Waterloo Controversy

Did the Duke of Wellington
Intentionally Deceive
His Prussian Allies?

An Interview with author Peter Hofschroer

by Dana Lombardy,
with commentary by Colonel John Elting and Ed Wimble

Peter Hofschroer's much acclaimed book 1815 - The Waterloo Campaign: Wellington, his German Allies and the Battles of Ligny and Quatre Bras, is the first of a new two volume study of the Waterloo campaign from Greenhill Books. It has created a firestorm of controversy by suggesting that the Duke of Wellington deliberately misled his Prussian allies in order to buy time for his army to assemble after Napoleon's opening movements caught him by surprise.

Peter Hofschrder is a historian and linguist who specializes in Napoleonic history. He covered the Prussian and Hanoverian armies for the Osprey Men-at-Arms series and wrote the volume about the battle of Leipzig 1813 for the Osprey Campaign series. He contributed numerous articles to magazines and journals such as War in History, Militdrgeschichtliche Mitteilungen, the journal of the Society of Army Historical Research, Age of Napoleon and First Empire. He was also involved in the production of the Waterloo computer game Fields of Glory published by MicroProse. He was a contributor to Napoleon's Marshals, edited by David Chandler, was awarded a Fellowship of the International Napoleonic Society, and twice received the Memorial Medal of the League of Bismarck, once in bronze, once in silver. Hofschroer's new book 1815 - The Waterloo Campaign: Wellington, his German Allies and the Battles of Ligny and Quatre Bras, is the first of a two volume study of the Waterloo campaign from Greenhill Books.

Whenever a national icon is accused of something as unseemly as lying, a strong reaction is almost inevitable. The recent furor in England over Peter Hofschroer's new book has presented us with a fairly rare spectacle - that of a Napoleonic historian being thrust squarely into the middle of a media circus. As with all such events, objectivity is the first casualty, and a lot of wild accusations have gone back and forth.

Yet, as the sound and fury begins to subside, serious questions remain. Was there indeed a deception perpetrated by the Duke of Wellington, and was it largely covered up? More importantly, since allies do mislead each other from time to time, what makes this particular deception so grave?

Historically it required the preponderance of Wellington's army, fighting all day long in what the Duke called a "near run thing", along with the timely arrival of three Prussian corps - for a grand total of nearly 125,000 men - to defeat a French army of approximately 74,000.

What has been lost in much of the debate is that the Prussian army was fortunate to survive the battle at Ligny on 16 June so that they could in fact play a decisive role two days later at Waterloo. A French flanking force of almost 20,000 men, led by Count d'Erlon, was positioned to fall upon the rear and flank of the Prussians late afternoon at Ligny. Due to an astonishing blunder, d'Erlon disregarded Napoleon's orders thereby calling off this assault when he received contradictory orders from Marshal Ney fighting the Anglo-Allied Army gathering at Quatre Bras.

This error robbed Napoleon of a decisive defeat of Blucher. Put into this context, Wellington's "lie" could have resulted in the total defeat of 97,000 Prussians. This would have left Wellington's Anglo-Allied Army of the Low Countries to face Napoleon's Armee du Nord alone.

In addition to our normal book review, we are presenting supplementary material to place this controversy into context. Here Peter Hofschroer answers some questions that our staff felt required further explanation.

Let's first address the issue of Bulow and his Prussian IV Army Corps failing to show up with 1/4 of the Prussian army at Ligny. You wrote (p. 220) that:

    "The first major error made by the Prussian General staff in this campaign was to fail to ensure that Bulow moved his IV Army Corps to be in a position to support the three remaining corps on 16 June.... Gneisenau had to be excessively polite to Bulow, his senior in rank, and failed to convey the urgency of the situation. This was not the only reason for the failure, however, for Bulow was also being deliberately awkward and obtuse."

Wouldn't you agree that Gneisenau's miscommunication and Bulow's pettiness are at least equal if not more serious military errors than those you say were perpetrated by Wellington?

