Robert E. Lee Rebuttal

Are You Reading
Politically Correct Civil War
Interpretations or History?

by William B. Kaliher, Orangeburg, South Carolina

As a history buff, I have long enjoyed different interpretations of history. "What if Hannibal or Hitler had made this decision versus what they did" is an enjoyable brain game. A study of history invites such thinking, and should be involved in assessing historical figures. To make a comparison and a point about England, pro or con, in the 1500's and to purposely leave out the country's naval accomplishments would be wrong and dishonest. Obviously England's place in world history would be even more impressive if someone did not realize the country had a navy. Unfortunately, since the 1950's such unconscionable and intellectually dishonest slight of hand by individuals holding currently popular political, i.e., politically correct or PC, viewpoints have made comparisons and assessments of the American Civil War useless and destructive to real history, scholarship and knowledge.

Mr. Tschanz' article on Lee has made me aware of the plight of much of today's scholarship concerning the Civil War. He does not seem interested in history between 1861-65, but in putting a spin on the interpretation of the Civil War because of his hate of slavery, his view of the injustices to the black population and his self inflicted personal guilt for those injustices.

Mr. Tschanz, normally an excellent historian, loses all objectivity when the Civil War is involved and he is far from alone among those currently commenting on the Civil War. A historian or thinker who can accurately conceive of the religious, cultural, social or economic beliefs and their influences on Alexander, Caesar, Attila, Montezuma, Napoleon and their respective societies and those of their foes, or any other ancient figure and country can write the best interpretation of that history.

When that writer can avoid today's mores and understand the ancient norms, then and only then can a new interpretation be valid and a superior history written. Should an animal rights activist write on Attila and fail to bury the modern SPCA influence his history would be inaccurate. The already cruel interpretation of Attila would be even worse as that person discovers the use of horses by the Hun.

I had a good overview of the Civil War and was surprised when I constantly read that according to the politically correct Mr. Tschanz that the South lacked good generals, and Robert E. Lee was especially inept. This was amazing as I had always considered that if manpower, the economy, money, industrial base, railroads, shipping, foreign recognition, etc., were given values when comparing the two sides the Confederacy would weigh in as an underdog in a range of from 50 or 1,000 to one. A concept of David facing Goliath and losing. My history had left me with the belief that the South had far superior generals and the advantage of troops fighting on their own soil which allowed them to postpone the inevitable as long as they did.

Mr. Tschanz may be much better read on the Civil War than I, but he is willing to overlook actual events to make a point and willing to compare apples to oranges in his arguments.

One of his points is that Lee lost a higher percentage of his men than any other Civil War general; 31% of his army at Antietam, 32% at Gettysburg; 20.7% at Seven Days; 19% at Second Bull Run. In a war of attrition Lee was leading his army to destruction. Lee was essentially repeating the role of Pyrrhus, who, after destroying the Romans said, "Another victory like this and I will lose the war." He was failing to consider the reasons why a Lee would split his army into three parts while facing another army -- not because he wanted to lose men, not because he thought nothing of the Union soldier or generals, but because he had no choice.

It is difficult to refute such percentages especially if the person making the point ignores reality and what is required of the respective generals. Mr. Tschanz, an obvious PC'er takes a tack of using tunnel vision to make one side look bad based on his assessment of the world from 130 years distant. To make the PC point, the use of statistics in any manner is sufficient and reinforces Bismarck's warning that there are three kinds of liars; liars, damn liars and statistics. Are the figures really accurate, when he makes such statements and claims Grant to be a superior general. Many see Grant as a butcher and only in the war because he was willing to obey Lincoln and move forward at all costs.

Mr. Tschanz' figures (see page 12) are bad for my side of the argument. They made the boast of one of Lee's armies, that they had killed one of Grant's Yankees for every man they had questionable. Fortunately percentages of losses mean virtually nothing in measuring success in a battle or a war. If they did we would not be reading of the French Revolution today or still celebrating the Greek stand at Thermopoylae, after all Leonidas managed a 100% casualty/fatality rate. To resolve this puzzle and satisfy my own fascination with the list of Union and Confederate casualties I selected the first battle on the list, Shiloh, reviewed the facts, and found the truth that goes with the figures.

Using the figures presented, we must look at the duties of the generals. What were their objectives? What type support did they have? Did they have valid alternatives? These questions provide the truth in the figures. We know for a fact the majority of Southern and Northern generals and the people at the time of the Civil War and for many years afterwards acclaimed Robert E. Lee as the greatest of all the generals. Those people were closer in time to make such determinations and based their views on what occurred, not on the statistics.

Even in the 1860's, it was known an attacking force should have at least a three to one advantage in a battle. When we look at what occurred in these battles, we must consider who had to attack with less than a three to one advantage and who did not. These considerations determine if going against the odds and expected rates of loss are worthwhile, if necessity makes taking on the odds something one has to do. The South never had the luxury of waiting until the odds were favorable.

