In Issue 29, Flavio Carrillo lambastes the victory determination systems in Europa games. "Europa suffers from a lack of strategic discussion and abounds with technicians of the game .... The reason for this lack of strategic focus lies in a failure of the game system itself-- inadequate and vaguely defined victory-point systems." And so on. I stand accused of obsessing on counting rifles for endless OB perfection, making Europa "a largely empty canvas containing excellent OBs and maps but little else ......

Give me a break!

The game system and the victory rules define a strategic framework. Even if you think the victory conditions are outright wrong (they aren't), they do define goals, and players form strategic plans to accomplish these goals. Every Europa player I've ever encountered, even the fiercest "technician" who focuses on game tactics and rules mechanics, never has "a lack of concern about the ultimate point of the game-winning.

If Europa magazine has more articles on tactics than on strategy, it's not the fault of the game system or the players, it's because tactics are easier to write about. Given the German forces for Barbarossa, for example, it's fairly easy to define what is the best use of force to accomplish tactical objectives such as overrunning a cavalry division in a swamp (don't send in the panzers), attacking a rifle corps in clear terrain (do send in the panzers), or so on. It's much more difficult to define what is the best way to use these same forces to conquer the Soviet Union (or otherwise win the game). At the strategic level, you have to deal with time and space: the overall situation, everywhere on the map, across multiple turns. This is much more difficult to write up, by its very nature.

"The game system and the victory rules define a strategic framework. "

This is how I see victory conditions fitting into Europa:

• The OBs and units are the basic tools players use to accomplish their goals. A lot of effort goes into getting these right. If the basics are wrong, everything else is pointless-try playing FitE/SE with every German division a 20-10 panzer division, or every Soviet artillery unit a 15-8.
• The rules define how you use your tools-what tactics to use to get the best effects. You learn proper tactics by playing the games: Form combined arms forces of armor, motorized forces, and artillery. Assault fortifications with siege forces. Station fighters to protect your front and to hinder enemy air power. Etc. Do it right, and you're rewarded. Do it wrong, and you'll get your clock cleaned.
• At the next level up, players use operations or "grand tactics" to accomplish their goals: how to operate their forces over space and time. The best killer stacks in the world aren't going to do much for you in the long run if you botch up getting supplies to the front, forget to prepare forward airbases, fail to reinforce critical sectors, concentrate on killing units when you should be gaining ground, etc. Operations are a means to an end: victory.
• At the highest level, the victory conditions define your strategic goals. If you accomplish the victory conditions, you win (and the victory represents, to the extent possible, a "real world" victory). The victory conditions do not define how you must achieve them. To the best of your ability, you form a plan and use your tools (forces) in the proper manner (tactics and operations) to accomplish your plan.

Europa games do this, time after time. So. what's Flavio's problem? He wants the victory conditions to limit operations, to force people to play in particular ways, so that things that were operationally possible but "politically" impossible won't happen, so that players won't "resort to ahistoric play." Well, I certainly agree with the outline of this argument, but we part company on what was politically impossible. From the look of things, Flavio tends to define anything that didn't happen historically as impossible. This is too restrictive-many things that didn't happen were indeed possible. We now arrive at our destination: it's a matter of informed opinion as to what was historically possible or politically impossible. So, let's swap opinions and take a look at one of his examples, the Arctic runaway defense.

Rob Ramey's "The Arctic Runaway" was first introduced in Europa #13

In essence, the Soviet player looks at the Arctic front and says "I'm outta here." Instead of defending a long and difficult line, Soviet forces zip back to the narrower gap between Lake Onega and the White Sea, thus reducing the level of forces needed in the theater. "It's a brilliant strategy except for one problem: any Soviet theater commander who ordered such a 'stalwart' defense would be shot."

Come on. On that criterion, every Soviet player gets shot: for losing all territory west of Smolensk in a couple of weeks, for letting Leningrad get surrounded, for losing 600,000 troops at Kiev, and so on. Sure, the Arctic runaway defense voluntarily gives up territory, but the Soviets historically were prepared to do just that. In 1942, the southernmost wing of the southern Soviet forces withdrew into the Caucasus Mountains and voluntarily ceded territory before the German advance, while the northern wing tried to stand fast at Voronezh and then Stalingrad. Even in 1941, the Soviets were on the verge of voluntarily abandoning Leningrad-symbol of the Bolshevik Revolution itself-until the weakening German offensive showed it just might be possible to hold out.

So, it's not politically inconceivable that the Soviets would voluntarily give up territory, if it made sense strategically. Is there something about the Arctic, then, that makes it inconceivable to abandon it? About the only thing going for it is ice-free Murmansk and the lend- lease route, but the consequences of letting the Germans close down the route are already built into the game.

Further, as with most runaway defenses, it's by no means clear that the Arctic Runaway is a "brilliant strategy." There's a lot to be said for engaging the Axis along the length of the Arctic front-the terrain's difficult for the Germans, too, and they're mighty thin on the ground. Actively fighting in the theater may inflict German casualties, may cause the Germans to divert forces to the region, and may even force the enemy over on the defensive.

(Here's a free operational hint: Some German players don't realize that Norway is fair game. They subconsciously believe that Norway is "theirs" and the Soviets aren't allowed to enter. If you face one of these players, he may let you do an end run around his lines in Finland and get on the road to Kirkenes. I've twice fought the Siege of Kirkenes, with unsupplied rifle regiments trying to push construction troops out of the town. This does wonders to induce the Germans to leave Murmansk alone and send a division back to clean up the rear area--so much for that summer's offensive.)

With no overriding reason to hold on to the Arctic, why should the victory conditions force the Soviet player to try to do so. Also, can the victory conditions actually force this? Unless the conditions virtually ensure that the Soviet player will lose the game if he abandons the Arctic, he always has the option of doing so. But, victory conditions where the Soviet loses if he abandons the Arctic, regardless of what happens elsewhere, are clearly ahistorical--exactly the situation Flavio set out to avoid. I've gone over this -several times, and the logic seems to hold.

Instead of straight-jacket victory conditions, isn't it better to let the Soviet player decide how to conduct his operations himself, and realize the consequences? Yes! Abandoning the Arctic is a means to an end: letting forces that would have to reinforce the Arctic go to other sectors. If this results in the Soviet player stopping the German offensive sooner and eventually winning the game, then the strategy pays off. If it results in nothing more than just giving the Germans a lot of territory, then the Soviet player has thrown away Murmansk's victory point and a slew of lend-lease reinforcements.

Inside Europa You Ask, I Answer

Questions and Answers
Victory in Europa
Mountain Units and Operational Flexibility
Grand Europa Economics
Partisans
Finland
HX: Exchange Commentary
Army Group North Operations
Leningrad 1941 Tournament Cancelled
Overrun-Proof Lines