The Battle of Vauchamps

The Prussians had already occupied Vauchamps when Marmont received the order to attack the village frontally. Grouchy, who had also assumed command of St. Germain's 2nd Heavy Cavalry Division, was ordered to turn the Allied right by moving through the woods by L'Echelle, Haute-Feuille, and Sarrechamp. The Imperial Guard Infantry and Cavalry formed the reserve on the main road. Blucher was quickly advised by his scouting parties that large masses of French cavalry had arrived on the heights to his right and were maneuvering to turn his flank while a large force of infantry had appeared on his left, marching from Sezanne to Montmirail. (1) Blucher was greatly disturbed by the appearance of the infantry, as he knew it was probably Napoleon that was about to arrive on his left. He quickly shifted two cavalry regiments from his reserve to augment his left flank.

In fact, it was not Napoleon, but Leval's 7th Division, VII Corps. Leval commanded 13 battalions, two foot and one horse battery. This was not an insignificant force, however, as they were veterans of Spain that Oudinot had detached from his corps.

Vauchamps and the small woods to its front were defended by Prussian infantry. General von Ziethen had covered the 11th Brigade with skirmishers from the 10th Infantry Regiment and had supported them with the 10th Reserve Infantry Regiment. He retained a reserve consisting of three battalions and two companies of Silesian Schutzen, under the command of Major von Lettow, behind the village of Vauchamps. On the edge of the village stood the 2/1st Silesian and 2/10th Reserve (22nd) Infantry Regiment. (2)

Behind the Prussian left wing stood the advance guard, 3,000 Russian infantry, and two cavalry regiments.

At 10:00 a.m., Ricard's 8th French Division of conscripts was ordered to take the village. At the same time as he began his advance, a French cavalry column with three regiments had already taken up position on the Prussian right flank. Ricard's artillery began firing on the skirmishers hiding in the woods, inflicting heavy casualties on them. To support the skirmishers, the 1/1st Silesian Infantry Regiment was shifted to the right of Vauchamps, supported by half of six-pounder Battery #9 and the 7th Silesian Landwehr Cavalry Regiment. A squadron of the 1st Silesian Hussars, under the command of Rittmeister von Hertel, was sent forward to a position between Vauchamps and the woods to protect the skirmishers should French cavalry be sent forward. As the French approached, the 7th Silesian Landwehr Cavalry, 1st Silesian Hussars and the East Prussian Cuirassier Regiment escorted the half battery forward and began to bombard the advancing French. When the French continued to advance this force quickly withdrew. (3)

Ricard's 1st Brigade approached on the right, covered by the Beaumont woods. Ricard's forces moved against the Prussian right, striking the Prussian skirmishers, drawn from the two fusilier companies of Major von Watzdorf, on their right. Despite their efforts, the Prussian skirmishers were soon overpowered.

Ricard's 2nd Brigade, formed in closed columns, (4) attacked frontally, covered with a skirmish line, moving along the left of the main road. They quickly overran the woods and cleared it of Prussians. The Prussians in Vauchamps prepared for the assault and were reinforced by portions of the rear guard, under Graf Hacken, and supported by a horse battery. Their combined efforts stopped Ricard's advance. The Prussians, encouraged by the repulse of Ricard's two brigades, pushed out of Vauchamps to chase the defeated French columns.

About the same time the Brandenburg Cuirassier and 8th Silesian Landwehr Cavalry Regiments were sent to the left flank to reinforce it. A large force of French cavalry was observed maneuvering around this flank. (5)

Marmont, having no other cavalry available, ordered his escort squadron to attack the advancing Prussians. They succeeded in doing little more than alarming the Prussians and causing them to break stride for a few moments. Napoleon, however, upon seeing the Prussians pause to deal with this feeble attack, sent forward the four service squadrons of the Imperial Guard. (6)

Two of Grouchy's cavalry squadrons, which had moved between Sarrechamp and the small woods to the right, charged forward and struck at the Prussian reinforcements coming down from Janvilliers. Only the squadron of Rittmeister von Hertel stood between them and von Hacke's horse battery standing on the right of the road. Von Hertel's tiny force was swept aside and the French cavalry rushed forward, seizing a battery. Seeing the danger, the Chief of Staff of the 2nd Army Corps, Colonel von Grolman, ordered the 7th Silesian Landwehr Cavalry Regiment, 150 men under Major von Schmidt, forward. (7) The landwehr cavalry succeeded in stopping the French and saving the battery. At this point the Imperial Guard's service squadrons rushed forward, chased back the 7th Silesian Landwehr and moved against the Prussian infantry standing before them. One Prussian battalion succeeded in scrambling into a farm on the left of the village, but the rest were sabered under the horrified eyes of the main Prussian army, formed 600 or 700 meters to the rear.

