The Egyptian Army
in 1973

Overview

by Greg Novak

It is often forgotten that the nadir of the Egyptian Army did not occur in the aftermath of the "Six Day War of 1967". Rather, the failure of the Egyptian Army and Air Force in the Fourth War, the so called "War of Attrition", marked the low point for the Egyptian military establishment. Though holding all of the advantages at the start in March of 1969, when that conflict ended in August of 1970, it was apparent all too apparent that once again that Egypt had been defeated.

In September of 1970, upon the death of President Nassar, Anwar el-Sadat succeeded to the post of President of the nation of Egypt. Though considered as a stand in at first, over the next two years he consolidated his hold on the government of Egypt. Sadat was a trained military leader who had a keen understanding of the situation that he faced.

As long as Egypt remained in a state of "No Peace, No War", her economic and other problems could not be dealt with by the government due to the amount of the GNP earmarked for defense. At the same time, no Egyptian leader could go begging hat in hand to the Israelis asking for an end to the conflict. Sadat's solution to this dilemma was built upon another of his insights -- that in a world divided into US and Soviet camps, no client state would be allowed to fall by its sponsor. If any of the client states was in danger of total defeat, that country could count on its sponsor pushing though a cease fire though the UN ending the conflict.

Thus, neither Egypt or Israel could "lose" the war in the traditional sense. Sadat realized that if the Egyptian Army could make a creditable showing, peace would follow.

To make a creditable showing, the Egyptian Army needed to be rebuilt and rearmed. When the Soviet Union refused to deliver the requested supplies, fearing that the such deliveries would endanger detente between the United States and the Soviet Union, Sadat responded by expelling the Soviet Union's advisors from Egypt in midsummer of 1972. Though on paper this action should have crippled his armed forces, in reality it had the opposite effect. Eager to keep Egypt as an ally, the Soviet Union commenced a major arms build up, going so far as to cause Sadat to remark to a friend early in 1973 that "they are drowning me in new weapons".

When Sadat announced his plans for a new war to his military staff, he found that with few exceptions that they were opposed to any such venture. They in turn argued for a war that would be fought sometime late in the decade, as no conflict should be fought until Egypt had a guaranteed chance of winning control of the skies from the Israeli Air Force. Since they could not make any prediction as to when that would be, Sadat ended up cleaning house, and appointing a new military leadership that would follow his plan.

His two key leaders were General Ahmed Ismail, who was appointed Command in Chief and Minister for War, and Lieutenant General Saad el-Shazli, who was serving as Army Chief of Staff. The roles of the two men are somewhat complicated by the fact that Shazli went into self imposed exile after the war in opposition to Sadat, and Ismail died of cancer in 1974. Shazli has been willing to take the credit for what went right, and quick to assign the blame to others for what went wrong. However it is apparent that Ismail provided the leadership and direction for the conflict, while Shazli was the "nuts and bolts" expert who trained the Egyptian Army for its new mission. Together the two men planned for an Egyptian crossing of the Suez Canal under the code name of Operation Badr.

The "Six Day War" had started a housecleaning of those military officers who been appointed to their posts for political reasons. The sweep continued after the "War of Attrition", which gave the Egyptian Army a solid professional base for the first ti~ie in the Arab-Israeli wars. College and university graduates were called up for service for the first time, and provided the Egyptian Armed Forces with a new source of badly needed officer material. The difference in the status of the officers and enlisted men so noted by the Israeli's in the "Six Day War" disappeared from view.

The nature of the rank and file changed as well for the Egyptian Armed Forces. Instead of the ill educated "fellah" who were all too unwillingly drafted into service, the increasing urbanization of Egypt gave the Egyptian Army a class of conscripts who had completed secondary school, and who were at home in a world of machines. A system of reservists was set up for the first time, which allowed for the expansion and contraction of the Army. Training was specific to the task that would be needed for the operation, and a series of pamphlets were written and issued explaining to each soldier what would needed of each.

Ismail's plan was not one of sweeping movements deep into Israeli territory designed to overrun Israel itself, but a simple straightforward one that would get his troops across the canal and into a position they could hold until the cease fire. His assault force was to be made of five reinforced infantry divisions, the majority of whose infantry was still on foot. Once across the Canal, the troops would bypass the Israeli emplacements, and spread out, linking up on a wide front covering the length of the canal. Egyptian commando and ranger formations would move into the Israeli rear, in an effort to harass and delay the Israeli reinforcements as they moved forward,

It is forgotten today that the Suez Canal was regarded by the military experts of the day as a major military obstacle, almost impassable in nature. With the canal 180 meters wide at its narrowest point, and 13 to 15 meters deep, the tidal ebb and flow made crossing difficult at best. Added to that was the fact that the banks of the Canal were lined with cement to a height of six feet, preventing amphibious vehicles from entering and leaving the Canal except at prepared points. On the Israeli side, the sand rampart created when the canal was built provided a further obstacle, with the Israelis building it up where ever needed. The efforts of the Egyptians to build up their bank in return during the War of Attrition meant that breaches in these sand ramparts would have to be made on both sides of the canal during any attempted crossing. If the breaches were made on the Egyptian side prior to the start of the war, they would be automatic targets for Israeli artillery, thus nothing could be done until the start of the war. The estimate of Israeli Intelligence that it would take 24 to 36 hours for the Egyptian Army to bridge the canal was considered as optimistic by most observers.

