1815: The Waterloo Campaign
Wellington, His German Allies
and the Battles of Ligny and Quatre Bras

Book Review

Reviewed by Arnold Blumberg

Author: Peter Hofschroer
Pages: 414
Illustrations: 25 black and white reproductions of period illustrations
Maps: 36, most indicating corps and division positions and movements
Footnotes: 630
Appendices and Tables: 23, including orders of battle down to battalion and battery level, casualty charts, timetable charts, etc.
Bibliography: 25 manuscript sources (20 British, 2 Irish, 1 Scottish, 1 German and 1 Dutch) plus 201 published sources (mostly books)
Index: 352 entries
Publisher: Greenhill Books, London, England
Publication Date: 1998
Binding: Cloth (hardbound)
ISBN: 1-85367- 304-8
Price: $49.95
Summary: After eight years of research, utilizing an impressive array of primary and secondary material, Peter Hofschroer has created a revisionist history of the opening maneuvers of June 1815 and the battles of Ligny and Quatre Bras that has stirred up a great deal of controversy. The heart of Hofschroer's new book presents events from the German perspective. Hofschroer also claims that the Duke of Wellington engaged in a great deal of deception to cover up his mistakes.

Author Peter Hofschroer is candid about the purpose in writing this book. The Preface states "Every historian has an ax to grind and I am no exception. My contention is that the accepted view in the English-speaking world of this campaign and battle needs challenging and revising." Hofschroer believes that the histories written in English about Waterloo tend to view it as principally an affair between France and Britain. The Prussian army's 51,000 men that turned the tide of battle late in the day, and the large number of German speaking units within Wellington's multi-national army, have not received what Hofschroer feels is due credit for their vital role in defeating Napoleon. Hofschroer, who has written books for the Osprey series as well as numerous articles on German military forces of the period, has set out to "correct" the record.

The result is a controversial book that has resulted in an often acrimonious debate among Napoleonic experts. Some book reviewers are outraged at the author's claims which sully the reputation of the Duke of Wellington. Hofschroer's basic contention is that "the Duke of Wellington deliberately misled his [Prussian] ally into fighting the battle at Ligny."

And the reason for this lie was "to ensure that the Prussians would make a stand at Ligny to buy the time needed by the Duke to make up for his errors of judgment the previous day." Napoleon's opening moves surprised Wellington who "thus had two choices before him on the morning of 16 June. He could inform Blucher of the facts, admitting his error, and asking, or even begging, the Prussians to make a determined stand at Ligny, allowing his forces to concentrate for battle on 17 June. Alternatively, Wellington could try to bluff his way through the situation, hoping the Prussians could hang on in the Sombreffe position long enough for sufficient of his forces to arrive to play a significant role in that day's battle [at Ligny]." According to Hofschroer, Wellington chose the latter option.

The above quotes are all from the final chapter of the book which details and documents Wellington's alleged deception. It should be stressed, however, that most of the book is devoted to chronicling in great detail the combat at Charleroi (15 June), and Ligny and Quatre Bras the next day. Hofschroer comprehensively describes the actions down to individual battalions and batteries involved. Sometimes these accounts seem repetitive.

For example, when describing the battles around Charleroi on 15 June, almost every fight that ends with a German retreat or defeat is caused by the Prussians running out of ammunition. This remarkable lapse in logistics is not explained.

In the process of setting the record straight, Hofschroer also presents a strong but not always convincing case that the Duke of Wellington deliberately lied to the Prussians prior to their defeat at Ligny. Has the author uncovered the "Waterloogate" of the Napoleonic Wars? [See the sidebars and interview with Hofschroer which follow this book review.]

The author seems to partly base his theory on the belief that the actions on the battlefields of the 1815 campaign were influenced by the political atmosphere at the Congress of Vienna. The Congress was convened in 1814 after the defeat and exile of Napoleon. The major nations which had been allied against France met to sort out the future power structure of Europe.

However, the conference, as well as peace on the Continent, was threatened by the demands of Alexander I of Russia for the annexation of all of Poland. To gain leverage for his demands the Czar supported Prussia's claim for control of all of Saxony. Austria, France and Great Britain opposed such an aggrandizement of power by the Russo-Prussian block.

From this situation Hofschroer postulates that a special antipathy grew between England and Prussia, an antagonism which would prove conducive for a betrayal of Blucher by Wellington. This is the weakest part of the book.

Another argument Hofschroer uses is that the problems between the Duke and the Prussians were exacerbated by the competition between them for the employment of the various German military contingents that were drafted by the Allies in 1815 for use against the French. Hofschroer believes that Wellington, in order to weaken the Prussian army in Belgium, did his best to deprive them of as many troops, in this case Germans, from strengthening Blucher.

To bolster his thesis of the importance of German units in the campaign, Hofschroer attempts to show how the absence of the Prussian- controlled portion of the Saxon army would be sorely missed in the coming fights. About 14,000 Saxons, a ally to Prussia, mutinied in early 1815 refusing to serve under Prussian leadership. Although the author states that these troops were the best non-Prussian German force available, he never backs up this question or evaluation with any evidence. While the cavalry was superb, the other two arms of the Saxon military were not highly regarded after a miserable performance in the 1813 campaign.

As far as Wellington desperately wanting the Saxons in his army, he stated that 14,000 men were not going to be enough troops to make a difference in the coming campaign. Later, when he was asked by the Prussians to actually take control of the Saxons and place them in his army, the Duke flatly refused. These facts somewhat contradict Hofschroer's assertion that Wellington wanted to take German troops from the Prussians, although Wellington may have feared a largescale Saxon defection to the French.

Did the Duke of Wellington intentionally deceive his Prussian ally? If so, was it because Wellington was caught by Napoleon's opening moves with his army poorly deployed to meet the French offensive? Was Wellington also motivated by the strained political situation with Prussia? Or, would the Prussians have fought at Ligny anyway, whether or not Wellington marched to their aid as he promised? In that case, did Wellington's "trickery" really matter or have any serious impact on the Waterloo campaign? Hofschroer's conjectures are not always convincing, but it still leaves scholars with provocative questions to debate.

Despite suspect interpretations, Hofschroer's effort is certainly interesting. The very detailed battle descriptions for the German forces makes this book a worthwhile read for military buffs. This reviewer looks forward to the next and final volume of this series which concludes with the battles of Wavre and Waterloo.

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