By Rich Barbuto
The Battle of First Bull Run was characterized by brittle or uncohesive units. Companies had been thrown together into make-shift regiments. While the men would know their company officers, they may have had little time to develop trust in them and even less time or opportunity to become confident in the regimental commander. Bull Run is full of incidents in which units lost strength to stragglers. Once fired upon, even a light fire, many units tended to stop cold or even withdraw. It was uncommon for any regiment to display the valor in the face of fire that veteran regiments would typically exhibit in subsequent years. To make matters worse, regiments tended to "melt away" after receiving fire all out of proportion to the fire received. Soldiers would fall out to help their comrades to the rear and forget to return. Other soldiers would take the opportunity to slip away to seek a safer location. To capture this phenomenon, I have introduced two elements to my home-made rules. First, I assign heavier than usual casualty results to fire. This represents the unit's combat power melting away a little more quickly. Second, in every turn that a regiment receives casualties, it must roll to see if it can continue on. On a roll of 5, the regiment can not move toward the enemy on its next turn. On a roll of 6, the regiment recoils 2 inches, remains facing the same direction, and can not move toward the enemy on the next turn. The purpose of these rules is to simulate the tremendous fiction resulting from a lack of cohesion within the regiment. Regiments also displayed fragile command and control. Just as regimental commanders were new to their soldiers, so were brigade commanders new to their regiments. Analysis of the battle shows a tremendous friction in the ability of brigade commanders to get their men into the fight and to keep them there for any length of time. For the purpose of this game, I examine the simple question "Does a unit obey orders to move into danger or to assault?" I have identified a brigade commander for every brigade and represented this person by a single mounted officer figure. When I want a brigade to move into the danger zone (which I define as moving within 15 inches of an enemy regiment) I have to roll for each regiment to see if it obeys the order. On a roll of 1-3, the regiment moves forward up to the allotted distance. On a roll of 4-5, the regiment moves up to ''/2 the allotted distance. On a roll of 6, the regiment moves forward only 1 inch. Modifiers: The brigade commander can only attach himself to a single regiment within his brigade and this must be apparent prior to rolling. If the brigade commander is attached, subtract 2 from the roll. The result of this is that once a brigade enters into the danger zone, the regiments will very likely not move in a concerted fashion and they may not complete an assault. This is in keeping with the evidence presented by the actual battle. Yes, many attacks were ordered and several were made but few resulted in crossing bayonets. Delays in getting regiments into the close fight will actually provide more time for other units to arrive in the area. Well, there you have it. A set of solo rules to simulate the particularly difficult command and control problems of First Bull Run. Part Two will be a narrative account of this battle fought solo, a thoroughly frustrating yet highly enjoyable affair. Going It Alone: The Solo Wargamers Corner First Bull Run (part I):
The Preliminaries Orders of Battle: USA and CSA The Battle Solo Rules Cohesion, Command, and Control Going It Alone: The Solo Wargamers Corner First Bull Run (part II): Back to MWAN # 121 Table of Contents Back to MWAN List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 2003 Hal Thinglum This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com |