The Egyptian Army trained for its new mission under the principle of "hide everything in plain sight". Midway down the Suez Canal, the island of El Ballah divides the Canal into north and south bound passing lanes. The island, directly under the guns of the Israeli strongpoints on the east bank of the canal became the Egyptian Army's Amphibious Training Ground. Units were sent out to the island, and practiced crossing the Canal back into Egypt. Everything that happened on the first day of the war, from the use of assault boats to bridging drills to even the use of water cannon to create the needed breaches was practiced in full view of the Israeli Army.

In fact, right up to the start of the war, the Egyptian Army created breaches in their rampart, and then filled them up on a regular basis. To the Israeli observers, such actions became routine and a regular part of life along the canal.

The Egyptian Army started its crossing of the Canal at 2:05 PM on October 6th, at a time of slack tide. By 8p.m. some 80,000 men had crossed the Canal, though only one of the Bar Lev strongpoints had fallen. The Israeli tank companies that attempted to make contact with remaining strongpoints were beaten back for the most part by the Egyptian infantry, though some units did manage to break through to the Canal. Protected by their entrenchments, the positions on the Bar Lev line fought on but found themselves either being evacuated, or cut off from the Israeli Army.

Following close behind the first waves, the Egyptian engineers built three types of bridges for each of the five assaulting divisions - two light assault bridges for personnel, a light vehicle bridge, and two heavy vehicle bridges, as well as operating vehicle ferries and assault craft. The construction of multiple bridges not only gave the Egyptians the additional means by which to cross the canal, but also gave the bridges better protection from Israeli artillery and air attack. (From a distance it proved difficult to tell the difference between a fight and heavy bridge.) As the war went on, the Egyptian engineers proved adept with moving the bridges about each sector, so that the location of a heavy bridge one day was the location of a light bridge the next.

Expecting some 10,000 dead on the first day, the Egyptian Army was amazed at the lightness of their losses. The two elements that were hurt the worse during the opening attacks were the Rangers, and the 130th Amphibious Brigade. The Rangers attempted to hurt the Israeli reservists as they moved forward, with mixed results. Some Ranger units were destroyed en route or in action, while others remained in action within the Israeli rear for most of the war. Considering the numbers of Israeli troops that were deployed against them, the Rangers did succeed in their mission of slowing down an Israeli response to the crossing of the canal.

The 130th Amphibious Brigade was an interesting attempt by the Egyptian Army to outflank the Israeli position. Due to the fact that the Suez Canal passes through the Great Bitter Lake, the sand ramparts that mark so much of the Canal do not exist there. The 130th Brigade was giving the mission of sailing across the lake at the start of the war, and penetrating into the Israeli rear with the hopes of holding Gildi Pass. The attempt failed when the first elements of the brigade, armed with PT-76 tanks, encountered Israeli Centurions and M-60's just west of the pass and were driven back.

The expansion of the bridgeheads continued under the control of the 2nd and 3rd Armies. (Contrary to what was reported at the time, there was no lst Army in the Egyptian organization - the chain of command ran from GHQ to the two arniies to the divisions.) In keeping with Ismail's plan, the Egyptian Army made no attempt to push the Israeli's back into the foothills of the Sinai during the early stages of the war. The collapse of the Syrian Army on the Golan prompted the Egyptian Army to undertake an advance in an attempt to draw off Israeli troops.

The attack failed and was quickly followed by an Israeli counterstroke which struck at the hinge between the 2nd and 3rd Army. The Israelis penetrated to the Suez Canal, and managed to cross a small force, which was continually reinforced. Attempts by the 2nd and 3rd Army to close the corridor failed, and the Israeli troops on the west bank of the Canal began to overrun the SAM belt, opening the way for the Israeli Air Force to reenter the fray.

At this point in the conflict, a difference of views between General Ahmed Ismail and Lieutenant General Saad el-Shazli resulted in Shazli being removed from command, Shazli wanted to withdraw armored units from the east bank of the canal, and use them to contain and destroy the Israeli troops on the west bank. Even though this might put the forces on the east bank at risk, Shazli was concerned about the west bank and a possible Israeli drive into Egypt. For Shazli, the solution called for a clear cut military victory of the Egyptian Army, even if it meant risking the loss of the east bank.

Ismail refused to issue that order, fearing that any withdrawal from the east bank would demoralize the Egyptian soldiers there, and allow the Israeli forces in turn to destroy the bridgeheads of the 2nd and 3rd Armies. Ismail's plan called for the forces on the east bank to try and cut the Israeli supply line, while all possible remaining forces from GHQ Reserve were to be used to contain the Israeli bridgehead. A cease-fire from the UN would then be arranged, giving the Egyptian Army the political victory that they needed. When Sadaat was presented with the two choices, Ismail's plan was adopted, and Shazli was removed from command.

By the time that the cease fire was accepted by the Israelis, the 3rd Army found itself cut off, but still holding its position. The Egyptian Army won its campaign in that Anwar el-Sadat was given the political capital he needed to allow him to make peace with Israel, starting with the reopening of the Suez Canal in 1975, and ending with the signing of a Treaty of Peace in 1979.

Though Sadat was assassinated in 1981, the peace between Israel and Egypt has held fast these last two decades, and in 1990-1991, the Egyptian Army found itself serving as part of the Arab coalition against Iraq.

The Egyptian Army in 1973

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© Copyright 1997 by Greg Novak.
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