NOTE FROM EDITOR: The following article was triggered by the article Column versus Line: Griffith ws. Bowden, authored by Charles Steenrod and published in EE&L 8. Mr. Cook is a long time reader and contributor. He is also a former member of the British army.
I don't find that a particularly useful starting point at all. You will find advocates of ordre mince and ordre profond on both sides of the Atlantic. [1]
Be all that as it may, I see the prospect of a useful debate in the making here, despite that fact that it was pretty much exhausted in the 'old' EE&L many years ago. May I start with the Charlie's preamble?
The prospect that the British Army had an "innate" tactical advantage is not likely I think, there being nothing natural or inborn about soldiering. As far as Wellington is concerned, it is also important to bear in mind that his armies were, more often than not, not exclusively British. The British soldier accounted, for example, for only approximately 30% of the Anglo-Allied army in 1815, the others being German, including the KGL, and Dutch-Belgians. Presumably they had something to do with it as well. The German and Portuguese elements in the Peninsular Army also had a vitally important part to play in those battles. It is a great mistake to overlook this. So, if there was a thin-line of any hue, it was as much a dark blue, and other colours, as a red one.
Lucky?
The proposition that the Anglo-Allied Army in 1815 was simply lucky is just not credible. As far as the British army is concerned specifically, it was unlucky enough to be involved in some of the most appalling debacles the period has to offer and be commanded from time to time by some of the most inept generals it is hard to imagine. It also was simply not a serious issue in Continental warfare until 1808 at the earliest.
Was Wellington lucky then? Doubtless he was sometimes. Luck, however, is not a commodity anyone has a monopoly on, nor is it one that can be depended upon for consistency. If the proposition is that Wellington was successful, which he was whether one likes it or not, and clearly some people do not, only because he had good luck, or because he had more than his share of it, then this is equally ludicrous. It also means that Wellington must also have been lucky in India and elsewhere, as well as in Iberia and Belgium. I don't think so.
The French armies in Spain were second rate were they? Units specially chosen for their mediocrity I suppose with, presumably, hand-picked unlucky, second rate commanders, such as Massena, Soult, Marmont and all the others. Oh really! Consistent bad luck is about as likely as consistent good luck. Not a serious proposition either I hope.
Numbers
As far as numbers are concerned, the observations in the context of most of the Central and Eastern European battles are obvious. It is a statistical matter of fact that they were usually fought with larger numbers. So what? The point eludes me. I am not sure what is meant by a "higher level of intensity". More bloody perhaps? I imagine that soldiers who fought in Iberia found the experience intense enough and I doubt that it was any less bloody in relative terms.
As for Waterloo, it is also a matter of historical fact that Wellington was indeed dependent upon the Prussians. It has become fashionable, it seems to me, to present this as a positive fault. Rarely is it pointed out that the Prussians were equally dependent upon the Anglo-Allied army, [2] although it is certainly true that the support Wellington received from Blucher was rather more fulsome than that which he received from Wellington. I digress, my point is that neither were capable of taking on Napoleon by themselves. This is hardly a revelation either I think.
Much of this, it seems, is being laid at the door of Scott Bowden. Is this entirely fair or accurate I wonder? Having pulled out Scott Bowden's book on Waterloo I find no such sentiments expressed in the section dealing with the Anglo-Allied army, or anywhere else in its pages for that matter. Narrow though the scope of the volume is, it not being a campaign history and concentrating principally on the armies, it is probably amongst the half-dozen worthwhile books written about the subject from any perspective during this half of the 20th Century.
I am not going to name my personal choices and I agree that there is an awful lot of shallow and repetitive material on the subject, some of which is more useful as a door stop or draught excluder. Unfortunately the one mentioned in the Osprey Campaign Series, is not large enough to be useful as anything. I have to say, however, that my 2 year old Boxer bitch liked it, but then she is not particularly discriminating and tends to eat anything!
