For the Union, 1861 was a year of disillusionment. First there was the "Forward to Richmond!" brand of enthusiasm and overconfidence, and short enlistment periods. Then came Bull Run and Big Bethel, and the stark revelation that amateur soldiers and mediocre commanders would not prevail. One result was the promotion of George Brinton McClellan to command the forces defending Washington, and ultimately to the overall command of the Union armies. Only thirty-five years old when he arrived, McClellan was an overachiever. He had graduated second in his West Point class of 1846, followed by distinguished service in the Mexican War, and a year spent observing European armies, including time in the Crimea. In 1855 he resigned from the army for a second, equally successful career in railroading. McClellan was vice president of the Illinois Central railroad, where he became acquainted with its legal counsel, Abraham Lincoln. When war broke out, McClellan was in Cincinnati and working as president of the Eastern Division of the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad, earning the princely sum of $10,000 a year. First Command West Point-educated officers were eagerly sought by the state governors, on whose shoulders fell most of the burden of raising the huge volunteer armies needed for the conflict. The situation called for professionals, not the well-meaning , dedicated but amateur leaders prevailing in state militias. Governor Andrew G. Curtin offered McClellan command of Pennsylvania's volunteers. On his way to accept, McClellan stopped in Columbus in answer to Ohio Governor William Dennison's request for advice. Dennison was extremely impressed and offered McClellan command of his Ohio's troops. He accepted. McClellan faced a difficult task. Organization, weapons and training facilities were in very short supply. But McClellan was a superb organizer with an undeniable talent for rendering order out of chaos, and he was successful in turning his men into an army. Ohio regiments figured heavily in the effort to secure West Virginia, a hotbed of Unionist sentiment, and McClellan commanded the effort. He gained control of the area quickly, winning the minor victory of Rich Mountain ten days before the Union disaster at Bull Run. But to the victory-starved government and people of the North, any win was good enough, and McClellan was brought to Washington. Forging A Sword Bull Run had left the army in a mess, now it was up to McClellan to clean it up. Again his genius for organization manifested itself. Ruthlessly and effectively, he turned a beaten and undisciplined rabble into the Army of the Potomac. At the time he was the object of enormous public confidence, which left him more than a little incredulous. The day after arriving, McClellan wrote his wife: "I find myself in a new and strange position here: President, cabinet, Gen. [Winfield] Scott, and all deferring to me. By some strange operation of magic I have become the power of the land." This faith also permeated his army. McClellan kept the proper distance from the enlisted ranks, and came down hard on the worst infractions, but the soldiers invested their "Little Mac" with a deep respect and affection that would endure longer than his command. Yet for all the adulation lavished on the "Young Napoleon," not all was well. All of his initial problems stemmed from the chain of command and his relations with it. Opposing many of McClellan's efforts was the general in chief of the army, Winfield Scott. The "Anaconda Plan" for dividing the Confederacy along river lines and choking it off with a naval blockade was his idea, demonstrating that Scott was still an excellent strategist. Behind him was a celebrated career reaching back to the War of 1812, and attaining its apex with the defeat of Mexico in 1847. Scott was the premier soldier of his time. However, that time was long past, and Winfield Scott was not the same general who staged the invasion at Veracruz and the march on Mexico City. Old, infirm, obese and reactionary, he was by no means the man to lead the United States in a murderous war with itself; a fact he was slow to recognize. Inevitably the old war-horse and the Young Napoleon clashed. Under pressure Scott retired on 1 November 1861 , and was replaced by McClellan. It was a bitter conflict between the two generals, though much of it evaporated when McClellan personally saw Scott off at the train station, a gesture of respect that the former commander visibly appreciated. McClellan's dealings with Republican politicians had no such denouement. He increasingly looked down on Lincoln as an unworthy commander in chief. His attitude towards his boss was that Lincoln was little more than a bumpkin with a large supply of amusing but progressively annoying stories. This corresponded with a widespread perception that Lincoln was a piteous figure who, try as he might, could never understand the principles of war. On at least two occasions McClellan snubbed Lincoln unforgivably, although the President did not react with the rage that the general deserved. Relations with Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton were even worse. A Democrat like McClellan, Stanton viciously attacked the Administration and the Republican Party in private. McClellan related Stanton's favorite term for Lincoln: "He never spoke of the President in any other way than as 'the original gorilla'..." Stanton would eventually become part