heavy concussion. I was not able to sufficiently maintain the order among my troops in the wood; the French, protected by a strong artillery fire from both sides of the wood, forced their way into the wood; I retreated while fighting slowly through the wood, up to the Chaussee between Hautain-le-Val and Quatre Bras, closer to Quatre Bras" (From "Aantekeningen over 1815, uit de papieren van den kolonel de Jongh", in De Nieuwe Spectator, 1866, I, page 4).

The French reinforcements mentioned were the men of JerŮme Bonaparte's 6th Infantry Division, who arrived on the battlefield at 3:00 p.m. and were directed into the Bossu Wood. The overwhelming French numbers pushed Saxe-Weimar's battalions northward. The farm of Grand Pierrepont fell. The Nassau light troops and the artillery section withdrew in the direction of Houtain-le-Val.

In a desperate move to stop the French, Prince Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar personally led his Nassau troops forward in a bayonet charge, supported by two companies of the 7th Dutch Militia, and actually succeeded in temporarily repulsing the French. The 7th Militia retook the eastern tip of the Bossu Wood and came into line on the southern edge of it. However, the southern part of the wood had fallen and the French were still making progress on the western side of the wood. The remaining troops of Saxe-Weimar fell back to the northern end of the wood in order to prevent any envelopment by the enemy.

While the 5th Militia and 7th Line Battalions still maintained themselves around Gemioncourt farm, the Prince of Orange carefully observed the development of the French attack to the east. Since the bulk of his forces were positioned in the Bossu Wood, there were relatively few troops left to block the eastern route. The Delhutte Wood was left totally undefended. Here, Jamin's Brigade of Foy's Division as well as Bachelu's Division were making progress against the spread-out companies of the Nassau infantry and the remnants of the 27th Jagers (jager at right).

Consequently, the French threatened to outflank the central position from both flanks. The defense of the Quatre Bras was clearly collapsing under the combined weight of one French cavalry brigade and three infantry divisions, altogether more than 15,000 men. Although the Prince of Orange saw the red masses of Lt. General Sir Thomas Picton's 5th Infantry Division appearing behind the crossroads and the arrival of van Merlen's Dutch-Belgian light cavalry brigade, he knew that it would take half an hour before these troops would be deployed.

The situation called for desperate measures, so the Prince of Orange immediately ordered the Dutch 6th Hussars under the command of Colonel Boreel to charge the French infantry to the left of the Dutch-Belgian position. However, this hasty attack was met by Pire's cavalry and the Dutch Hussars were thrown back in confusion. With the French closely pursuing, Boreel's hussars tried to get back to the crossroads. Under this avalanche of horsemen, and with many of their officers dead or wounded, the 5th Militia was unable to hold its position on the main road and completely scattered. The men could only be collected behind the houses of Quatre Bras and remained in reserve for the rest of the day. From an original strength of some 482 men, the battalion lost 301 killed, wounded, and missing during the fighting around Gemioncourt (62% of its original strength). The Prince of Orange now had to flee for his life and found refuge among the men of the 7th Line. Without support from the infantry near the main road, the Dutch defenders of Gemioncourt were quickly thrown out of the farm by Foy's light infantry. The key stronghold in the center was lost.

The retreat of Boreel's hussars was covered by the Belgian 5th Dragoons, who were able to check the pursuing French cavalry. This gave Picton the time required to deploy his division along the road to Namur and at the crossroads. Picton's men went forward and pushed back Bachelu's infantry on the left, but were unable to dislodge the French from Gemion-court. A short while later, the Brunswick contingent also arrived at the crossroads. It was now 4:00 p.m. and the Allied position was stabilizing.

When Marshal Ney saw the Allied reinforcements coming up, he ordered an all-out effort to capture the crossroads. General Count Reille's 2nd French Corps was again launched in a renewed attack - JerŮme's Division to clear the Bossu Wood, while Foy's Division attacked the crossroads and Bachelu's Division drove up the Namur road. Supported by the light cavalry of Pire, the French almost made it to the Quatre Bras crossroads. Some British regiments were heavily mauled by the French cavalry which surprised them coming out of the tall crops. Perponcher's men, among them the 7th Line, a few companies of the 8th Militia, and Brunswick's troops, were not able to withstand the advance of Jerome's infantry through the Bossu Wood.

Additional Allied reinforcements now arrived, including a British and a Hanoverian brigade and more Nassauers under von Kruse. Their timely arrival gave Wellington a numerical superiority which he would soon use. The time was about 5:00 p.m.

The men of Bijlandt's Brigade were finally relieved. A veteran of the 7th Militia battalion summed up the day's events: "It had been very hot that day, as much from the bullets as from the sun" (from P. Wakker, Aanteekeningen van een Veteraan, 1865, pages 7-8).

At the end of the day, while the men of Bijlandt's brigade were held in reserve behind the houses of Quatre Bras, Wellington ordered a counterattack with his fresh reinforcements and drove the French back to their starting positions.

The losses of Bijlandt's Brigade were considerable, particularly among the 5th Militia and 27th Jagers (right), which had put up a stiff resistance to a superior force of infantry, cavalry, and artillery for more than an hour without support. Bijlandt's other battalions suffered fewer losses because they enjoyed the protection of the Bossu Wood or were held in reserve.

The performance of the militia in its first battle was noticed by the Prince of Orange:

"Seeing how important it was to preserve the position on the heights of the road called Quatre Bras, I was fortunate enough to hold it against an enemy very superior in every respect. Having been attacked by the two army corps of d'Erlon and Reille [here the Prince makes an error; d'Erlon's 1st Corps never took part in the battle of the 16th] and having succeeded in holding them in check, the Duke of Wellington had enough time to reunite sufficient forces to baffle the designs of the enemy.... I experience a keen pleasure in being able to inform your Majesty that his troops [Dutch and Belgians], the infantry and artillery particularly, fought with much courage" (from the Extraordinary Edition of the Staatscourant, 23 June 1815, volume 6).

27 Jager uniform detail.

Without the disobedience of General de Perponcher in choosing to fight at Quatre Bras, and the initial steadfast fighting of the inexperienced militia in their first battle, Waterloo probably would not have occurred. This contribution has been overlooked or ignored in many English-language histories of the campaign. For example, the only thing noted American author Jac Weller has to say about the Netherlands troops at Quatre Bras is: "The start [of the battle] was not propitious, for most of the Dutch-Belgian units were already retreating in disorder" (Wellington at Waterloo, page 53), implying that the battle really began when Picton arrived.

Although many of Bijlandt's losses were "missing" (39% of the casualties suffered), some of these possibly became prisoners when they were overrun, although many probably simply continued toward home. However, the 27th Jagers and 5th Militia gave a good account of themselves, losing most of their 343 killed and wounded before they broke and ran. This loss represented 27% of their starting strength, which was the same percentage of killed and wounded the more experienced and veteran British troops would endure at Waterloo. Despite their bravery at Quatre Bras, the Dutch and Belgians would be primarily remembered for the events two days later up the road to Brussels.

More Cowards at Waterloo?

Back to Table of Contents -- Napoleon #16
Back to Napoleon List of Issues
Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List
© Copyright 2001 by Napoleon LLC.
This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web.
The full text and graphics from other military history magazines and gaming magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com
Order Napoleon magazine direct