I've not read Wellington Commander so I can't comment. As for the secret of the British soldiers' success, frankly I have my doubts. They weren't always successful by any means. I suspect they just did as they were told as generations of soldiers have before and since. On the other hand, maybe Maude has a point,
"It is now clearly established that in all essentials the training and tactical methods of the old pre-Jena period - i.e., from 1800-1806 - was identical in spirit with those in use in the British Army at the same date and for many subsequent years, and our ample experience in the Peninsula, at Waterloo, and in India, is there as sufficient justification both for ourselves and the Prussians". [3]
He is, of course, speaking in terms of principles, rather than specifics, and in the context of Prussia and the 1806 campaign.
Controversy
I seem to have arrived at Cdt Colin. What did he say that is so controversial?
"When in touch with the enemy, skirmishers, acting also as scouts, were thrown forward with order to engage him, inflicting as much loss as possible before the battalions came up into line. These, when they reached the extreme range of the enemy's gun, opened to deploying intervals and then formed line; the skirmishers fell back on the wings of their respective battalions or regiments and the musketry fight began." [4]
This, I should say is also in the context of the 1806 campaign, and the French army specifically, when, it is generally agreed, it was at the peak of its professional competence, nevertheless, it is the essence of what he has to say on the subject of columnar tactics generally. It is also the counsel of perfection but, on the other hand, it is obvious from perusal of the various regulations, and I have copies of most (I don't have the Austrian Generals Reglement of 1769 or any Russian ones), that the column, of whatever kind, was intended as an instrument of movement and manoeuvre, not of combat. From comparison it is also evident that the French RŠglement 1791 was not nearly the revolutionary documented described by many modern commentators, including Colin. The difference lay, not in the regulations themselves, but in the tactical doctrine. If the regulations were the tool, tactics were the application of that tool.
If one accepts that tactics are, crudely stated,
"the opinion of the senior officer present" [5]
then it is also possible to accept both Maude's point and Paddy Griffith's premise that attacks could also be made "in column if they thought they could get away with it". The point to be made here is, why deploy if you don't need to? The answer is clearly, you don't. I have no problem with that. What seems to exists is a modern dogmatic interpretation of Colin, which goes something like " because he says it was done like this, it was done like this in every case". Not a chance, I would say.
In any event, I seem to remember that Paddy Griffith tended towards Bressonet's view, which if memory continues to serve me correctly, differed from Colin's in that columns were more instrumental in servicing the skirmish line. Whether that is an entirely correct generalisation or not, Bressonet was French, was he not? So much for Paddy Griffith's 'British' view.
That columns were supposed to deploy, if they needed to, cannot be in dispute. The logic is inescapable. If infantry were intended purely as an instrument of shock, please explain why every country went to the trouble of arming it with muskets? Why did the later regulations of the period (Austrian 1807 and Prussian 1812) retain comprehensive evolutions for deploying into line from the formed column if musketry was not an issue? Furthermore the column of divisions on the centre, exemplified by the French colonne d'attaque, has only one advantage over any other formed on such a frontage, speed of deployment by means of a flank march to both flanks at the same time. What was its purpose if not to develop musketry when needed?
I see no real conflict here with either Scott Bowden or Paddy Griffith.
The two 'schools', if such exist, seem to be between Colin and Oman, the latter heavily influencing generations of British historians and other authors. Having had a brief look at the former's view, it seem only fair to examine the latter's also. In his analysis of British and French doctrine in the Peninsula, he begins thus,
"Every student who takes a serious interest in military history is aware that, in a general way, the victories of Wellington over his French adversaries were due to a skilful use of the two-deep British line against the massive column, which had become the regular formation for a French army acting on the offensive, during the later years of the great war that raged from 1792 till 1814." [6]
The use of the term "massive column" is unfortunate because we know it is not correct, it is also not entirely what Oman went on to describe but, nevertheless, it became the accepted description, evidenced, apparently, by aberrations such as d'Erlon's unique formation at Waterloo.
It is also unfortunate that Oman used Maida, a 'battle' hardly larger in terms of numbers than some big re-enactments, in order to illustrate the alleged superiority of line over column. It has long been accepted that this was flawed, both sides being deployed, indeed I have a note to the effect that Oman later corrected his error in correspondence with Fortescue, although, infuriatingly I have no record of the reference and can find no mention of it in any of either Oman's or Fortescue's works. [7]
Oman's analysis of musketry has also been somewhat discredited in recent years although my own view is that the modern tendency to discount it entirely cannot be right either.
