The battle of Kohn illustrates very well the difficulties inherent in the oblique order. The required formations and movements could never take place in presence of an enemy that could maneuver. In addition, the wheel into line had to be made at considerable distance from the enemy and a long, slow advance in line under fire was required. At Prague, the general Prussian advance was carried out without fire by the Prussian infantry and led to the massacre of several of Frederick's regiments by the Austrian artillery. [4] After that bloodbath, Frederick was quick to revise his ideas and the Prussian army returned to the tactics of firepower. Thus the tactical feasibility of such an advance against a powerful artillery was questionable. At Torgau, (November 3, 1760) the Austrian artillery concentration made by the very able Marshal Dann led to the virtual destruction of 10 battalions of Frederick's grenadiers. A close analysis of the Seven Year War battles shows that after 1757, the oblique order became more and more difficult to use against an adversary that had figured out Frederick's system of attack. As mentioned in On War, [6] the oblique order had outlived its usefulness by the Napoleonic period and the clinging to such an obsolete system by the Prussian high command could only lead to disaster. As a matter of fact, the tactical system followed by Frederick had many disadvantages. Among these were the slight depth of his line of battle, the want of reserves, the want of skirmishers, and the impossibility of properly commanding troops when spread out in such long lines and columns. General officers in command had their troops scattered over a long front, which they could neither overlook nor direct (hence the botching of Frederick's battle plan at Kolin). However, the admirable drill, steadiness, and maneuvering powers of the Prussian Army gave it, when opposed to troops who were not possessed of those qualities, such a preeminence, that Frederick's successes were due to these qualities rather than his tactics. It should be noted that, if the Prussians had developed by the Seven Years War a very efficient machine, man for man superior to anything that could be thrown against it, this very accomplishment placed them in an evolutionary dead-end street. The reason for this had nothing to do with the Prussian tactics; these remained dominant until the demise of smoothbore weapons, but were caused by strict adherence to linear grand tactics demanded by Frederick and the Prussian social system. ENDNOTES [1] Brent Nosworthy is the author of the very successful The Anatomy of Victory, Battle Tactics 1689-1763, Hippocrene Books, New York, 1990, now available in paper back edition for $16.95. The Anatomy of Victory was reviewed in EEL 109 (Vol. 1) and is highly recommended. [2] The statistics for the Battle of Torgau taken from Duffy's The Army of Frederick are: (a) Prussians: For 35,000 infantry, 13,500 cavalry and 309 guns, the losses were 16,670. (b) Austrians: For 42,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry and 275 guns, the losses were 15,697 (including more than 7,000 prisoners) and 49 guns. If Torgau was a Prussian victory, the Prussian casualties were very high. Daun had concentrated his artillery which virtually destroyed 10 Prussian grenadier battalions. Jany's estimate of 16,670 casualties for the Prussians could be low if compared with Bleckwenn's figure of 24,700 (quoted by Duffy). After the battle Frederick, perfectly aware of the appalling cost of the battle, asked Berenhorst (the royal adjutant) to come up with an accurate computation. It was said that Berenhorst's assessment exceeded 20,000. When the figures were presented to Frederick, the latter sharply told Berenhorst:"...It will cost you your head, if these figures ever get out!". Even if Jany's figure of 16,670 is compared with the Austrian losses of 15,697 (less 7000 prisoners) or about 9000 killed and wounded, the Prussian losses (killed and wounded) are staggering! [3] The battle statistics for the battles of Prague and Leuthen are: (1) Prague: (a) Prussians: 65,000 and 214 guns. Losses 14,300.(b) Austrians: 62,000 and 177 guns. Losses 13,400 (including over 4,500 prisoners) and 60 guns. (2) Leuthen: (a) Prussians: 33,000, 167 guns. Losses 11,589. (b) Austrians: 65,000, 210 guns. Losses 22,000 (including 12,000 prisoners) and 131 guns. ref. Duffy's Frederick, the Military Life, p. 153. [4] In 1806, the Prussian oblique order could not be successfully used against the highly maneuverable French infantry. [5] At Prague, Frederick had decided to try attacking without firing a shot. In his memoirs, General von Warnery puts the responsibility for the bloodbath squarely upon Frederick's novel methods. Source: Duffy, The Army of Frederick the Great. [6] See On War. BIBLIOGRAPHY: Home, Robert, A Precis of Modern Tactics , London, 1882. Duffy, Christopher, The Army of Frederick the Great, Hippocrene Books, New York, 1974. Duffy, Christopher, Frederick the Great, A Military Life, Routledge, New York, 1988. Dupuy R.E. and T.N. The Encyclopedia of Military History from 3500 B. C. to the Present, 2nd Edition, Harper and Row, New York, 1986. Clausewitz, Carl von, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton University Press, 1976. Nosworthy, Brent, The Anatomy of Victory, Battle Tactics 1689-1763 , Hippocrene Books, New York, 1990. Frederick's "Oblique Order" Introduction Prussian Tactics 1757 and the Oblique Order Battle of Prague: May 6, 1757 Battle of Leuthen: December 5, 1757 Battle of Kolin: June 14, 1757 Conclusions, Notes, and Bibliography Back to Empire, Eagles, & Lions Table of Contents Vol. 2 No. 4 Back to EEL List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1994 by Emperor's Headquarters This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com