On the Attack Formation
of the Middle Guard
at Waterloo

(Petit, 1815)

edited by Jean A. Lochet

II. General Petit's Report: The Introduction

The report starts with the following introduction by G.C. Moore Smith, (the person who transcribed the manuscript, no date available, JAL) which reflects our point of view, which is that General Petit's report deserves our attention, especially in the light of what is published on squares in the present issue. In addition it answer the basic question of who was General Petit.

General Petit's Account of the Waterloo Campaign

"The manuscript preserved in the Morrison collection, London, is now published by the kind permission of Mrs. Alfred Morrison. It is especially important as containing a first hand account by a most competent witness of the formation of Napoleon's last column of attack at Waterloo, an account demanding consideration in any attempt to reconcile the different versions of the close of the battle. M. Henry Houssaye, of the French Academy, had access to the document, and has largely based upon it his narrative of the battle, as will be seen from his notes in 1815, Waterloo. He has not however printed it, and the readers are often in uncertainty how much is inference on the part of Mr. Houssaye. It will, therefore, be convenient to students to have the original document in print.

Jean Martin Petit was born at Paris in 1772, and died on 8 June 1856. On June 1813 he was appointed general de brigade in the imperial guard, and created a baron, and on the 26 Feb. 1814 commander of the Legion of Honor. It was he who at the time of Napoleon's first abdication received the farewell kiss in the court of the palace of Fontainebleau. Petit swore allegiance to Louis XVIII, but on Napoleon's return from Elba rejoined his standard. As a lieutenant-general he commanded at Waterloo the 1st Regiment of Grenadiers a pied of the guard, the last troops which stood ground in the action.

His rank was not recognised by the restored house of Bourbon, but was confirmed to him on 27 Feb. 1831 by Louis-Philippe, who nominated him a peer of France and commandant of the Invalides (7 Oct. 1840). In 1848, Petit, then in the reserve, placed himself at the head of the Society of the 10th of December, whose object was the restoration of the Empire. He was created a senator on 27 March 1852, and retained under the order of Jerome Bonaparte the command of the Invalides, where he is now buried.

Petit's manuscript contains marginal additions in the same hand, which appear to have been made when the MS. was read over by the writer. I have generally incorporated these in the text where they do not interrupt the narrative. In places the manuscript is difficult to read, if not actually illegible, in other places a gap is left for a name. The account of the constitution of the Old Guard which I have printed first, is written at the other end of the of sheets to the rest, and the date to which it refers is not stated.

We can not be sure, therefore, if the numbers assigned to the regiments are those of the beginning of the campaign or on the morning of Waterloo. [7] The document appears to me to have been used by the authors of the Victoires, Conquetes, Desastres, etc. des Fran‡ais as some phrases of the latter book are identical with Petit's. (Some of those produced from the Victoires, etc. by Siborne in his account of the Battle of Waterloo.) It seems probable, therefore, that the document was actually written for the use of the compilers of Victoires, etc. In any case, the date is almost certainly no later than 1820, as the 2nd volume of the Victoires, etc. dealing with Waterloo, appeared in 1821."

III. Pertinent excerpts from General Petit's Report

(1) Organization of the Guard infantry during the Campaign of Waterloo

"The infantry of the Guard was formed during the Campaign of 1815 in two Divisions, each of 3 regiments and reserve composed of the 2 senior regiments that of the Grenadiers and that of the Chasseurs. Each of these two regiments formed the reserve of the Division composed of the same arm. The Chasseurs formed one Division, the Grenadiers the other. The two Divisions were under the command of Generals Roguet and Michel.

Lieutenant-General Count Friant commanded both as well as the infantry of the Young Guard, and had under his orders the Old Guard Lieutenant-General Count Morand.

It was the practice in the Old Guard to march always with the left in front [8]; thus the Chasseurs always marched in front of the Grenadiers and the rear regiments contained the Grenadiers. Similarly, the four regiments of Chasseurs marched with the 4th Chasseurs leading, followed by the 3rd, then the 2nd. It was the same with the Grenadiers. Sometimes the two arms9 were mixed but in this cases the 1st Regiment of Chasseurs followed by the 1st Regiment of Grenadiers were nevertheless at the rear...."

