Editor's Note: Some believed Grouchy earned the rank of Marshal for his brilliant performance during the 1814 campaign in France (see EE&L #11). He became the 26th and final Napoleonic Marshal at the start of the 1815 campaign and has been unjustly blamed for the Emperor's defeat at Waterloo. His performance after Napoleon's defeat was important, but was overshadowed by other events at the time and eventually became forgotten. Here is that story.
Large Wavre Pursuit Map (slow download: 147K) or Jumbo Wavre Pursuit Map (very slow: 337K)
Grouchy has always been an easy target for many historians. In spite of the fact that a great deal of responsibility should be shared by Napoleon, it is easy to argue that Grouchy's leadership in pursuing the Prussians after Napoleon's victory at Ligny was less than perfect. However, after Napoleon had been»defeated at Waterloo, we find Grouchy once more the aggressive and competent general.
The skillful withdrawal of his command from Wavre after he learned of Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo was a major achievement that has seldom been acknowledged and credited to Grouchy by English language historians.
Large Wavre-Charleroi Map (slow download: 147K) or Jumbo Wavre-Charleroi Map (very slow: 337K)
He admitted that he had been wrong to have ignored Gérard's earlier advice and should have marched on the previous day to the sound of the guns. [3] His humility rallied his generals behind him, including the critical Vandamme, and from then on he got their full cooperation. The situation was critical as Grouchy's command could be cut off and overwhelmed by the Allies.
Grouchy now faced the delicate task of disengaging his troops from the on-going attacks on the Prussians at Wavre and withdrawing his command back to France. That could only be achieved by crossing the Sambre River either at Charleroi or Namur. A retreat through Charleroi was the shortest route, but it would have placed the French amidst the pursuing Allies. The Namur route would force Grouchy to cover some 70 kilometers (44 miles) to reach the French border. In addition, the bridges at Namur were not secure and might even have been occupied during the
previous day's pursuit! Securing these bridges quickly was essential.
Grouchy immediately ordered Exelmans with his two Divisions of Dragoons toward Namur. He was told to cover the 40 kilometers (25 miles) that separated Wavre from Namur as fast as
he could with his command and to secure the bridges, if they were still unoccupied.
Then, Grouchy, taking personal command of Gérard's Corps, along with the trains and the wounded, followed Exelmans by moving toward Corbais, Walhain, and Gembloux. He was to be covered on his right by Vallin's cavalry brigade. Pajol's light cavalry, with the Division of Teste,
continued to pursue Thielemann's Corps in order to prevent the Prussians from realizing that the majority of the French were withdrawing to the south-east. Once the Prussians were sufficiently engaged toward Louvain, Pajol was to retreat and cover the left of the IV Corps.
Until that time, Vandamme with the III Corps would remain at Wavre in order to contain a possible attack by Prussian Corps coming back from Waterloo. Then, in turn, he would retreat by Dion-le-Mont, Tourinnes and Grand-Leez.
The operation, very well planned, proceeded without the slightest problem. Thielemann had not a clue and, later, was very surprised to find out that the French had withdrawn. Pirch I, who was at Mellery, was also fooled and Grouchy's Corps passed some 8 kilometers (5 miles) from him. Hence, Grouchy was able to reach Gembloux without firing a shot.
On the same day, Bonnemain's brigade, launched as a spearhead by Exelmans, held the bridges at Namur since 4 p.m. Not a Prussian had been sighted. Around 7 p.m., Exelmans' entire command had reached Namur. Welcomed and resupplied with food by the local population, the II Cavalry Corps, leaving Bonnemain's command to guard the bridges, took position in the direction of Dinant.
At that time, Grouchy, who had reached the road from Nivelles to Namur at Point du Jour, some 20 kilometers (12.5 miles) from Quatre- Bras, set up camp for the night at Temploux (a village 8 kilometers [5 miles] from Namur) with the IV Corps, the trains and the wounded. Vallin's cavalry covered his rear around Mazy. Vandamme, who had left Wavre around 4 p.m., reached Grand-Leez and stopped for the night 8 kilometers (5 miles) to the east of Gembloux. Pajol and his command made camp at Gembloux at about 11 p.m.
In some twelve hours, Grouchy had managed to extricate his command from a potentially disastrous situation. Some 30 kilometers (19 miles) now separated him from Thielemann at Rhode-Saint Agathe. Pirch I, whose forces were only some 12 kilometers (7.5 miles) away, could have acted but he was unaware of the French dispositions. Grouchy, already somewhat worried, would have been frantic had he known that the Prussians were so close.
The next morning, at 2 a.m. on 20 June, Grouchy ordered Vandamme to go to Namur, gather together all the wounded and "limping" (éclopés in the French text)
soldiers and send them to Charlemont, and prepare food for the entire command. Then, Grouchy continued his withdrawal, slowly, encumbered by the grand park and the wounded.