HOFSCHROER: Yes, if you refer to my concluding chapter, specifically to page 350, you will see that I not only criticize the Prussians for failing to get Bulow to Ligny on 16 June, but also for having handled the Saxon situation so poorly that these troops too were not available for use on 16 June. Wellington's failure to react to the events on 15 June in time was a further contributing factor to the Prussian defeat. It was not the only factor and not necessarily the most serious. However, had Wellington told the Prussians the truth as to his dispositions and intentions, the Prussians may well never have fought at Ligny Certainly, they seriously considered a withdrawal once it became clear that Bulow was not going to arrive. Had they done so, they would not have been defeated and the false information received from Wellington certainly tipped the scales of decision in favor of fighting a major action at Ligny that day. Thus, the bulk of the blame for the Prussian defeat has to be placed on the shoulders of Wellington. He used the Prussians to buy back the time his errors of judgment the previous day had lost.

Comment on this account from Elizabeth Longford's well-known biography Wellington: The Years of the Sword (1969). This basic version of events is repeated in many histories written in English, including those of Andrew Uffindell, John Codman Ropes, and Jac Weller.

    "An hour or so later, he [Wellington] realized that his memorandum [to Blucher, the Frasnes letter] had been guilty of wildly optimistic predictions.

    "His reinforcements would reach him nothing like so soon. He therefore decided to ride the six miles [from Quatre Bras to Ligny] over to Blucher, concert their joint plans, and incidentally, put the picture right....

    "A few minutes later, Wellington and Blucher were together climbing the windmill of Bussy on a ridge behind Ligny. At the top they opened their telescopes. The sight revealed to Wellington was alarming.... Wellington muttered to Hardinge [an aide] 'If they fight here they will be damnably mauled.' Then he faced Blucher and said the same thing more tactfully.

    "'Everybody knows their own army best: but if I were to fight here, I should expect to be beat.'

    "'My men like to see their enemy,' replied Gneisenau with annoyance.... The discussion ended with Wellington giving the suspicious Gneisenau a pledge of support, though a qualified one.

    " 'Well! I will come, provided I am not attacked myself.' "

HOFSCHROER: Longford's opening description ("An hour or so later, he [Wellington] realized that his memorandum [to Blucher, the Frasnes letter?] had been guilty of wildly optimistic predictions.") is not footnoted in the original text. It is supposition and speculation. It is also a false assessment of the reality of the situation. Wellington was not being "wildly optimistic" in what he told Blucher of his dispositions and intentions, he was being deliberately misleading. Let us not forget that an hour before writing the "Frasnes Letter", Wellington had ridden past his Reserve having its breakfast near Waterloo.

Yet he wrote to Blucher telling him it was "on the march from Waterloo on Genappe where it will arrive at midday". As Wellington issued its marching orders about 11 a.m., he knew it was not going to be marching anywhere, let alone arrive at Genappe at midday. Now either Wellington suffered from defective eyesight, or he had an atrocious memory or he deliberately misled Blucher. I have never seen any evidence to support the first two possibilities, so logic tells me it had to be the third. And the "Frasnes Letter" was only one of several occasions that Wellington sent the Prussians what he knew to be misleading information.

Let us also not forget that Lady Longford, a Packenham, is closely related to the Wellesleys and as such was one of the few people who was allowed access to the first Duke's private, unpublished papers before they entered the public domain a few years ago.

Having gone through these papers myself, mine is the first account of Waterloo published since they became so easily available. It would seem that some prior writers have overlooked parts of those papers that are less than favorable to the image of the first Duke than they wanted to present.

With regards to the lines "His reinforcements would reach him nothing like so soon. He therefore decided to ride the six miles [from Quatre Bras to Ligny] over to Blucher, concert their joint plans, and incidentally, put the picture right there is a good English word for this statement - poppy-cock. I think the American equivalent tends to get deleted before publication. Now if it really was Wellington's intention at Brye to "put the picture right", then why did he not tell Blucher that he suffered from defective eyesight and had not seen the thousands of his men at Waterloo having their breakfast, that he had forgotten to order them on until after he got to Quatre Bras and that the position he gave for them in the "Frasnes Letter" was quite incorrect and that the earliest he could get troops into position to support Blucher would be late that afternoon and it would not be the 20,000 men he promised?