Putting these controversies aside, what did Oman say in detail about French columns? Did he maintain that they were always massive, monstrous or some such other extreme description? Well, actually no. He certainly makes reference to Macdonald's and d'Erlon's formations, at Wagram and Waterloo respectively, in such a way as to make it possible to infer that they were the rule, rather than the exception, and it is true that he considered the divisional column a clumsy formation, and moreover, one intended for shock. It's an opinion. On the other hand he also says of divisional columns,
"But secondly that they sometimes did attempt to deploy, but always too late, since they waited till they had driven in the British skirmishing line, and tried to assume the thinner formation when they were already under fire and heavily engaged. I have come on several narratives dealing with attempts to deploy on the part of a French brigade or regiment which had forced its way to the front, and on every occasion it only lead to confusion." [8]
He also gives a contemporary British quote on the same page to substantiate this.
Later on, after having, again, criticised d'Erlon, we have this,
"Normally, however, columns of divisions (double-companies) were the French order, i.e. a battalion of 900 men in six companies had a front of one hundred muskets, and 200 men in all able to fire, while 700 were in the rear ranks, able to be shot but not to shoot". [9]
There is not much, if anything, that one can dispute in either of these two statements. It is also evidence that Oman was not so inflexible in his thought as sometimes depicted by his critics. In the context of French columns, is there really serious conflict between Colin's interpretation of what was supposed to happen generally, and Oman's interpretation of what actually did happen in the Peninsula specifically? I don't think that there is.
What is at issue is why the Franco-British experience was different, and how. It seems to me that it was unique. Oman's view is that the following factors were critical,
"The chief of these were:
(1) that the line must not be exposed before the moment of actual conflict; (2) that till that moment it must be covered by a screen of skirmishers impenetrable to the enemy's tirailleurs;
(3) that it must be properly covered on its flanks, either by the nature of the ground or by cavalry and artillery." [10]
That seems reasonable enough to me.
Here we have it then. Wait a moment, apparently not. Musketry has been discounted, the volley and local counter attack are in serious question, now Wellington's tactical methods are, apparently, flawed. [11] We seem to be back to French errors and Wellington's luck again. Not likely I think.
Let's take some other qualified opinion. Elsewhere we find the following of Waterloo,
"The English (sic) tactics deserved, and have always received, the high commendation of historians." [12]
and,
"That the tactics employed by the French at the battle of Waterloo in their operations against the army of the Duke of Wellington were unworthy of the experience and reputation of their commanders is almost universally admitted." [13]
of Wellington in particular,
"Though esteemed a cautious officer, he had shown over and over that he possessed not only courage and firmness, but that in daring, and in coolly taking great risks he was equal to any emergency. His hold on his army, that is on his own troops, was perfect". [14]
Well now, was this written by a Wellington worshipper, a Francophobe perhaps? Not at all. It was written by an American in 1892, moreover one whose account, according to Scott Bowden, is one of the two best in the English language, the other being Becke's published in 1914. I agree that it is a wholly balanced, impartial, highly detailed and comprehensive analysis.
Lets have another view point though,
"There is no better example of his expertise in defensive tactics than Waterloo. At this battle, Wellington conspicuously deployed his troops in an extremely dense order after he masterfully placed the bulk of the army on a gentle, reverse slope with numerous hamlets and farms acting as 'breakwaters' against the enemy advance. In light of the Allied victory at Waterloo, the effect of Wellington's reverse slope tactics - in conjunction with the dense deployment of the Anglo-Allied troops - cannot be minimized." [15]
Who Wrote it?
I wonder who wrote it? Sounds as if it could be Paddy Griffith. It certainly seems to be representative of the "British' school. Well, there's a thing, none other than Scott Bowden. So much for the Griffith (British) vs. Bowden (American) schools.
A French view perhaps? What does Cdt Colin think of Wellington's dispositions at Waterloo? He is, after all, responsible for all this controversy in the first place!
