Marmont informed Napoleon of Blucher's movement westward and that he was forced to give way. But his withdrawal from Vertus was so well conducted that he gave Napoleon time to react. Consequently, on the night of 13-14 February, the entire Imperial Guard was alerted to proceed to Montmirail under Marshal Ney, with Friant's First Old Guard Divison, Meunier's First Voltigeur Division, Laferriere's 3rd Guard Cavalry, Guyot's line cavalry, and Drouot's Guard Artillery. Curial's 2nd Old Guard Division was to be picked up on the way. In order for Napoleon to keep contact with Marshal Mortier's Old Guard, posts were established every seven and a half miles.(3)

The Battle of Vauchamps

On 14 February, at the time that Napoleon had arrived at Montmirail from Chateau-Thierry, Blucher's command had passed Champaubert and moved toward Vauchamps. Napoleon informed Marmont that he was coming to the rescue with the Guard and General Grouchy's line cavalry. Then he ordered Marmont to attack Blucher as soon as the Prussians came out of Vauchamps. Marmont skillfully drew Blucher to attack him on the morning of the 14th to the west of Vauchamps. Suddenly, to his great surprise, Blucher saw Marmont's weak force that he had previously been pushing back stop and counterattack vigorously. At the height of the engagement, Grouchy's cavalry crashed into the Prussian right flank. Charged aggressively, the surprised Prussian vanguard fell back in disorder into Vauchamps and came out of it in an even more confused condition. (4) Blucher called up his reserves and prepared his command to eliminate Marmont's weak corps. However, within the numerous cavalry that deployed opposite him, he recognized the cavalry of the French Imperial Guard. Blucher realized that serious trouble was ahead.

At about 9:00 a.m., the cheers of the troops announced the arrival of Napoleon with the Guard, which formed in columns of attackbehind the artillery. At a given signal, they stormed Ziethen's 11th Brigade (acting as the vanguard and then attacked Kleist's Prussian 2nd Corps and Kapzevitch's 10th Infantry Corps. Ziethen's Brigade was badly handled on the spot, but Blucher succeeded in extricating the rest of his men and commenced his retreat. During two hours, his troops formed in squares on both sides of the highway to Chalons, in echiquier (checkerboard), withdrew in good order, calmly enduring the fire of Drouot's artillery and the repeated charges of the Guard cavalry. But all was not over yet. Both of Blucher's flanks were menaced, the right by Grouchy's 3,500 sabers and the left by Leval-still out of range-and his 7th Division's 4,500 veteran infantry from Spain along with the cavalry of the Guard.

The able Grouchy (5) found a road running parallel to the Prussian line of retreat and managed to get ahead of the hard pressed Allied squares. The Prussians appeared hopelessly trapped. However, the Prussians were saved by the mud as Grouchy's charges could not get momentum and were not supported by his horse artillery which, also because of the mud, had not been able to join him in time. Nevertheless, his 3,500 cavalrymen broke some squares and threw the Prussian masses into confusion.

Blucher, pressed in the front by the French infantry and outflanked on his right by Grouchy and on his left by the cavalry of the Guard, tried to keep his harassed command withdrawing in good order. He had managed to do so as far as Janvilliers. But, behind that village, around the wood of Serchamps, he was intercepted and charged on both flanks by the French cavalry; Blucher lost four guns and 3,000 men. In spite of these losses, and still full of fight, Blucher managed to rally his forces. He continued to present a determined front until Drouot, galloping at the head of 50 guns, blasted the Allied troops with canister at short range. But night was rapidly falling. For two hours, Drouot chased the Prussians as far as Champaubert, littering the fields and the highway with dead and wounded.

As night arrived, Blucher tried to organize a defense at Champaubert. Once more Grouchy's cavalry fell on the Prussian flank and scattered them. At the same time, a charge of the Guard cavalry ordered by Napoleon and Ney fell on the other Prussian flank with similar success. Both charges broke through and met in Champaubert. Confusion was everywhere and the night prevented any further charges.

According to Count de Segur, the night was hiding the extent of the success. In the midst of the confusion, Blucher, Prince August of Prussia, Generals Kleist and Kapzevitch were several times on the verge of being captured, killed or wounded. A brave stand by Ziethen and his artillery ended the fighting.

Blucher realized that finally the French grip was easing and continued his retreat as far as Etoges, some ten miles from Champaubert, where, regaining some control over his troops, he deployed Urusov's 8th Russian Division. But Marmont, in spite of a pitch black night, had been ordered to pursue. He managed to attack the Russians in Etoges where he captured 7 guns, 800 men and General Urusov. The rest of that particular Russian Division melted away into the darkness. Blucher meanwhile continued his retreat toward Chalons. The time was 7:00 p.m.

