Neither Caesar Nor Punchinello

The Army of the Kingdom of Italy
in the 1812 Campaign in Russia
Part I

Behaviour of Italian Troops
in Battle: July-September 1812

by Marco Gioannini
Edited by Marc Raiff

Italian Guard of Honor bivouacing in Russia. Illustration by Faber du Four.

Ostrovno (July 25-26)

The battle of Ostrovno was a two day engagement between Napoleon's advance guard, Nansouty's I Reserve Cavalry Corps personally led by King Murat and supported by the IV Corps, and Barclay de Tolly's rearguard, the IV Corps under General Ostermann.Ostermann had received orders to defend the city of Vitebsk and its magazines. [9]

On July 25th at daybreak, Murat's scouting parties were engaged by Ostermann's cavalry posted along the road leading to the small town of Ostrovno. A rather confused encounter battle followed that lasted several hours until Ostermann was forced to withdraw some miles eastward by the arrival of Eugene's Corps' leading division. The Russian general calmly redeployed his troops in a strong defensive position and waited for another day of fighting. Lieutenant De Laugier gave the following description of Ostermann's second day position:

"The Russian line, covered by a steep ravine on its front, was placed on a knoll from which they could overlook the approaching tracks without being seen. The Dvina River protected the Russian right. On the left a thick wood interspersed with rocks, logs and luxuriant undergrowth would disorder any massed formation. Swarms of enemyjaegers were hidden in the forest". [10]

On the 26th, the battle started at about 10 a.m. and lasted about four or five hours. The Russians repulsed several frontal attacks by the French divisions of the IV Corps. In the afternoon, after the French had succeeded in clearing the forest, the tired Russians abandoned the position and withdrew to Vitebsk and beyond.

The role of the Italian contingent in the battle of Ostrovno is a matter of debate. Eyewitness accounts and historian reports differ considerably.

According to De Laugier, [11] Villata's cavalry brigade took part in several charges under General Ornano. As far as the first day is concerned, Nafziger [12] seems to confirm this. The Italian light cavalry is also credited by Cappello [13] for an outflanking movement around the Russian left on the 26th , but according to Nafziger [14] it was Pire's brigade. As De Laugier [15] referred to this action as being performed generically "by a light cavalry brigade" and not "by the Italian cavalry brigade", the question still remains undecided.

Both Zanoli [16] and De Laugier [17] reported that on the morning of the 26th the artillery of the Italian Guard was commanded forward to cover the advance of Delzons' division with counter-battery fire against the Russian guns on the heights. I found no other reference to this action, but I cannot exclude it.

Zanoli [18] wrote that two Guard infantry battalions (probably the Conscripts) and the single battalion of the Ist Light advanced into the forest to relieve the 92nd Line (Delzons' division) from a stalemate position, but this episode is not confirmed by any other source. The 92nd's frozen position in the forest is mentioned by Nafziger, who, however, makes no reference to any Italian support. [19] Neither Eugene in his report to the Emperor nor General Lechi in his letter of August I st to the Italian Minister of War in Milan attributed any activity to the Italian infantry at Ostrovno.

On the contrary, Lechi wrote: "We (the Guard) were all eager to hurl ourselves into the fight, but the enemy's sudden withdrawal was the cause of our inactivity". [20]

Moreover, Colonel Galimberti, Pino's AdjutantCommandant in charge of keeping track of any unit movement and engagement, noted in the division diary that the 26th of July was just another marching day that ended with a night rest in the Ostrovno area. [21]

My conclusion is that no Italian infantry unit was actively employed at Ostrovno: the Guard was kept in reserve and Pino's division, which was the Corps junior formation and therefore usually occupied the last position in the marching order; reached the battlefield only to encamp for the night.

