Skirmisher Tactics
in the Napoleonic Wars

Part III: Russia

by George F. Nafziger

Russian skirmish tactics are not a common topic and only one source of hard data was found to be available. That work is Zweguintov's work on the Russian army. In it Zweguintov provides the following details of Russian skirmishing before and during the Napoleonic era.

Zweguintov speaks of a work, "Notes relative to the service in the infantry in general and in the light infantry in particular," which was written by Kutusov for the Bougski (Bug) Jager Corps in 1786. This work served in 1789 as general guidance for the employment of skirmishers and eventually became the equivalent of a regulation for that service.

The jagers were armed with a special fusil (musket) designated for use by the jagers as well as with a pistol. The NCO's, after 1777 had a rifled carbine. According to Zweguintov the Jagers were trained in marksmanship, though there is some strong data to suggest that it was only the "enlightened" regimental commanders that encouraged such practice.

The jagers were to serve as the advanced and flank guards during marches, as well as in combat when they were placed on the wings in the order of battle or on the back flanks of a square, to cover the guns and to occupy the important points.

Duties

The "Notes" describes the following as their duties:

"To reconnoiter and protect the march of the army or the corps in a terrain where cavalry cannot perform that task. They were to occupy defiles with small numbers of men, so that enemy might not delay the army's passage. They were to reconnoiter forests and brushy areas, to "rake" them clean, to defend a woods, with or with out chevaux de frise, and to prevent the enemy from penetrating them. What was called for during the reconnaissance of and in the sweeping a forest applied, with appropriate modifications, was performed in villages, cemeteries and all other places, notably terrain that was rugged or broken with forests. The jagers occasionally deployed in dispersed order before formed infantry and protected them with skirmish fire during which time the line infantry deployed in order of battle or when it traversed broken terrain where it was susceptible to disorder.

In operating in concert with infantry, the battalions of jagers formed themselves in three ranks, like the line infantry, but operated independently. After 1765 they operated in two ranks. A jager battalion was divided into four "divisions" each of two "demi-divisions" and each demi-division contained two pelotons. When operating in closed order in line or in column the normal cadence of the jagers was 80 paces per minute. When they deployed for combat and when maneuvering on the field of battle ("to execute the decisive blow against the adversary") they used the "redoubled cadence" of 120 paces per minute. Kutousov directed the use of the "pas de course" (the French pas de course was 250 paces per minute) for all cases where the jagers did not advance in closed order."

Kutousov's "Notes"

Kutousov's "Notes" foreshadowed the "march by pelotons," the "march by files," the "march in dense column" (by entire divisions, where the interval defaulted to "demi-divisions", by pelotons, or finally by files of four) and four "maneuvers proper for jagers." The following are specific maneuvers from Kutusov's "Notes."

1st Maneuver: During maneuvers in lightly wooded terrain, inhabited localities and cemeteries, the skirmishers line was combined with a formed reserve in two lines. They advanced at the redoubled cadence, firing on order or signal, using natural cover, and advancing by bounds. On the order "pelotons advance in skirmish order" the even numbered pelotons went sixty paces forward at the run and deployed themselves in skirmishers (the men of the second rank maneuvered so as to place themselves to the left of those of the first rank), the pelotons of the wing divisions covered the flanks of their skirmisher line. This formation advanced (the odd numbered pelotons followed behind the skirmisher line at a distance of 60 paces) until the moment when the commander ordered the commencement of fire on a target or to take cover.

When arriving at difficult terrain that must be traversed, the commander passed the formed infantry through the skirmishers and formed them after they had traversed the terrain, and covers the maneuver with peloton fire. During this time the even numbered pelotons regroup and run to place themselves in formation between the intervals of the odd pelotons.

In the case of retreat by line infantry which is unable to hold off the enemy, the odd numbered platoons which had placed themselves before the skirmish line withdrew through the line at the pas de course and, once 60 paces behind it, reformed to face the enemy. During this time the skirmishers were to have been maintaining a constant fire on the enemy. Then the men of the second rank, which find themselves in the skirmish line, withdraw at the run 30 paces. The odd numbered pelotons then deploy in skirmishers, while the men of the first rank of the even pelotons which had stood before those of the second rank while it withdrew, withdraw at the pas de course behind the odd numbered pelotons deployed in skirmishers and reform 60 paces behind them in two ranks.

