McClellan on the Peninsula

Conclusions

by James P. Werbaneth, Alison Park, Pennsylvania

McClellan viewed Malvern Hill not so much as a victory as an escape from disaster. The Confederates saw matters much differently, and their morale fell as they feared that he would take advantage of the battle to drive once more on Richmond. But George Brinton McClellan was just not that kind of general. Once it was in place at Harrison's Landing, the Army of the Potomac presented its masters with a new decision; what to do with it. On 4 July the President saw the first priority as insuring that it was not destroyed, and accordingly he sent 25,000 troops to it, including 7,500 amphibious-experienced soldiers under Ambrose E. Burnside, previously operating on the North Carolina coast. But Lincoln told McClellan that there would be no more reinforcements, instructing him:

    "Save the army first, where you are, if you can, and secondly by removal, if you must."

That was a most heatedly discussed subject. Many officers, including McClellan and his corps commanders, saw evacuation as difficult and costly, if not actually impossible. Others wanted to stay in the area to renew the offensive, not because other options were closed. Others were unhappy that McClellan had pulled off Malvern Hill in the first place. Among them was Phil Kearney, who raged that McClellan was guilty of either cowardice or treason. However justifiable Kearney's anger, it was really beside the point at this stage.

In public at least, McClellan behaved as though Malvern Hill had been a great victory, and the Northern public readily accepted this view. Lincoln strongly disagreed, and saw it as a crushing blow. Thus perception and reality became so intertwined that the former became the latter.

Curiously, in the security of Harrison's Landing McClellan's despair gave way to a new confidence. On 7 July, Lincoln received a telegram from his commander:

    "My position is very strong, and daily becoming more so. If not attacked today, I shall laugh at them... Alarm yourself as little as possible about me, and don't lose confidence in the army."

Lincoln came to Harrison's Landing on 8 July to see things for himself. He conferred with McClellan and the corps commanders, and received their gloomy views of the chances of extracting the army. McClellan also took advantage of the President's presence to hand him a presumptuous letter of condescending, gratuitous political advise. This was not the most tactless act of his career, but it did come close.

Halleck's Appointment

Lincoln had already been considering the matter of a new overall commander, even going to West Point in late June to consult Winfield Scott. On 11 July, over Stanton's protests, he ordered Major General Henry W. Halleck to Washington

    "to command the whole land forces of the United States as General in Chief."

Reluctant to leave the West, where his lethargy was becoming legendary, Halleck had no choice but to obey Lincoln's direct command.

One of Halleck's first acts was to go to the Peninsula. McClellan outlined an ambitious scheme to cross the James, cut Richmond's communications to the south, and take Petersburg. It was a good plan, but McClellan said that it required another 30,000 troops, whereas Halleck was ready to give him only 20,000. His superiors were skeptical of McClellan by now, and when he raised his request to 35,000 troops, their suspicions were confirmed. A week later the cabinet decided to recall the Army of the Potomac.

Halleck cabled McClellan on 3 August to start transferring his army to Aquia Creek in northern Virginia, emphasizing that no further reinforcements could be sent. McClellan protested, citing good discipline and morale, and the security of his command, aided by naval power. He added:

    "Here, directly in front of this army, is the heart of the rebellion. All points of secondary importance should be abandoned and every available man brought here; a decided victory and the military strength of the rebellion is crushed. It matters not what partial reverses we may meet elsewhere. Here is the true defense of Washington."

It was vintage McClellan strategy, and by no means wrong. However, Halleck was not in the mood for it, and tersely replied:

    "The order will not be rescinded and you will be expected to execute it with promptness."

The final irony of the Peninsular Campaign soon occurred. Earlier, Halleck had asked McClellan to feel out the enemy in front of him. The day after receiving the order to withdraw McClellan attacked the Confederates holding Malvern Hill who were then forced to retreat hurriedly. He next sent Colonel William H. Averell's cavalry on a reconnaissance that took them as far as Savage's Station. McClellan reported:

    "Our troops advanced twelve miles in one direction and seventeen in another toward Richmond today."

It mattered little. Throughout August the Army of the Potomac boarded its transports, leaving behind IV Corps to hold Yorktown. McClellan arrived at Aquia Creek on 24 August and reported for orders at Alexandria three days later.

McClellan: An Appraisal

George McClellan was one of the most important figures of the Civil War. He was also the most enigmatic, as no other leader was so gifted in some important ways, and yet was able to deliver on so little of his promise. The Peninsular Campaign was McClellan at his best and his worst, and sheds light on his character as a general.

His strategy of using sea power and amphibious warfare to turn the Rebel flank and take the Confederate capital was imaginative and, indeed, bold. Only Scott's expedition to Veracruz and his march on Mexico City offered applicable precedent, and that did not involve the troops, resources or effort demanded by McClellan's plan. In addition, even a decisive Mexican victory probably would not have led to the dissolution of a country, whereas this was a very real hazard of McClellan's operation.

He also had the perception to recognize the value of new and as-yet untested technology, and to rely on it. Specifically, the Monitor had a prominent role in all of his planning. That he was not a naval officer and still had this good judgment and confidence is even more impressive.

