Conclusions

We have presented the overall outline of the Waterloo Campaign from the perspective of the key assumptions by which Napoleon issued his orders. We have speculated on his inexplicable state of mind that apparently refused to accept, or even to seek reality on the enemy's whereabouts on several occasions. At Ligny, he didn't believe that he was facing the main Prussian army until the battle had begun. On the same day he also refused to accept that Ney was facing Wellington's army at Quatre-Bras instead of the "dust of battalions" he imagined.

Then, on the eve after his success at Ligny, there is again that incomprehensible wishful thinking that assumed that the Prussians were soundly defeated when only their center had been broken through. That delayed Grouchy's pursuit until late in the day.

The very same state of mind is responsible for the lack of action upon discovering Wellington's retreat early the next day. We have seen that his army was ready to move by 4 a.m. Instead, he did not move until noon. Worse, on the night after Ligny, he did not inform Ney of the victory!

The importance of wasted hours has been pointed out by many military writers. "The inaction of the French army on the 17th and early 18th, has been the real reason for the defeat of Waterloo," writes General Delort.

Jomini says: "How can we explain the eight hours lost to inspect the battlefield when the interest was in pursuing the Prussians?" Damnitz: "In looking at June 17, one is very surprised to see the neglect shown by the enemy in pursuing the Prussians as well as to execute movements." Napoleon himself, at St. Helena, deplored that waste of time, but blamed his subordinates for it.

Granted, Napoleon could have been better served by Ney. But at QuatreBras, Ney prevented Wellington from helping Blucher at Ligny. At Waterloo, Soult, reputed to be the best tactician in Europe, would have been a much better choice than Ney to command the army. Soult would not have committed the heavy cavalry so early in the battle.

The choice of Soult for the highly responsible post of Chief-of-Staff to the Grand Army was a serious mistake. In fact, it was a disaster. Accustomed to commanding large bodies of troops, he was ill equipped to play Berthier's role as an office clerk to Napoleon.

In addition, there is no doubt that if Napoleon had followed Carnot's advice and awaited more troops, even a single Corps, he would have been in a better position to win the campaign.

Finally, Napoleon was poorly served by the elements. The repeated summer storms soaked the ground, impairing the army's movement and delaying the movement of the artillery at Waterloo. The effect of the soaked ground was even worse as it decreased the effect of the French artillery fire.

In a recent letter sent to EE&L, Colonel Elting, author of Swords Around a Throne, suggested: "Had it been a reasonably dry day, Napoleon's artillery probably would have Wellington, while Blucher still was looking for his boots!"

Sources

Bowden, Scott, The Armies at Waterloo, Emperor's Press, Chicago, 1990.
Charras, Lt-Col., Histoire de la Campagnede 1815, Waterloo, Paris, 1869.
Houssaye, Henri, 1815, Paris.
Lachouque, Cdt, Le secret de Waterloo, Paris.
Lachouque, Cdt, Waterloo, Paris.
Margerit, Robert, Waterloo, Paris, 1964.
Napoleon I, Emperor, Correspondence de Napoleon, 32 volumes, Paris, 1858-1870.
Weller, Jac, Wellington at Waterloo, New York, 1967
Misc. notes and data from the French Archives.

Continued

To 15 June
16 June: The Events of the Second Day
17 June: The Tardy Pursuit of Wellington and Blücher
The Orders of 18 June