The Allies lost 7,000 men, 10 flags andl 6 guns besides a mass of transport. Like manybattles ending in a rout, (6) the losses of the attacker were minimal. The French ended up losing only 600 men.(7)

Vauchamps, the Aftermath

Blucher was able to rally his troops and withdrew to Chalons to reorganize his command, under the cover of a Urosov's weak Division at Etoges, which we have seen was severely handled by Marmont.

Napoleon's intention was to pursue Blucher to Chalons and finish him up. From there, via Vitry, the Emperor intended to fall on the rear of the Schwarzenberg's Army of Bohemia. However, the last dispatches he had received informed him that the Austro-Russians of the Army of Bohemia had accelerated their offensive and pushed back Victor and Marshal Oudinot even further. The Allied vanguards had reached Provins, Nangis, Montereau and Fontainebleau. Paris was threatened, or more exactly Paris appeared to be menaced. What Napoleon did not know is that the news of Blucher's defeats had disturbed the Allied high command. The Allies once more become very hesitant. One can only imagine what would have happened if Blucher had been captured at Vauchamps. The invasion of France might have ended there.

In the face of these developments what was Napoleon to do? He could only make a decision from what he knew! What Napoleon did not know was that the Allies' forward march was already halted. These forces received orders (8) from the alarmed Schwarzenburg to remain in their position and await the development of Napoleon's next maneuvers.

Acting on the suppositions he made on the battlefield of Vauchamps, the Emperor had developed his plan. To cover Paris, he had to abandon the pursuit of Blucher. He ordered Marmont to continue the chase of the Army of Silesia.

That evening, the Guard, minus Mortier's detachment, slept at Montmirail, and the next day moved to Meaux. On 16 February, Napoleon was at Guignes with his Old Guard and had his army ready to deal with Schwarzenberg, leading to events-- Montereau and Craonne -- which form the next chapter in the 1814 Campaign.

Some additional comments on "The Six Days Campaign of 1814"

So ended the marvelous episode in Napoleon's career that is known as "The Six Days Campaign of 1814." (9) During these six days, Napoleon had completely regained his old skill as a field commander. An author claimed that during the Campaign of 1814, Napoleon ceased to be the Emperor and again became the general. There is a great deal of truth in that. Some authors have claimed that the second week of February 1814 is worthy of Napoleon at his best and compared the tactical brilliance he displayed during that week with the great days of the First Italian Campaign.

He handled his small army numbering less than 30,000 (10) in a skillful manner. He was able to coordinate that small army in a way that was impossible with the huge armies of the last five years. In six days his men had covered -- deep in mud -- some eighty miles, won four victories and inflicted a cumulative total of 20,000 casualties, in addition to capturing a number of guns and a huge amount of supply wagons. All this at a relatively small cost in casualties, with one major difference: The Allies could replace their casualties easily while Napoleon in 1814 could not! That was especially true for the Guard.

To put matters in their proper perspective, let us quote a footnote from Houssaye's 1814, p. 69:

"German historians have tried to belittle the credit of these tidy victories by saying that the French fought two against one. To substantiate their claim they arbitrarily decrease the allies effectives and inflate those of the Emperor. However, in taking into account the official returns {Archives Guerres, JAL} and the numbers reported by foreign reports concerning the Allied units as they crossed the Rhine, we were able to come up with the following numbers. (It is well understood that we reduce 20% for the losses of Olssufiev and Sacken for the Battle of Brienne and La Rothiere and 10% for that of Yorck, Kleist and Kapzevitch):

"At Champaubert: Olssufiev's Corps: 4,700. Divisions Ricard and Lagrange: 3,200; 1st Cavalry Corps: 1,500; 2 squadrons of the Imperial Guard: 150. Total: 4,700 Russians against 4,850 French."

"At Montmirail: Sacken's Corps: 15,700; Pirch's and Horn's brigades (part of Yorck's Corps) 16 battalions: 7,000. Ricard's Division: 1,200. Guard (10 battalions) 4,000,Guard Cavalry: 4,200, Guards of Honor 900. Ney's Divisions, 2,500. Total 22,700 Russians and Prussians against 12,800 French."

"At Vauchamps: Kleist's Corps (less Klux's brigade) 13,500; Olssufiev's survivors: 1,500; Kapzevitch 6,500. Divisions Ricard and Lagrange: 3,000; 1st and 3rd Cavalry Corps: 3,600; Guard Cavalry (less Colbert's Division): 3,300, 1 Old Guard battalion: 400. Total: Prussians and Russians: 21,500 against 10,300 French."

