Fire on the Mountain

This, in Issue 29, advocates that a 1/7 or greater proportion of mountain troops should get a +1 when attacking "difficult terrain" (mountains, wooded rough, rough, ravine), to give them more punch. The case for this is not clear:

• Mountain troops already have punch in the mountains, by not being halved in the attack like all other units.
• The case for extra punch is not proven. Giving "the French Moroccans some extra punch at Cassino" is perhaps unwarranted: "The French Expeditionary Corps also made limited advances [at Cassino] but suffered extremely heavy casualties." (Peter Young, The Atlas of the Second World War)
• The -2 for mountains was playtested in Balkan Front, where it worked satisfactorily.
• The proposed rule is not particularly "clean." +1 against only mountains would be simple enough, but this would result in anomalies: it would be better for mountain troops to attack mountain (-2 +1 = net -1) than wooded rough (-2). Once you try to account for this, similar reasoning extends to other terrain, until you end up with a "difficult terrain" classification.

In conclusion, the case for "Fire on the Mountain" needs to be proven.

Operational Flexibility

At the end of Issue 29's "Europa On Line," Victor Hauser, our intrepid editor, advances his counter density theory of operational flexibility. In 1943, for example, not only are the Soviets stronger, they have about 400 more counter than the Axis. The Axis must concentrate their few units in large stacks to hold the front, while the Soviets can use their extra units to ooze through the line and create problems.

Victor's right, but it's not a failing of the game system here, it's history in play. First, consider letting the Germans break down all their divisions, so that they can have as many units as they want. Would German play be changed significantly? No, the Germans still have to form a crust defense, as strong as possible, because the Soviets have military superiority.

Second, note that breaking down all German divisions doesn't give the Germans an ooze ability similar to the Soviets. The Soviets are oozing divisions, with their ZOCs, while the German are stuck with regiments, without ZOCs. This is because the Soviets simply have millions more men under arms than the Germans, an accurate historical factor.

Third, Soviet "ooze" did indeed happen, time after time, in the war. Even with a crust defense, the Germans had great difficulties manning the entire front, and the Soviets exploited this at all levels from tactical to strategic. One repeated Soviet ploy was to push at the juncture of two German divisions, corps, or armies. These junctures were always the weakest points, and the Soviets often oozed or burst through. The Germans knew this, recognized what was going on, and still never were able to devise an effective counter to it.

Inside Europa You Ask, I Answer

Questions and Answers
Victory in Europa
Mountain Units and Operational Flexibility
Grand Europa Economics
Partisans
Finland
HX: Exchange Commentary
Army Group North Operations
Leningrad 1941 Tournament Cancelled
Overrun-Proof Lines