With regard to the last section of the text you quote, this version of events given by Longford is a combination of various stories told by the Duke in later life to his close associates. These associates made notes of their conversations and their sons and daughters published them posthumously late in the 19th Century. By the rules of evidence, this material is very much hearsay and a good historian would treat it with caution. Wellington never gave this version of events in any of his public statements on the issue.

The only person that ever corroborated this version was Wellington's aide Hardinge. He did so during one of the private conversations noted. He never made a public statement to this effect. All the other participants in this meeting recorded a conversation that was about when and how Wellington was going to intervene at Ligny. No one else including FitzRoy Somerset, Wellington's Military Secretary records any criticism of the choice of position and deployment of the Prussian army. An article by me due for publication in Age of Napoleon will examine this issue in greater detail and comes to the conclusion that the version of events given by Longford was a tall story invented by Wellington to cover his deception of Blucher.

Of the Prussians present at the meeting described in Longford's book, only Muffling, the Prussian liaison to Wellington's staff, subsequently confirmed the italicized statement "...I will come, provided I am not attacked myself." It should also be noted that the conversation took place in French, with an Englishmen speaking to Prussians, and can that perhaps explain any of the discrepancies in the Prussian and English accounts?

HOFSCHROER: All educated people spoke French at this time. I think enough of the participants in the Brye meeting spoke and understood French well enough not to mistake "I should expect to be beat" for "I will be here this afternoon with 20,000 men".

Prior to the campaign's commencement, elaborate planning had been made for the Prussian army to fight on what would come to be known as the field of Ligny. The night before the battle, 15 June, there was concern in Prussian headquarters that since Bulow's IV Corps would not arrive, and that no assurances had yet been received from Wellington, that perhaps the position was a bad one. Blucher, as you describe, "without a moment's hesitation", decided to stand and fight on the battlefield chosen by himself. It appears that Blucher unilaterally decided to stand at Ligny. How can Wellington be held responsible for this decision? How did Wellington's "deception" affect Blucher's deployments and conduct of the battle? Had Wellington been forthright in his troop locations, how would the battle of Ligny turned out differently?

HOFSCHROER: I believe you are referring to my quote from Nostitz on page 222. If so, then I can find nothing there to the effect that the Sombreffe position was "a bad one", as you say Seems to me you have been reading too much of Longford! During the night of 15/16 June, Blucher decided to hold his positions, as you state.

The Prussians could have used the cover of darkness to slip away.

However, as Blucher had given his word to Wellington to make a stand in this position, he did so, pending the arrival of information from Wellington as to his movements and intentions. This information arrived during the course of the morning of 16 June. It was in part false and very misleading. Had Wellington given Blucher correct information, then it is likely that Blucher would have concentrated his army in the next best defensible position, that around Gembloux, where he knew the IV Corps would arrive.

The I Corps would have formed the rear guard, holding the Sombreffe position for as long as possible, to cover the movement of the II and III Corps. Napoleon would then have been able to move the bulk of his forces against Wellington's scattered troops and possibly have reached Brussels by that evening. Thus, if Wellington had not misled Blucher, Ligny would most likely have only been a rearguard action involving one Prussian army corps.

Ed Wimble comments about several points raised by your book's revisionist look at the Waterloo campaign. Wimble speculates on how some of the Prussians may have felt "betrayed" by Wellington after their defeat at Ligny. What is your impression of Prussian feelings toward the Duke during their retreat?

HOFSCHROER: I wonder if that really was the thought going through the minds of the Prussian high command on the night of 16/17 June. Until the collapse of the center of their position in the late evening of 16 June, Muffling had been sending hourly reports to Blucher. By 4 p.m. at the latest, the news of the commencement of the Battle of Quatre Bras would have arrived at Brye. There was nothing to stop the Prussians starting a withdrawal then, so Blucher chose not to. I would speculate that he considered himself strong enough to hold on in the Sombreffe position [Ligny] that day for Bulow to arrive the next day. He almost did.