More generally, McClellan saw the huge advantage the North had in its sea power and was eager to use it. Though the Union sealift capacity at the start of the war was not yet nearly sufficient to sustain an operation of this magnitude, this did not daunt McClellan. Then when the landing at Urbanna had to be canceled, he had the flexibility to choose a new site, from which victory was still entirely possible. Early in his tenure as commander of the Army of the Potomac, McClellan showed tremendous organizational ability and personal leadership. He turned a beaten force into a real army, and earned the confidence, loyalty and affection of his troops without ever pandering to them.

On the other hand, the Peninsular Campaign uncovered major problems with McClellan, both in his preparations and execution. First and foremost, was his arrogant, inflexible inability to deal with civil authority. It is true that Stanton was an unprincipled backstabber who used McClellan's friendship for his own gain, something made possible by McClellan's naivete and inexperience with cutthroat national politics. But instead of searching for ways of dealing effectively with his new superior that would advance the interests of the army, his strategies, and even his own career, without compromising his own sense of ethics, McClellan set himself on a higher moral plane. From there he could look down on the likes of Stanton and Lincoln, a move that was both offensive and counterproductive. McClellan's arrogance was all the more glaring because it was directed by a flawed general at the greatest President in American history, though few in 1862 would have realized it. Furthermore, the general was actually modest when he first attained supreme command, and was shocked by the trust and confidence invested in him.

This is highly important. If he was the savior of his country, as he was constantly reminded at first, then McClellan had to live up to this role, and not betray it. Because of this the aspersions cast on his loyalty, difficult for anyone, touched an especially sensitive nerve.

It also explains his operational caution. McClellan correctly saw the Army of the Potomac as the bulwark of the Union, and was not about to hazard the country by risking the army unnecessarily. Sweeping behind the enemy and taking Richmond was an acceptable risk in his mind, as it was predicated on the material advantage of a monopoly on naval power and, as McClellan saw it, an invariable Confederate reaction. But actually seeking out the enemy to fight him under all but the most favorable circumstances was definitely unacceptable. Contributing as well were the awful intelligence reports supplied by Pinkerton. But the most important factor remained — McClellan really took his responsibilities too seriously. Then when action did take place, he proved to be an inadequate tactician.

War is the most risk-fraught of human endeavors, and a commander who tries to avoid all risk has chosen the wrong career. McClellan tried to do so, partly by constantly demanding reinforcements, something that grew so tiresome Lincoln commented that "sending reinforcements to McClellan is like shoveling flies across a barn."

McClellan had an entirely different opponent in Robert E. Lee. As Longstreet pointed out, the dignified, gentle Lee loved to fight. He was not about to run scared from the Army of the Potomac, though an objective reading of its capabilities gave him good reason to flee. Instead, Lee took the offensive. The Seven Days Battles were typified by Confederate risks gone wrong, and Stonewall Jackson contributed almost nothing directly. But, in addition to his earlier campaign in the Valley, Jackson indirectly contributed immeasurably just by being there. The possibility that he might be able to appear on schedule gave Lee the confidence he needed to take the initiative. Though the Seven Days were a net tactical failure for the South, Lee's determination, steadfastness and sheer stubborn pugnacity made them a major victory over a general who lacked these attributes. In the struggle of wills, it was McClellan who came up short. Abraham Lincoln later told a group of ladies visiting the White House:

    "General McClellan thinks he is going to whip the rebels by strategy, and the army has got the same notion. They have no idea that the war is to be carried on and put through by hard, tough fighting, and that will hurt somebody; and no headway is going to be made while this delusion lasts."

Lincoln saw the central problem. And until he had generals who were willing to accept the hazards of tough fighting, and the certainty that somebody would get hurt, victory would be distant in the East.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Boatner III, Mark M. The Civil War Dictionary New York: McKay, 1988.
Catton, Bruce. The Army of the Potomac Volume I, Mr. Lincoln's Army. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1951.
_____. This Hallowed Ground. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1956.
Davis, William C. (ed.). The Image of War: 1861-1865, Volume II, The Guns of '62. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1982.
——-Hassler, Warren W., Jr. "Yorktown: The First Siege."
——-Thomas, Emory M. "The Peninsular Campaign."
Freeman, Douglas Southall. Lee's Lieutenants: A Study in Command, Volume One, Manassas to Malvern Hill. New York: Scribner's, 1946.
Hansen, Harry. The Civil War. New York: Bonanza, 1961.
Keegan, John. The Mask of Command. New York: Penguin, 1987.
Nofi, A. A. (ed.). Eyewitness History of the Civil War Volume II, The Bloody Struggle: The Civil War In the East, 1862. New York: Gallery, 1988.
——-Goss, Warren Lee. "Yorktown and Williamsburg."
——-Longstreet, James. "'The Seven Days,' Including Frayser's Farm."
——-Porter, Fitz John. "The Battle of Malvern Hill."
——-Sorrel, G. Moxley. "The Peninsula and Williamsburg."
Seaman, Mark, "The Campaigns in the Valley,"
Strategy & Tactics 123 (Holiday 1988), 14-23, 42-48.
Sears, Stephen W. George B. McClellan: The Young Napoleon. New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1988.
Wheeler, Richard. Sword Over Richmond: An Eyewitness History of McClellan's Peninsular Campaign. New York: Harper & Row, 1986.

Jim Werbaneth is the publisher and editor of the internationally acclaimed newsletter Line of Departure.

McClellan in the Peninsula

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