On the same day at about 5 a.m., Thielemann and Pirch I finally realized that something was afoot. Thielemann was at Rhode-Saint Agatha when he sent Colonel Hobe with his cavalry and a light battery to pursue the French, while he followed up with his infantry. Pirch I, from Mellery, sent a probe to the east under Colonel von Sohr consisting of three infantry battalions and eight squadrons of cavalry.
In Gembloux, shortly after 8 a.m., von Sohr learned that the French had bivouacked there and that some Prussian horsemen were following them. Awaiting his infantry, he immediately sent forward some cavalry patrols. One of them informed him that some French battalions were at Bocquet, on the road to from Nivelles to Namur.
That was the rear-guard of the French IV Corps consisting of the Divisions of Pécheux and Vichery. They were at Temploux, covering Grouchy's column's slow withdrawal to Namur. By 10 a.m., the French column was about to reach Belgrade, a village very close to Namur. Coming down the route from the Abbaye d'Argenton, the III Corps had reached Rhines and its vanguard was four
kilometers (2.5 miles) from Namur, the converging point of all the troops under Grouchy's command.
Artillery Fire
Suddenly, artillery fire was heard around Rhinos and le Bocquet. Sohr had attacked Pécheux and Vichery. Grouchy galloped to see what was happening and ordered his two Divisions, if necessary, to withdraw fighting toward Temploux but to hold until most of the command was safely in Namur. The French withdrawal continued.
In addition, Grouchy sent a few squadrons from Vallin's command between the road from Nivelles and the path from the Abbaye d'Argenton, where they encountered some Prussian Uhlans
that tried to cut off communications between the III and IV Corps. That mediocre cavalry was quickly dispersed. Then, Grouchy went to Rhines where he found Vandamme [5] who had rushed up to the sound of guns with Pajol.
They were busy repulsing Hobe who had disordered a square from Lefol's Division and captured two guns, but the 20th Dragoons and Clary's Hussars quickly chased off the infantry, took back the two guns and captured a howitzer. Without infantry support, [6] Hobe had to fall back to the west.
Grouchy's command was now only threatened from the rear by von Sohr, who with only 2,500 men could not be a serious menace to Pécheux and Vichery. Those two Divisions slowly fell
back as the French columns were retreated through Namur. Vandamme with the III Corps and Teste's Division now became the rearguard. [7]
At around 1 p.m., the fighting was very intense on the edges of the city as von Sohr had made his junction with Hobe and a full brigade [8] sent by Pirch I had reached Temploux.
All these Prussian forces now attacked Vandamme, who held back the Prussians from the heights until 5 p.m. when he was ordered to fall back into Namur. Grouchy had already sent Exelmans' Dragoons to occupy Dinant. They were followed by the wounded, and the rest of his command. Grouchy sent the following order to Vandamme:
"After you leave Namur, my dear General, I want you to take position in the suburb of Dinant, and hold it for the time necessary that the rest of my command has cleared the city. I plan to push as far as Charlemont... I have ordered Pajol's cavalry to find out what is taking place around Charleroi, if possible. If I find my troops too tired, I'll deploy them before
I reach Charlemont. Do not forget to give orders to Teste's Division. There are 3 gates in Namur, make sure that each one is closed and guarded the time necessary for you to withdraw. I have barricaded the bridges over the Meuse and the Sambre. You'll have to defend them as you
come out from that city."
Vandamme, fighting as he retreated, withdrew his troops by echelon into Namur and came out by the Dinant gate. General Teste executed the Marshal's orders. Entrenched in Namur, that
Division with less than 2,000 men was to hold the Fortress until nightfall. Several Prussian assaults were repulsed. Then the Division withdrew and by 8 p.m. the last French soldier left the city by the gate of France which was then set afire.
Teste's Division reached Profondeville, almost half way to Dinant, without being pursued. Pirch I had taken quarters in Namur. On the morning of the 2lst, Teste rejoined the
III and IV Corps in Dinant. During the same day, Grouchy's command crossed the border back into France without being pursued. That evening, the troops brought back by the Marshal (a little more than 28,000 effectives, a thousand wounded and 100 guns) reached the fortresses of Givet and Charlemont where they were billeted and fed.
On 23 June, Grouchy was nominated to take command of the Armée du Nord. He was on his way to Soissons where he had been ordered to go by Soult, Napoleon's Chief-of-Staff. Davout, the Minister of War, wrote to him: "You have rendered France a service that will be appreciated
by everyone." [9]
Unfortunately, we know how Grouchy was rewarded. For the next 50 years, he was considered responsible for the disaster at Waterloo.