The battle of Ostrovno is an interesting case (another being Borodino) of primary sources contradicting each other. Eyewitness accounts told one story, official reports a different one. My opinion is that, though often useful to shed some light on actions performed by Italian troops and often unjustly overlooked by other (particularly French) sources, Italian eyewitness accounts (especially De Laugier's) should be taken cautiously, because they sometimes show an inclination to systematically overemphasize the Italian military role in Russia. Beside a nationally biased attitude, I can suggest two specific reasons for this inclination:

    1) many eyewitnesses published their memoirs during the wars for Italian independence and apparently felt obliged to make the most of Italian courage in any past campaign, even at the cost of altering the historical truth;

    2) throughout the campaign a diffused dissatisfaction for being relegated to secondary roles grew within the Italian contingent and, although at Malo-Jaroslavets and in many following episodes of the retreat from Moscow the Italians fought brilliantly and were often decisive, traces of this attitude are present in historical reports and memoirs either by direct complaining or, indirectly, by claiming for the Italian troops more merit than deserved.

Agaponovchtchina (July 28)

A skirmish between the single battalion of the 1st Light and some Cossack parties.

Ousviat and Velij (July 31)

Two minor engagements for the Italian cavalry that displayed a high degree of initiative and professional skills. On July 31st, a strong detachment of the Queen's Dragoons under their regiment commander, Colonel Narboni, was scouting toward Ousviat, north of Souraj, where the Italians had encamped for a rest after the first phase of the campaign. Not far from the village, the dragoons ran into a Russian supply convoy escorted by some infantry. A squadron immediately charged and seized 200 wagons loaded with precious barley and rye flour. 40 infantry were also taken prisoner. What happened at Velij on the same day was more remarkable. About 200 chasseurs of the 2nd regiment under Colonel Banco, after routing some cavalry over a bridge, charged four Russian infantry battalions that were escorting another supply convoy. The infantry had time to take position behind a ditch and coolly formed a big hollow square with the wagons in the center. Five times were the chasseurs driven back with losses by the stubborn resistance of the Russians. Finally, just before the enemy cavalry could reform, the Italians succeeded in breaking the square and capturing 150 wagons as well as 500 prisoners at the cost of 50 losses. This action earned Colonel Banco and his men a mention in the Emperor's daily bulletin.

Velij (August 6)

Villata's cavalry brigade supported by the three voltigeur companies of the Dalmatian regiment ambushed and repulsed a Cossack raid.

Souraj (August 7)

Italian Guard piquets succeeded in baffling a Cossack night attack.

Giatsk (September 4)

This was an engagement between the Italian cavalry (Villata's light brigade in the front line with the Queen's and the Guard Dragoons in reserve) and Platov's cossacks acting as aggressive rearguard of General Konowvitsyn. After a fierce melee, the Cossacks retreated in order, the tired Italians did not pursue.

Dozens of minor engagements like the above probably occurred during the retreat from Moscow, but were not recorded.

Borodino (September 7)

Only part of the Italian contingent of the IV Corps was present at Borodino. Detached in the Vitebsk area for a secondary mission, Pino's division made every effort to reach the battlefield by forced marching even 25 miles per day. But they did not succeed and were able to rejoin their fellows only the day after the battle. Though unable to share their part of glory and carnage, Pino's men nevertheless had a positive role in preventing General Wintzingerode's force from joining Kutozov's main army before the battle.

IV Corps Italian troops moving up to participate in the Battle of Borodino. Illustration by Faber du Four.

Planning the forthcoming battle, the Emperor established that Eugene's IV Corps would act as the left wing of the Grande Armee and ordered it to deploy just in front of the village of Borodino. Eugene put Broussier's, Delzons' and Morand's (detached from the I Corps) divisions in the front line, with the Italian Guard in reserve and the light cavalry brigades protecting the left flank and the rear. After seizing and securing Borodino in the early hours of the battle, Eugene left Delzons' division on the left bank of the Kolocza Riverto hold the village and its surroundings. Then he moved the rest of his forces across the stream to prepare the attacks against the Raevsky Redoubt. The Corps artillery, including the Italian guns present on the battlefield, took position on a height just behind Borodino and started pouring fire on the redoubt to support the infantry ascending the slope.