of the triumvirate, with Lincoln and Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles, that engineered victory. This did not necessarily mean that he had any visible system of ethics. Stanton was a power-hungry, cynical conniver who ingratiated himself with McClellan solely so the celebrated general could help him get more power. After the corruption of Secretary of War Simon Cameron was discovered, resulting in his exile as Minister to Russia, Stanton used McClellan and his support to gain the War Department for himself. Stanton took office on 20 January 1862. Nine days later McClellan wrote to Colonel Randolph Marcy, his father-in-law and later chief of staff: "I am getting on very well — Stanton's appointment has helped me infinitely so far, & will still more in the future." These were virtually the last kind words that George B. McClellan would ever have for Stanton. Once he had the position he wanted, Stanton become so cold, distant and insulated that McClellan could not even conduct normal business with him. Worse, Stanton neglected no opportunity to undermine the general's standing with the President, going so far as to question McClellan's loyalty to the Union. From that point, McClellan's relations with his superiors were irredeemably poisoned, though McClellan's own growing arrogance had much to do with it as well. After all, he was called the "Young Napoleon" so much he probably started to believe it. That McClellan saw enemies in Washington as determined as those in Richmond provided the contexts for one of the most bitter and memorable issues of the Civil War. That was McClellan's famous inertia. Feet of Lead McClellan had forged a sword of the Army of the Potomac, and as reinforcements arrived it continually grew stronger. This was widely apparent, as was the corollary — that he should take that sword and wield it. Instead, he refused to take the war to the enemy. Figuring heavily in his reasoning in 1861 and early 1862 were inflated reports of Confederate strength. This was due to the intelligence gathered by Allan Pinkerton's spy network, an impressive organization that yielded highly detailed reports. However, they were usually wrong, typically doubling the number of troops facing McClellan. He in turn accepted them uncritically. For example, McClellan was certain that General Joseph Johnston occupied the old Bull Run battlefield with between 70,000 and 105,000 troops, all highly proficient and craving Northern blood. Actually, the figure never reached 48,000, and Joe Johnston had no faith that his troops could stand up to the superior Union numbers. Second, McClellan had a plan for an audacious and potentially decisive offensive which, unfortunately, he could not implement immediately. He kept in mind the principle of the objective, writing to Stanton on 3 February 1862: "I do not wish to waste life in useless battles, but to strike at the heart." However, there was a feeling that perhaps McClellan's distaste for battles was not only limited to the useless ones. To Strike At The Heart McClellan's strategic plan was rooted in a cabinet meeting he attended a day or two after arriving in Washington. A briefing was given by Colonel Rush Hawkins of the 9th New York Infantry, on the amphibious seizure of Hatteras Inlet, in which he had participated. Afterward McClellan called Hawkins over and asked him questions, not about Hatteras Inlet but about conditions at Hampton Roads. The young colonel had already told General John Wool, commander of the Federal garrison at Fort Monroe, that an army should be landed there to push on Richmond from the east. Hawkins quickly sketched out a map of the area, including roads on which to march, and how gunboats on the York and James Rivers could provide flank security. Hawkins' proposal dovetailed with both McClellan's reluctance to frontally engage Johnston and his belief that sea power, if properly employed, could decisively turn the enemy flank. With one brilliant maneuver Richmond could be taken and Johnston compelled to retreat, at a minimal cost in Union lives. However, McClellan quickly parted company with Hawkins regarding the site of the landing, as he preferred Urbanna on the Rappahannock, or alternatively Mobjack Bay. I Have A Plan, Trust Me McClellan refused to tell his superiors anything concrete. Instead, he confided that he had a plan — a good one. His superiors should trust him completely he said without worrying about the details. His ostensible reason for this inordinate secrecy was a concern for security, but McClellan's method was tactless and not conducive to the trust that he was demanding. Eventually he informed Lincoln and Stanton of his intentions. Both men advocated a more conservative overland advance. A stalemate ensued, and despite both sides' intentions to the contrary, not much happened for a long time. This did nothing to relieve the pressure, both from the government and the public for McClellan to take the offensive immediately. Particularly galling, the Confederates had emplaced batteries on the lower Potomac to interdict river traffic, thereby cutting off Washington from the sea. In October 1861 the navy reported that the Potomac would have to be closed to traffic, save that escorted by heavy warships. The clamor to do something, anything, was heightened by the onset of rampant disease and death in the Army of the Potomac's ranks that Fall. "I Would Like to Borrow The Army" By New Year's Day 