Tactics
by Dick Zimmermann
A party (25mm RSMs) of Indians seconded by a few Canadian militiamen led by an officer of Les Compagnies Franches de la Marine have just ambushed a company of Highland grenadiers of the 42nd Regiment (30mm Surens) which had been marching through the woods in two parallel columns. The 42nd has been properly ordered to turn to face the threat and charge, as you see, since the officer knows the Indians will not stand a charge. The Native Americans would never think of recklessly remaining in position regardless of the good cover they have. Instead, they will soon vanish to the rear hoping the Highlanders will become overextended so that attacks can be planned later versus the flanks or versus Isolated soldiers. The Indians may even plan to decoy the Scots into an ambush waiting just to the rear. Brave stands and counter-charges in the European mould are unworthy alien concepts to the redmen and should be to wargamers commanding them as well unless the odds are dearly In favor of the painted warriors. Miniatures are from the collection of Bill Protz photographed by Bill Kojis. Theme Editor - Bill Protz. We have an enormous record of Indian raids, sometimes on a colony by colony basis, where small numbers of Indians struck quickly and then disappeared. While an attempt at providing a simple summary of these tactical practices has some danger attached to it (the problem of oversimplification), there is merit in making the attempt. From reviewing the journals of the period and significant secondary sources, we can make some valid statements: 1. Indians regularly sought to surprise their opponents. If they could secretly strike at enemy encampments or units on the march, they would do it. At times, Indians would rather avoid a fight if the element of surprise was no longer present. 2. There was no preference for day or night attacks, both being used with equal degrees of success or failure. For obvious reasons, smaller raids would often occur at night and the large fire fights or battles were daylight affairs. 3. Indians generally avoided large scale charges. Once they sprang a trap, they continued a firefight until their opponents retreated or they themselves quit the fight. 4. There was clear tactical control exercised by Indian leaders or white leaders that accompanied them. In combat, Indians generally did not act as an ill disciplined mob but exercised intelligent judgment in advancing, retreating or taking up a new position. 5. In general there was no strong pursuit off the field if victorious. Indians were content to fight one engagement, collect their spoils and go home. Strength of War Parties Several sources are useful here. In Pennsylvania from 1755-58, Sipe lists in numbing detail (where records exist) each raid perpetrated in Pennsylvania by Indians. In 14 of these; Indian numbers are given: Seven actions involve from 3-20 Indians, 3 record 20-30, 2 record 30 Indians and the last four are given as groups of 60,100,130 and 150 Indians. The group of 150 was subdivided into 15 groups. of about 10 men each (Sipe, pp. 205-381). Kercheval lists similar raids in Virginia. In that colony numerous groups of 68 Indians carried out raids and the largest of them involved 60-80 Indians (pp. 72-108). For Montcalm's expedition. against Ft. William Henry, Bougainville lists a total of 1799 Indians although he notes that many left as the expedition proceeded. Forty different groups. are listed ranging in number from 5-258 (Bougainville, pp. 150-51):
5-20 : 10 21-30 : 7 31-60 : 13 61-90 : 6 over 91 : 4 These examples show clearly that Indian war parties or tribal groups of under20 men were quite common and that war parties of over 60 were far less common. Indians versus fortified Places The "normal" Indian tactics have been described earlier. However, history is full of the unusual and this section notes some of the strange incidents that make this period so fascinating. In Pennsylvania, many settlers singled out a home in a community to be fortified, i.e., walls, doors and shutters reinforced and loopholes cut for defensive musketry. On three different occasions, Indians successfully attacked and carried fortified homes (Sipe, pp. 286,297 and 381). On another occasion, Indians assaulted but failed to take a fortified house. On one occasion, August 1, 1756, Capt. Jacobs, a Delaware Chief, accompanied by the French, assaulted and carried Ft. Granville, a small fort. Sixty Delawares set fire to the logs and after it burned, they captured 29 adults and children who were all killed or carded off into captivity (Sipe, p. 294). From June 3 to August 9,1760, Cherokee Indians besieged Ft. Loudon in South Carolina - seven hundred Indians keeping the fort cutoff from outside assistance until it surrendered on August 9. Twenty-five to forty men were killed, 3 women and several others were wounded and 200 soldiers were taken prisoner (Corkran, p. 218). At one point there was some discussion of the fort's artillery being dragged off for another siege at Ft. Prince George. This plan never came to fruition, but the threat certainly seemed real enough for a time (Corkran, p. 221). CONCLUSIONFrom all of this information, it's clear that Indians played an enormously important role during the French and Indian War. They were probably the most important fact or in disrupting the early British strategy and promoting French interests. They provided forces for numerous raids and their tactics were varied and successful. From a wargaming perspective, Indians roles in springing ambushes, besieging forts and fighting alongside regulars should be carefully reviewed. More Indians from the French and Indian Wars
French and British Strategy Tactics Major Engagements 1754-60 1768 Populations and Sources Back to Table of Contents -- Courier Vol. VIII No. 4 To Courier List of Issues To MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1988 by The Courier Publishing Company. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com |