The debate over Soviet strategy in 1941 has recently seen a great deal of review in the scholarly historical journals. This review has centered on the age-old questions of whether Stalin anticipated a German attack on the USSR or whether he was actually preparing to attack Nazi Germany. I believe the latter proposition is simply due to a gross misunderstanding of Soviet strategy before the war. Doctrine must have some relevance to warplans. To analyze Soviet warplans, it is necessary to look at the preparations and wargames that occurred during that fateful year between June 1940 and June 1941.

The problem in drawing conclusions about the course of the January wargame is that little information is currently available and of those reports that do exist, most sources present only a fragmentary picture. Many of the attendees were either ordered by Stalin to be executed or were killed in combat during the war.

Few of the survivors wrote memoirs and unfortunately, of those that did survive, the reports generally concentrate on the verbal interplay between Stalin and his generals rather than on the specific goals and course of play of the wargame. Therefore, to examine the January wargame it is necessary to piece together the various memoirs and compare them to the operational plans and the Fall field exercises as outlined for Soviet defense.

It was common Soviet military practice to hold annual conferences to report on issues pertaining to military and political training. Usually, these meetings only included the top officers of each military district. The one for December, 1940 however, was significantly different for four reasons.

• First, this study conference was the last major gathering before the outbreak of war and was followed by a strategic wargame in January. Although General Staff exercises continued, the roster of participants revolved more around each individual military district rather than the strategic-operational review held in December.

• Second, the numerous participants involved included most of the senior leadership in a multi-day exercise with combined arms interplay. Some members of the Politburo also attended.

• Third, the January wargame review was conducted at the Kremlin and in front of the assembled Politburo.

• Finally, the events scheduled for the wargame postulated the actual war plans expected to be used by both sides in the event of war.

Each reason, while not unique, serves to interconnect and provide the foundation for Soviet conduct of operations in June 1941. As a result, their importance to Soviet actions upon the outbreak of war require further analysis to define what did and did not occur at the General Staff wargames.

When the Soviet leadership convened at the General Staff headquarters on January 8, it was for the purpose of playing two strategicoperational wargames.

In the first wargame, Zhukov would command the "Blue" side (Germany) with Colonel General F.I. Kuznetsov, commander of the Baltic Special MD, as his Chief of Staff. They would be opposed by the "Red" team (Russia) commanded by then Colonel General D.G. Pavlov with Major General V. Ye. Klimovskikh, Chief of Staff of the Western Military District, continuing to serve in that capacity.

Also, attending the meeting were the Defense Commissar, Marshal S.K. Timoshenko, the Chief of the General Staff, General of the Army K. Meretskov, and the various commanders and staffs of the military districts as well as some army commanders and other ranking service branch leaders. In his memoirs, Zhukov discusses in summary the outlines of the initial January wargame. He informs us that the scenario was based on the probability of the German force as the aggressor. Over 60 divisions were assigned to the "Blue" player as opposed to over 50 divisions to the "Red" player. The "Blue" attack was based on the General Staff analysis of Nazi tactics as gathered from previous campaigns of the war. Zhukov indicates, and the comments made at the December study conference support the contention, that German operational policies, as opposed to execution, were well known and realistically simulated by the "Blue" player.

Of actual tactics, Zhukov provides little information. However, V. Anfilov in Bessmertnyi Podvig provides a summary of the Zhukov war plan. By that account, Zhukov formed three powerful groupings to launch simultaneous strikes north of the Pripet Marshes. Zhukov informs us that as a result of his attack, the "game abounded in dramatic situations for the eastern side. They proved to be in many ways similar to what really happened after June 22, 1941..."

The dramatic situations Zhukov alludes to centered around the encirclement and destruction of the Soviet forces grouped around Bialystok and Grodno. The powerful blows of the "Blue" side resulted in a breakout toward Lida, about 70 km east of the frontier. At this point, Fugate indicates the game was halted since, "...the "Blues" had succeeded in establishing the necessary prerequisites for a victory. In a swift series of maneuvers, Zhukov had once and for all exposed the fallacy of a forward strategy that placed the main part of the Red Army too close to the demarcation line..."

This analysis, on its face, provides powerful support for the later development of a defense in depth theory. Unfortunately this conception is not exactly what happened at the wargame. Or more specif ically, it is only a part of what happened during the first map exercise. As Zhukov indicates, the purpose of the wargame was not to test German tactics, for these had been covered in the December study conference.