1862, Lincoln's demands for action, not just interminable drill and training, had neither diminished nor come any closer to satisfaction. The Army of the Potomac had 191,480 effectives, and if as many as 58,000 were retained for purely defensive purposes, that still left over 133,000 to take the offensive. Lincoln said on New Years Day: I am in great distress. If something is not done soon, the bottom will be out of the whole affair, and if General McClellan does not want to use the army, I would like to borrow it, provided I could see how it could be made to do something. Nor was Stanton pleased. A few days after becoming Secretary of War, he caustically told Charles A. Dana of the New York Tribune that the army "has got to fight or run away... the champagne and oysters on the Potomac must be stopped." To his credit, Stanton's first goal was a consensus on strategy. At his urging, McClellan met with Lincoln, finally revealing his Urbanna landing strategy. McClellan and Lincoln were both stubborn men, and Lincoln was as convinced of the utility of an overland advance as McClellan was of the need for a combined operation. Instead of taking such exchanges of view as a normal part of his job, McClellan came away from the meeting resentful that his commander in chief would presume to direct military strategy. McClellan also proposed an even more radical plan to shift as many as 70,000 men and 250 guns to Kentucky, taking command there personally and marching into Tennessee to cut the Confederacy's main east-west rail line. McClellan's presence, presumably, would also serve to prod Generals Henry Halleck and Don Carlos Buell into acting in concert. However, events in the West began to move without McClellan and besides, Lincoln was adamant that an offensive should be staged in the East. McClellan's Plan The general stubbornly stuck to his amphibious plan. The first units would be embarked at Annapolis for the Virginia coast. This, he reasoned, would be sufficient to induce the Confederates to give up their Potomac River batteries, allowing Union reinforcements to reach the beachhead more directly. Also McClellan felt he could count on the radically innovative ironclad USS Monitor, then undergoing trials at New York, to help open the river. The major flaw in the scheme was that Johnston had to be completely fooled, so that the Federals could reinforce Urbanna quicker than the Confederates could mass against it. McClellan fretted that Johnston would perceive a threat to his position at Manassas and Centreville and retreat prematurely. Hence McClellan's reluctance to become active before he was ready to implement his seaborne flanking move. Lincoln and Stanton reluctantly approved the scheme. However, they still wanted Manassas occupied before the Army of the Potomac embarked. McClellan rightly saw this as incompatible with his plan, and the deadlock between the civilian and military leaders did not end, it just evolved. A Question of Sealift By no stretch of the imagination did the navy have the ships necessary to carry the army. The task of securing transport from the civilian sector fell to Assistant Secretary of War John Tucker. Tucker chartered 113 steamers, 188 schooners and 88 barges, Many of them were old and dilapidated, some even pulled out of retirement. The average cost to operate the larger ships was $215.10 per day, with the smaller ones going for $14.27 to $24.45. In early March the first vessels made their way down the East Coast to Chesapeake Bay, while at Washington, carpenters waited to make the necessary modifications and repairs. Lincoln ordered McClellan to march on Centreville, a move the general dreaded. Just as he was about to move, on 8 March Lincoln ordered the reorganization of the Army of the Potomac into corps. Among all the military experts consulted by the President, opinion was unanimous that corps should be formed. McClellan himself agreed, but had refused to actually organize them until combat revealed which of his officers were best suited to that level of command. This presented Lincoln with the unpalatable prospect that, in the climactic battle before Richmond, McClellan would have the impossible task of directly commanding as many as 130,000 men in twelve divisions. Army Reorganization On the Eve of Battle Rather than wait for McClellan to make up his mind, Lincoln did it for him. Immediately formed were: I Corps under Major General Irvin McDowell; II Corps, commanded by Brigadier General Edwin V. Sumner; III Corps, Samuel P. Heintzelman, and IV Corps, under Brigadier General Erasmus D. Keyes. Provision was made for the creation of V Corps under the politically appointed general Nathaniel P. Banks. James S. Wadsworth was named military governor of the District of Columbia. McClellan objected strongly to Lincoln's order, which was calculated, as much as anything, to remind McClellan who was ultimately in charge. McClellan wired Stanton that he would either have to disregard the command, or delay his move to Bull Run. Choosing to march, Stanton gave McClellan a reprieve on the corps' organization. Wadsworth's appointment was also distasteful to McClellan. A wealthy New York landowner, Wadsworth had no military training. McClellan had no one but himself to blame. Nearly two months earlier he had promised this "very delicate & responsible" position to Major General John A. Dix, one of the Administration's first military appointees, and an energetic and able