By Marvin Scott
The Japanese had some predictable patterns of behavior. If an observation plane flew over a city, it probably would be bombed in two days. The Emperor’s forces liked to put on a big air raid to celebrate the Emperor’s birthday. Attacking bombers flew in a rigid formation, a V of Vs. American pursuit pilots report that they could sometimes fly up behind a V and shoot down the last plane and nobody seemed to notice. The technique was to pull up behind the bomber, kill the tail gunner, then close to shoot down the bomber. Japanese aircraft were usually fragile, easy to shoot down. The “Betty” bomber was one of the easiest. It had gas tanks that would ignite so easily that the pursuit pilots called it the “type 1 lighter.” Japanese fighters were designed for speed and maneuverability. If hit they would often simply disintegrate. The bomber formations over China were not escorted by fighters in early days. When China got some pursuits, the Japanese added an escort of fighters flying above the bombers. Some days the Japanese would schedule two raids. The second raid would arrive over the target about an hour after the first. This was a strategy to catch the pursuits on the ground being refueled and loading ammunition. Japanese strafing was different from Allied strafing and from movie depictions. They did not fly low and strafe a line. Instead they dived and concentrated fire on a point. To lure Allied pursuits, the Japanese would have one plane at low altitude turning and maneuvering to call attention to itself. When pursuits attacked this plane, they would in turn be attacked by Japanese fighters which had been flying above the bait. Once engaged, the Japanese planes were very aggressive and favored turning dogfights. Engine torque made a left turn very easy. Most Japanese pilots in 1941 had already flown years of missions over China, and some had even battled Chinese and Russian aircraft. These were experienced pilots flying fast, maneuverable aircraft. Flying Tiger tactics were based in part on RAF experience and part on the strengths of the P-40. The AVG pilots flew in teams of two. They were directed to the intercept by a network of observers except over Burma. China had a network that actually reached to the Japanese airfields. Chennault got warning calls when the Japanese started warming their engines. The intercepting P-40s were told to make a diving pass at the target, then dive away and zoom up into positions for another pass. They were not to get into a turning dogfight. Since the Tigers were serving as interceptors, they could also use a simple stratagem. They could get airborne, wait out the air raid, and pounce on the bombers and their escorting fighters after the attackers had used up their fuel. Some of the Japanese fighters strafed after the bombers had hit the target. On their return flight they would be out of ammunition and need all their gas to reach their base. This made them easy targets for the attacking P-40s. While this tactic did not prevent the current air raids, it did raise the cost in losses. The typical rule of thumb was no air force could sustain a bombing campaign if they lost more than 10% of their bombers on their average raid. Of course, both sides tried to destroy enemy planes on the ground. Chennault expected this and had Chinese workmen build dozens of decoy P-40s using wood, straw and a can of gasoline. They are reported to have drawn Japanese fire and burned realistically. More Flying Tigers
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