I would also suspect that in view of the numbers of men Wellington said he would have at hand that day, Blucher calculated that Wellington was facing a larger part of Napoleon's army than he actually was and that the Prussians themselves were facing a smaller part than they actually were. Now if d'Erlon had actually appeared on Blucher's right ...

If the Prussians did not feel betrayed by Wellington, then what about Gneisenau's bitter comments about "wily Wellington" that Wimble mentions?

HOFSCHROER: Having established that the Prussians knew from about 4 p.m. on 16 June that no help could be expected from Wellington and did not withdraw from the Sombreffe position, one assumes it was their intention to maintain contact with Wellington. Contrary to the mythology, in my first volume I demonstrate that Gneisenau made every effort to contain the Prussian retreat and keep his army close to Wellington's (retreat to Tilly). Only because control broke down did Blucher later agree to a retreat to Wavre.

The myth that Gneisenau favored a retreat to the Rhine [away from Wellington] appears to be just that - I have found no credible evidence to support it.

Equally, I am wondering what basis there is in fact for the story that Blucher and Gneisenau argued over going to Waterloo on the night of 17/18 June. For instance, I have seen a report written by Gneisenau from noon, 17 June, in which he mention's Wellington's intention to stand at Waterloo the next day if the Prussians support him. The only reservation Gneisenau expressed was if the ammunition wagons could be located in time to make this possible. Furthermore, at 3 p.m. on 17 June, Gneisenau ordered Zieten to prevent the French cutting communications with Wellington. Once confirmation of Wellington's intention to stand at Waterloo was received by Gneisenau at midnight on 17/18 June, he issued his orders for the next day.

To sum up. On the night of 16/17 June, Gneisenau did his utmost to insure the Prussians did not fall back far or away from Wellington. At noon on 17 June, his only concern about supporting Wellington on 18 June was the lack of ammunition.

At 3 p.m., he insured he did not lose touch with Wellington. At midnight, he ordered his army to move to support Wellington. Is this consistent with not wanting to move to Waterloo and when did the supposed row with Blucher take place?

Are you willing to concede that your long exposition of the poisoned political climate between the British and Prussians before the 1815 campaign might have led some readers to believe you were making insinuations that Wellington's "deception" was politically motivated? Has this resulted in a misreading of your book? Would like to take this opportunity to clarify this issue if this political environment in fact had nothing to do with Wellington's behavior?

HOFSCHROER: I am very surprised that some people have made such comments. That is not my own view and that is not what I said in my book. For instance, on page 234, I wrote: "...he [Wellington] may well have believed that the small body of men available at Quatre Bras, albeit it not the 20,000 men he would consistently promise, would be sufficient for the task in hand, and could move to support the Prussians at Ligny, while he did not need to commit the rest of his troops until he was sure of the whereabouts of the remainder of the French army."

How can anybody interpret that statement to be expounding a "politically motivated deception"? It seems clear to me that I am saying that Wellington was waiting for the situation at the front to develop before making a final decision as the where to move his army. Now is that a political decision or a military decision?

Several critics have commented adversely on the "conspiracy theory" they claim I am expounding. I have written to each and every one of these critics personally and asked them to elaborate by giving a reference to my text to where I am supposed to be making such claims. All of these critics have failed to do so. I only hope that their comments on the issues I raise in the second volume dealing with the battle of Waterloo and afterwards, particularly the way in which I demonstrate how in later life Wellington and his associates manipulated the information on the campaign made public, will be more objective and refer to what I actually do say.

Ed Wimble seems to agree with your idea that there was an attempt after Waterloo to cover up errors and actions that might have sullied reputations. What can we expect to read in the second volume of your series on 1815 dealing with the battles of Waterloo and Wavre?

HOFSCHROER: I'm pleased that he picked up this point. If you think volume one was controversial on this issue, just wait for volume two! It may interest you to know that I found a copy of an as yet unpublished English translation of Clausewitz's History of 1815 sitting in the Wellington Papers. I have traced much of the correspondence on this issue to various archives. Using those letters, I have reconstructed the story of how Wellington was shown this translation, his reaction to it and how it came to end up sitting unpublished in England. And that is not all.

More Waterloo

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