Knowing Mr. Tschanz was not comparing the sides equally and was only searching far enough to make one side look worse, I picked up the 'S' of a 1960 edition of "Compton's Pictured Encyclopedia" which wouldn't have a lot about Shiloh, but would provide a more meaningful picture than the figures for Shiloh on his list.

His Figures are:

    Union 62,682 troops 10,162 or 16.2% casualties
    South 40,335 troops 9,735 or 24.1% casualties

Compton's figures are:

    Union 70,000 troops 13,000 lost
    South 40,000 troops 10,000 lost

From this second source, we see the southern losses even higher than his percentages which still supports the PC position of poor Southern Generalship based on only this narrow fact. Unless we look! As I relate the facts behind the battle, I shall use Compton's figures for ease and because they favor the PC side in some percentages and are probably far more accurate than the newer and likely PC influenced figures. Based on the time of the sources, there was less likely to be a sword to bear when the earlier figures were compiled.

What do the figures really mean? Do they tell anything about being a good general or being brave soldiers; do they tell anything about strategy or tactics? No, they don't reflect anything but the percentages of the casualties.

Now let's put some meat and truth on the figures from a simple pictorial encyclopedia: April 6, 1862, Grant is eating breakfast. His cavalry is not out, and he doesn't have his sentries out very far as he knows General A.S. Johnson is retreating and camped 20 miles away. The great General Grant and the 45,000 troops with him are relaxed. Please note that the 45,000 is fairly accurate and different than the 70 or 62 thousand listed above for the battle and is only 5,000 more than Johnson has.

At this point we do not have the comparative battle losses, but during the night the Northern General Buell arrives with 25,000 fresh troops which gives the final Union figure of 70 thousand and drives the south's Beauregard from the field the following day since Johnson died because of his foolish planNow the pitiful southern general, A.S. Johnson, who was retreating and letting Grant relax breaks camp and marches all night attacking Grant at dawn. In the PC view Johnson is incompetent as he doesn't have the 3 to 1 ratio required, and he is attacking with exhausted troops.

The PC view will only base itself on the percentage of losses and try to keep the reader from realizing as Johnson did, that he never will have the manpower, and he has to overcome his disadvantages by movement, surprise and superior fighting men. Johnson has nothing else going for him. Now we have the attack with both generals commanding too many raw recruits, an equal disadvantage for both sides. [I mention both sides having raw recruits as the new histories often point out that fact for the north and prominently mention problems of communication to explain northern losses while not acknowledging such problems for the south] At the end of the day the Union side is lost and is barely surviving at the water's edge. Johnson will finish them in the morning and has accomplished this fighting a superior force with exhausted troops after marching 20 miles.

This brief description is accurate and puts the PC figures in their true light. A desperate attack by tired troops who should have been three times their number to have succeeded but almost did, and were only driven away after Grant was rescued by Buell with another army almost as large as the original Confederate force. The PC figures are certainly true, but given the facts, the loss and percentage of men lost is not totally negative for the Confederate side and could explain why the Union Generals, soldiers and public did not feel, following this and other Civil War battles, that the victory and rates of death were as lopsided as PC historians claim. Was the gamble to halt the Union advance in the west worth the losses is the only question. It can not be asked from 130 years hindsight, especially if your thinking and rational is in reality to prove that the "evil side," has to also be incompetent.

An accurate review of most Civil War battles can easily be done and quickly negate the PC historians point of view. A fair review will in many instances explain why the figures are worse for the South. The only way to criticize southern generals for taking more losses under the conditions demands that the critical PC reviewer put forth and support a realistic and better alternative the Southern generals could have followed. The PC danger and damage is to the pleasure reader who is mislead or the youngster who is introduced to a false history.

The only valid question is not what were the losses, but was the gamble worth the losses given a win or a loss. The first answer is a definite yes, if the South had won and Buell had not rescued Grant, who by the way defined his brilliance in this battle when meeting an almost evenly matched enemy. Sitting in a defensive position, facing exhausted raw troops he got his ass kicked to put it mildly. In the second case which was the loss, I will let you answer. I tend to admire the general willing to take a rational gamble and I like underdogs.

Johnson and other Southern generals had no alternatives. Johnson could have retreated to the ocean, temporarily saving his army while the North grew stronger, or he could strike to take advantage of almost any opportunity, even against severe odds. Anyway, now the numbers mean something.

It is unfortunate that basic history could be so misused. It is fortunate that thinking people do not consider studies of the Civil War since 1960 valid simply because of the misuse of statistics to make one side look bad based on today's political mood. Mr. Tschanz' sources are an example of this.

I find it amazing that the earliest source is from 1958, one in the 1970's, four in the 1980's and the remainder from this decade. A Sherlock Holmes is not needed to determine that a new view of history is not being presented but a conscious effort is being made to alter truth. It may be time that reputable historians develop a code that signifies this is history and not PC wannabe's, for many modern "histories," are less accurate and less valid than Saddam Husseins version of the Iraqi victories in the recent Gulf War.

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© Copyright 1994 by David W. Tschanz.
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