"The manner in which this position was occupied deserves the closest attention. It was quite different from all that European generals had done for a whole century. Wellington disposed the elements of his army so as to make the very most of their fire, and for this purpose often went into the greatest detail. The troops employed at each point were exactly apportioned according to the effect to be produced - so as to protect them from enfilade and to obtain cross fire wherever possible.
The batteries were posted just sufficiently forward in the first line to be able to see, but were concealed as much as possible; the guns were mounted behind slopes and hedges and embrasures made. The infantry was stationed some distance behind the crest, sheltered from the French fire, and was not to come up to the hollow road until required. A continuous chain of skirmishers was posted some 200 or 300 yards in advance; that is to say, at about the foot of the slopes.
The most interesting point of this organisation was the occupation of various localities situated less than a cannon shot in front of the line." [16]
This seems to encapsulate Oman's three factors and, so, we have Frenchman, Englishman and American, in perfect agreement.
Scenarios
Where column meets line there appear to me to be three likely scenarios.
As for the prospect that the first was the only possible option. Well, I tend towards the, 'they are round and they bounce' school, if you get my drift.
By all means let us conduct a micro-examination of what really happened, but I fear that we are in danger of starting a controversy that doesn't really exist. I also detect the faintest hope in some quarters that if one digs deep enough it will be possible to prove that Napoleon actually won after all.
As for Wellington's, or, indeed, Napoleon's mistakes, surely it is much more revealing to examining what was done right.
"He who has made no mistakes in war, has seldom made war. [17]
Oman is in error when he says that the French narratives do not show the French deployed. Reynier's report says so very clearly. Oman's correspondence with Fortescue on the matter is extensive. However, in 1929, in Studies in the Napoleonic Wars, Oman, for unknown reasons, once more represented the French at Maida in columns. An error that has been perpetued since by many English historians.
Colonel Elting in Swords Around the Throne, p. 531: "English-language description of Napoleoinc tactics have long been confounded by the seemingly authoritative works of Sir Charles Oman. A military historian of considerable stature, Oman had no personal knowledge of things military; somehow he developed the theory that the French practically always attacked in heavy columns. Because of his reputation, his error was widely picked up by British and American writers and is only now being squelched."
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Footnotes:
[1] Steenrod, Charlie. Column vs. Line, Griffith vs. Bowden. EE&L No8. p.11.
[2] Bowden, Scott. Armies at Waterloo. Arlington, Texas. 1983. pp.203-227.
[3] Maude, F.N. Col. The Jena Campaign 1806. London, 1909. p.20.
[4] Colin, J. Cdtl, The Great Battles of History. London, 1915. p.78.
[5] Soldier's saying. Anon.
[6] Oman, Sir Charles. Studies in the Napoleonic Wars. London, 1929. p.82.
[7] Note from Editor: In Wellington's Army, first published in 1912, Oman described the French at Maida in columns. Then, later on. Oman found that at Maida, the French were in line. In his book Wellington's Army, Oman wrote the following: "Till lately I had supposed that Reynier had a least his left wing, or striking echelon, in columns of battalions, but evidence put before me seems to prove that, despite the fact that the French narratives do not show it, the majority at least of Reynier's men were deployed. This is borne by Bunbury's narrative, p.244, where it is definely stated, as well as by Boothby's, p. 78."
[8] Ibid. p.103.
[9] Ibid. pp.105-106.
[10] Ibid. p.99.
[11] Steenrod. op.cit. p.15.
[12] Ropes, John Codman. The Campaign of Waterloo. New York, 1916. p.331.
[13] Ibid. p.329.
[14] Ibid. p.41.
[15] Bowden. op. cit. p.206.
[16] Colin. op. cit. p.129.
[17] Attributed to Turenne.
I: Attack of Middle Guard (Houssaye, 1815)
II: Attack of Middle Guard (Petit, 1815)
Number of Middle Guard Battalions
View of Middle Guard Attack
View of Middle Guard Illustration (Large: slow: 135K)
View of Middle Guard Illustration (Jumbo: monster: 1,133K)
What Really Happened at Waterloo?
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