We have not reprinted the part of General Petit's report dealing with the Guard at Charleroi and Ligny.

(2) The Guard on the 17th: March toward Waterloo

"At 6AM on the 17th, the Guard was entirely re-united in front of Ligny. The infantry was set in motion, regaining the highway to Brussels at Quatre-Bras, passing through Genappe, and spent the night at.... (blank in the report) where the head of the column did not arrive until 11PM.

The column had left the main road to take a cross-road a little before the close of the day, in order to avoid the congestion caused by the cavalry and artillery. They were assailed during the night by a terrible storm. The roads were in such a state of degradation that it was impossible to retain any form of order on the march. The men in trying to find easier paths, and marching across fields got in large part out of order. It was not until the day of the 18th that they rejoined their colors. The weather at that time became a little nicer. The troops employed the morning cleaning their weapons, which were in poor state because of the heavy rain."

(3) Initial Deployment and Attack of Plancenoit

"At 10AM, the Guard was again in motion marching always parallel to the main road..... General Friant had formed columns of a regimental front, first on the left of the road, then on the right having in front of them a screen which masked them from the enemy. He remained thus until 4PM.

The enemy meanwhile had made progress on our right (this is the Prussians), which was badly outflanked. The Young Guard, which had been dispatched there at 2PM, had been forced to retreat behind the village of Plancenoit and the 2nd regiment of Chasseurs and the 2nd regiment of Grenadiers each sent a battalion (1st battalion by later remarks, JAL) to the village. The enemy were soon repulsed with great loss. They were pursued with the bayonet up to the plateau. The Chasseurs and the Grenadiers marched right up to the Prussian batteries which were abandoned for a moment. This maneuver took place towards 6PM."

Then the report becomes very interesting:

"After this maneuver, the 1st regiment of Grenadiers formed up in two squares, one per battalion. One was placed on the right of the road facing the enemy on the summit of the position dominating the small road leading from Plancenoit to join the main road. It threw out its tirailleurs on the extreme right of the village (i.e. to the south as seen from this position, JAL) to observe the enemy, whom they found there in force. Several were taken with an adjutant-major who was to become heavily engaged.

The other square was placed on the left of the road on the rounded hillock which from the start held the Emperor. It was joined by a battery of six 8-pdr (6-pdr) and by the company sappers and sailors of the Guard."

It is quite obvious that the French right flank was quite fragile and that the possibility of a Prussian cavalry attack was taken seriously enough: (1) to form the two battalions of the 1st Grenadiers in squares, (2) to support these squares with a foot battery and (3) to place the Emperor inside the second square.

It is obvious that the Prussian menace on the French right flank was taken seriously. The time was after 8PM. How much that menace influenced the formation of the other Guard battalions in squares?

(4) The Deployment of the Middle Guard Toward the British Line

"It was approaching 7PM, the troops of the Guard having suffered horribly, when the 3rd and 4th Chasseurs and the 3rd and 4th Grenadiers were ordered to march. They passed along the left of the road where they were formed in squares by battalions with the exception of the two of the 4th regiments which in view of their small effective strength formed one square each. They were formed and placed thus: the 1st battalion of the 3rd Grenadiers with its right resting on the main road. The 2nd battalion was immediately detached at less than full artillery range to the left to watch and check a movement which the enemy was making on that point. The Emperor placed himself with this battalion, which formed his guard."

Apparently, the Prussian menace was increasing to the point that Napoleon detached the 2nd battalion of the 3rd Grenadiers to watch his left and counter an enemy movement.

(5) The attack of the Middle Guard

"A little in rear and echeloned to the left of the 1st battalion of the 3rd regiment, were formed successively the 4th regiment of Grenadiers and Chasseurs: they were, as has been said, in squares, but all drawn up close to one another. It was in this formation that the whole moved forward, the first battalion of the 3rd regiment of Grenadiers thus, as has been said, its right against the road marching parallel to its route, the other units following the movements in good order, keeping their distances.

