McClellan on the Peninsula

The Seven Days

by James P. Werbaneth, Alison Park, Pennsylvania

On 11 June Lee wrote a warm letter to Jackson, congratulating him for his victories in the Valley, and sending him fourteen regiments, even at the expense of weakening the main force in front of Richmond. He instructed Jackson to keep the gaps into the Valley screened with cavalry and artillery but to move with the bulk of his army eastward to Ashland. From there Jackson could fall upon the enemy right flank, between the Chickahominy and Pamunkey Rivers. The Union line would thus be turned.

Lee called in his leading generals for a conference on 23 June. When Longstreet and AP and DH Hill arrived, they found Jackson already there, having ridden forty miles since midnight on a relay of horses. Lee told them he wanted to attack on 26 June, the first day that Jackson thought he could be in position.

In concert with Jackson's flanking move, A. P. Hill would cross the Chickahominy and march on Mechanicsville; D. H. Hill and Longstreet were to cross the Mechanicsville Bridge; the former on the left and the latter to the right, proceeding down the river in echelon with A. P. Hill, who was to advance on Gaines' Mill. Thus the bulk of the Confederate army would be concentrated against one, very vulnerable flank of the Army of the Potomac. Only about 25,000 men, under Magruder and Huger, would be withheld to guard Richmond.

Lee expected to have about 80,000 troops for the effort, including Jackson's. However, for most of the month he was far short of that, and in the Seven Days Battles he never had more than 85,000, and that was at the very end. On the other hand, he had access to Northern newspapers that found their way into Richmond, and Lee knew just how much his opponents were overestimating Confederate strength. Lee might have been badly outnumbered, but he was not going to working under the handicap of fear, thanks to Pinkerton and McClellan.

McClellan At Work

In the meantime the Union commander did little besides consolidate his position on the Chickahominy. McClellan repeated his determination to renew the offensive, always contingent however on the decline of the Chickahominy's water level, or the arrival of more reinforcements and supplies. Actually, McClellan just waited, using these reasons as excuses for his inactivity, showing that procrastinating side of his nature which was both infamous and frustrating.

Richmond was a city in despair, and inversely morale in the Army of the Potomac was high. There was a prevailing feeling among the Union troops that they could blast their way into the city even though a year had been spent preparing its defenses. Considering the potency of the Union siege train and Confederate military perception of it, the soldiers were probably right.

The climate was sweltering and wet and the Chickahominy was bordered by marshes, so disease continued to scourge the Union army. The stench of corpses unburied since Seven Pines did not help conditions either.

Yet some Federals actually found that the area had its benefits. One regiment, the 55th New York, was French and therefore had high level of culinary sophistication. The regimental mess frequently served local frog's legs,

    "as large as and more delicate than the legs of chicken."

They also found the blacksnakes living in the swamps delicious, though other units did not agree with the 55th New York's tastes. Pinkerton did not cease his spurious contributions to the Army of the Potomac's intelligence. In June "Major Allen" returned from Washington with news for McClellan, basically gossip and the latest information on his rivals' machinations. More welcome to the general, he received the division of Brigadier General George A. McCall, detached from McDowell's corps. It was sent to the dangling Union right and attached to Porter's V Corps.

Stuart's Ride

While formulating his plan for the attack, Lee lacked a clear picture of Union deployments on their northern flank. He determined that a cavalry reconnaissance was in order, and entrusted this task to J. E. B. Stuart, a twenty-nine-year-old even more flamboyant than Magruder, but with far more ability. Joe Johnston had been impressed by Stuart, writing on 10 August 1861:

    He is a rare man, wonderfully endowed by nature with the qualities necessary for an officer of light cavalry... Calm, firm, acute, active and enterprising, I know of no one more competent than he to estimate the occurrences before him at their true value. If you can add to this army a real brigade of cavalry, you can find no better brigadier-general to command it.

On 10 June 1862, Lee ordered Stuart to ascertain the strength of the enemy right. Recognizing that some of the qualities so admired by Johnston could manifest themselves as rashness, Lee reminded Stuart of the need for caution, specifically discouraging his notion of riding completely around the Union army. Stuart got underway in the early hours of 12 June, taking with him a small, picked force led by an interesting assortment of young officers. Among them was Lee's son W. H. F. "Rooney" Lee and a nephew, Fitzhugh Lee. Also riding with Stuart was a Prussian officer on leave, Heros von Borcke, and John S. Mosby, later the war's outstanding partisan.

