Wellington Reappraised

The American Reaction to
Peter Hofschroer's 1815 Book

by Dana Lombardy,
with commentary by Colonel John Elting and Ed Wimble

The Brunswick troops depicted here are a contingent of Wellington's Anglo-Allied army. Hofschroer maintains that 75% of the troops that defeated Napoleon at Waterloo were German. He argues that the credit for the victory at Waterloo should go predominately to the Germans troops who bore the brunt of the fighting.

American reviews have been generally positive on Hofschroer's new book. However, Owen Connelly, author of Blundering to Glory: Napoleon's Military Campaigns, wrote: "The book is a valuable addition to the history of the Waterloo Campaign, though flawed by Hofschroer's attempts to besmirch Wellington's reputation."

Army History: The Professional Bulletin of Army History said: "This is a generally well researched and well-written tome about the Prussian Contribution to victory."

Colonel John Elting, author of Swords Around a Throne and coauthor of A Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, countered the criticism of British writers with the following defense of Hofschroer's book:

"This is the most important book on the Waterloo campaign written in many years and is an intensely researched account of how Wellington came to be so bamboozled and of the almost fatal consequences thereof.

"Since 1815 it has been an article of faith among German historians that Wellington deceived Blucher during the opening phase of the campaign, promising quick support that was actually impossible because of the tardy concentration of the British forces. So assured, Blucher stood to fight at Ligny, got whipped and - except for d'Erlon's inexplicable meandering - undoubtedly would have been completely crushed, leaving Wellington with an unpleasant assortment of alternatives including a 19th Century Dunkirk.

"Almost all British historians have vehemently rejected such imputations, the Duke's immaculate omniscience being a basic article of their faith. American opinion has varied but at least some of us have believed that, whether inadvertently or intentionally, Wellington did mislead Blucher as to when and in what strength British reinforcements might reach him.

"Peter Hofschroer believes that this deception was intentional, that Wellington deliberately risked sacrificing Blucher in order to gain time for his own fumbled concentration. He traces this AngloPrussian friction back to the squabbling Congress of Vienna and Wellington's role in the British effort to restrain Prussian territorial rapacity, followed by - after Napoleon's return from Elba - the two nations' competition in getting the contingents of the smaller German states for their respective armies. Hofschroer does not whitewash Prussia: the arrogant stupidity with which Blucher and Gneisenau mishandled the Saxon troops, the sloppy Prussian staff functioning and the ramshackle state of the Prussian Army itself are presented in detail.

"The opening moves of the campaign are traced in depth, backed by exhaustive research and careful space-and-time studies. A good many myths and alibis bite the dust. It appears that the Allies were better informed of Napoleon's concentration than has been previously realized, but that Wellington badly misjudged Napoleon's probable strategy and, though promptly warned of his advance, was slow to react. If this version of Wellington seems less than omniscient, remember that the Duke never was exactly a timid soul, and that a commander who could devastate his Portuguese ally's territory to cover his retreat into the Lines of Tories Verdes [1810-1811] just might have been capable of considering Blucher's army an expendable rearguard.

"Serious students of the Hundred Days may disagree entirely or in part - but they should first read this book ' "

Ed Wimble, noted Waterloo expert and designer of several games and articles on the Waterloo campaign, provided these comments on Peter Hofschroer's new book:

"Trying to determine exactly what the Duke of Wellington said during and after the Waterloo Campaign is very difficult. Unlike Napoleon or Field Marshal Blucher, whose careers came to a halt shortly after the battle (Blucher retiring to his estates in Silesia; Napoleon exiled to St. Helena), the Duke entered upon a second career in politics that spanned the next several decades. Though he was reticent to discuss the battle in public, he had many private conversations over the 37 years in which he lived beyond the battle, and the gist of these conversations was chronicled by the various participants of varying reliability.

The veracity of these accounts when reconciled with actual events range from the plausible to the utterly impossible. Taken as a whole one might go so far as to say these reminiscences re-invent the events of June 1815, according to the dynamics of myth-making that inevitably follow in the wake of great battles and their heroes.

"The controversy itself - that is, the deliberate misleading of Prussian Headquarters by Wellington regarding the disposition of the Anglo-Allied Army at approximately noon on 16 June - is not new. The Prussians made their costly defense of Ligny believing they would be supported by a substantial portion of Wellington's forces. Wellington's "betrayal" was undoubtedly on every high ranking Prussian's mind throughout the long night of the 16th/17th during the retreat to Wavre.

When the debate arose on the night of the 17th/18th as to whether or not the Prussians should march to their ally's support, the debate became acrimonious. Gneisenau, Chief of Staff of the army and second in command, bitterly expressed his belief that the "wily Wellington" had betrayed them, and was therefore against this flank march as much as Blucher was in favor of it. (Gneisenau reportedly exclaimed that "The Duke's resolve to hold Belgium lasts only so long as the last drop of Prussian blood!")

"There is something new about this controversy, however. That is the idea that Wellington purposefully chose to cover up the misleading elements of his correspondence with his allies at the beginning of the campaign. Hofschroer provides documentation to support Gneisenau's accusations which always seemed like so many sour grapes to many historians, an excuse for the Prussian defeat at Ligny. Hofschroer certainly builds a strong case for this cover-up.

"If Wellington's reputation is a bit tarnished by these convincing allegations, a reappraisal of Blucher's decision seems in order. His resolve to march from Wavre to Waterloo seems all the more remarkable. The scene in Prussian Headquarters that night is without a doubt worthy of some great playwright. Imagine the main character, in spite of all evidence to the contrary and against the violent, recriminatory advice of almost everyone present, still chose to march to Wellington's aid despite incredible military risks to the Prussian army (Wellington, remember, had a viable retreat route from Mont St. Jean, the Prussians, however, would not.)

"Whatever the merits may be with the rest of this work by Hofschroer, future historians of the Waterloo campaign will have to consider his conclusions when discussing the Duke of Wellington's behavior and motives on 16 June 1815. By his own admission, Wellington had been "humbugged" by Napoleon's opening maneuver.

Did he in turn humbug Blucher and Gneisenau to regain this lost time? Since this appears to be true, should historians now reconsider similar tales of mistrust attending Wellington's relationship with the generals of Spain and Portugal during the Peninsular War?"

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