A force of French hussars then pulled onto the field. Facing them, Colonel Graf Hacke drew forward two squadrons of the East Prussian Cuirassiers and the 8th Landwehr Cavalry Regiment. They formed line, with the cuirassiers on the right, the landwehr in the middle, and the 1st Silesian Hussars on the left. Facing them was an overwhelming force of French cavalry under General Grouchy.

Meanwhile, two companies of Old Guard Chasseurs a Pied moved up to the farm, on the left of the village, where the Prussian battalion had taken refuge, broke into the courtyard, and took the Prussians prisoner. As this occurred along the road, on the right of the road the French Guard cavalry and cuirassiers engaged the force of Prussian cuirassiers and hussars that von Hacke had organized. After several charges, the Prussian cavalry was thrown back by the Divisions of Lefebvre-Desnouettes and Laferriere. They fell back towards the extreme left of the Prussian line of infantry. The infantry, fearing cavalry attack, responded by forming into square. Two Russian jagerbattalions on the left flank, also formed in square, fought off the French attacks with great bravery. (8)

About this time the Corps of Kleist and Kapzevitch reached Janvilliers and the Boularderie Farm. The 10th Brigade, under General von Pirch, formed itself on the right of the road with its left flank on the road and its right flank in a small wood occupied by the 3/7th Reserve (19th) Infantry Regiment. (9) The Fus/2nd West Prussian Infantry Regiment was ordered into Janvilliers, which was already occupied by a force of Prussian cavalry.

The 12th Brigade of Prince August von Preussen stood behind the 10th Brigade and detached the Fus/2/llth Reserve (23rd) Infantry Regiment towards Janvilliers. The fusiliers detached their skirmishers into the village and the musketeer battalion took up a position in the church courtyard. Both battalions remained formed. The Russians placed a battery on the heights to the right of the village and fired on the French cavalry as it approached. (10)

The entire French army was in motion. Lagrange's 3rd Division, VI Corps, was marching in column by regiment along the right of the road. A little to the left and in the same order followed Ricard's 8th Division. Following the line infantry came the Young Guard under the orders of Ney, and to the right of them marched the Old Guard. Three kilometers to the rear Leval's 7th Division, VII Corps, scrambled to catch up, eager to come to grip with France's enemies. On the flank, with all the line cavalry, Grouchy completed his movement to turn the allied right flank. (11)

Kleist sent the 3/7th Reserve (19th) Infantry Regiment to his right flank to occupy the Sarrechamp Farm and the Russian Corps of Kapzevitch formed itself in battalion masses to the left of the road.

The Brandenburg Cuirassiers and 8th Silesian Landwehr Regiment, standing before Grouchy's cavalry, were quickly overrun and driven back. In another attack against the Allied flank, twelve French cavalry regiments, organized in four ranks, faced Colonel Hacke's three weakregiments. The Prussianshad little hope. They were engaged frontally by the first ranks while the rear rank of cuirassiers swung out and struck their flank, sealing their fate. The Prussian cavalry fled back to Janvilliers, closely pursued until the French cavalry was turned back by skirmishers hidden in the scrub and the 2/llth Reserve Regiment. As the French pushed forward they tried to overrun six- pounder Foot Battery #9. They also penetrated into the edge of the village and a ferocious house-to-house fight erupted.

The position was totally compromised, so Blucher ordered an immediate withdrawal of his forces. Unfortunately, he did not have enough cavalry to cover his retreat, so he formed his infantry into squares and placed a few batteries between those squares. His wings were covered by five cavalry regiments and the remainder of his artillery was sent to the rear in great haste.

Those formations in close combat with the French were ordered to break and scatter. They were to fall in behind the formed units. However, Grouchy's I Cavalry Corps pushed through the village and around the right flank. The French cavalry caught the withdrawing Prussians and cut them down in droves. The 1/2/Fus/1st Silesian Infantry Regiment and the 1/2/10th Reserve Infantry Regiment were destroyed in this action. (12) French accounts state that around 1,000 Prussians were cut down in this charge. The two battalions which sought shelter in the village were taken prisoner along with four guns and five caissons. Von Damitz states that of the five battalions forming the advanced guard, Major von Bessel, the commander of the 10th Reserve Regiment, was later only able to organize a single converged battalion of 532 men.

Blucher's withdrawal began about 2:00 p.m. The mass of the Allied artillery went down the main road as fast as the deep mud would permit. All of the various detached battalions were ordered to rejoin the main body, but the 3/7th Reserve (19th) Regiment, holding the edge of Sarrechamp, could not execute the order. It was trapped but did not meet its fate until after dark.

The terrain over which Blucher had to retire was open as far as Champaubert, except for a few woods where he quickly posted small groups of skirmishers with orders to harass the attacking French cavalry. The Prussians withdrew in good order as far as Champaubert, but the squares were unable to move through the village, so they moved into the large field to the right of the village.