Stuart accomplished this dangerous, grueling mission with his usual flair, with the last exhausted troopers returning on the 15th. Stuart had determined that the Union flank was unsecured, then penetrated the enemy rear and raised havoc. Stuart then did just what Lee had warned him not to and rode around the Army of the Potomac, which was why the operation was so dangerous and grueling.

Stuart's ride was a success. It gave Lee the intelligence he needed, provided the Confederates with a badly-needed morale boost, and while humiliated the Federals. But it also alerted McClellan to the part of his line where Lee's intentions lay, and deprived Lee of the surprise he needed for a truly crushing victory.

Despite this, McClellan played into the enemy's hands by shifting all of his troops except Porter's corps and Stoneman's cavalry south of the Chickahominy, for his long-awaited renewed push toward Richmond. Even with this shift accomplished, McClellan delayed. Once again, Magruder was bluffing the Union into grossly overestimating his strength.

On 25 June McClellan ordered Heintzelman to assault the outposts before him, held by Huger's forces. This skirmish grew into something more substantial, though nothing was accomplished, outside of the Federal's holding the outposts when darkness fell and fighting halted. What distinguished the clash was that it marked the last time that the Union army had the initiative on the Peninsula.

Lee was ready to start his offensive, but lacked one vital component — Stonewall Jackson. On the night of the twenty-fifth, he still had not reached Ashland, having encountered various obstacles, and would be unable to reach the battlefield on time.

This was the start of Jackson's direct involvement in the Peninsular Campaign, and set the tone for his performance throughout it — slow movement, late arrival, and disappointment. This was not the speedy, resourceful Stonewall of the Valley, but an exhausted version, leading troops that were just as tired as he was.

Mechanicsville & Gaines' Mill

The Seven Days Battles started on 26 June, with the Battle of Mechanicsville. At nine o'clock in the morning, six hours behind schedule, Jackson's vanguard still had not arrived. An impatient A. P. Hill launched the attack on his own authority. D. H. Hill and Longstreet followed him closely across the Chickahominy, pushing back the Union outposts.

This was an illusory success, however, as McCall made his stand on Beaver Dam Creek, a mile east of Mechanicsville. Lee arrived and tried to made sense out of the disorder created by crowding of the three divisions and the tendency of their generals, particularly A. P. Hill, to act as free agents. Union artillery and infantry fire was devastating. Then, in an imaginative interpretation of Lee's order to stand and hold, A. P. Hill sent the brigades of Richard Pender and Ripley to try to turn the enemy flank at Ellison's Mill. Two strong attacks there failed, partially due to rifle pits and obstructions.

From the Confederate point of view, this first blow was a catastrophe, mainly because of a lack of cooperation among Lee's generals. A. P. Hill's performance was horrible. Of 56,000 Confederates available, only about 16,000 were actually engaged, and 1,400 became casualties. They faced 15,000 entrenched Union troops, an unpardonable sin in a battle dependent on cooperation. Federal losses ran to only 49 killed and 207 wounded. McClellan was rightfully jubilant. Even so, he was deeply aware of the danger posed by his deployment, and decided to abandon his base at White House Landing and move to the James. This was not the panicked move of a beaten or unduly alarmed general, but a calculated measure to regroup around a safer base, and from there resume the offensive. Lee was not deterred. On 27 June he moved up his batteries and ordered A. P. Hill to attack again, taking advantage of McCall's retreat back to Gaines' Mill.

Once more, Jackson was late. When he did arrive, poor coordination prevented him from committing his troops in support of D. H. Hill. Yet the Federals were still hard-pressed. Early in the morning Porter called for reinforcements, and McClellan sent him Slocum's division of VI Corps and the message:

    "You must hold until dark."

This was the limit of McClellan's involvement in the Battle of Gaines' Mill. He did so little, and left so much to Fitz John Porter, even so dedicated a McClellan partisan as Porter could give him just scant praise. Virtually all the burden of leadership fell on the corps commander, and he responded with the finest defensive performance of his career. To the south, Magruder made one of his ostentatious diversions, freezing 60,000 Northerners who might have been able otherwise to reinforce Porter.

V Corps' center collapsed, and Porter's units were thrown into some confusion. But the timely intervention of French's brigade and Meagher's Irish Brigade prevented a total rout, and Porter was able to retreat in an orderly fashion.

A Southern Miscalculation

Lee correctly deduced that McClellan would retreat from Gaines' Mill. But he thought that the Army of the Potomac would withdraw back down the Peninsula, when in fact McClellan was heading south toward his new base at Harrison's Landing. This gave the Federals a day's head start, highly fortunate because the Confederates, even with their inferior numbers, logistics and tendency to trip each other up, might have been able to surround and destroy the Army of the Potomac.