The Second Maneuver: This maneuver was used when the visibility was sixty paces or less. On the order "a peloton by twos forward" the even numbered pelotons advance at the pas de course and deploy in two lines of skirmishers, instead of just one, the first at sixty paces from the main body. The second line forms at thirty paces before the reserve pelotons. The two skirmisher lines then advance with or without firing.

When the first line fires, the second line passes through it at the pas de course, stops 30 paces before the first line and, after giving the first line time to reload, fires in it turn. After this the two lines resume their advance and fire, each line in its turn. When the commander recalls to the rear his skirmish lines, they moved at the pas de course until they were ten paces behind the formed reserves and form anew, two lines of skirmishers at 30 and 60 paces behind those reserves. The reserve pelotons then with at the pas de course and reform in two ranks behind them.

3rd Maneuver: This maneuver was used in wooded terrain as well as in street fighting when it was not possible to deploy as skirmishers. One peloton in two placed itself in Indian file, by the first rank and then the second rank. If it encountered the enemy, where deployment was not possible, the leading skirmishers fire and turn to the right, the following skirmisher advanced and fired, stepping to the side, and eventually every soldier in the line rotated forward and fired in a carricole by pelotons. If space allowed the peloton deployed in one or two skirmish lines according to conditions. When the edge of a woods was occupied the reserve pelotons were to pass in their turn, through the skirmish line and form before them.

4th Maneuver. When traversing a narrow file, the pelotons formed in two ranks and formed a column by fours. To do this the two halves of the battalion made a demi-turn to the center and the column moved forward from this point. When the column stopped, the soldiers made a facing to the right and then to the left, forming again their two ranks towards each side. The column square, with the pelotons of the head of the column moving to the right and left to become the front face of the square, with the following pelotons facing towards the right and left, to form the lateral flanks and the rear pelotons running by files formed the rear face of the square, always moving by files to occupy their places. In lieu of a square, the column could also form a circle.

In approaching a woods which was to be swept the commander stopped the column and the men of every other peloton advanced at the pas de course to form a skirmish line 60 meters in front of the column such that the extremities of the line were pulled back to cover the flanks of the battalion; the other pelotons remained as a reserve. The column could, on signal, deploy in a line across natural obstacles. If it was necessary to open fire instantly, on the alert, the best shots of the two ranks advanced and occupied the enemy with their fire, while the others loaded their muskets and passed them forward.

Tenor of Tactics

This is pretty thin data upon which to hang one's hat, but it fits the general tenor of the tactics employed by the other nations. It should be noted that there is absolutely no mention of the skirmishers operating in any particularly independent fashion and they did not operate in pairs like the rest of Europe's armies. They were supposedly encouraged with marksmanship training and taught to use cover. Otherwise the tactics described are very primitive and restrictive. It is also unfortunate that no intervals between the deployed skirmishers is provided which prevents a comparison of the density of skirmishers used by the Russians to that used by the other nations.

Other fragmentary evidence can be found which very explicitly states that the Russian line infantry regiments in 1812 did have integral skirmishers. Based on slightly later documentation and a comparison to period Austrian tactics these skirmishers were probably drawn from the third rank of the line companies. This suggests that there were some philosophical change, but without more documentation it is difficult determine who significant this change truly was.

It has been repeatedly stated in manuscripts discussing the tactics of the Russian army that they did not have a series of all encompassing regulations by which their armies maneuvered, but that each regimental commander chose whatever suited his fancy. Indeed, a review of the Russian 1799 infantry drill regulation is almost devoid of drill, concentrating on organization and standing in formation for reviews. No doubt this effected the Russian skirmisher tactics as well.

The only other point of note is that in 1812 the opolochenie or militia was reported in French period documents as being used in a skirmisher role during the Second Battle of Polotsk. It is probable that they were employed in the older, linear system described by Zweguintov, as that system could easily be employed by less trained troops and would be far easier to control by the company officers.

More Skirmisher Tactics

Back to Empire, Eagles, & Lions Table of Contents Vol. 3 No. 2
Back to EEL List of Issues
Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List
© Copyright 1997 by Jean Lochet

This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web.
Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com