Even though Pavlov "won" the first January strategic wargame, there was little cause for overt celebration by Stalin. Proof exists Stalin did not interpret this as a victory both through his substantial officer rotations and the continued refinement of the war plans. These efforts proceeded in conjunction with massive efforts to increase the security of the Soviet Union. General Staff actions took substance in the form of concrete steps, to address the shortcomings of the wargame. Broadly, these remedial steps fell into two categories.

First, as Chief of Staff, Zhukov continued to evince faith in the provisions of the counterstrike plan as evidenced by his preparations over the next five months. Far from diverting forces as Fugate charges, Zhukov continually urged Stalin to increase the commitment of forces to the forward echelon;

a) both through new units and through the call-up of new manpower;

b) through Zhukov's redoubled efforts to finish the forward fortif ied zones and by providing 40,000 border guards in May-June alone:

c) along with Timoshenko, he insured the spring maneuvers went toward, not away from the border and

d) Zhukov's own comments both then and now support his efforts to initiate the rehearsed plan.

As a result of the physical efforts undertaken by Stalin to insure the security of the warplan both the Red Air Force and Soviet ground troops focused on a closer concentration on the border. For the Air Force, based on the lessons outlined in the December study conference, the General Staff anticipated that the massed use of aviation would greatly assist the offensive momentum of the expected military operations.

Similarly, the need for forward deployment rested on the anticipated success of the operational plan. If the warplan had tested poorly, it would have raised troubling questions concerning that forward deployment of these assets. However, just the opposite occurred. Thus, steps were taken to allow this 0 concentration by extensive efforts to increase the readiness of the western district airfields. These steps included not only expanding facilities, but also involved hardening runways, and constructing new airfields.

During the spring of 1941, over 250 existing airfields were overhauled after April and an additional 164 new airfields were built. Similarly, in the two January wargames, 50-80 divisions with no second echelon, simulated both the offensive and the defensive tasks required of the Soviet forces. This latter effort was not the intended result. A contrived superiority, achieved by what Stalin believed to be a dubious procedure of thinning passive sectors, merely confirmed his worst fears that more needed to be done to prepare the border areas.

An obvious remedy was to greatly increase in real life the available level of Soviet forces utilized in the strategic wargame. In doing this, Stalin would insure an adequate covering force and provide reserves for the planned Soviet counterstrike. By June 22, 1941 Stalin believed this had been done against the anticipated levels of German strength as seen in the Soviet Deployment Table (at right).

The 170 divisions and two brigades represented a massive increase over the level of Soviet forces used in the wargame. However, these forces were not strictly drawn up to defend the border but rather were deployed so as to create the necessary reserves for the planned counterstrike.

By June 22, the Baltic Special MD had six divisions, the Western Special MD had six independent corps (including two mechanized), the Kiev Special MD had four mechanized and five rifle corps plus one cavalry division, and the Odessa MD had two rifle corps in their operational reserves. Nor, was this force the only Soviet troops in the western districts. Beside the enumerated units, 4 armies and 28 rifle divisions from the interior military districts were transferred to the DneprDivina; 100,000 men were provided by the border troops and the NKVD field units and the 1st Brigade of Naval Infantry, five airborne corps and ten antitank brigades were also available for deployment.

By placing 69 divisions on the Soviet border north of the Pripet Marshes, and locating 80 divisions south of that geographical dividing line, a clear indication of Stalin's caution begins to emerge. In total, approximately 200 Soviet divisions and several brigades assembled within the five military districts to defeat what was anticipated to be a much lesser number of German divisions. How much less is indicated by Zhukov.

Anticipation

"Shortly before the war, Stalin, the People's Commissar for Defense, and the General Staff had believed that the Nazi Command would keep not less than 50 percent (my emphasis) of its troops and its Air Force in the West and the occupied countries." During the invasion of France and the Low Countries, the German Army had utilized approximately 135 divisions. Even if Stalin was totally aware of the German reorganization program carried out in 1940-41, he would only have "seen" 214 divisions.

Thus 70-110 divisions was the reasonable expectation for a German assault force. However, Germany utilized over 150 divisions in the assault as well as over 30 allied divisions and many brigades and ancillary units. By comparison, the 170 divisions and 2 brigades of Soviet troops no longer retained the decisive edge, especially if they were caught unmobilized. This inability to discern the true nature of the balance simply added to the dislocation caused by the failure to complete mobilization.

Secondly, the General Staff knew the 10th Army in the Bialystok bulge was in an exposed position. The wargame had shown that quite clearly. The problem was to strengthen it to allow it to hold its position and further to deploy tactical reserves in the GrodnoSuwalki and Brest directions powerful enough to prevent the encirclement of the two forward groupings.

In the initial Zhukov attack, the Blue forces only reached Lida, 60-70 kilometers from the border. To block a repeat of this maneuver, the General Staff placed in echelon the tactical reserves (13 Army) of the district, deployed on the forward edge of the breakthrough zone. Similarly, the General Staff concentrated five mechanized corps in this breakthrough areas, including the very large 6th Mechanized Corps.