The movement of the supply base did not come easily, and chaos reigned. Though naval transports figured heavily, there were not enough wagons, and huge stocks had to be burned. J. E. B. Stuart pursued, and on what was ostensibly just a reconnaissance he penetrated all the way to White House. There he added to his reputation by expanding his repertoire to take on the Union gunboat Marblehead. Stuart brought up a howitzer, and drove off the ship.

Savage's Station

Thrown off by the direction of McClellan's retreat, Lee waited until the 29th to begin his pursuit. When it finally started, he boldly ordered Huger and Magruder to attack. Magruder had already been making holding attacks as part of his deception, but the new attacks were part of a comprehensive effort to seriously damage the Union army. Magruder got a late start, as he expected to be attacked himself. However, the great majority of the Federals opposite him had withdrawn, leaving behind just a small covering force, thus faking out the great faker.

Magruder attacked two of Sumner's corps around 2 p.m. using only two and a half brigades of the six available. Nor was Jackson in place, having been delayed by the need to rebuild bridges burned by Porter in his retreat.

Savage's Station was one more scathing indictment of shoddy Confederate staff work and command and control. But this time the Union also suffered, and although Sumner lost 1,590 troops to Magruder's 626, he felt he had won a great victory and, oblivious to the continuing danger to the Federal rearguard, was determined to stay on the field. If adequately prosecuted by the Confederates, the battle could have destroyed the Union rearguard. However, Magruder's vacillation (in some ways understandable) and poor tactical coordination saved Sumner's position. Furthermore, Jackson never did show up until three o'clock the next morning.

There was one especially painful result of the battle for the Army of the Potomac. Savage's Station was a forward supply base and hospital site, filled with many wounded from Gaines' Mill. As the Federals withdrew they had to leave behind 2,500 sick and wounded, to become prisoners of the Confederates. McClellan was thoroughly frightened and shocked by the Battle of Savage's Station, and by the situation in which he saw his Army of the Potomac. At midnight after the action, he sent an inexcusable cable to Stanton in which he tried to obscure his heavy losses by praising his troops' bravery, and shifting the blame to the government. He wrote that his army was

    "...overwhelmed by vastly superior numbers, even as I put my last reserves into action. The loss on both sides is terrible. Had I 20,000 or even 10,000 fresh troops to use tomorrow I could take Richmond, but I have not a man in reserve, and I shall be glad to cover my retreat and save the material and personnel of the army... I have lost this battle because my force was too small... I again repeat that I am not responsible for this... You must send me very large reinforcements and send them at once. If I save this army now, I tell you plainly I owe no thanks to you, or to any other person in Washington. You have done your best to sacrifice this army."

This was McClellan at his most obnoxious, and a century later this hysterical epistle remains unbelievable. Even though it was written in the heat of emotion, there is no possible excuse for its insubordinate tone and substance, nor for his craven dodging of responsibility.

So appalling was the cable that a supervisor of military telegrams in Washington took it upon himself to delete the last two lines, so that the kernel of McClellan's venom never reached Stanton or Lincoln. The President was deeply worried. He took several days to reply, and when he did it was with a patience and consideration that McClellan scarcely deserved:

    "It is impossible to reinforce you for your present emergency. If we had a million of men, we could not get them to you in time. We have not the men to send. If you are not strong enough to face the enemy, you must find a place of security, and wait, rest, and repair. Maintain your ground if you can, but save the army at all events, even if you have to fall back to Fort Monroe. We still have strength enough in the country, and will bring it out."

The route to safety passed through White Oak Swamp, and here the Confederates were to make another attempt to flank the rearguard, on 30 June. Once again, the plan depended on Jackson's ability to penetrate to the rear across a river line, this time over Grapevine Bridge on White Oak Swamp Creek.

And once again, it failed due to bad coordination and Stonewall's inability to adhere to the schedule. Jackson never did get to the battle; he found the bridge destroyed, and moreover, Longstreet speculated, he wanted to rest his exhausted troops. In addition, much depended on Huger, who, obstructed by fallen timbers, did not participate in the Battle of White Oak Swamp either.

In any case the fighting was fierce and losses high on both sides. The Confederates had 3,615 casualties, including three brigade commanders wounded, and the Union 2,853. Among the Union casualties was McCall, whose division bore the brunt of the fighting, and who wandered into Confederate lines and was captured. His replacement was John Reynolds, and he too was taken prisoner, later to be exchanged, only to meet his end by a sniper's bullet at Gettysburg. Porter's Corps already occupied the strong defensive position of Malvern Hill, and McClellan ordered to rest of the army to proceed there.

