The chain of events from the French side: Quatre Bras, Ligny, and Waterloo
It is not our intention to attempt to completely cover the entire Waterloo campaign or to relate once more certain well-known anecdotes. We will examine some pertinent points in the chain of events from the French side which, in our opinion, have been overlooked by many historians. These include:
- Napoleon's state of mind during the Campaign, and his questionable evaluation of the evolving military situation;
- The relatively unknown set of orders from Napoleon that led to the deployment of the French army before Quatre-Bras, Ligny and finally Waterloo; and
- Napoleon's constant procrastination in pursuing Wellington and Blücher, particularly after Ligny.
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Separate Forces
Separately, Wellington's and Blücher's forces were not strong enough to win a battle against Napoleon's army, but Napoleon could not expect to defeat their combined armies because they out numbered him by about two-to-one.
Hence, the Emperor had to defeat them in detail. He attempted just that against Blücher at Ligny, but Wellington's simultaneous battle at Quatre-Bras tied up troops that Napoleon might have employed in defeating the Prussians more decisively. Although criticized for his defeat at Ligny, Blücher had seriously disrupted Napoleon's plan to move quickly to Brussels, and forced him to detach Grouchy with significant forces to pursue the Prussians.
[1]
The excellent performance of Wellington and the Anglo-Allied army during the Campaign has been the subject of many books and articles. (The Prussian contribution to the Allied victory at Waterloo is covered elsewhere in this issue by Marc Raiff and Ed Wimble.) We have not concentrated on the tactical aspects of the Campaign, but rather what took place at the French high command level.
On the day before he decided to strike the Allies in Belgium, Napoleon met secretly with Carnot [2] and divulged his plan. Carnot strongly advised him to wait until his Armée du Nord had been reinforced. He pointed out that neither the Russians nor the Austrians could arrive before the end of July. In addition, the English and the Prussians would not venture to attack until their allies had joined them. During these six weeks, Napoleon could double his forces, transform France into an armed camp, etc. The Emperor shook his head: "I know all that," he answered, "but it is essential that I should win a brilliant victory without waiting so long!"
Napoleon knew what was at stake and realized he was taking a
considerable risk in attacking two armies which together were more powerful than his own. It was his way to assume the offensive to defeat his enemy in detail before they could concentrate. He decided to crush the nearest menace first, the Allied armies in Belgium.
In the four days from 11-14 June, Napoleon secretly and quickly
concentrated his army in the north of France, south of Charleroi. That concentration was admirable. He was in a position to strike Wellington and Blücher before they learned that the French army had left its cantonments near Paris. However, Berthier was no longer available to issue orders to the army. A key part of Napoleon's war machine was missing and Soult, the Emperor's new chief-of-staff, was far from being an efficient replacement. [3]
On 15 June, Napoleon struck at Charleroi. Napoleon had been making war for twenty years and all the commanders in Europe learned the new tactics from the master. Moreover, during these twenty years, Napoleon had worn out his war machinery and he no longer possessed the old tempo.
He was not the Napoleon of earlier campaigns, quick to act and react.
Instead of attacking Blücher immediately, he gave him time to concentrate. In fact, it was Blücher who reacted quickly, and by evening, he concentrated his army. Three of his Corps (Bülow's IV Corps was too far away) were near Sombreffe some 10 miles north-east of Charleroi. The more cautious Wellington, fearing for his line of communications with Brussels and
the coast, decided to concentrate further north of Charleroi at the Quatre-Bras crossroad.
On the eve of that first day, Napoleon was satisfied. Later, on St. Helena, he
summed up the results: "The two (enemy) armies were surprised, their communications disturbed." Ney had not made contact with the British and believed that the Allies were retreating
in different directions to concentrate much further to their rear. The Emperor considered himself to be in a central position able to attack each of his enemies separately. Of course, he assumed, falsely, that the Prussians were retreating eastward, apparently away from Wellington, on their own separate line of communications.
This proved to be plain wishful thinking. Napoleon did not take into consideration Blücher's character and Wellington's tenacity. Why would an army of 126,000 men led by the "old Vorwärts" retreat before a French force of 125,000? In the Emperor's mind, it was more agreeable to judge on appearance rather than on the less flattering reality. Sadly for the French, during the few days thatwere to follow, he rarely emerged from the realm of the imaginary.
More Waterloo Campaign
[1] See "In Defense of Marshal Grouchy" on Grouchy's retreat from Wavre, elsewhere in this issue.
Napoleon's Concentration Before the Campaign
The Events of the First Day
16 June: The Events of the Second Day
17 June: The Tardy Pursuit of Wellington and Blücher
The Orders of 18 June
Conclusion and Sources
Footnotes
[2] Carnot was known as the "organizer of victory." He was the mastermind behind the levée en masse and instrumental in organizing the armies of the Revolution. Bonaparte appointed him Inspector General of the Army in 1800. Disagreements with Napoleon caused him to be unemployed until 1814 when he was appointed to command the defense of Antwerp. In 1815 he rallied to Napoleon and was made Minister of the Interior. Napoleon greatly valued Carnot's judgements.
[3] Several incidents were to confirm that as will be seen later. The first mishap took place when Soult forgot to send Vandamme the orders to move on the 15th. In addition, Soult also neglected to send a second ADC to order Vandamme to move on the 15th since the first ADC never made it. (He broke a leg after falling from his horse.) The result was to delay the movement of two Corps in an action that required speed in order to surprise the Allies. This was only the beginning of Soult's blunders.
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