The troops advanced in this way at the pas de charge until they had passed beyond La Haye Sainte, vigorously pushing back all of the enemy before them notwithstanding a great storm of artillery and musketry.

At this moment, General Friant, commander in chief of the movement, was grievously wounded, and General Michel, commander of the Chasseurs was killed. The death of the latter caused an excited movement among his troops. They stopped. But very soon, in response to General Poret, commander of the 3rd regiment of Grenadiers, the 1st battalion of that regiment regained its vigour, then resumed its advance, marching at the pas de charge with loud cries. Marshal Ney, dismounted, was on foot at the head of the battalion, sword in hand. The other battalions of Grenadiers and of Chasseurs, equally resumed their progress. Each one followed, all were of the best: the enemy was terrified: the first formidable enemy battery was stormed and in a moment in our possession.

New enemy columns, infantry and cavalry appeared. Entire ranks of ours were carried away by the most terrible fire of artillery (of the second line) and by musketry which crashed into our squares: there was soon disorder, we retreated.

Meanwhile, the two 2nd battalions of Grenadiers and Chasseurs of the 2nd regiments [10] had been brought up at the pas de charge, commanded by Generals Christiani and Pelet. [11] They were determined to regain the offensive, but the enemy continued their progress; there was disorder; it was necessary to retire.

During all these misfortune, the 2nd battalion of the 3rd regiment of Grenadiers, which was with the Emperor maintained its position in front of Plancenoit. General Cambronne arrived at the same position with the 2nd battalion of the lst regiment of Chasseurs [12] and held position there. General Roguet, second-colonel of the Grenadiers found himself there. The enemy effort on that point lacked nothing of their effort on the left. General Cambronne was wounded. Thrown from his horse, he was believed dead. A great number of officers and soldiers fell on the field of battle. We retired from it having no power to resist such a large number.

The Emperor retired at the gallop and placed himself in the square of the 1st regiment of Grenadiers. The whole army was in the most horrible disorder, infantry, cavalry, artillery all hurrying in all directions. Before long we had nothing remaining in order except the two squares formed by the two battalions of the regiment placed on the two positions on the right and left of the main road. By order of the Emperor, General Petit, their commander, had the Grenadiers play the recall to rally all the men of the Guard who were carried away by the torrent of fugitives. The enemy followed closely. To avoid him penetrating the squares, we were obliged to fire even into our men who were being pursued and who tried to take cover in our squares by thrown themselves in complete disorder. It was an evil to avoid a greater one.

Night was falling. The Emperor himself gave the order to retire from our positions, which were becoming untenable and which were evidently outflanked on right and left. The two squares retired in good order, the lst battalion across the fields, the 2nd by the main road. We made frequent halts to repair the faces of the squares and give time for the skirmishers and fugitives to rejoin us.

At a half-league from Genappe, the two squares came together on the main road, where they marched in columns by sections. In this way, during our march, we gathered all that we could of the other regiments of the Guard. The enemy followed this movement closely, without annoying us much. It was not until a panic had seized the soldiers of the artillery train, who cut the traces of their horses and overturned their guns and caissons, which blocked and encumbered the route, that the enemy attacked the left of the column with a lively fusillade."

We stop here the translation of General Petit's report on the Guard at Waterloo.

(6) Comments on General Petit's Report

General Petit's report is certainly a key document in the study of the attack of the Middle Guard at Waterloo. The report is very specific. He claims that the Middle Guard battalions attacked in squares.

In the past, some historians refuted Petit's report on the ground that many British eyewitness accounts, mostly from the Waterloo Letters, reported the French as being in columns. But some of these accounts clearly mention that they were not sure (see above reports) and that the visibility was very poor because of the heavy smoke, and others report the French in squares. Let us repeat here what Houssaye wrote on the matter in his narrative:

"To be truthful, according to Siborne, Cotton, Kennedy and several of the Waterloo letters, the Guard was formed in close columns. "I believe, says Lieutenant Sharpin (228) that they were in close columns". "I could not see exactly, says Colonel Gawler (292), the enemy's formation, the smoke was too thick; but I was told they were in columns". I would state further that in the English Relation of the Battle of Waterloo (Relation Anglaise de la Bataille de Waterloo), published in 1815, (p.32), it is said that the Guard attacked in squares."