administrator who commanded respect. Possibly due to overwork and the effects of a bout with typhoid over the winter, McClellan never followed up this or other good proposals, such as an amphibious attack to retake Norfolk and neutralize the Confederate ironclad Virginia being built there. The "Conquest" of Centreville At this point, McClellan appeared capable of doing nothing right, except maybe in the eyes of his devoted soldiers. He occupied Centreville and Manassas Junction on 11 March unresisted. Fearing the 112,000 troops with McClellan, Joe Johnston had pulled back behind the Rappahannock, leaving behind a huge mass of debris and defensive works. Abandoned as well were intact huts and large stocks of rations, accumulated with difficulty by the Confederacy. This was no victory, and exposed McClellan to scorn and ridicule. Exposed was a Southern ruse of putting logs, painted black, in gun emplacements to make the position look stronger. The press roundly castigated McClellan for being frightened by these "Quaker guns." Johnston's withdrawal was calculated to put him in a more central location, from where he could respond flexibly to a Union offensive. It also forced McClellan to abandon his planned landing at Urbanna and substitute one at Fort Monroe, as originally conceived by Hawkins. It was McClellan's least favorite alternative, but one he still preferred to marching overland to Richmond. The Ironclads Appear The same weekend brought more bad news. The Virginia sortied to savage the Union blockaders in Hampton Roads, threatening the naval superiority on which McClellan depended. The USS Monitor already on her way, was nearly swamped in the Atlantic. The first reports of the Virginia's success caused enormous consternation in Washington, a panic that particularly affected Stanton, who expected the Confederate ironclad to come up the Potomac and shell the city at any moment. He predicted that every wooden ship in the US Navy was vulnerable, and that the Virginia, improvised as she was, could lay waste to every Northern coastal city with her guns. By contrast Navy Secretary Gideon Welles kept his nerve, maintaining his faith in the Monitor, and believing that the Virginia's deep draft alleviated much of her threat. When the Virginia next sortied she was met by the Monitor, and the first combat between armored warships was fought to a draw. Nonetheless, as long as Norfolk remained in enemy hands and the Virginia had a harbor from which to operate, simply by existing she denied valuable naval options to the Union. Commander of the Army of the Potomac, ONLY On 11 March McClellan suffered a very personal and galling setback. At that day's cabinet meeting Lincoln announced that he was removing McClellan as general in chief. Halleck would assume command in the West, but there would be no overall commander. Lincoln and Stanton would direct the war effort themselves. The intent was probably to limit McClellan's focus to the main effort, inferring that the top command would be his again after its conclusion. "Little Mac" saw the decision as one more intrigue by his enemies. It galled since he read about it first in a newspaper, before he could be informed personally, as Lincoln had instructed. Lincoln's messenger was eventually able to mollify McClellan and assure him that he still had the President's full confidence. But the damage had already been done, and even Lincoln's greatest admirers must admit that his Administration had made a fundamental mistake in how it handled McClellan. However, the Union remained committed to McClellan's plan, though Lincoln established important conditions for the move. First, and most important, the Army of the Potomac was not to leave until sufficient forces could be left behind to keep Washington totally secure. Second, no more than two corps of about 50,000 men were to embark until the lower Potomac had been cleared of enemy batteries, or the President approved. This point was largely moot because Johnston's retreat had also entailed the abandonment of the troublesome batteries. Third, and also partly irrelevant, the move was to begin on 18 March, with close army-navy cooperation to seize or drive off the batteries. That these batteries were neutralized was extremely important. With the lower Potomac open and safe, the army could sail straight down the river, and not have to march to Annapolis first. Ready to Move McClellan called a conference of his corps commanders at Fairfax Court House on 13 March, and revealed the details of his final plan. The Army of the Potomac would sail from Washington and Alexandria, while an auxiliary naval force would silence the Confederate batteries on the York. Stanton gave McClellan the final orders from Lincoln; leave a force at Manassas Junction, provide security for the capital, and move the Army of the Potomac to Fort Monroe or closer to Richmond. Moreover, [A]t all costs move the remainder of the army at once in pursuit of the enemy by the same route. The President made it clear that he wanted action. McClellan in the Peninsula McClellan in the Peninsula: Background and Organization McClellan in the Peninsula: The Advance up the Peninsula McClellan in the Peninsula: The Seven Days McClellan in the Peninsula: Conclusions Back to Cry Havoc #12 Table of Contents Back to Cry Havoc List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1995 by David W. Tschanz. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com