Wargame Purpose

The purpose of the January wargame was for "...checking the practicability and expediency of the main provisions laid down in the plan for cover and action by the troops in the initial period of the war." In short, it was to test the provisions for the "Red" counterstrike and the counteroffensive as laid down in the Soviet operational plans. Thus, to better understand the wargame an analysis of the operational plans and their development will provide the basis for any useful examination.

During early 1940, Marshal B. Shaposhnikov, then Chief of the General Staff, had formulated an operational plan that postulated the main adversary as Germany and the primary Nazi target as north of the Pripet Marshes. However, another source, S. Ivanov in Nachal'hyi Period Voiny, indicates a somewhat different scenario in that the General Staff believed the target of Germany to be the Ukraine. Thus, they felt the principle retaliatory Soviet force should be deployed in the area north of the Pripet for purposes of a reactive attack.

In either case, the emphasis in both plans was to confine the German attack to the border areas and to launch a counterstrike. When this operational plan was presented to Stalin in September, 1940, he expressed the opinion that the German main effort would go toward the south and it must be met by a maximum Soviet response. Nor did Stalin pull this opinion from thin air. In April and May 1941, Soviet intelligence agents in Switzerland and Tokyo provided invasion dates and target; both cited the Ukraine. Even in May 1941, Golikov's GRU continued to identify the main

German concentrations as opposite the Ukraine. As a result, the General Staff revised its plan and increased the strength of the Kiev Special Military District. After the September meeting, the various military staffs continued to labor to pull together a cohesive operational program. A target completion date of December 15 was set. If that date could be met, it would allow the command and staffs of each military district to begin work on their respective plans by January 1 st. During the interim, district field exercises would go forward. During these District exercises, the scenario always featured tactical and operational counterstrikes by Soviet forces. Mobile warfare was examined, but many times as a part of offensives on fortified locales, rather than in open operations.

In reviewing this sequence of events, the importance of these dates must not be lost in relation to the various events of the December-January study conferences. Having postulated a probable opponent, an attack direction, and a method of response, the leadership of the Soviet Union prepared to meet in December to analyze the result of earlier reforms and to discuss the latest trends in military thought.

Prior to the main army meetings, the navy had gathered in October to review combat operations in the recent western campaigns. Specific reference was made to Nazi air operations and the assistance they rendered to the Blitzkrieg. Note was taken of problems in high-speed operations. These meetings resulted in follow-up conversations just prior to the army meetings.

Conference

The study conference convened on December 23 and closed on December 29. After two days (December 23-24) of review on Red Army training, the leadership devoted four days (December 25-29) to the study and analysis of detailed reports on German and Soviet operational doctrine. Specific reference was made to Hitler's practice of flouting the accepted standards of international law regarding the outbreak of war. Zhukov mentioned both the power and the surprise of the German method of attack. Lieutenant General D. Kozlov, Chief of the Air Defense Force (PVO) noted the German practice of achieving air superiority by surprise massed air strikes.

Additional reports dealt with the new methods of mechanized warfare and the problems of local defense. Strategic defense was not covered in the reports since this would not be part of the Soviet plan. Instead the subjects of these reports tended to illustrate the offensive thrust of the operational plan and by implication identify the leadership that would execute such a plan.

That is, the commanders of the Kiev Special and Western Special MD and the Chief of the Air Force Main Directorate. At the conclusion, a front-level wargame was held and this was followed in January by the strategic game at the General Staff headquarters.

Throughout the time remaining before the onset of the German attack, the troops of the Red Army continued to engage in field exercises practicing the doctrine outlined in the war plans. This doctrine detailed primary weight to the side on the offensive. As a result, the proposition continued that it was the Soviet side that would attack and it was on German territory that the war would be fought. This view, notes Vasilevskii of the General Staff, was interpreted by some rather "one-sidedly" and as a result it "fostered delusions of an easy victory." However, it also reveals lessons that surely must have been reinforced from the conduct of the wargames. The plan that was to be executed was the operational plan as amended by Stalin and refined based on the December-January conferences.

From February through April, 1941, discussions were held at the highest command and staff levels of the Defense Commissariat and the military districts to insure an understanding of, and a compliance with the provisions of the covering plans and the mobilization effort. In summary detail, the 1941 plan anticipated: "...that the hostilities would begin with our troops beating back enemy attacks, that large air battles would ensue from the very outset and the enemy would seek to incapacitate our airfields, debilitate the concentrations of our troops, especially armor, cripple our logistics and hit railway junctions and major frontline cities.