Philip Haythornwaite in an article published in EE&L 74 (September 1983) The "Waterloo Letters" and the Imperial Guard, concluded:

"Such is the testimony of the "Waterloo Letters" recounted here neither support nor disapprove Houssaye (that the Guard attacked in squares, JAL) but merely to illustrate that "eye-witness" testimony rarely agree in the smaller details..."

In addition, Mr. Mill, a reader from Scotland, in a recent letter, says the following:

"On the fascating subject of the French Middle Guard attack at the crisis of the Battle of Waterloo which crops up periodically in this magazine, you may be interested in the following information.

In EE&L 7, page 59, note 6, it is stated by the editorial team that the only primary source evidence to support the theory that the Middle Guard advanced in hollow squares is that of the French General Petit.

However, there is another eyewitness account which strongly back up the hollow square theory. This is to be found in the book: Notes and Reminiscences of a Staff Officer by Lieut.-Colonel Basil Jackson, edited by R.C. Seaton and published in London in 1903.

On p.86 Jackson relates that, while crossing the battlefield for a last look on 20th June, he stopped close to the crest of the Allied ridge near Hougoumont and spoke to a French Guard wounded who, "as they lay, they formed large squares, of which the centres were 'hollow'".

This is very definite evidence and tends to prove that the Middle Guard did indeed attack in hollow squares. Further quibbling about "columns" is unnecessary.

The above quote is also to be found in the following books:

    The Life of Napoleon I by J.Holland Rose, published London, 1919 (one volume edition), p. 507, note 1.
    The Eagle's Last Triumph, Napoleon's Victory at Ligny, June 1815 by A. Uffindell, published by Greenhill Books, London, 1994, p. 217, note 10.

There is also a few other eyewitness accounts supporting the "square" theory, but Jackson's is the only one, as far as I am aware, to specify "hollow squares".

To the Point

Well, the above is to the point and backs up Petit's report and furthermore says very clearly that the Middle Guard was in hollow squares. Many people argue that these squares were some form of a column. The above quotation supports the hollow square theory. One point is sure. General Petit commanded the 1st Grenadiers at Waterloo and was a veteran of the Napoleonic wars. He should and would have known the difference between a square and a column. And that to us, is a key point.

A second point is significant. Back in 1978, etc., we lacked the evidence that we are presenting in this issue. That is: squares were used in the field as moving formations and even fast attack formations. That is, in our opinion, a key point that deserves careful examination. General Petit in his report is on point. He says:

"It was approaching 7PM, the troops of Guard having suffered horribly, when the 3rd and 4th Chasseurs and the 3rd and 4th Grenadiers were ordered to march. They passed along the road where they were formed in squares by battalion. (Emphasis mine, JAL)

In his report, General Petit noted that these Guard battalions had been in columns since 10AM (see above).

Formed in Squares

Our contention is that the Middle Guard was formed in squares during the attack on the Mont St. Jean plateau. Furthermore Petit's report and Lt. Colonel Basil Jackson's statement proves that these squares were hollow. No wonder that the late Commandant Lachouque [13] chose to represent the attacking Middle Guard at Waterloo in hollow squares in his book Waterloo.

Note that in our article More on Squares to be found elsewhere in this issue we estimated the size of a Guard square (with an effective strength of less than 500 men per battalion) to be approximately 37 yards by 37. In contrast, a close column of the same battalion would have been approximately 37 yards by 10 yards. That is not much of a difference on a battlefield obscured by heavy smoke.

As usual comments (positive or negative) from the readership would be appreciated.