This corps contained along with 650 older tanks, 452 new T-34's and KV-1, making it the most powerful tank unit in the region. It was intended by this offensive force grouping to prevent a breakout through massive counterstrikes, and to keep intact beyond the battle zone the second echelon forces until needed for the counteroffensive. As a result, this Red Army deployment in the bulge was not intended as a Soviet neck in the noose, but rather as the anvil to the anticipated counterstrike's hammer.

However, the anvil retained powerful forces and on June 23 attempted to repeat the presumably practiced counterstrike maneuvers. The attack by Lt. General I. Boldin, Deputy Commander of the Western M.D., contained two mechanized corps and elements of the 6th Cavalry Corp. This flank attack failed, however due to the unsatisfactory state of Soviet communications caused by the German air strikes. The allowance by the rules of the January wargames of absolute Soviet Gommand/control and the provision of leisurely time constraints did not recur in the real world of June 22, 1941. The final result was a disaster of far larger proportions that the Zhukov attack of January, 1941 - a disaster that Stalin believed he had avoided.

All of the military plans floundered on the failure of the political side to correctly discern that no ultimatum would be forthcoming from Nazi Germany. This issue of a final warning is more fully discussed in my article "Stalin and the Outbreak of War in 1941" in the April 1989 issue of the Journal of Contemporary History.

The significance of the failure to adequately read the intelligence data has been often discussed. In the opinion of this author, Stalin's "failure" is much too simplistic as a cause of the Soviet debacle. Lost in the debate is the issue of Soviet military readiness. We're not talking about lack of modern tanks or aircraft (for certainly there were numerous models of each), but more significantly the logistics difficulties that were to plague the Soviet armed forces over the first two weeks, the lack of adequate doctrine for defensive operations that rendered offensive attacks as the only Soviet option during June - July, and the burdensome bureaucracy that proved a blessing once motivated, but restdcted all initiative in the early going.

In Europa terms, the Red Army of Fire In the East/Scorched Earth bears only passing resemblance to the real article. By that I don't mean to state that GDW failed to produce a workable game product. Indeed what is wrong with the package is that it affords too many options. The Red Army simply could not react in the fashion that I see debated in TEN and ETO. Not because it didn't, but because it couldn't. The Red Air Force had no command structure to allow it to function in the masses that appear. The Soviet logistics network put more Red Army tanks out of commission in the first two weeks than any part of the Wehrmacht.

The General Staff did not know the conditions at the front in any timely manner for hours and even days after the Germans moved. Thus, precise movements by troops that deploy at the same speed as the Germans and in the perfect locations to foil German initiative are simply not related to Soviet capabilities during the June September time period.

I believe that more consideration is needed on the issue of the opening move and the requirements of Soviet offensive operations. In the absence of operational information, the General Staff did what was rehearsed pre-war by the troops. They counterattacked on a Front scale. Try that in Europa. It certainly opens the options and it also eliminates the need for a pre-invasion turn. Coupled to Soviet air restrictions and ground mobility penalties, it changes the nature of the Red Army that is seen in FUE.

In conclusion, these suggested areas for new rules seem to favor Germany. However, let me make clear that any tampering with the rules which shifts play balance towards a German victory should be undertaken with consideration. I do not believe that Germany was close to winning in 1941 and think such talk is based merely on a German lack of understanding of the reality that they faced in December. As seen in my article "The Creation of Soviet Reserves and the 1941 Campaign" (TEN#6), the true numbers against Hitler were enormous even in 1941. In game terms German strength gave out not due to winter or misguided strategy, but rather because it was inadequate. No amount of tinkering with FRE/SE should look to alter that fact.

About Louis Rotundo

Louis is a graduate of the University of Central Florida, where he received a Master of Public Policy degree in 1975. In the course of a diverse career Louis has been a staff assistant to a U.S. Senator, Special Assistant to the Director of the Florida Solar Energy Center, and most recently Special Assistant to the President at the University of Central Florida in Orlando. He is currently self-employed as a private consultant to a variety of government and business clients.

In the field of military history, Louis has conducted lectures on Soviet Combat Studies, has been a consultant for the CIA, and is on the Editorial Board of the Journal of Soviet Military Studies. Louis has one book currently published, Battle for Stalingrad: The Soviet General Staff Analysis of the Battle on the Volga, ed. Pergamon-Brassey, 1989. Two additional books with the working titles Soviet Strategy in the Great Patriotic War and The Dawn of Supersonic Flight: The X-1 at Pinecastle, are under preparation. Both are scheduled for publication in 1990.

Louis has also authored a number of articles and papers on Soviet conduct of strategy during World War II, including "The Creation of Soviet Reserves and the 1941 Campaign", which appeared in TEN #6 and the Military Affairs Journal.

More War Plans and the 1941 Kremlin Wargame

Introduction
1941 War Plans Revisited
Conclusion