"For our part we made provisions for our air units acting in force to bar the enemy from gaining the air superiority and to inflict heavy losses on his ground forces. We expected our border to be attacked by ground forces comprising large armor groups." This description clearly indicates that the main provisions of the German tactics were known and countermeasures were prepared to deal with them. Vasilevskii states these countermeasures envisioned that: "The initial thrust was to be contained by our rifle units and strongholds in the border military districts acting jointly with the border guards. In the meantime, mechanized corps were to counterattack from antitank lines and set the stage for our decisive offensive. It was planned that by the beginning of the enemy offensive our troops moved from inside the country would be deployed in the border districts. It was also assumed that in any eventuality our forces would enter the hostilities fully prepared, organized in formations as envisaged by the plan and concentrated beforehand."

In short, the plans said the USSR would contain the German attack and utilizing its massive armored reserves, would launch a counterstrike. This counterstrike would be followed by a commitment of the second echelon forces. These troops were expected to be ready to intervene depending on events, within several hours to one day.

Plan to Spirit

The General Staff plan was a proposal that fit the Soviet operational spirit which stressed aggressive action to defeat a potential toe. The anticipated initial counterstrike required massive preparations to implement. The fact that time did not permit their completion has tended to distort the actual intent. However, Ivanov clearly indicates the importance of the border battle when he states: "The entire system for strategic deployment of the Armed Forces was subordinated to this concept." Fugate, however, expressed the opposite opinion when he states, "it seems ludicrous to suppose the General Staff and Stalin would have gambled on one major battle in the frontier zone, especially after Pavlov's failure in the January wargames." His conception of the above-cited remarks seems to represent significant support for the defense in depth theory. Yet, in point of fact, the frontier battle is absolutely what the General Staff was proposing! Ivanov indicates the offensive nature of the accepted General Staff view as: "... powerful, retaliatory attacks against the enemy at the start of the war, in combination with the extensive use of aviation and tanks, will be of decisive (my emphasis) importance."

Thus, it is for that reason alone that the Air Force was forward concentrated, the supply dumps located in the western districts as opposed to on the Volga, and the continuous flow of men and equipment went forward. However, no final concept of the retaliatory strike was ever developed, thus leaving doubt as to its actual capability for implementation. Although Fugate postulates that Stalin attached "importance" to Zhukov's summation on January 13th, it is difficult to discern what could be stated to be that weight.

Since Zhukov reports and Ivanov supports the fact that the plan was not significantly changed, merely refined, the border fortifications not moved away from the frontier nor work slowed, the troops not redeployed away from the frontier (indeed the opposite occurred) or Pavlov sacked, the mass of evidence indicates that neither a belated defense in depth or a sacrifice of the forward echelon was the plan. Since the operational plan was not changed, either something other than a crushing defeat must have occurred at the wargame or the General Staff (Zhukov foremost) must simply have chosen to ignore the supposed lessons learned from the game.

Fugate believes that Zhukov did not ignore the lesson as revealed in the wargame. He states that Zhukov reveals the defense in depth theory through his comment: "In recent years, it is common to blame the High Command for not having ordered our main forces to pull up from the interior to repulse the enemy. I do not venture to state what would have happened if this were done: whether the result would have been better or worse.

It is quite possible that, being underequipped with antitank and antiaircraft facilities and being less mobile than the enemy, our troops may have failed to withstand the powerful slashing thrust of the enemy panzer troops and may therefore, have found themselves in as grave a predicament as some of the armies of the frontier districts. How can one tell what may then have developed at the approach to Moscow and Leningrad, and the south of the country."

However, a careful reading of this passage reveals another interpretation. Zhukov was not saying the troops should not have been located forward. Rather, his phrasing seems to indicate the comment that it's lucky they were not deployed forward. Zhukov alludes to the disasters on the frontier but only to indicate it could have been much worse if the General Staff had followed the argument advanced in Istoriya Vefikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny Sovetskogo Soyuza, 1941-45, (IVOVSS), about the border deployments. However, Fugate seems to confuse what Zhukov meant by "our main forces." It was not the strategic echelon which could not be ready until mobilized.