Acknowledgment: A special thank you to our friend Tanya Flynn for scanning with her advanced technical gear most of the old EE&L texts which are now part of the above article and avoiding my tedious retyping of them.

Footnotes:

[1] Houssaye, like many other historians, is in error when he shows 8-pdrs as part of the French artillery at Waterloo. There simply were none. The French ordnance was limited to Year XI 6 and 12-pdrs and to 24-pdr and 6-inch howitzers.
[2] French text: "Les cinq bataillons de la moyenne garde, formes en autant de carres, s'avancerent par echelons, la droite en tete. Entre chaque echelon, les canonniers a cheval de la garde menaient deus pieces de 8, au total une batterie complete sous les ordres du colonel Duchand. Dans cette marche oblique, a peu pres analogue au movement "Vers la gauche, en avant en bataille", tous les echelons ne conserverent pas leur intervalle. Le quatrieme se raprocha du troisieme. Bientot les cinq echelons n'en formerent plus que quatre: a droite le 1er battalion du 3e grenadiers; au centre l'unique bataillon du 4e grenadiers; plus a gauche, les 1er et 2e bataillons du 3e chasseurs; a l'extreme gauche, le 4e chasseurs reduit a un seul bataillon."
[3] That threat was too real! Just a few hours earlier, d'Erlon's Corps had been repulsed and badly mauled by the famous charge of the Union Brigade.
[4] See elsewhere the number of the Guard battalions attacking.
[5] Houssaye supports his claim with the following: "On the action of the van der Smissen battery and the charge of the Dittmer brigade: letter from Chasse to Lord Hill, 5 and 11 July 1815, quoted in La Relation belge de la bataille de Waterloo, 9, 11, the prequoted Relation of the United Service Gazette and the letters from Colonel Taylor, Lieutenant Anderson, and Captain Mac-Ready (Waterloo Letters, 172, 330, 338). Anderson reports that a foreign corps was behind the left of Halkett, and Mac-Ready says that the Imperial Guard that attacked Halkett's infantry disappeared suddenly. The foreign corps was the Belgian brigade of Ditmer, and if the Guard suddenly disaapeared, it is because it had been repulsed by that brigade.

The British historians that would make believe that the British army won the battle all by itself do not mention the Belgian charge. They even try to establish a confusion between the 2nd brigade of Chasse (d'Aubreme), which although in the second line was ready to rout (Waterloo Letters, 104, 108, 110) and its first brigade (Ditmer) which repulsed the 3rd Grenadiers."
[6] EE&L will be glad to present any well documented account, different from that of Houssaye, showing that the Middle Guard was exclusively defeated by the Maitland's Guard and the 52nd.
[7] We know from different accounts that Petit's regiment numbers are the original numbers assigned at the beginning of the campaign.
[8] That is with the junior unit ahead. In other words, the junior units entered the battlefield first, hence keeping the senior Old Guard units in reserve. However, the Guard regiments were deployed by seniority. That is the most senior regiment (or battalion) on the right, etc. For instance at Waterloo, the Middle Guard was deployed by order of seniority, i.e. the 3rd Grenadier on the right, then the 4th Grenadiers, then the 3rd Chasseurs and finally the 4th Chasseurs at the extreme left.
[9] In all the French official accounts, the infantry of the Guard is always separated into two arms: the Grenadiers and the Chasseurs. The Grenadiers were senior to the Chasseurs.
[10] These were the 2 battalions that had been left as a reserve in front of Plancenoit. These 2 battalions were not part of the initial attack but were brought back latter at the pas de charge.
[11] Since Pelet was coming forward with the reserve, it would seem that he was not an 'eyewitness' in terms of being with the front liners. However, he was watching the attack develop, and the guy on the sidelines often sees more of the game than the players (!).
[12] The 1st battalion of this regiment had been the staff escort and was placed in the rear of the farm of the old manor (?) where it was to withstand the efforts the enemy made to attack our line of retreat.
[13] The late Commandant Lachouque is a well known Napoleonic historians authors of many significant works such as Napoleon et sa garde, better known in English as the reputed The Anatomy of Glory.

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