The two companies of the Silesian Schutzen, 230 men strong, formed column and fixed their bayonets. (13) Not waiting to be caught in the open they began to withdraw until the French cavalry caught up with them. Safe in their dense formation they waited until the French were within 50 paces of them and let loose with a terrific volley that emptied many saddles. Because they were marksmen armed with better weapons, the Silesian Schutzen were able to make their way to the rear.

Profiting from the disorder in the Prussian ranks, Napoleon's service squadrons and Laferriere's 1st Old Guard Cavalry Division charged several other squares. The Prussian squares held fast, except for the 1/7th Reserve (19th) Infantry Regiment. This battalion had been held behind Champaubert. It was equipped with English muskets, and though they were superior arms, they were not enough. As they were attacked frontally by one group of French cavalry, a force of lancers struck their flank and broke their square. One hundred and sixty men were taken prisoners, four officers and sixteen men escaped. The rest of the 459-man battalion were cut down. (14)

The French infantry chased after the cavalry at the pas de charge, advancing into Fromentieres. (15) Blucher re- organized his forces and continued to withdraw en echiquier. Napoleon, seeing this new disposition, ordered General Drouot to advance all the Guard artillery. (16) Thirty guns advanced and showered the Prussian squares with canister. The Prussians were only able to respond with six guns.

The pursuit was murderous, but it was only an effort to slow the withdrawal of the Army of Silesia. General Grouchy was preparing an even greater disaster for them. The Prussians moved towards Etoges, but as they stood astride the main road before Champaubert, Grouchy gave the order to General Coin, his artillery commander, to close on them with two horse batteries. Unfortunately, the terrible condition of the roads delayed their advance and night fell before they could be brought to bear.

Colonel Hacke and his tiny force, now reorganized and standing in two lines, once again stood before the French cavalry, only to be driven back again. At one point the French cavalry pushed between the 10th and 12th Prussian Brigades, almost capturing Blucher and his staff. At this critical moment, the 2/2nd West Prussian Infantry Regiment, led in person by Prince August von Preussen, fired on the French and drove them off. (17)

In the dark, Blucher continued his withdrawal, when, at Grouchy's command, Doumerc, Bordesoulle, and Saint-Germain fell upon Blucher's harried forces like a bolt of thunder. Blucher's lines were pierced and several squares were scattered. The French cannonade ceased and the Guard cavalry arrived at the trot to spread terror through the Allied ranks. There was truly a great chance that both corps would be cut off and destroyed. On the left flank, Kapzevitch's troops, the East Prussian Cuirassier Regiment and part of Ziethen's troops faced off against the French cavalry.

The French cavalry once again rolled in to waiting masses of Allied infantry. Prince August von Preussen, Field Marshal Blucher, Generals Kleist and Kapzevitch were knocked from their horses or swept away by the crush of the fugitives. The French cuirassiers flew into the midst of the screaming crowd of Prussians, sabering them at will and without resistance. However, the butchery was shortlived as Ney, fearing that the French cavalry would become too widely dispersed and entangled in the woods, had the recall sounded. (18)

The withdrawal of the French cavalry gave Blucher a respite and the chance to reorganize his army behind Etoges. A Prussian cuirassier regiment, Ziethen's 11th Brigade, and a few Russian battalions remained organized and continued their march on Bergeres. Prince Urusov formed a rearguard with the Russian 8th Divisionl9 and ordered Udom, with the remains of Olssufiev's Corps, to hold the escape route from the Etoges Forest. Udom had 1,800 men and 15 guns.

Marmont relentlessly pursued with the VI Corps and Doumerc's cavalry relentlessly, except for a short rest in Champaubert. He caught Udom's 9th Division by surprise at the edge of the Etoges Park, near the entrance of the city. A single charge by the French cuirassiers put them to flight. Marmont took advantage of this to push Lagrange's 3rd Division, VI Corps, into Etoges, driving the Russians back into the last three Prussian battalions of the 12th Brigade. A French Marine Regiment entered the city with bayonets leveled, crushing the Russian resistance, capturing Prince Urusov and 600 Russians, plus eight guns. As the Prussians withdrew they left the 1st Silesian Hussar Regiment on the outskirts of Etoges to warn of any French advance.

It was at this point that one last tragedy occurred. The 3/7th Reserve (19th) Reserve Regiment, with 290 men, had been cut off in the edge of Sarrecamp. Its commander, Major von Weinskowski, screened it with skirmishers and made the best of his position. Fate proved unkind and this brave battalion was caught by a force of the 1st (Polish) Guard Lancers, supported by some horse artillery. Canister drove the skirmishers back to the main body of the battalion, and in its position behind the ditches and walls of Sarrecamp it appeared secure. However, as the sun began to fall two battalions of Old Guard marched up. Their sappers cut through the gates and the Old Guard poured into the defensive perimeter, followed by the Polish lancers. After a ferocious fight, only 150 men remained alive as prisoners.