Grouchy's retreat from Wavre was a masterpiece of a successful fighting withdrawal in which luck played an important part. Had the bridges at Namur been occupied by the Prussians, the
French retreat would have been vastly more difficult. Even after Exelmans's Dragoons had secured the bridges, an attack by a strong Prussian contingent could have dislodged them from their
position. The Prussians did neither.
It is interesting to note that during his retreat, Grouchy used his Dragoons [10] twice as mounted infantry in an important strategic role. The first time was to capture the bridges at Namur and then a second time to occupy Dinant.
Granted, in both cases the Dragoons did not have to actually fight as infantry, but that does not eliminate their important tactical and strategic value as mounted infantry. This is a
pertinent point seldom acknowledged by historians. France was the only country during the Napoleonic Wars still training its Dragoons as infantry (a point that will be further discussed in a future EE&L).
It can be further argued that the capture of the Namur bridges by the Dragoons was an unnecessary operation since the Allies did not attempt to cut off Grouchy's command. An
appropriate retort is that it may have been an altogether different story if the Allies had been, let us say, more aggressive in their pursuit. We should remember that Grouchy's infantry (under attack by the pursuing Prussians) did not reach Namur until 4-5 p.m. on 20 June, while Exelmans' Dragoons had been there on the 19th at 4 p.m. That was a full day's difference!
[Editor's Note: To carry our discussion a little further, the capture of the bridges at Namur bears a great similarity to the wargame report presented in EE&L #10. In our wargame, the Dragoons, like those of Exelmans, were not directly engaged but achieved an important similar role by occupying the bridge at Rohrstadt.]
In addition to bringing his command almost intact back to France, Grouchy rallied a number of stragglers from the Waterloo battlefield. By the time he reached Laon, on 26 June, his command included some 45,000 men.
Grouchy's Wing Order of Battle.
Grouchy, Maréchal E. de, Fragments historiques relatifs à la Campagne et à la bataille de Waterloo, Paris, 1830.
[1] His order-of-battle is listed in the sidebar on Grouchy's Wing Order of Battle.
It is well known that on 17 June, the morning after Napoleon defeated the Prussians at Ligny, Grouchy, in the tradition of Napoleonic warfare, was given an important command: [1] to pursue and engage the defeated enemy. A full night had been lost by Napoleon in starting the pursuit of the defeated Prussians and that is seldom acknowledged. In order to be successful, the pursuit of a defeated enemy has to be started immediately. Napoleon, not Grouchy, broke his own rule in this case.
Grouchy on the Day after Waterloo
News that confirmed Napoleon's disaster at Waterloo reached Grouchy the day after the battle, 19 June at around 10.30 a.m. [2] as he renewed his attacks on the Prussians at Wavre. He immediately assembled his generals and during a short council of war, broke the news to them.
Grouchy's Plan
The Retreat toward Namur
The Prussian Pursuit
Vandamme's Retreat from Namur
Grouchy is Nominated Commander of the Armée
du Nord (Army of the North)
Conclusions
Sources
Houssaye, 1815, Librairie Périn, Paris, 1898.
Linck, Tony, Napoleon's Generals, The Waterloo Campaign, Emperor's Press, Chicago, 1994.
Margerit, Robert, Waterloo, Gallimard, Paris, 1964.
[2] The news was brought by Captain Dumonceau who, in addition, relayed the order of the Emperor to cross back over the Sambre.
[3] The Battle of Waterloo started at around 11:30 a.m. while Grouchy was taking I a brief rest in Walhain. Gérard rode up and I urged him to march immediately toward the sound of the guns by moving north-east cross-country toward the Dyle. If Grouchy had done so, he might have slowed or even stopped the Prussian advance on Plancenoit. Or, Grouchy could have provided Napoleon with a reserve. These "what-ifs" have been debated by many historians.
[4] In all fairness, one must recognize that the Prussians were exhausted by the constant marching.
[5] Some historians report that Vandamme seriously compromised Grouchy's retreat when he could not be found as he had decided to spend the night in a nearby house without informing anyone where he was. Hence part of his Corps was roughly handled by the Prussians. This account is improbable since Grouchy had taken personal command of Vandamme's Corps. In addition, Margerit says that Vandamme had been sent to Namur by Grouchy.
[6] Hobe was without infantry support because Thielemann, after a march of 30 kilometers (19 miles), was unable to move beyond Gembloux that day.
[7] Grouchy's soldiers were welcomed, like Exelmans' Dragoons had been, fed by the population, the wounded cared for, etc. Berthezène said: "It would have been impossible to save our wounded without the help of the population. Our unfortunate companions were placed by the population in some small boats and sent down the Meuse."
[8] A Prussian brigade was the equivalent of a French Division.
[9] The French text reads: Vous avez rendu à la France un service qui sera apprécié de tout le monde...
[10] Okouneff refers to Dragoons as cavallerie mixte, i.e., mixed cavalry.
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