Neither Caesar Nor Punchinello

The Army of the Kingdom of Italy
in the 1812 Campaign in Russia
Part I

Italian Strategic Role in the Campaign

by Marco Gioannini
Edited by Marc Raiff

Being incorporated in Eugene's IV Corps, throughout the Russian campaign the Italian contingent acted (with only one notable exception) at the strategical level in accordance with the instructions received by its parent grand-tactical unit. Four different phases can be singled out in the strategical assignments of the IV Corps.

Bivouac of Italian wagons during the advance of the IV Corps. Illustration by Albrecht Adam.

In the first phase, from the crossing of the Niemen River at the beginning of July to July 24th, when it reached the left bank of the Dvina River, the IV Corps acted independently from the rest of the Grande Armee. As the main body under Napoleon, with Murat's cavalry as advance guard, pursued Barclay de Tolly beyond Vilna, Eugene's Corps marched off via Smorgoni-Vileike-Bochenkovitsky serving as a link between the Emperor on its left and Davout on its right. The latter had had orders to prevent Bagration from joining Barclay. A first attempt at trapping Bagration early in July had failed as Eugene had been slowed down by the thunderstorm on the Niemen River. As the advance resumed, the IV Corps trudged across marshy and deserted lands for many days without ever coming in sight of the retreating enemy.

From July 24th to the occupation of Moscow on September 15th, the IV Corps was attached to Napoleon's main body. It therefore took part in several unsuccessful attempts to force Barclay to fight a decisive battle. At Ostrovno Delzons' and Broussier's divisions valiantly supported Murat against Ostermann's delaying action. With the exception of the light cavalry brigade and some artillery, the Italians were probably not engaged in this fighting.

In the first week of August, Napoleon's depleted army rested in the surroundings of Vitebsk. The Italians encamped near the small town of Souraj with orders of scouting north and eastward. Performing their duty, the Italian cavalry had some skirmishes with the Cossacks and the chance to capture two Russian supply trains.

Later in the month Eugene's Corps played an active role in the so-called 'maneuver of Smolensk'. However, being ordered to take position on the heights of Korytnia several miles west of Smolensk, it did not partake in the battle for the town.

After this battle, while part of the IV Corps remained with Napoleon and kept on pursuing the Russians, Pino's division was detached back to Inkovo and Vitebsk to prevent raids through the lines of communication. This mission, the first and the last performed by Italian troops independently from the IV Corps throughout the campaign, began on August 21st. Although not leading to any serious engagement with the enemy, it took much more time than Napoleon had expected so that Pino's division, despite a forced march, was unable to rejoin the Grande Armee for the great battle of September 7th. Pino's division played however a positive role by placing his division between General Wintzingerode's column and Kutozov's main army.

At Borodino, the IV Corps formed the left wing. While Delzons' and Broussier's divisions suffered severe losses in the fighting for the village of Borodino as well as in the attacks against the Raevski redoubt, the Italian Guard stood still in reserve under the Russian artillery fire. The Italian artillery was in the grandbattery placed in front of the redoubt and the light cavalry covered the open flank, being consequently heavily engaged by Platov's and Ouvarov's cavalry as they tried to outflank the French left (see section III).

After Borodino, Eugene was ordered to cover the left flank of the Grande Armee on the way to Moscow. On September 15th, the Viceroy encamped with the Guard in the Russian capital, while Pino quartered in the surrounding area.

During Napoleon's southward movement to Kaluga from the 19th to the 24th of October the IV Corps, still relatively fit and in good order, acted as advance guard (third phase). Eugene's assignment was to quickly advance on the new road to Kaluga (via Borovsk-Malo Jaroslavets) and so baffling the Russians who were in position across the old road to Kaluga near Taroutino. As known, Napoleon's plan led to a tactical success at Malo-Jaroslavets (see section III) but also resulted in a strategical disaster as, just after the battle, the Emperor decided to face about and return to the old road to Smolensk, which he had followed when marching on Moscow. The distinguished behavior of the IV Corps at Malo-Jaroslavets was obviously not responsible for this choice.

From Malo-Jaroslavets to the crossing of the Berezina on November 28th (fourth phase) the IV Corps had the task to provide direct support to the rearguard. By marching just a few miles ahead of Davout's and, successively, Ney's Corps, Eugene kept a link between the retreating columns and prevented Cossack swarms or Russian regulars (Miloradovich's advance guard) from slipping into the gap or along the flanks.The engagements at Viazma and Krasnoe, rather similar in their patterns, were caused by Eugene's successful attempts to meet these orders.

During the march from Viazma to Smolensk, Napoleon entrusted an important strategical mission to Eugene's Corps: on November 7th it abandoned the Smolensk road and moved northwest toward Doukhowchtchina on the road to Vitebsk. From there it would be in a good position to threaten the rear of Wittgenstein's army, consequently abating the pressure on Oudinot and Victor. Unfortunately the mission aborted almost immediately: the crossing of the icy Vop River proved too much for the tired Italians and caused many losses of men and horses. The remaining guns were left behind. In the meanwhile, notice had come that Wittgenstein had seized Vitebsk. On November 10th the Emperor recalled Eugene back to Smolensk to rejoin what was left of the Grande Armee.

The IV Corps arrived at the Berezina in such bad condition that it was unable to play any active role in the following engagement.

More Neither Caesar Nor Punchinello Army of Italy in Russia 1812 Part I

Part II: Behaviour of Italian Troops in Battle: October-November 1812

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