Koch says that for a loss of 600 men, the French army took 15 guns,10 flags, and 2,000 Prussians prisoners, in addition to inflicting 3,500 casualties on the Prussians and around 3,500 casualties on the Russians.(20) According to von Damitz the Prussian losses at Vauchamps were 8 officers and 3,908 men dead, wounded and prisoners, plus six guns and one howitzer lost. He gives the Russian losses at 2,000 men and nine guns.(21) Plotho gives the total Allied losses at 5,000 to 6,000 men and 15 guns. For the 2nd Prussian Corps he says that 15 officers and 1,487 other ranks were killed, that 11 officers and 447 other ranks were captured, and that 54 officers and 1,970 men were wounded. He also lists six guns and one seven-pounder howitzer as being lost. This is a total of 3,904 officers and men hors de combat or prisoner. (22)

Napoleon and Ney returned with the Guard to spend the night in Montrnirail. Marmont, with the VI Corps and Doumerc's cavalry, spent the night near Etoges. Grouchy and the exhausted cavalry of St. Germain and Bordesoulle bivouacked near Champaubert. Leval's 7th Division, which arrived too late to participate in the battle, was equally fatigued from its forced march and collapsed for the night.

The shattered debris of the Army of Silesia continued its flight to Chalons that night, littering the road with its dead and wounded, plus a multitude of broken and abandoned vehicles. The cavalry, under General Ziethen, formed a rearguard. During the next day Kleist and Kapzevitch lead their corps over the Marne and moved into cantonments behind Chalons. The entire army reunited on the 16th, weakened by a loss of 18,000 to 20,000 men over this week.

During the space of six short days, Napoleon had successively pounded the five corps of the Army of Silesia that had been marching so confident of victory only a week earlier. Blucher's confidence had made him careless. He committed the nearly fatal error of dividing his command and giving Napoleon the chance to defeat him in detail. After his victory at La Rothiere, Blucher believed that only a French rabble stood between him and a triumphant parade down the streets of Paris.

Although Napoleon won a series of impressive victories during the Six Days campaign, it was not enough to save his throne. If Macdonald had captured the bridge at Chateau-Thierry, it would have been the end of Sacken's and York's corps. If Blucher's retreat at Vauchamps had been slower and the French infantry had time to arrive, the Army of Silesia might have been destroyed. This impressive string of victories came close to reversing the outcome of the 1814 campaign in Napoleon's favor. Instead, the reorganized and reinforced Allies eventually resumed the offensive that would ultimately lead to the fall of Paris and Napoleon's first abdication.

Bibliography

von Damitz, K., Geschichte des Feldzuges von 1814 in dem ostlichen und nordlichen Frankreich bis zur Einnahme von Paris, 1842, Berlin, Ernst Siegfried Mittler.

Plotho, C., Der Kreig in Deutschland und Frankreich in den Jahren 1813 und 1814, 1817, Berlin, Carl Friederich Amelang.

Sporschil, J., Die Grosse Chronik, Geschichte des Kreiges des Verbundeten Europa's gegen Napoleon Bonaparte, in den Jahren 1813,1814, und 1815, 1841, Braunschweig, George Westerman.

Footnotes (1) Koch, Vol. I, p. 258.
(2) von Damitz, Vol. II, p. 161.
(3) Plotho, Vol. III,p. 186.
(4) Sporschil, Vol. II, p. 411.
(5) Plotho, Vol. III, p. 187.
(6) von Damitz, Vol. II, p.165, Sporschill, Vol. II, p. 411, Plotho, Vol. III, p. 187.
(7) von Damitz, Vol. II, p.164.
(8) Sporschill, Vol. II, p. 411.
(9) von Damitz, Vol. II, p. 166.
(10) von Damitz, Vol. II, p. 166.
(11) Koch, Vol. I, p. 261.
(12) von Damitz, Vol. II, p. 167.
(12) von Damitz, Vol. II, p. 167.
(13) The Silesian Schutzen carried a special, long bayonet known as a "hirschfanger."
(14) von Damitz, Vol. II, p. 178.
(15) Koch, Voil. I, p. 261-2.
(16) Sporschill, Vol. II, p. 413.
(17) von Damitz, Vol. II, p. 178.
(18) Koch, Vol I, p. 263.
(19) von Damitz, Vol. II, p. 179.
(20) Koch, Vol I, p. 264.
(21) von Damitz, Vol. ii, p. 181.
(22) Plotho, Vol. III, p. 190.