"It is necessary to remind Blucher's apologists that it was with only 24,000 men -- the elite of his army to be truthful -- that Napoleon had embarked in his operations against the 57,000 of the Army of Silesia."

In addition, if Napoleon had been better served by his Marshals, it is quite possible that he would have achieved Blucher's complete destruction if he not been compelled to turn southward against the Army of Bohemia. That he was not able to do so is the consequences of two major mistakes from two of his marshals, namely:

(1) Macdonald's (11) failure to secure the bridge on the Marne at Chateau-Thierry. If had done so, Yorck's and Sacken's commands-their line of retreat cut off-most likely would have been forced to surrender.

(2) Victor's inability to hold the line of the Seine against Schwarzenberg. Victor was one of Napoleon's commanders who had been demoralized by the massive French defeat at Leipzig and the subsequent retreat to France. During the 1814 Campaign, Victor had become too lethargic for independent command and, a few days later, Napoleon had to remove him from the command of his corps. Such an independent command required the competence of a Davout, a Soult or even of a Marmont, but certainly not of a demoralized Victor.

Let us say once more that it is quite possible that the Army of Silesia could have been completely destroyed, if the Seine front had been held better and/or if only Napoleon had known that Schwarzenberg's army was standing still awaiting for the outcome of the Emperor's maneuvers. As mentioned above, one can imagine what would have happened if Blucher had been captured at Vauchamps. The invasion of France might have ended there.

As a consequence the appearance of Napoleon with the Guard on Schwarzenberg's rear-with the Army of Silesia eliminated-would have been enough to force the latter back on his starting line around Troyes or even force him to retreat to the Rhine. Blucher greatly reduced command would have had no choice but to do the same....

However, was took place was somewhat different. The Army of Silesia, although shaken and scattered, was still very much in being. The timely arrival of reinforcements in the form of the Russian Winzingerode's 30,000 strong corps was to repair much of the damage of the past week's defeats. Meanwhile, Blucher was reconsolidating his army, including Sacken's and York's commands, at Chalons. Soon the Army of Silesia was again operational. Nevertheless, Blucher had been taught a serious lesson.

Footnotes

(1) Nogent was defended by General Bourmont's garrison of 1,200 men despite the fact that the town had been set afire by Austrian howitzers.
(2) Houssaye, 1814, p. 70
(3) Mortier was pursuing Yorck and Sacken beyond the Marne.
(4) Vauchamps was and still is a small village devoted to the production of wheat as it was in 1814. It consists of a main street with houses built on the side of the road. Most of the present day houses were already there in 1814.
(5) Grouchy was an excellent general. His name has been unjustly tarnished for his alleged poor role at Waterloo. In fact he obeyed Napoleon's orders in engaging at Wavre. His skillful withdrawal after the disaster of Waterloo is a remarkable operation, which we will cover in a future issue.
(6) Vauchamps may have been only a partial route.
(7) These figures are from Houssaye, p. 69, who is using a number of sources to substantiate his claim among which are: Archives Guerres, Vincennes; Marmont's Memoires VI, 56-60, Muffling, 57-61, Plotho, III, 186-187, Schultz, XII, 132-133.
(8) Orders from Schwarzenberg dated February 15 and 17, ref. Plotho III, 157-158, 207-211, quoted by Houssaye.
(9) David Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, p. 975.
(10) Let us not forget that during these six days, the bulk of his forces were the still highly trained guard and high quality cavalry and artillery, but he also had some raw recruits that behaved magnificently like Ricard's command at Montmirail. There is no doubt that Napoleon being in charge during these battles had a strong inspirational effect on his troops. In all fairness, there is also little doubt that the prestige of the "Alt Kaisergard" also played a significant part in defeating the Prussians.
(11) Napoleon's judgement pronounced at St. Helena was not flattering to Macdonald. He conceded his courage and loyalty but Napoleon labeled him slow and even lazy, able enough with a small force up to 20,000 men and under supervision, but no more than that. The events around Chateau-Thierry appear to confirm that.

Bibliography

De Segur, Comte Philippe, Du Rhin a Fontainebleau, Nelson, Paris, date unknown.
Houssaye, 1814, Perrin, Paris, 1888.
Lachouque, Commandant Henri, translated by Anne S.K. Brown, Anatomy of Glory, Brown University Press, 1961.
Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon
Numerous miscelaneous notes from French Archives (Archives Guerres and Bibliotheques Nationale).
Mikhailofsky-Danielefsky, A. History of the Campaign of France in the Year 1814, 1992 reprint by Ken Trotman Ltd. Cambridge. England.
Zweguintov, L'Armee Russe, Paris.

Go to The Battle of Vauchamps: Prussian Account
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Related:

In defense of Grouchy at Waterloo