Rather, Zhukov refers to the second echelon expected to be ready within one day of the outbreak of war. In reality, as will be discussed later, given the numbers of units the General Staff believed available to Germany, there seemed no urgent need to pull these units up to the frontier. Indeed, if one reads the next paragraph after the above quoted text from Zhukov's account, he seems to be specifically positioning a hindsight justification. His italicized remark that such a mass rush to the border was what Germany desired can be seen as the final slam on the IVOVSS attack on his preparations. However, Zhukov's own quoted remarks to Stalin of June 22 argued for just such a course of action. It appears as a major discrepancy in Zhukov's memoirs.

Prior to the initiation of the strategic wargame, Stalin on January 7 requested a meeting with Timoshenko and Zhukov to discuss the impending map exercises and the just completed December study conference. After criticizing Timoshenko for dismissing the attendees without clearing it with Stalin, the dictator turned to the anticipated wargame. The series of questions that he asks indicates his interest in the issues to be reviewed in the map exercise. However, contrary to Fugate's speculation about why Zhukov was given the role of aggressor, this action was consistent with the intentions of the game. Eremenko states that the point of the proceedings was to assist in understanding the Soviet plan and the individual actions expected to fulfill this plan. Since Pavlov was the Western M.D. Commander it was logical to anticipate he would command his own forces.

The opposite is true for the Kiev M.D. The papers given at the study conference acknowledged that these two individuals were mobile force experts and thus here was a chance to practice what was required by the operational plan. Although Stalin was pleased with the selection of commanders, the choice of remarks framed as a question reveals the prior nature of this decision. Fugate aside, Stalin obviously did not know nor did he select the mechanics or commanders of the impending exercise.

A hint as to the anticipated course of the strategic wargame may be found in Eremenko's memoirs. After the December study conference, Eremenko reports a wargame was played entitled "An Offensive Operation by a Front". This game must have occurred December 30 since the lower staff s were dismissed on New Years Eve. Within that game, the "Eastern" side was tasked with offensive efforts to "...breach a deeply distributed defense and utilize mobile formations to exploit the gap."

From the further comments made by Eremenko, it can be assumed this map exercise represented a smaller version dress rehearsal for the January strategic games. From the information available in Zhukov it is obvious that Anfilov's scenario is correct. The war game did open with a powerful German attack. This attack did create difficult situations for the Red player (Pavlov). A review of the records seems to reveal that if the counteroffensive was even attempted it must have failed since no mention is made by either Zhukov, Anfilov, Eremenko or Kazakov.

However, a clue exists as to why no discussion appears in the published records. Meretskov states: "I was given 15-20 minutes to characterize the December meeting... and the January operational exercise. When I went over to the exercise / only managed to report on the actions of the enemy (my emphasis), when Stalin interrupted me and began asking questions."

Thus, without discussion time, little of the Soviet reactive efforts were covered. Since most of the published accounts discuss the interplay from Stalin's questions, these omissions leave a distortion of the result. Yet in spite of the paucity of information, substantial evidence exists of another result beside the Zhukov victory scenario. Simply put, it is that neither M. Kazakov or Stalin allude to Zhukov's victory in their remarks. Nor does Zhukov claim in his memoirs that he "won" the wargame.

Winning?

Kazakov says, "strictly speaking, two games were played on two different strategic sectors, the Western and the Southwestern." This is correct as tar as it goes, but different scenarios must have been played out within those games. Zhukov reports the scenario that he won. To explain this unexpected and certainly unpleasant development, Meretskov, under questioning, sought to pinpoint the problem not as a flaw in positional deployment but as an error in initial Soviet strength.

The Chief of Staff clearly indicated the Zhukov breakthrough primarily rested on the initial superiority of the "Blues," particularly in tanks and aircraft. Zhukov readily acknowledged that this superior strength "...explained the decisive movement of the "Blues" during the playing of the game (my emphasis)." However, an obviously irritated Stalin, dismayed by the poor showing of the "Reds," cut him off with the comment: "Don't forget that its not only the arithmetical majority but the skill of commanders and troops that matters in battle."

Conversely, Kazakov reports the one that Pavlov won. How do we know? A careful reading of Kazkov's analysis reveals he quotes Meretskov as saying during the January 13 debriefing at the Kremlin that the "Red" team with 60-65 divisions (not 50) conducting offensive (not defensive) operations had overcome the "Blue" team in the Western sector. In summary, just the opposite of what Zhukov reports. Obviously, since we know only two wargames occurred this must refer to the final phase of game one.