Of all the actions of the Seven Days, Malvern Hill was the one that Lee never should have initiated, representing a serious miscalculation on his part. He seems to have overestimated the damage done to the Army of the Potomac and, worse, taken little heed of his subordinates' poor coordination and mistiming. Also, Jackson's consistent inability to show up when and where he was supposed to appears to have made little impression.

Nonetheless, Lee elected to assault an enemy army deployed in a very strong position, and within range of naval gunfire support from the James River. Also, the Federals had their artillery reserve, under Colonel Henry J. Hunt, with them on Malvern Hill. The battle taught Lee a lesson in the futility of sending waves of infantry against massed guns, especially when the latter were competently deployed on favorable terrain.

McClellan repeated his noninvolvement of Gaines' Mill, riding over Malvern Hill and giving only the most general instructions of deployment. The real work fell, as usual, to his corps commanders. On the left was Porter, with the divisions of Brigadier Generals George Sykes, George W. Morrel, and Truman Seymour, commanding the unit led in succession by McCall and Reynolds. To their right were the divisions of Heintzelman's III Corps, under Philip Kearney, Joseph Hooker and Daniel Sickles, and Couch's division of Keyes' corps. Sumner was held back in reserve. Lee's plan was for Jackson, commanding the divisions of D. H. Hill, Richard S. Ewell and William Whiting as well as his own, to march down Quaker or Willis Church Road (alternate names for the same route). Somewhat behind Jackson, Magruder was supposed to advance just to the west of Jackson, and form up with his right. Huger would receive his orders when the others arrived. In reserve were A. P. Hill and Longstreet, as they had done most of the fighting in the last battles.

Huger finally got his instructions, which were to advance with his artillery, blow a hole in the enemy line, and advance through it with his infantry. The great and glaring flaw in the plan was that the Federals were not to be beaten in a firepower duel, something which the wounded Joe Johnston had kept foremost in his mind.

Hunt had done a masterful job positioning his guns. At one o'clock the Union artillery awoke with a roar, so dominating the Confederate guns that within two and a half hours all rebel cannon had been silenced. In addition, Hunt's artillery kept Huger's leading infantry pinned down, negating both parts of the rebel general's intended role.

Lee was about to commit Longstreet and A. P. Hill when Whiting informed him that the enemy appeared to be withdrawing. Magruder, who had taken up position behind Huger, was now ordered to advance. This was not supposed to be the start of a general advance. But D. H. Hill interpreted it that way, and he also moved forward. The consequence was that, starting at six thirty, he led two hopeless and costly attacks, lasting about half an hour. Hill had not considered Lee's battle plan feasible, and years later he was moved to write:

    "It was not war — it was murder."

Of the 86,784 Confederates engaged, 5,355 became casualties. Considering the dominating character of their artillery, Union losses were unexpectedly high, at 3,214 of 83,345 engaged, with the worst casualties inflicted on Morrel's and Couch's divisions. Fitz John Porter remembered:

    "It was not to be supposed that our men, though concealed by the irregularities of the ground, were not sufferers from the enemy's fire. The fact is that before they exposed themselves by pursuing the enemy, the ground was literally covered with the dead and wounded from dropping bullets and bursting shells and their contents; but they bravely bore the severe trial of having to remain inactive under a damaging fire."

Malvern Hill was undeniably a Union victory. The Army of the Potomac held the position and had completely frustrated the Confederates. Moreover, morale was high, and as Porter mentioned, towards the end some units were so full of enthusiasm that they spontaneously rushed down the hill to pursue the fleeing rebels.

Porter and Hunt advised the obvious; at least holding onto Malvern Hill, and possibly counterattacking. But by now McClellan was totally intimidated by Lee and ordered a renewal of the retreat to Harrison's Landing. Withdrawing from a victory instead of exploiting it, the Union army's' morale plummeted.

By dawn of 2 July, the Army of the Potomac had reached Harrison's Landing. The land was low and sodden from the rain that had plagued the campaign, but it was a secure position, of the sort advised by Lincoln, and the channel was wide enough for supply boats, a distinct advantage over the alternate site of City Point. The boats began arriving with the stores taken from White House Landing, and the army consolidated its position. The Seven Days were over, and so was the Peninsular Campaign.

The Seven Days was a nearly unbroken string of Southern miscues and failures. Yet despite tactical ineptitude on the part of his subordinates and a consistent paucity of good staff work, Lee accomplished his strategic goal of relieving the pressure on Richmond, and driving away McClellan.

McClellan in the Peninsula

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