At about 11 a.m. this action was briskly interrupted by a serious menace to Eugene's far left flank. To lessen the pressure on his center and left, Kutozov had released a strong cavalry force, Ouvarov's Guard Cavalry and Platov's Cossacks, across the Kolocza River. The IV Corps light cavalry brigades, although supported by Preysing's Bavarians, were unable to sustain the impetus of the Russian horsemen and fled. According to Nafziger [22], Ouvarov formed the Elisabethgrad Hussars and the Guard Cossacks into the first rank, with the Guard Dragoon, Uhlan and Hussar Regiments, the Niejine Dragoons and a horse battery in the second line. It was this force that, after routing the French cavalry, met Delzons' 84th Line Regiment formed in squares. Against the firm resistance of the French infantry, valiantly supported by some Italian guns that had been shifted to face the new threat, the Russian squadrons slowed down and wavered. Their hesitation gave the battered IV Corps cavalry the chance to reform behind the squares. With the help of some units from Grouchy's III Cavalry Reserve Corps, Ornano's horsemen counterattacked and repulsed Ouvarov beyond the Kolocza.

According to the most accepted reconstructions of the battle of Borodino (see Nafziger), no Italian infantry unit was engaged in this action. This is apparently confirmed by a letter that General Lechi, the Italian Guard commander, wrote to the Minister of War in Milan three days after the battle: "( ... ) in the memorable battle of September 7th the Guard was exposed to the lively fire of the Russian batteries and suffered about50losses without having the opportunity to discharge their muskets". [23]

But Lieutenant De Laugier, who was an officer in a Guard regiment, gave a radically different version of this episode. He wrote, in fact, that Eugene hastily recalled the Guard, which was preparing to assault the redoubt, to face the advancing Russian cavalry:

"As soon as they were in front of the enemy cavalry, the Italian Guard regiments advanced in echeloned squares to attack it. The enemy had almost reached the Italian battery, forcing it to stop firing, and severely battered Delzons' regiments, when the Italian Guard squares dashed forward fixed bayonets. Ouvarov and Platov tried to advance but some lively volleys forced them to withdraw at full speed. Ornano's cavalry, having therefore time to reform behind the Guard squares, advanced to avenge their earlier setback. Supported by the Dragoons and the Garde d'Honneur, they attacked the disordered Russians who crossed back over the Kolocza." [24]

So, according to De Laugier, not only did the Italian Guard take part in the action against Ouvarov's cavalry, but it also played a decisive role in repulsing the Russian attack. Did De Laugier assist at another battle? Of course not. But, then, how can his point of view be reconciled with the diverging report of General Lechi, De Laugier's commander?

My assumption is that Lechi's report is not false. A commander omitting to mention a successful action performed by his men is an unlikely event. A first temptation, then, would be turning again to the dissatisfaction of Italian troops with their role in the campaign and offering it as an explanation of De Laugier's exaggerated if not plainly false statements.

But there is another solution that allows us to give some credit to De Laugier's version without renouncing the substantial truth of Lechi's official report. After all, the Ital I an Guard had been left in reserve and one of the typical reserve functions was facing any sudden and unforeseen threat. It would not therefore have been surprising had the Royal Guard been employed in support of the Corps left wing threatened by the Russian cavalry masses debouching from the woods in their flank. Let us suppose that. this was the case. Ordered forward to cover the battered light cavalry as well as Delzons' infantry squares which were slowly retreating under the Russian pressure, the Italian Guard regiments met Ouvarov's cavalry. The Russian horsemen were blown from the long outflanking movement and the former charges. Against the calm and imposing look of elite units formed in echeloned squares the tired Russian squadrons wavered and found it safer not to charge. Neither a clash occurred, nor a bullet was shot by the Guard. The two parties stood at distance for a while and this gave the Corps cavalry time to reform under the cover of the Italian and French squares and successfully counterattack with the help of the forthcoming units of Grouchy's III Cavalry Reserve Corps.

The above is, of course, fiction. But it is also the only way to partially reconcile Lechi's and De Laugier's reports, without seriously contradicting the standard reconstruction of these events (e.g. my hypothetical reconstruction would fit Nafziger's version, with the Italian Guard squares deployed beside, or in place of, Delzons').

The case, however, still remains undecided and I am looking forward to hearing EEL readership's opinion and evidence about the following question: did the the Italian Guard infantry actively fight at Borodino? Any takers?

More Neither Caesar Nor Punchinello Army of Italy in Russia 1812 Part I

Part II: Behaviour of Italian Troops in Battle: October-November 1812

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