When Stalin asked Meretskov how this was done, the Chief of Staff cited a reallocation of forces from quiet sectors. This reallocation allowed offensive operations by the "Red" player in spite of the small margin of superiority. The reallocation created offensive possibilities due to the existing Soviet belief that 1 1/2 of their divisions could overwhelm one German division. Since one Soviet division could also defend against 2-3 German divisions it was possible for the "Red" player to concentrate reserves on the main axis for an offensive assault. These reserves became available through thinning out the first echelon, potentially accounting for the easy "Blue" breakthrough. However, when Meretskov reported this supposition, he was not boasting, as Stalin indicated, but more probably was explaining the umpires' rules for the game. During the discussion Stalin seized the initiative by indicating the fleeting nature of local superiority in the mechanized age.

However, Stalin's viewpoint concerning reserve mobility, while correct enough, did not recognize the powerful nature of the initial German thrusts. Nor did he acknowledge the overwhelming paralysis due to the air strikes and communications disruptions that accompanied previous German attacks. However, the subsequent events of 22 June, 1941 lend ample proof that neither did anyone else in the room fully comprehend the disaster that could accompany such miscalculations.

For example, during the December study conference, Pavlov participated in the group discussions with remarks that supposedly disconcerted Kazakov. That general reports Pavlov "...clearly overstated the combat capabilities of our tank troops. He said, 'we are rightly obliged to entrust the tank corps with annihilating one-two enemy tank or fourfive enemy infantry divisions."' If this attitude was reflected by stretching the rules of the wargame it becomes even more understandable how the "Reds" were able to win with a slight margin of superiority.

Additional Explanation

There is, however, an additional explanation for the "Red" triumph. Zhukov tells us that in the first wargame Timoshenko, Meretskov, and Col. General G.M. Stern took a hand in the 'action' in the southwestern direction. Two possibilities emerge from that shrouded insight; first, Zhukov thinned his forces beyond prudence and thus the counterstrike from the southwest direction was successful; or second, the breakthrough cited by Antilov in Bessmert'nyi Podvig might have occurred against a very thin "Red" covering force. Thus Pavlov possessed ample reserves and used them to launch a winning counterstrike after the initial Zhukov success in the wargame.

In either case, Kazakov tells us the final result; the "Reds" overwhelmed the "Blues." It is also equally obvious from the detailed questions asked by Stalin that he was uneasy over the course of play in this scenario.

Two further points provide supporting proof of a second scenario or phase to the initial wargame aside from the previous information. First, after such a supposedly terrible defeat, why was Pavlov not removed in the massive immediate reshuffling of officers. When Stalin questioned Pavlov it was not the "Red" successes he wished to discuss. Rather, it was the failure of Pavlov to find solutions to the initial attack of Zhukov. If no other scenario had transpired what saved him from dismissal? In supposition, Pavlov's glib response was one issued by a commander that had just executed the General Staff operational plan and won and whom the umpires had ruled had acted correctly.

After all, Pavlov had contained the German thrust in the border zone. Small initial failures such as the inability to drive back toward the German border during the game were just accidents of war. Two, Zhukov cites the lessons of the December study conference as becoming operative at a later date. Aside from no major changes to the strategic plan, he cites the strengthening of frontier forces and another round of large scale strategic maneuvers as results of the improvements to the plan.

Additionally, new reserves were deployed and a second echelon, along the Dnepr-Dvina river line was created. All of these efforts would support an attempt to repair the exposed weaknesses of what otherwise tested as a good plan.

The detailed information in this article lends powerful support to the thesis of a Pavlov "victory". But there is however, one further piece of evidence that no disaster occurred in the initial wargame. No records exist of the actions in the second wargame in the southwest direction. However, based on the rehearsed warplans from the fall exercises in the Kiev Military District and the recorded comments in the January meeting, it is apparent that the General Staff proposed a "Red" offensive thrust by Zhukov with Pavlov taking the "Blue" team.

Thus when Meretskov began the discussion of the second wargame, Stalin again raised the question of who won, but he framed it in a fashion to confirm the previous supposition that Pavlov, not Zhukov, triumphed in the first wargame for his question is, "Was it the'Reds' again (my emphasis)?" Fugate's suppositions aside, it is difficult to find evidence for the crushing Zhukov victory or its decisive impact on Soviet plans.

More War Plans and the 1941 Kremlin Wargame

Introduction
1941 War Plans Revisited
Conclusion